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PROLOGUE .  
THE MANY FACES OF THE ERASURE  
 
 
“People don’t understand that citizenship is something different from 
permanent residence” 1 
 
Ana (that is not her real name), was born in Velika Kladuša (now Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 
1958. There she completed her elementary education and vocational training. In 1978 she 
moved to Ljubljana (Slovenia) where she was able to find a job. After only three months, her 
employer asked her to register a permanent residence in Ljubljana because they were going to 
offer her a permanent contract.  
 
Soon after establishing residence in Slovenia, Ana met her future husband and they had three 
children together. After her husband got a civilian job with the military they were able to 
move into a military-owned apartment. In 1990, at the beginning of Slovenian independence 
process, Ana filed for divorce (she said she and her husband just weren’t meant to be because 
they saw the world too differently) and she was given both custody over her children as well 
as the apartment. 
 
In 1991, when she was supposed to apply for citizenship, Ana decided not too, for she was 
told that it was not obligatory. She thought to herself: 
I’ve lived here for so many years, I had permanent residence registered in Ljubljana, my 
children were citizens and Slovenes through their father, and I was part of that family, the 
mother of three children and I had a regular job. ... I couldn’t know that I was going to lose 
my rights if I didn’t take citizenship. 
Indeed, Ana had no way of knowing that her residency status will be invalidated without any 
prior notification. Here is how she recalls the moment she found out she had been erased: 
In 1993 I went to Mačkova Street to get a certificate concerning a shared household which I 
had to submit to the center for social work. The clerk asked me for my personal document. 
When I gave her my ID card, she took it, punched it and instructed me to go to the office for 
foreigners. When I wanted to get the certificate and didn’t get it, I knew that something was 
seriously wrong ... I couldn’t understand what had happened that I was suddenly left without 
permanent residence. Until then, I had obtained and extended all my documents in Ljubljana, 
but when the country became independent this stopped. My passport and driver’s license, both 
                                                          
1
 The case presented here is taken from Kogovšek Šalamon et al. 2010: 251–255. 
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issued in Ljubljana, had already expired by that time. Only then did I begin to understand that 
I no longer had legal status in this country.  
Although she was able to keep the apartment after her divorce, Ana nevertheless was unable 
to purchase it because she had been erased and did not have Slovenian citizenship. After 
realizing that her condition indeed presented a problem, in the summer of 1992 she finally 
applied for citizenship. Ana, however, still could not purchase the apartment – not even on 
behalf of her children who were Slovenian citizens. First of all, she didn’t have any valid 
documents, so she couldn’t obtain a bank loan even though at that time she still had a 
permanent job. The other reason was that the Ministry of Defence, the new owner of the 
apartment, sued her for unpaid rent. The court procedure lasted for seven years, during which 
time the Ministry attempted to evict her. In the end, the Ministry lost the case since the debt 
was accumulated when her ex-husband was the official tenant. 
Ana was deeply aware how lucky she was in retaining her job – and a permanent one at that – 
despite having been erased. The Erasure was nevertheless also felt in this segment of her life:  
The awkward thing was, that without a personal document, I couldn’t withdraw my wages 
which were paid to my bank account. Until 1995 I didn’t have problems because I withdrew 
money from ATMs. The problem emerged when the bank card had to be replaced, and, 
naturally, I had to submit a personal document. I gave my old ID card, but they didn’t 
consider it a valid document. How could I get my wages? 
Agreeing with her employer to be paid “cash-in-hand”, Ana was able to overcome this 
problem as well. But what of it if her salary was so low that it didn’t even allow her to provide 
for her children and herself?  
The pressure under which she had lived was eventually felt by her three children as well. The 
hardship had had an especially profound effect on her older daughter. She  
was really hurting because of this; she quarrelled with everyone, she was angry with the 
teachers, she went totally berserk. Her marks were bad, she barely managed to complete 
elementary education, and she couldn’t enroll anywhere after that. It was difficult for her; she 
wanted to be like her friends, her schoolmates but she couldn’t. When she was in the eighth 
grade she reproached me, saying that I wasn’t able to take care of her, that she didn’t need 
me, and that it was my fault that she couldn’t enroll anywhere. 
 
Although her children were Slovenian citizens through their father and received child 
benefits, Ana herself, even though a single parent, could not obtain any kind of social 
assistance on the account of her “status-less” condition.  
Ana eventually fell ill due to the psychological pressure of living on the edge and without 
valid documents. She was advised by her doctor to take a few months of sick leave, but was 
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rejected by her employer. Unable to keep up with the pressures of the work, Ana eventually 
lost her job. She recalls how terrible her situation was at that time: “the entire right side of my 
body was blocked, my leg, my hand, half of my face – everything was so stiff that I didn’t feel 
anything”. Her condition persisted for several years.  
Throughout all this, many of her friends and family were unaware of her problems and those 
who knew did not provide her with much support. Her brother, for instance told her: 
‘But how come you don’t have a passport? It’s your fault, you could have arranged it. They 
offered citizenship but you didn’t take it!’ 
In 2000, after it was announced that “people without documents and permanent residence who 
had been living here at least from the plebiscite on should go to the Office for Foreigners”, 
Ana finally applied for permanent residence. After more than a year, she finally received it 
and was then able to apply for a Bosnian passport. In 2002 she also got her foreigners ID card: 
“I still have it at home. I was so glad, as if I had been born again, so happy and relieve I 
was,” she says. In 2003, after thirteen years, she finally obtained Slovenian citizenship. 
 
 
“12 Years an Erased”2 
 
Srečka3 was born in Croatia and lived there until her thirteenth birthday when she moved to 
Belgrade (Serbia). Unable to find a stable job there, towards the end of the 1980s she came to 
Slovenia where prospects seemed better. Luckily, her sister was able to get her a job with a 
renowned pharmaceutical company. Srečka registered her permanent residency in Slovenia 
and rented an apartment, one in which she lived for the next 18 years. She considers those to 
have been the best years of her life.  
Things, however, soon turned for the worse. When her company went bankrupt, Srečka lost 
her job. She registered with the Employment Service, but since there were no jobs for her, she 
had to find other ways to survive.  
                                                          
2
 The case presented here is taken from Kogovšek Šalamon et al. 2010:  145–150. The title alludes to Solomon 
Northup's book 12 Years a Slave (1853) 
3
 Srečka is a female name that sounds much like, and alludes to the notion of being lucky (sreča in Slov.). In any 
case, this name in neither the person’s real name. 
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I began to sew, and I was lucky again that a lady who owned a boutique noticed me in a shop. 
... Two years later my son was born. I worked for that boutique right up till he was born and 
later. I worked all day to be able to save money for the one year of maternity leave. Since I 
was registered with the Employment Service, I was insured, so I was entitled to a three-month 
minimal maternity benefit. 
 
When the six-month deadline was established for applying for citizenship, Srečka did not 
hesitate. At the local administrative office, however, they requested that she presents a 
stamped birth certificate as part of her application. Being unable to provide the exact 
requested document, she was put in an unpredictable situation. She found out that she and her 
son had been erased when one day she went to the social services office to sign some papers 
for his kindergarten enrolment. 
 
Even though she had been erased, she was again lucky: on one occasion, a friend of hers who 
was employed at that same administrative office warned her not to go there again, for they 
would destroy her documents. Because of this warning, Srečka was at least able to use her 
existing documents for some time and so resolve various bureaucratic matters with them. But 
in 1993 the documents had to be replaced. 
 
With the employment situation getting worse and resources diminishing, Srečka and her son 
eventually lost their apartment. One day, after again being late with rent, she found that the 
owner had changed the locks so she and her son were literally left on the street. She moved 
around various apartments, never able to pay rent regularly. On one occasion “a friend” took 
her in and Srečka paid for the lodging by cooking, washing and cleaning. But this individual 
mistreated Srečka and did not allow her to use much if any electricity and heating. It was 
during that time that Srečka fell seriously ill.   
I weighed only 52 kilos; I had a high fever and couldn’t get up. That situation lasted one 
month or so. I treated it myself, using echinacea, aspirin, syrups, tablets, herbs and the like.  
 
Back on her feet, Srečka was able to start a business of her own – though it did not produce 
any profit – and was thereafter able to obtain a Croatian passport. Though unable to do the 
same for her son, who was born in Slovenia, and unable to use it in order to obtain Slovenian 
citizenship, Srečka nevertheless felt relieved that she finally had some legal status. 
 
Around 2000 things started looking up again for Srečka. She went to Croatia where she 
obtained a certificate of nationality and a birth certificate. Then she arranged a permanent 
8 
 
residence permit for herself. She could not, however, arrange for her son’s status – only his 
father could do so.  
 
One of Srečka’s biggest problems, even after she had regularized her status, was that although 
she had worked her whole adult life, because of the Erasure, for much of those years she had 
worked illegally and so did not pay her pension contributions. Luckily, she says, she likes 
working and will continue to do so as long as she is able to. 
 
Srečka concludes: 
This story describes only the tip of the iceberg. How much uncertainty there was, how many 
nights without sleep, tears, and suffering because of the lack of money, when I and my son ate 
only spaghetti, alone in this world, without a roof over our heads, without money, without 
insurance and without dignity. For 12 years. 
 
 
A citizen in name only
4
 
 
Rifet moved to Slovenia in 1984 and in 1992 he applied for Slovenian citizenship. He 
received no official reply. An employee at the social care centre where he lived convinced 
him that he would not be granted Slovenian citizenship and should therefore rather obtain a 
Bosnian passport and a temporary residence permit. 
In 1999, when his Bosnian passport expired, he decided to deal with the unresolved matter of 
his Slovenian citizenship.   
When I phoned the office at Beethovenova street, the sector for naturalization, I insisted that 
the clerk check the computer files and find out what my status was. She found me and sent an 
invitation to an interview. The official assured me that I would be granted Slovenian 
citizenship one hundred percent sure and that there was no point in extending the Bosnian 
passport since I was going to get a Slovenian passport.  
One week later, on 14 September 1999, he was informed that his citizenship certificate was 
ready and that it will be sent to him by mail. The very next day Rifet went to see a doctor and 
then met his friend to whom he revealed the happy news. They had a drink and then went 
their separate ways. 
                                                          
4
 The case presented here is taken from Zorn 2003: 125–128. 
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That afternoon I was stopped by two police officers and asked to show my documents. I gave 
them my residence permit and told them that on the previous day I had become a Slovenian 
citizen. I also showed them my Bosnian passport, which indeed had expired. The police officer 
said I had committed an offense. I asked him to call the Ministry of Internal Affairs and check 
my status. It was a working day, Wednesday, half past one, but he did not do it. The officer 
insisted that I had committed a serious offense and that I had to come with him.  
Being in the vicinity of the bar where only minutes before they met, Rifet was able to 
summon his friend back. Even though the latter tried to explain Rifet’s situation to the police 
officers, they did not listen to him. One of them was particularly hostile towards Rifet because 
of his Muslim name. The police officers escorted him to the police station, where he waited 
for more than half an hour before being taken to the police magistrate.   
Here is how the subsequent events unfolded. 
The officer who took the matter in hand first went to the police magistrate alone. The other, 
silent policeman, guarded me outside in the meanwhile. In about ten minutes I was asked to 
come in, and there was a payment order on the table. I cheered up because I thought I was 
only going to pay a fine – although I did not know what for – and that they would let me go. ... 
We went out, the police officers were walking close to me, one at each side, but I did not know 
why. When we stepped into the street, my friend asked them: “What are you doing? Why don’t 
you let him go?” The one who hated me and carried all my papers said: “He doesn’t know 
anything. He was ordered to leave the country under police escort.” The magistrate had not 
told me this, I was told about it by the police officer when we were outside in the street. 
Shocked and in panic, Rifet escaped from the police officers and ran to the nearby pub where 
he grabbed a beer glass and knocked himself with it over the head. Subduing Rifet, the 
officers almost chocked him in the process. He was, as it is, covered in blood due to his self-
inflicted wound. After that, he was brought to the police station where he was beaten, hit in 
the head and had his legs tied. Eventually, he was taken to the hospital for emergency surgery, 
but even there the doctors treated him like some drug addict or a common criminal. As soon 
as they were finished, without being given any pain killers or other further treatment, he was 
taken back to the police station.  
Meanwhile, his friend ran away and was able to inform the care centre employee about what 
had just happened. She immediately called both the police and the interior ministry to enquire 
about Rifet’s situation.  
Back at the police station, Rifet was put back into a prison cell. He recalls being scared and 
fearing for his life. Finally, some higher ranking officers entered. “I was glad”, he says, 
“because I thought that I could finally tell them it was a misunderstanding and that somebody 
would realize my situation. None of them wanted to listen to me. They said they were going to 
take me away”. 
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Instead of being released, however, he was taken to the centre for asylum seekers. He recalls 
it as a terrible “black-and-white place” where people slept on the floor. The next morning, 
however, out of nowhere, a guard came to him, handed him his passport and told him he was 
free to go.  
Rifet recalls: 
One day after the event I received my citizenship certificate and went to the psychiatric 
hospital. I was completely beside myself. I needed half a year to calm down. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
LEGAL EXCLUSIONISM:  A NEW WAY OF LOOKING  AT OLD PROBLEMS  
 
“The law giveth and the law taketh away”.  
(Dayan 2011: 42) 
 
While it may be that we are born and die naked,
5
 we go about our lives wearing innumerable 
clothes, many of them of the legal kind. We dress ourselves as citizens of this or that State; as 
owners of houses, automobiles and company shares; as parents, guardians, spouses or infants; 
as university professors and students; as claimants in courts of law, inmates or protected 
witnesses. Legal vestiges are indeed in great supply. This dissertation is about such legal 
vestiges: it is about what they are, who gets to wear them and why, and about their effects for 
those carrying them; but it is especially about the way law can take them away and about the 
consequences this has on those left without them. 
The particular thing about legal vestiges is that despite being fictitious, they have an 
incredible capacity to radically transform men: “It is as if whenever ‘legal’ is used, it erodes 
not just the customary and normal but the very facts of existence” says one author (Dayan 
2011: 150). By vesting individuals with different outfits, the law often distorts reality: it tends 
to exaggerate certain features of individuals and overlook others, thus creating particular legal 
chimeras. As the same author continues, “[t]his transforming power gives law a reality that 
flies in the face of logic, and the most fantastic fictions are put forth as the most natural, the 
most reasonable thing in the world” (Dayan 2011: 150f).  
On the side of law’s creative transformational power, one very important piece of legal 
clothing is what we usually refer to as legal personhood (also legal subjectivity, legal 
personality etc.). Legal personhood is a particular type of clothing, a kind of second skin that 
transforms real-life human beings into subjects of law – being vested with legal personhood 
makes them into entities that are able to partake in legal relations, acquire rights and duties 
(contractually or otherwise), be held liable for their legal actions etc. Legal personhood is the 
principal legal cover as it is the condition of anyone’s acting in the law. We have seen that 
                                                          
5
 The epigraph is a paraphrase of Job 1:21, where it is said: “And said, Naked came I out of my mother’s womb, 
and naked shall I return thither: the Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord”. 
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besides this one, law gives out numerous other kinds of legal vestiges; while some of them 
will be referred to and discussed in this thesis, given its purported overarching importance, 
legal personhood will be the focus of this dissertation. 
Law’s transformative power, however, doesn’t manifest itself only as the power to create but 
as the power to destroy or take away as well. We see this capacity at work everywhere: when 
citizens are turned into aliens, foreign soldiers into “unlawful enemy combatants”, asylum 
seekers into illegal immigrants and so on. Whether law can also transform persons into non-
persons – and if so, how – will be a key question of this thesis. 
Due to its second-skin-like nature, legal personhood is often taken for granted and 
presupposed in human beings. Unlike with citizenship, or some other such status which can 
be acquired or lost at any moment, it appears today firmly accepted that immediately upon 
their birth, human beings are provided with legal personhood which then attaches to them 
throughout their lives. In this manner, legal personhood is depicted as a (quasi)natural quality 
that pertains to all human beings by virtue of their birth. Historically speaking, however, 
things have not always been this way. Indeed, for much of history, slavery – the legal 
institution sanctioning ownership of men by other men – had been an important part of human 
relations and social organization. In Medieval times, and until not too long ago, it was 
possible to deprive an individual convicted of certain crimes of all his civil rights, making him 
for all effect and purposes dead in the eyes of the law. History is replete with cases of human 
beings being legally considered as non-persons.  
While today slavery and civil death may no longer exist in their original forms as they are 
thought to be contrary to the fundamental principles of civilized nations and universal human 
rights, their transformative-exclusionary spirit lives on, incorporated into new institutes and 
practices that provide for similar results. In the USA alone there are currently more than six 
million individuals deprived of the right to vote under felony disenfranchisement laws on the 
account of having been previously convicted of a crime or for currently serving a prison 
sentence; as of 2017, more than forty men as still being held indefinitely at the Guantanamo 
Bay facility without having been charged of any crime or ever brought to trial – as so-called 
“enemy combatants” their situation has often been described as being in a legal black hole; 
finally, thousands of migrants that are fleeing the impoverished and war-torn countries of 
Africa and the Middle East enter the European Union illegally only to be put in so-called CIE 
(Identification and Expulsion Centres). There they await identification and possible expulsion, 
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living in prison-like conditions, with severe limitations of personal freedoms and other basic 
rights.  
Considering the above said, what can we make of legal personhood? On the one hand we have 
the dogma of legal personhood’s ubiquity and inalienability; on the other hand are examples 
of its relativization, limitation and even deprivation. Which is the real face of legal 
personhood? It is believed that after the atrocities of World War II, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) ushered in the so-called Age of Rights (see Bobbio 2005): a 
radically different political and legal perception of human beings and their legal selves, 
together with a changed perception of the power of States in their confront. In this age of 
human rights triumph, each human being is perceived as uniquely valuable in herself and as 
such endowed with inalienable rights, such as the rights to life, liberty and personal integrity. 
Enslavement, torture, massive deportations, summary justice and the likes are supposed to be 
relicts of a barbarous past. Yet, in light of the above examples (and numerous others could be 
furnished), it is my belief that even today law’s exclusionary power can be harvested in order 
to deprive individuals, fully or partially, of their legal personhood thus producing different 
kind of legal chimeras and even human non-persons. The basic presuppositions of this new 
model, particularly the idea that all human beings unconditionally and inalienably possess 
legal personhood, should therefore be reconsidered. 
Suppose we accept (and there is no reason why we shouldn’t) that legal personhood is the 
condition of one’s acting in the law: of entering into contracts, committing crimes and being 
held responsible for them, seeking judicial protection of one’s property rights against 
unauthorized invasions etc. Suppose also that an individual can, in some way and to some 
degree or even fully, have it taken away (this is a somewhat more problematic claim). What 
would that mean for her? If legal personhood makes one a subject, a someone who can 
actively participate in legal relations, being stripped of it should make one unable to perform 
any act-in-the-law. Does this mean that being left without one’s legal skin results in being 
made a kind of homo sacer (Agamben 1995) – a bare, worthless and dispensable life? Can we 
go so far as to say that someone without legal personhood is relegated to the condition of a 
non-person, thus a thing?  
These are some of the doubts and uncertainties that have sparked my interest in the topic and 
more or less explicitly guide this investigation. These perplexities arose when in my 
investigations, I had come in contact with a series of different material, both academic and 
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lay: a novel telling the story of one teenager from the former Yugoslav republic of Slovenia 
who, due to a series of accidents, was swept into a whirlwind of tragic political events that left 
him excluded from the only community he ever considered his home and consequently 
pushed him into one of the bloodiest wars in modern history (Bauk 2015); the monumental 
On Totalitarianism, where Hannah Arendt so efficiently depicts the plight of stateless 
individuals after World War I and reveals how the loss of a community where one belongs 
and is valued had resulted for these people in a condition that can only be described as one of 
utter rightlessness; the incredible journey of Solomon Northup – as told by the protagonist 
himself in the novel 12 Years a Slave (2014) made famous by a recent homonymous movie –, 
a freeborn black man in the antebellum US, who one day was tricked by a couple of slave 
dealers, kidnapped and sold into slavery. Having spent twelve years as a slave in Southern 
plantations, treated not as a person but as an object and saleable piece of property, Solomon 
was in the end nevertheless fortunate enough to regain his freedom; finally, Primo Levi’s 
(2007 & 2014) first-person testimonies from the Nazi death camps in Se questo è un uomo 
(2014) and I sommersi e i salvati (2007), where every newcomer, who even upon arrival 
possessed little of the distinctive features that make a man what he is, was stripped of even 
those last human characteristics that he still had. The final product of a prolonged process of 
exclusion which began with the infamous Nuremberg Race Law and ended there in the lagers, 
was a figure never before seen: the Muselmänner, says Levi, were “non-men”, figures whose 
“divine spark” was dead within them. “One hesitates to call them living,” says the witness, 
“one hesitates to call their death death, in the face of which they have no fear, as they are too 
tired to understand”. 
These harrowing stories of the “Erasure”, slavery, post-World War I statelessness and the 
extermination of the Jews in the Second World War, even though they occurred far apart in 
time and space and differ in numerous important respects, nevertheless seemed to me to be 
fundamentally related, as if manifestations of the same phenomenon. They all spoke of a 
condition human beings can find themselves by the will of some malicious men in power; a 
condition marked by radical losses of fundamental rights and (above all) the ability to obtain 
anew these rights; a condition in which, so it seems, one losses a part or everything of what 
usually defines one as a person. I propose that this overarching phenomenon, the common 
denominator joining all these cases, should be called “legal exclusionism”. The term should 
be understood roughly as including those legal practices whereby legal instruments, such as 
laws, sub-statutory acts, judicial decisions etc., are employed in order to limit, disfigure, 
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hollow out or take away the legal personhood of an individual. This definition is, of course, 
highly undetermined, but for now it should provide a sufficient idea of what I am talking 
about. 
Can such legal practices as the above ones be described in terms of legal exclusionism? If 
there is some plausibility to this – what are the consequences for our way of thinking about 
law in general? Can we envision measures to eradicate such practices from happening? Or are 
we left with the realization that no matter what we do, how we design our law, there will 
always be the possibility of law being used for exclusionary purposes? This dissertation is 
essentially an attempt of articulating these underlying intuitions and finding some answers to 
the presented perplexities.  
This dissertation, however, is only one part of the larger project on legal exclusionism which I 
am considering and focuses on just one such proposed example of legal exclusionism. The 
Erasure, as the case has come to be known, regards the administrative “handling” of the 
permanent residency status of some twenty-five thousand individuals, who after the 
dissolution of a former common state, found themselves illegal aliens on the territory of a 
newly-established state, where they were trapped in a kind of legal limbo – an unpredictable, 
highly precarious legal situation which for many of them meant a kind of legal death. While 
the specifics of the case will be discussed extensively later on (in Parts II and III of the thesis), 
I should here only add that while the example may not be what I would consider a 
paradigmatic case of legal exclusionism, such as the three cases mentioned earlier, it is 
nevertheless a highly valuable case study for it manifests several pathologies relevant for 
understanding legal exclusionism. 
As will be shown on the example of the Erasure, deprivation, limitation or disfigurement of 
legal personhood can be achieved by various means and to different effect. In this analysis, I 
propose to focus on seeing how legal exclusionism functions if it is perceived as representing 
deviations (violations) from the requirements of formal legality (formal Rule of Law). 
Why formal legality as the means of analysing exclusionist practices? Why not, as it might 
intuitively seem to make more sense, square off these cases against the requirements set by 
international human rights norms? The reasons for my choice of method will be explained in 
due time (see Part III), but let me us quickly mention some of them here: for one, the ideal of 
formal legality regards only the manner in which laws are created and the way they are 
implemented and does not address the question of the content of laws. In this way, focused 
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only on the necessary formal qualities of law, it presents itself both as politically neutral as 
well as indifferent with respect to the historical time and place of the scrutinized cases. This 
quality makes it ideal as an instrument with which we can analyse the cases we have in mind. 
Moreover, as we will later on see, in most cases of legal exclusion, the legal acts behind it are 
seldom directly exclusionary in their content. Rarely will we find such provisions as the one, 
for example, in Art. 1 of the Italian Civil Code, which stated that limitations of the general 
legal capacity due to one’s race are to be determined by special laws (the provision has since 
been abrogated). It is much more common that exclusionary practices are based on ambiguous 
and lacunose legislation that leaves ample space to administrative bodies charged with its 
interpretation and implementation to do so in an unchecked and arbitrary fashion. The chosen 
analytical tools should enable us to detect precisely these exclusionary methods.  
I should conclude this introductory chapter by admitting to some limitations of this work as 
well as pointing to what I believe might be some of its merits.  
Foremost, many of the concepts and theories mentioned or applied in this thesis are not 
rigorously defined or extensively discussed therein; rather, they often remain superficially 
described and unexamined. Similarly, throughout the text, I refer to and make use of the work 
of numerous authors without either extensively presenting their work on the particular issue or 
fully adopting their views. Moreover, regardless the fact that my focus is limited to the 
analysis of the Erasure case only, even within this more limited context several questions and 
different perspectives are raised and not all of them are followed through and examined to the 
end. In general, both temporal and spatial limitations prevented me from being able to 
sufficiently dedicate myself to analysing all the hugely complex issues raised in this 
dissertation. This thesis is therefore but a first, and in many aspects sketchy, attempt at a 
particular type of analysis. Given the embryonic stage of the project, numerous lacunae can be 
identified along the way. 
Despite these (and perhaps other) shortcomings, I believe that the aims this project is persuing 
outweigh its deficiencies. While each of the cases that I mentioned above and which form the 
central reference points of the project (namely, slavery, Jewish extermination and the status of 
refugees) have been examined individually time and again by legal scholars, political 
scientists, sociologist and students of almost every other social science, this project attempts 
for the first time – at least to my knowledge – to bring all of these, and potentially numerous 
other examples, together on the same plane in order to consider them as manifestations of the 
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same broader phenomenon and analyse them using the same set of tools. This thesis and its 
analysis of the case of the Erasure are intended as a first attempt in this direction. While the 
cases themselves and the tools used to analyse them are not in any way new or inventive, the 
manner of looking at them that I proposes – as instances of legal exclusionism from the status 
of legal personhood – are, however, in my opinion, novel. Legal exclusionism is (just) a new 
way of looking at old (and new) problems. 
Hopefully the results of this analysis will provoke further positive implications: above all, 
they may stimulate a critical re-evaluation of some basic presuppositions about the way our 
legal institutions function, starting with human rights; the way law is created and implement,  
especially by the increasingly expanding administrative State apparatus; the way fundamental 
legal statuses are interconnected and mutually dependent, above all the way legal personhood 
is (in)dependent of other statuses and so forth. 
* 
This dissertation has three Parts. In Part I (Legal Status & Legal Personhood), I discuss two 
fundamental legal notions that form the conceptual backbone of the thesis, namely “legal 
status” and “legal personhood”. The Part has two Chapters: in Chapter 2, I analyse different 
conceptions of “legal status”, whereas in Chapter 3, I deal with legal personhood. After 
presenting a possible model for understanding legal personhood as a particular type of legal 
status, I go on to discuss different theories of personhood. Finally, I address a novel proposal 
for expanding the tight ontological dichotomy of persons and things that informs our way of 
thinking about entities both in law and in the world at large.  
In Part II (The Erasure & Legal Personhood), I deal with the Erasure and its consequences, 
especially for the status of a person. In Chapter 4, I provide a reconstruction of the legal 
framework that determined the Erasure – I look at both the relevant legal sources prior to 
Slovenia’s secession from SFRY as well as the laws adopted by the newly formed State 
relevant to the matter. Next, in Chapter 5, I examine the mechanisms of the Erasure: the legal 
tools used in achieving the deprivation of citizenship and residency status of more than twenty 
thousand individuals. Finally, in Chapter 6, I analyse the consequences this deprivation of had 
on the underlying personhood status of the affected individuals. The conclusions regarding the 
precariousness of legal personhood due to its (inter)dependence on such derivative statuses 
leads me to propose (albeit extremely briefly and very sketchily) a somewhat altered manner 
of viewing at and regularizing legal personhood. 
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Finally, in Part III (The Erasure and the Rule of Law), I discuss the Erasure from the 
perspective of the conditions of formal legality (Rule of Law). In Chapter 7, I first analyse the 
requirements of the formal Rule of Law, with particular emphasis given on the last condition, 
namely the congruence between the “law on the books” and the actions of legal officials 
implementing it or rather the “law in action”. In Chapter 8, I confront these requirements with 
the legal sources and actions of authorities in the case of the Erasure.  
In the Conclusion of the thesis I summarize the main findings and attempt to bring together 
the key notions of the investigation. 
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PART  I.   
LEGAL STATUS &  LEGAL PERSONHOOD  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
This first Part of the thesis is dedicated to a discussion and definition of two key notions of 
this thesis, namely the notion of legal status and the notion of a person in law. This Part, then, 
serves primarily as a necessary theoretical basis for our further discussion of legal 
exclusionism, in particular the Erasure as one example this larger phenomenon in law.  
Hereinafter, I will defend the claim that “the person”, in law, is a particular kind of “legal 
status”. Both are indeterminate and ambiguous words and the claim generally lacks sufficient 
context. I will attempt to resolve these problems as I progress.  
In Chapter 2, I will provide a broader perspective on the notion “legal status”. In the 
respective sections of the chapter (2.1. – 2.6.), I will present several conceptions of legal 
status which differ in many aspects, but one in particularly: one of the presented conceptions 
(see 2.1.) views legal status as a condition of an individual, based either on some inherent or 
acquired feature of hers – a condition that significantly characterizes the individual and 
fundamentally determines her legal life. Her status determines what that individual “is”: a 
married woman, an infant, a lunatic etc. On the other hand are conceptions (2.3.–2.5.) that 
explain the notion of status as a formal legal instrument – as an expedient for representing a 
connection between a set of conditioning facts and a set of normative consequences following 
from these facts. In this sense, a legal status is an intermediary legal term, “a vehicle of 
information” or a logical connector. It is a version of this conception of status that I will opt 
for in my thesis (2.6.). In between (2.2.), I discuss Henry Sumner Maine’s famous thesis of 
the development of “progressive societies” from “status to contract”. 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the discussion of the notion of person in law. In the first section 
(3.1.), I propose to view the concept of the person in the formal sense of the term. In laying 
out this view, I stipulate that the content of the status (the normative consequences attached to 
it) can best be described as the set of legal capacities. These capacities importantly determine 
which kinds of entities may reasonably be ascribed the status of a person in law. In order to 
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acquire a better understanding of which entities have traditionally been judged proper 
candidates for legal personhood, and for what reasons, in the next section (3.2.), I examine 
several theories of legal personhood. Here, two large groups of theories are distinguished: on 
the one hand (3.2.1.), there are formalist theories of personhood (also called “the legalist” 
theories) which view the person as merely an instrument that serves to achieve some 
instrumental purpose within the legal system. On this view, the criteria for personhood are 
determined exclusively within (by) the law itself in relation to the immediate need – there are 
no inherent, a priori, extra-legal limits that would determine the extension of the status. On 
the other hand (3.2.2.), there are substantive (also “realist”) theories of personhood that rather 
see the person in law as an expression of an independently and a priori existing real entity 
which is only given its due recognition by the legal system. The latter theories differ amongst 
each other with regard to the exact personhood-determining characteristic, i.e. a physical or 
some other trait that makes an entity deserving of special recognition.  
Finally, in the last section of the chapter (3.3.), I present one possible solution to the problem 
that the standard persons-things dichotomy in law is facing in that it is increasingly unable to 
fit different categories of (new) entities within the rigid confines of the two conceptual 
categories. The proposed expansion of the conceptual universe in respect shows that even 
though the categories of persons and things have been around for millennia, they needn’t be 
seen as immutable and timeless. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
LEGAL STATUS  
 
Taking about “the legal status (of)” is common for lawyers. Nevertheless, the meaning of the 
term is far from being unambiguous, as it is used in different contexts in order to refer to 
sometimes radically different things. Austin even declared that determining what exactly a 
status is to be “the most difficult problem in the whole science of jurisprudence” (Austin 
2002: 190). What are some of the typical uses of the term “legal status” that can be 
encountered in legal discussions? Let us look at some examples.  
Sometimes we come across talk of legal status of particular legal institutes or even entire 
areas of law. For instance, we talk about “the constitutional status of tort law” or “the 
constitutional status of the President of the republic”; some even discuss the “status of law” as 
such in a given society. In such cases, what we are usually referring to is actually the effective 
legal regulation of a particular area of law or legal institute: the current legal arrangement of 
tort law in the UK and its relation to other branches of UK law; the constitutionally 
determined powers and limits thereof of the President in Italy; or, law’s relation to politics, 
science and economy in the contemporary globalized society and the changes it has 
underwent in the last century. Or something of the sorts. 
Historically, the “legal status of” infants, married women, inmates, mentally handicapped, 
slaves and the likes, has been a matter of vivid discussion. When invoked in such cases, it is 
used to refer to specific, oftentimes minority and vulnerable groups of subjects and their legal 
condition. In this context, having a status is a mark of its holders’ legal ab-normality, with 
normality being determined by the legal position of a sui iuris adult man of sound mind. 
Usually two types of questions are discussed in this regard: on the one hand, the criteria 
prescribed for the ascription of a particular status (i.e. who is or can be, legally, an infant, a 
married woman, an inmate, a lunatic etc.; and, on the other hand, the normative consequences 
attached to the status, i.e. the particular rights and obligations, powers, immunities, privileges, 
capacities or incapacities stemming from a given status (in short: rights and duties).  
Finally, the term “legal status” is sometimes used to refer to practically any individual legal 
position of an individual (i.e. a claim, a right, a no-right, an obligation, an (in)capacity etc.),
6
 
                                                          
6
 “Legal position” is here understood in the Hohfeldian sense. See Hohfeld 1923. 
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or a cluster thereof. We thus say, for instance, that the status of parents in modern society in 
respect to their children has changed greatly, with the State imposing ever greater duties upon 
the parents to provide for their children’s well-being; or that obtaining residency status in an 
EU country is becoming increasingly difficult due to the migration crisis; or that chimpanzees 
have the right to personal freedom and, as a consequence, should have the status of (non-
human) persons in law. In this broad sense, the list of legal statuses is potentially limitless. 
These examples should give us an idea of the extent and the diversity of the linguistic field in 
which the expression “legal status” is in play. As far as this thesis is concerned, the first 
proposed use – in the sense of “the state of affairs” regarding a given legal institute or area of 
law – is of no interest. The latter two uses, however, appear more informative. They reveal 
important differences in the use of “legal status” in different historical, doctrinal and 
jurisdictional contexts: for instance, in the first case (the legal status of the ab-normals), status 
appears as something rigid, a permanent or, at least, a long-term condition; in the second case, 
status is used to refer to even very transient, short-termed legal positions.
7
 Moreover, in the 
first case, it appears to regard only specific classes of individuals that in some way escape the 
“normal” condition – the weak or the vulnerable ones; in the second case, rather, “legal 
status” is used quite indiscriminately to denote a legal position which any individual may find 
herself in.  
Provided this very general framework of reference – and before I turn to discussing different 
theoretical conceptions of legal status –, I will only briefly remark on the historical (Roman 
law) origins of the use of the term legal status and then present several different uses of the 
notion in jurisprudential discourse. 
Roman law knew two different, albeit very similar terms for what would today be commonly 
referred to as legal status.  
On the one hand, with regard to an individual, the term was used either to refer to the 
individual’s official rank or his specific legal position (Berger 1953): with regard to the 
community of free men (status libertatis); with regard to the community of citizens (status 
civitatis); and, finally, with regard to the family (status familiae).
8
 An individual could 
possess each status in various combinations with the others: a person that was simultaneously 
free, a Roman citizen and a pater familias (or in any case not subject to a potesta) had what 
                                                          
7
 More on this distinction in Ricciardi 2008: 53 ff. 
8
 Cfr. Marrone 2006: 189. 
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today would be called full legal capacity or full citizenship (civitas optimo iure).
9
 On the other 
hand, any change (mutatio) of the three statuses could either improve one’s legal condition 
(e.g. when a slave became a free man (manumissio)) or deteriorate it – the loss of any of these 
elements was termed capitis deminutio. Given the three statuses, three capitis deminutio were 
possible: i) capitis deminutio minima regarded the loss of status familiae (either due to entry 
into another family or by becoming head of a new family); ii) capitis deminutio media, which 
meant the loss of status civitatis (i.e. loss of citizenship without the loss of freedom, but 
including the loss of membership in family) and iii) capitis deminutio maxima, which marked 
the loss of status libertatis (when an individual became a slave) and included both of the 
lesser losses.
10
  
In its most general sense, the conception Romans had of status – although without calling it 
that way – as the way of being (existing) of a person in front of the legal order (see Crifò 
1960: 129) carried over to our times. Status, even today, regardless its specific meaning, is 
always a relational notion: one holds a particular status only in relation to something or 
someone else. 
More recently, John Salmond in his Jurisprudence (1913) argued that we may distinguish 
four different senses in which the term “status” is used. 
First, as to mean the “legal condition of any kind, whether personal or proprietary”. In this 
comprehensive use, an individual’s status “includes his whole position in the law – the sum 
total of his legal rights, duties, liabilities, or other legal relations, whether proprietary or 
personal, or any particular group of them separately considered” (Salmond 1913: 210; 
emphasis mine). Examples of such uses of status include that of a landowner, a trustee, a 
solicitor and so forth.  
In this most general sense of the term, having a status of any kind indicates that the individual 
stands in a certain relationship with the law (hence, it is a relational concept). It is due to this 
relationship that the individual is considered a person in law. This, in turn, means that the 
individual is both a (potential) duty-bearer as well as a (potential) rights-holder.
11
 The 
                                                          
9 
Cfr. Mindus 2014: 103; Bovero 2002: 17. This situation of full-fledged membership is also termed caput. See 
Berger 1953 and Crifò 1960: 129. 
10
 Cfr. Berger 1953; see also Marrone 2006: 249–250. 
11 Allen claims that this understaning is also reflected in the High Court of Justice’s case Niboyet v. Niboyet 
(1879), where status is defined as is “[t]he legal position of the individual in or with regard to the rest of the 
community”. In this, we recognize the general understanding of status in Roman law (see above). 
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problem with this conception, however, is that it is too vague. According to Savigny, for 
example, the term used in this sense lacks technical, juridical significance and is, instead, the 
sense in which it is used in common language (see Allen 1930: 279). Both Salmond (1913: 
210) and Allen were also opposed to identifying the term with this usage on practical grounds. 
Allen argued that while it might be that case that the term is “sometimes loosely employed to 
denote the general attribute of being a true and lawful man within the jurisdiction of a 
particular community” (Allen 1930: 279), in the greater part of its use the term “has a more 
restricted and a more technical meaning (Ibid.).
12
  
Secondly, status has been used to denote a “personal legal condition”. In this sense (that 
Salmond himself seems to adopt), status is “a man’s legal condition, only as far as his 
personal rights and burdens are concerned, to the exclusion of his proprietary relations” 
(Ibid.). Thus, in this sense, we speak of the status of an infant or a farther or a public official, 
but not of a landowner.  
Thirdly, in can be used to refer to “personal capacities and incapacities”. Understood in this 
sense, the “law of status” includes the different capacities different classes of people (infants, 
married women, lunatics etc.) possess and which enable them to acquire rights and enter into 
legal relations (Salmond 1913: 211). As such, law of status is considered a special branch of 
law. Nevertheless, Salmond finds “little justification for confining the term status to this 
particular branch of personal condition” (Ibid.). As we will shortly see, C.K. Allen essentially 
adopts this conception of status (2.3.) 
Finally, the term can be used to denote a “compulsory as opposed to conventional personal 
condition”. In this sense, status is used to indicate those conditions that are imposed on an 
individual, such as slavery, as opposed to those that an individual acquires of his own free 
will – such as virtually any contractually based status. 
In what follows, I will look at several different conceptions of legal status. In the next section 
(2.1.), I discuss Graveson’s conception, which is aligned with perhaps the most widespread 
understanding of status in our history. It is a particular, “substantive” conception that 
conceives of status as a condition of specific types of people due to which they are unable to 
perform certain acts-in-the-law or participate actively in legal commerce in some other way. 
                                                          
12
 Allen also indirectly furnishes a conceptual objection against this use of the term, for he himself adopts a 
different conception of status as “a condition which qualifies a person for the exercise of rights” (Allen 1930: 
279). 
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After that, in 2.2. I present H.S. Maine’s treatment of status. Maine’s discussion of status is 
not interesting because of some particularly original conception thereof, but rather because of 
his highly impactful thesis on the historical development of our modern societies “from status 
to contract”. Moreover, discussing Maine’s thesis also enables me to introduce C.K. Allen’s 
views on status in the next section (2.3.). This and all further sections (2.4.–2.6.) deal with 
conceptions that fall within what I have called “formal” conceptions of status. The prevailing 
characteristic of these conceptions is that “status” serves primarily as a formal, technical 
device in presenting legal materials. 
The presentation of these conceptions does not necessarily respect the temporal order in 
which they were first proposed; the presentation is not a historical (diachronic) one. Rather, I 
attempt to provide a particular conceptual development of the notion by way of which certain 
fundamental ideas about the notion of status will gradually emerge. On this way, the 
conception of legal status that I adopt in this thesis will emerge in the end (2.6.).
13
 
 
 
2.1. Status as a “specia l  condition of the ab-normals”  
 
In his extensive study Status in the Common Law (1953), Ronald Graveson argues that 
wherever there is law, human personality is two-fold. One is a purely biological, a “natural 
personality”: it is a set of “powers and incapacities which determine what that person in fact 
can or cannot do” (Graveson 1953: 111). The other is the “legal personality”. The latter can 
either be “the legal condition of the normal member of a society”14 or it can be a status, i.e. 
“the condition of those persons whom a particular society regards as legally abnormal” (Ibid.). 
Specifically, for Graveson status is  
a special condition of a continuous and institutional nature, differing from the legal position of 
the normal person, which is conferred by the law and not purely by the act of the parties, 
whenever a person occupies a position of which the creation, continuance or relinquishment and 
the incidents are a matter of sufficient social or public concern. (Graveson 1953: 2)  
                                                          
13
 In this relatively short presentation I was forced to omit discussion of certain other, even well-known and 
influential conceptions of status. Perhaps the most prominent among these is Jellinek’s theory of statuses. For 
more on this theory, see Jellinek 1912 & 1949 and Alexy 2010. 
14
 Graveson defines the “normal person” in a narrow legal sense, as “one of full age and capacity who is neither 
married nor subject to any other legally imposed enabling or disabling condition, such as would arise, for 
example, from his being a peer, a bankrupt or a convicted felon” (Graveson 1953: 2). 
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In both cases, “legal personality” it represents who the person is in the legal sphere, “and 
carries with it capacities for the performance of legal acts as well as incapacities, rights and 
duties, powers and disabilities of a legal nature” (Graveson 1953: 112). In other terms, the 
attribution of legal personality is, in general, a recognition of one’s legal existence and of her 
ability (capacity) to participate in the legal sphere. 
While the above characteristics are shared by both the legal condition of the normal person, as 
well as by status-holders, Graveson nominates a list of features that are exclusive to status, 
that is, to the legal condition of the abnormal members of society.
15
 
 i) Status, says Graveson, “is a personality conferred by the State through the 
application of general principles of law” (Graveson 1953: 112). This conferral (concession) is, 
as already indicated, the “recognition by the State through its legal system of the existence of 
the individual as a legal as well as a natural person” (Ibid.). As something that is conceded by 
the State it is not an inherent feature of human beings – although in contemporary (mature) 
legal systems legal personality is practically a universal attribute of their citizens (members), 
almost “an inborn quality” (Graveson 1953: 112f.). 
ii) Graveson notes that “status is essentially a conception of law, not a question of fact” 
(Graveson 1953: 114) – even though the reason or basis for its ascription can be found in 
some natural circumstance, such as being of a certain age (i.e. an infant). But not only is the 
idea of status as such a matter of law, the same also holds for “the factors which determine 
what shall constitute a status and entitle a person to claim that status” (Ibid.).  
iii) The ascription of status to an individual is not a matter of that individual’s interest. 
Rather, it is a matter of a public or a social interest (or both) (Graveson 1953: 114). For 
example, the status of a convict is imposed upon an individual in the interest of public safety; 
on the other hand, the status of an infant is, it is true, ascribed to her primarily for her own 
protection against the world, but there exists also a more general social interest in the welfare 
and safety of these vulnerable members of society (see Graveson 1953: 115). 
iv) Status – if properly acquired (i.e. in accordance with domestic law) on the prescribed 
basis –16 is, on Graveson’s view, entitled to “universal recognition” (see Graveson 1953: 119). 
The key point here is that since legal statuses are ascribed by national law, it is most probable 
                                                          
15
 Besides providing a list of their characteristics, Graveson also furnishes a classification of status based on their 
nature or the basis of their acquisition. See Graveson 1953: 134–136. 
16
 See characteristic n. 4. Graveson 1953: 116-119. 
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that different States will not only design different statuses, but that even the statuses that they 
have in common (e.g. citizenship), will likely have different attribution-conditions and that 
their contents (normative consequences or entitlements) will likewise differ. Thus, in order to 
avoid possible conflicts that might arise, universal recognition of a status is something that 
may “rightly be expected from all countries in which the rule of law operates” (Graveson 
1953: 119). Such recognition, however, may extend “only to the existence of the status, and 
not necessarily to its contents” (Graveson 1953: 120).  
v) As far as the entities to which status can be ascribed concerns, Graveson argues that 
generally speaking status is ascribed only to “objects which have a basis of living personality” 
(Graveson 1953: 120), whether they be natural or legal persons. However, it is also the case 
that “there is theoretically no need so to limit the conception” (Ibid.). Legal personality can 
also be attributed to inanimate (material) objects, such as corporation or foundations if there is 
an interest in making them potential holders of rights and duties.
17
  Nevertheless, certain 
limitations do arise from the fact that the concept of status rests upon “the idea of an entity 
capable of supporting capacities and incapacities and, in particular, of instituting or defending 
judicial proceedings, directly or through some other person” (Graveson 1953: 122). Thus, the 
entity to which a status is ascribed should, in principle, have certain characteristics that make 
it possible for her to make use of (to exercise) the rights and duties stemming from the 
ascribed status. 
vi) Status cannot exist in abstracto, that is, separated from the object, or entity, to 
which it is attached. Status is a person’s legal personality, and as such only makes sense as 
long as there is a person to whom it can be attached. To describe this close relationship, 
Graveson uses a metaphor. He says: “Status is the legal shadow of a human personality: 
remove either that personality or the light of law which creates it, and the shadow vanishes” 
(Graveson 1953: 124).  
vii) “One of the functions of status in a legal system,” argues Graveson, “is the legal 
classification of society” (Graveson 1953: 124f). Ascription of status with particular rights 
and duties creates, within a society, particular groups – an operation which distinguishes the 
members of these groups between each other as well as each group in relation to the legal 
position of the normal citizens (Graveson 1953: 125). Such treatment of individuals by groups 
greatly facilitates the legal organization and management of a society. Graveson, following 
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 On the legal personhood of corporations, see Dewey 1926. 
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Austin (see below), also holds that these groups (or classes) of people should not be so 
extensive as to comprise all, or almost all, of society’s members – that would make little sense 
seeing how “a status implies a special legal position, and if the whole community is in such a 
position, that condition ceases to be special” (Ibid.). Nevertheless, these groups are, and must 
be, generally large in size. This means that status-groups cannot be based on any minor legal 
detail that distinguishes some individuals from the legal position of the normal citizen. Rather, 
“the classification of persons ... will generally have to depend upon variations from the legal 
position of the normal citizen which are extensive both in importance and quality” (Graveson 
1953: 126). 
viii) Finally, statuses are of an institutional and permanent nature. They are often 
based on certain natural disabilities of individuals and relate to some of the most basic 
relationships and institutions in a society (see Graveson 1953: 129). Contrasted with ad hoc 
powers (rights), statuses thus have more general effects upon the status-holder and are of 
long(er) duration. Moreover, given the particular social interest in them, the content of a given 
status is fixed by law and individuals have little influence on them (Graveson 1953: 132). For 
the same reasons, the status as such and its relative rights and duties cannot be transferred to 
another (Graveson 1953: 133). 
Although Graveson’s conception of status is limited to the specific legal condition of 
individuals that in some important way differ from the legal condition of the “normal” 
individual, I believe that the characteristics of a status as presented by the author can, 
nevertheless be generalized. As we will see, the above characteristics are almost fully 
integrated (explicitly or implicitly) into the conception of status that I eventually adopt. 
 
 
2.2. “From status to contract”  
 
In Chapter V (entitled Primitive Society and Ancient Law) of his famous Ancient Law (1861), 
Henry Sumner Maine traces the development of law and its institutions, from the oldest legal 
systems to the law of his days. His focus is on the institutions of family law, for it is in this 
field that the most profound differences between “ancient law” and modern law are to be 
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found. Indeed, as Maine argued: “the [basic] unit of an ancient society was the Family, of a 
modern society the Individual” (Maine 1906: 121).  
It should be noted that Maine does not furnish a distinct conception of status. Rather, he 
provides a historical analysis of the role status played in history and provides a thesis 
regarding its fading influence, being gradually substituted by contract as the primary means of 
establishing the legal condition of an individual in a given community. 
His investigation of familial relations, particularly in Roman law, such as those between the 
husband and his wife, the father and his children, the master and his slaves etc. shows that in 
ancient times all of individual’s legal relations depended upon his or her position within the 
family unit – more specifically, in relation to the eldest male individual as the head of the 
family (in Roman law pater familias holding patria potestas).  
In the earlier times this dependency was complete in all respects: “The eldest male parent – 
the eldest ascendant – is absolutely supreme in his household. His dominion extends to life 
and death, and is as unqualified over his children and their houses as over his slaves” (Maine 
1906: 119). Progressively, however, this “family dependency” diminished with “individual 
obligation” taking its place (Maine 1906: 163). Indeed, with the increased attention placed by 
law on the individual, there comes also the change in the source determining one’s legal 
condition. Maine argues, 
[It is not] difficult to see what is the tie between man and man which replaced by degrees 
those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the Family. It is 
Contract. Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of society in which all the 
relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have steadily 
moved towards a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the free 
agreement of Individuals. In Western Europe the progress achieved in this direction has been 
considerable. Thus the status of the Slave has disappeared – it has been superseded by the 
contractual relation of the servant to his master. The status of the Female under Tutelage, if the 
tutelage be understood of persons other than her husband, has also ceased to exist; from her 
coming of age to her marriage all the relations she may form are relations of contract. So too 
the status of the Son under Power has no true place in the law of modern European societies. If 
any civil obligation binds together the Parent and the child of full age, it is one to which only 
contract gives its legal validity (Ibid.). 
Despite what Maine sees as a clear shrinking of the role of status in Western law in light of 
the increasing importance of contractual relations, certain residues of the ancient statuses have 
remained in modern times. Hence the examples of infants, orphans and lunatics (see Maine 
1906: 164). The legal position of such individuals is (more or less) not dependent on legal 
actions taken of their own free will but regulated by “the Law of Persons”.  This is so, argues 
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Maine, because such individuals “do not possess the faculty of forming a judgment of their 
own interests; in other words, that they are wanting in the first essential of an engagement by 
Contract” (Ibid.). 
It is clear from this that on Maine’s view status (what is left of it) is a matter of disabilities. 
“In this view”, says Allen (1930: 284), “every man, in normal circumstances, is free to 
determine, according to his own will, his rights and duties towards his fellow-citizens”. If, 
however, “he has not sufficient will to determine this for himself, the law imposes on him 
certain defined capacities and incapacities which constitute his status” (Ibid.). Thus, if the 
notion of status is applied only to the cases Maine examines (in Chapter V); if, in other words, 
we “avoid applying the term to such conditions as are the immediate or remote result of 
agreement”, then “we may say that the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto 
been a movement from Status to Contract” (Maine 1906: 165).18  
This Maine’s thesis has been “one of the most famous legal aphorisms in the English 
language” (Allen 1930: 285) and it has been “generalized and understood as a universal 
principle of legal evolution” (Rehbinder 1971: 942). Yet, despite its overall fortunes, the 
thesis has nevertheless been subject to numerous criticisms. 
Pollock, for one, argues that Maine’s thesis should be “understood as limited to the law of 
Property”: that is, “inclusive of whatever has a value measurable in exchange” (Pollock in: 
Maine 1906: 422). So limited, the argument is still valid, argues Pollock. Indeed, by pointing 
to the still changing legal position of married women, he claims that the movement has not yet 
been completed. Apart from that, however, Pollock does not believe “that a movement from 
Status to Contract can be asserted with any generality” (Pollock in: Maine 1906: 423). He 
shows how certain legal institutions (or legal positions of individuals) may have been 
increasingly de-regularized, but certain features of these positions have nevertheless remained 
a matter of status. Maine’s test in regard – i.e. whether the individual in question is capable of 
forming a judgment on her own interests – fails in such cases. This is because in cases as 
these, the law is interested in more than just that individual’s own interests. “Paramount 
considerations of the stability of society, or the general convenience of the third persons, 
override the freedom usually left to parties in their own affairs” (Ibid.). Thus, while it is true 
                                                          
18
 “The meaning of the statement is clear: that the rights and duties, capacities and incapacities of the individual 
are no longer being fixed by law as a consequence of his membership of a class; but those former incidents of 
status are coming more and more to depend for their nature and existence upon the will of the parties affected by 
them: and the remedy for breach of those incidents is becoming increasingly contractual in nature” (Graveson 
1953: 34).  
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that the law of persons has been “cut short”, it is also the case that “so long as we recognise 
any differences at all among persons, we cannot allow their existence and nature to be treated 
merely as a matter of bargain” (Ibid.). Finally, Pollock notes that Maine himself limited to an 
important degree the extent of his claim, excluding from it, above all, the institute of 
marriage. If status is understood in this more limited sense, an important objection against 
Maine falls, but, says Pollock, it also drastically reduces its scope (and importance). 
For his part, Graveson also notes that “a movement away from status does not necessarily 
connote a movement in the direction of contract” (Graveson 1953: 34). Indeed, in Roman law 
the idea of a contract was largely undeveloped and promises were enforced in other manners. 
The theory of autonomy and free will, lying at the basis of the theory of contract, came much 
later, with Kant and Bentham (see Graveson 1953: 35). As far as English Common Law is 
concerned, where status does not originate only in familiar relations but is chiefly based in 
“estates and tenures of land” (Ibid.), Graveson shows that the movement was, quite the 
opposite, “from contract to status” (Graveson 1953: 38). It was  
[b]y virtue of the possession of a certain status in the social order [that] a person would be 
entitled to claim a certain estate in land. The grant of such estate would be based on express 
undertakings of service and protection or implied acceptance of the generally understood 
terms of the grant. ... The status of the grantee would be vitally material in determining what 
set of rights and duties ... would govern the relationship to arise from the grant. Once the grant 
was made, those rights and duties, public and private, would attach inalienably to the grantee 
during his life, and thereby become part of his status (Graveson 1953: 38). 
Like Pollock, Graveson is similarly critical of the narrowness of Maine’s claim. While he sees 
as perfectly reasonable the fact that Maine himself limited the validity of his claims to his 
own time – and thus did not wish to predict future developments – he is nevertheless critical 
of the fact that Maine excluded from the scope of his thesis “those personal conditions which 
resulted, immediately or remotely, from agreement” (Graveson 1953: 36) – i.e., statuses 
resulting from marriage and also most of the Common law that is the result of the feudal 
agreement between lord and man (Ibid.). Taking this in consideration, Graveson asks himself 
what is even left of the maxim. His answer: “So far as the Common Law is concerned, very 
little remains if one subtracts from our law of status those personal conditions resulting on the 
one hand from feudal land tenure and on the other indirectly from private agreement” (Ibid.).  
Allen (1930) also moves certain objections against Maine. Applying Maine’s test for 
attribution of status to several historical statuses (e.g. sex, minority, coverture, celibacy, 
mental defect, slavery, civil death etc.), he comes to conclude that while most of them would 
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pass it, i.e. they do regard “aspects of a man’s personality over which he himself has no 
control over” (Allen 1930: 284), others do not arise involuntarily but by some action of the 
individual herself. Thus, he argues that Maine’s central assumption is in need of modification. 
He argues that while it is true that most historic statuses have originated in circumstances 
beyond an individual’s control, they may nevertheless also originate in her own “voluntary 
act” (Allen 1930: 286).  
Moreover, Allen argues that in modern law status “does not necessarily depend on defect of 
judgment” (Allen 1930: 286). There are numerous statuses, such as professional rank, 
illegitimacy, nationality etc. that are based on different policy grounds. Thus, says Allen, 
while natural incapacity may be the main cause for ascribing a status, “the law may attach that 
quality to a particular class on any ground of policy which social exigencies dictate” (Ibid.). 
From this consideration follows Allen’s conclusion that status in not only a matter of 
incapacity, but of capacity as well. 
 
 
2.3.  Status as a matter of capacities and incapacities  
 
C.K. Allen, whom I have already invoked above, also provided his own definition of status. 
On his view, status is “the condition of belonging to a particular class of persons to whom the 
law assigns certain peculiar legal capacities or incapacities or both” (Allen 1930: 288).19  
Several elements of this definition can be individualized. For one, status is a condition of an 
individual. As such it is permanent or at least long-term in nature; it is static and therefore 
cannot be exercised (unlike capacities as we will soon see) (Allen 1930: 292). Moreover, and 
more importantly, status is not a cluster of (substantive) rights and duties – rather, it is the 
“condition of membership of a group” (Ibid.). Such a group (or a class) of persons, in relation 
to a status, is determined by “an established rule of law”20 in virtue of which “legal 
consequences result to its members from the mere fact of belonging to it” (Allen 1930: 289).  
                                                          
19
 He constructs his own view of status on the critique of Salmond’s, Austin’s and Maine’s treatment of status. 
See Allen 1930: 277–288. 
20
 Status, therefore, is something that is ascribed by law upon an individual. Status may originate either from an 
individual’s voluntary act or from “circumstances which lie beyond the control and choice of the individual” 
(Allen 1930: 286). 
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When speaking of legal consequences stemming from membership in a given class of persons 
(i.e. from being ascribed a status), Allen points out that we should distinguish between rights 
and duties, on the one hand, and the capacities and incapacities, on the other hand. As said, on 
Allen’s view status is not determined by the rights and duties attached to a particular legal 
condition. While individuals may hold certain rights and duties in relation to a particular (kind 
of) thing, this fact alone does not affect their capacity in any way. Status, on the other hand, is 
“a condition affecting capacity generally” (Allen 1930: 290). Thus, for instance, in the case 
infancy, the consequences of that status are in the contractual domain seen in the infant’s 
general incapacity to contract – and not in some particular right an individual young child 
may or may not hold in virtue of a specific relationship. Unlike Graveson and Maine, Allen 
believes that status is a matter not only of incapacities, but of capacities as well. 
The notion of capacities (and incapacities) is central in Allen’s account. On his view, 
capacities are of two kinds: passive and active. While the former is the “capacity for 
enjoyment of rights”, the latter is “the capacity for exercise of rights” (Allen 1930: 290). Allen 
swiftly dismisses the first, arguing that “[t]o say that a person has capacity for enjoying rights 
is merely to say that he is a person” (Allen 1930: 291). Though theoretically possible, he 
rejects the practical possibility of there being, in modern law, individuals without the general 
capacity for enjoying rights.  
Allen, thus, focuses his attention on the active legal capacity, i.e. “the ability to exercise 
(which of course presupposes the ability to acquire) specific rights” (Allen 1930: 291).21 
Certain characteristics of active legal capacity are emphasized by Allen. For one, it should be 
clearly distinguished from rights – which are exercised on the basis of a given capacity. 
Capacity is “a condition precedent to the exercise of rights” – as such it is “latent and 
potential in the individual” (Allen 1930: 291). Moreover, capacity is also a power: given its 
dormant character it can be said to be static. But it is also dynamic for it “affects rights and 
duties as soon as it is exercised” (Allen 1930: 292).  
To conclude: Allen shows us that we must clearly distinguish between three important 
concepts: status, capacity and rights, respectively. While status is a condition “which gives 
rise to certain capacities or incapacities or both”, capacity is “the power to acquire and 
exercise rights” (Allen 1930: 292). 
                                                          
21 
This ability, he adds, can either be total or partial. See Allen 1930: 291. 
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2.4. Status as a matter of “commodious exposition”  
 
John Austin dealt with the question of status in Lectures XL–XLIII of his Lectures on 
Jurisprudence. There, with reference to the purposes of law, he distinguishes Law of Persons 
and Law of Things. He describes the distinction between the two as follows: 
There are certain rights and duties, with certain capacities and incapacities to take rights and 
incur duties, by which persons, as subjects of law, are variously determined to certain classes. 
The rights, duties, capacities, or incapacities, which determine a given person to any of these 
classes, constitute a condition or status which the person occupies, or with which the person is 
invested. (Austin 2002: 706)   
Persons, then, are holders of statuses, i.e. sets of rights and duties (with capacities and 
incapacities) – potentially a great many of them (Ibid.). Such statuses include, but are not 
limited to, being a son, a husband, a father, an advocate, a trader and so forth. While both the 
Law of Things and the Law of Persons deal with persons and their rights and duties, these are 
regarded in the Law of Things in a more general or abstract manner. On the other hand, rights 
and duties that affect particular classes of individuals are grouped together under the Law of 
Persons – or, what amounts to the same, Law of Status. The line between these two bodies of 
law is thus determined by the notion of status: “The Law of Things is the law; the corpus 
juris, minus the law of status or conditions. The Law of Persons is the law of status or 
conditions, detached for the sake of convenience from the body of the entire legal system” 
(Austin 2002: 709). 
While representing a line of demarcation between the two departments of law, status seems to 
have very few other particular characteristics. Indeed, when inquiring into the nature of status, 
Austin admits that even after thorough investigation, he can “find no mark by which a status 
or condition can be distinguished from any other collection of rights and duties” (Austin 
2002: 710). There is, in other words, “no common generic character which determines what a 
status or condition is” (Ibid.). In the end, the only reasons, as far as Austin is concerned, for 
detaching particular sets of rights and duties – termed status – from the rest of the law is 
purely “for the sake of commodious expositions” (Ibid.).  
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Nevertheless, Austin does find that the rights and duties (with capacities and incapacities) that 
constitute status do have, generally speaking, certain (common) characteristics: 
First of all, Austin holds that a status “resides” in an individual “not as being that very 
individual person” but rather “as being a member of a class of persons” (Austin 2002: 710). 
The idea of a class (of persons) is central in Austin’s understanding of status: “It does not 
matter, on Austin’s view, what the class is ... but a class of some kind, with rights and duties 
peculiar to itself” (Allen 1930: 282). What is relevant here is, first, that status is not related to 
singular rights ascribed to individuals as such (e.g. privileges) and, second, that “the class 
itself must not be such that it may comprise any, or nearly any, person whatsoever” (i.e. an 
universal class of all persons). Indeed, “[c]lasses possessing a status or condition are classes 
which can only comprise a part of the community” (Austin 2002: 713).  
Classes of people – in virtue of being ascribed a given status – are distinguished from other 
classes precisely because of the particular set of rights and duties that are attached to them. 
This is a further characteristic Austin recognizes in regard. Or, as he puts is: “the rights and 
duties capacities and incapacities constituting status or conditions, regard specially the class 
of persons by whom the status or condition is borne” (Austin 2002: 711). Rights, such as 
those that stem from various contracts regard no particular class of persons; rights of infants, 
on the other hand, regard specifically that group of people. Of course, such rights needn’t 
regard these individuals exclusively, says Austin – it suffices that they “specially regard such 
persons” (Ibid.).  
Finally, a further characteristic of the rights and duties that determine a status is that they are 
“commonly considerable in number and various in kind” (Austin 2002: 710). Indeed, they are 
potentially so many as to affect the individual in many, if not most, of his social relations 
(Ibid.). Although Austin does admit that this is not really a distinguishing mark of statuses.  
In Lecture XLI Austin dismisses several definitions of status that he sees as erroneous – 
arguing, for example, against Bentham’s view that status is an inherent quality of a given 
person generating rights and duties,
22
 and against the idea that status is a (set of) capacity.
23
 In 
Lecture XLII he ultimately furnishes a definition of status based on the elements previously 
pointed out. What, then, is a status? This is Austin’s definition:  
                                                          
22
 See more in Austin 2002: 720–725; cfr. also Allen 1930: 281. 
23
 See Austin 2002: 738–740; cfr. Allen 1930: 281f. 
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Where a set of rights and duties capacities and incapacities, specifically affecting a narrow 
class of persons, is detached from the bulk of the legal system, and placed under a separate 
head for the convenience of exposition, that set of rights and duties capacities and incapacities, 
is called a status (Austin 2002: 746f). 
Status, then, is merely a methodological instrument for organizing law (legal systematization). 
The only difference between a status and any other set of rights and duties is that a status only 
applies to “a narrow class of persons” and not to any and all persons.  
 
 
2.5.  Status as an intermediary legal term  
 
While very little can be said about the specificity of “status” on Austin’s account, one and 
perhaps the only relevant feature that he emphasizes is that it facilitates the systematization 
(exposition) of law. For Austin, status is but an instrument for organizing law.  
This idea of status is heavily present in Alf Ross’s famous paper  Tû-Tû (1957). Ross beings 
his seminal work by telling us about a tribe Noît-cif from the Noîsulli Islands in the South 
Pacific which applies certain rules by relying on the notion of tû-tû. In this tribe, the following 
statements hold true: 
(1) If a person x has encountered their mother in law, x is tû-tû. 
(2) If a person x has killed a totem animal, x is tû-tû. 
(3) If a person x has eaten the food prepared for the chief, x is tû-tû. 
(4) If a person x is tû-tû, x is subject to the ceremony of purification.  
Ross is quick to dispense with any kind of “magic”: “It is obvious”, he argues, “that the Noît-
cif tribe dwells in a state of darkest superstition. ‘Tû-tû’ is of course nothing at all, a word 
devoid of any meaning whatever” (1957: 812). To prove this, Ross shows how meaningful 
statements could easily be constructed without employed this term. For instance, the 
following statement does not make use of the term: “(5) If a person x has killed a totem 
animal, x is subject to the ceremony of purification.” This, on Ross’s account, goes to show 
that tû-tû has no “semantic reference” of its own: it refers to nothing in the real world.  The 
tribe’s system could very well function without the use of tû-tû. The relevant statements 
would then look like this:  
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(6) If a person x has encountered their mother in law, x is subject to the ceremony of 
purification. 
(7) If a person x has killed a totem animal, x is subject to the ceremony of purification. 
(8) If a person x has eaten the food prepared for the chief, x is subject to the ceremony 
of purification. 
These rules appear quite common and unproblematic. Yet, imagine that the following 
statements are also valid in the same tribe: 
(9) If a person x is tû-tû, x is unfit for combat.  
(10) If a person x is tû-tû, x is unfit for hunting.24 
This simple addition of two further (correct) uses of the term tû-tû would, if we were to 
abandon it, render the system at hand much more complex, augmenting the number of valid 
norms considerably. 
Legal rules in our contemporary legal systems often function in the exact same way, says 
Ross. We, too, “express ourselves as though something had come into being between the 
conditioning fact (juristic fact) and the conditioned legal consequence, namely, a claim, a 
right, which like an intervening vehicle or causal connecting link promotes an effect or 
provides the basis for a legal consequence” (Ross 1957: 818). Our legal systems are full of 
such notions: among them are right, duty, claim, ownership, marriage, citizenship, contract, 
validity, negligence etc. They all function exactly as tû-tû:25 they are “inserted” between the 
(legally relevant) conditioning facts on the one side and the conditioned (normative) 
consequences on the other side. In this way they greatly facilitate the presentation (i.e. reduce 
the number) of legally valid statements (rules) in a given legal system. They serve, in other 
words, as “a tool of presentation” (Ross 1957: 820).  
As it is highly relevant for my discussion, I should add that Ross notes that the intermediary 
link will not always be a single right (a single legal position), but that it can also be “a 
complex legal condition of rights and duties” (Ross 1957: 821). Such is the example of (the 
legal effects of) marriage or (the legal effects of ) citizenship. In such cases we speak of “a 
status” (Ibid.). 
While Ross’s ideas with regard have been highly influential, numerous refinements and 
critiques have been offered. I shall mention just some of the briefly. 
                                                          
24 
See Brożek 2015. 
25
 See Ross’s scheme on p. 820. 
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Brożek (2015), for instance, offers two important criticisms of Ross’s treatment of tû-tû: first, 
he argues that Ross’s argument regarding the “semantic voidness” of tû-tû is flawed in that 
any predicate can be used in place of tû-tû. This is possible by accepting Ross’s strategy in 
which he accepts two claims, namely i) “a (partial) meaning postulate, such as ‘If a person x 
has eaten the food prepared for the chief, x is a tû-tû’” and ii) “a norm in which the term under 
consideration in the description of a state of affairs that triggers the application of the norm, as 
in ‘If a person x is tû-tû, x is subject to the ceremony of purification’” (Brożek 2015: 18). 
“Assuming”, says Brożek, “that one can always identify a (partial) meaning postulate for any 
term, the possibility of carrying out Ross’s argument to the effect that the term has no 
semantic reference hangs together with there being a norm which the terms appears in the 
description of a state of affairs that triggers the application of the norm” (Ibid.). For example, 
if for the term “food” a partial meaning postulate is, let says, “If x is a mango, then x is food”, 
it suffices that there is a social norm, such as, “If x is food, then x should be shared among the 
members of the community” in order to prove that “food” has no semantic reference (Ibid.).  
Secondly, Brożek also shows that Ross is mistaken in claiming that intermediate legal terms 
function (are of benefit) only as efficient tools for the presentation of legal rules. According to 
Brożek intermediary legal terms are indispensable for a functional legal system because, one, 
they increase coherence in the legal system (Brożek 2015: 20) and, two, they “may help 
increase the completeness of a legal system” (Brożek 2015: 21). As they are not fundamental 
for the current project, I shall not pursue these objections further. 
Finally, Lars Lindahl (2004), who provides a thorough theoretical analysis of intermediary 
legal terms and of their role in legal inferences, also argues that legal middle terms are not 
only vehicles of inference (see Lindahl 2004: 189). Instead, Lindahl argues, “[l]egal 
institutions such as contract, ownership, citizenship and matrimony are instruments for 
satisfying the needs and interests of individuals” (2004: 198). Thus, they have a particular 
instrumental function in legal systems. What Lindahl emphasizes in relation to the specific 
group of legal institutions that correspond to “complex legal positions of individuals” (2004: 
199), such as ownership, citizenship or matrimony, is that the normative consequences 
stemming from these positions have “a strong interrelationship”: they “are considered to 
constitute a bundle, the value of which depends on incorporating components that go together. 
That the components ‘go together’ can be expressed by saying that having them jointly in a 
bundle accomplishes a synergetic effect” (Ibid.).  It is this synergy that is the reason for 
ascribing the whole bundle to a single legal middle term, such as “citizenship” (Ibid.).  
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Lindahl further emphasizes the importance of formulating (reconstructing) pre-legal inference 
schemes in relation to instrumental ideas regarding such middle terms. He argues that these 
inference schemes, be they philosophical, anthropological or economic, are not tied to 
particular legal systems, but are rather more universal in nature. They are, nevertheless, 
relevant for the rules of particular legal systems. “By clarifying the ‘rationale’ of different 
legal institutions, such reconstructions indicate the reasons for composing particular bundles 
of rights, powers, obligations, etc., to be attached to the appropriate sets of grounds” (Lindahl 
2004: 200). The idea here is that not only are the normative consequences attached to a given 
status not a random set of rights and duties – being rather a sensible, interrelated bundle of 
such – but that the attribution of these rights and duties (the status itself) also has an 
underlying rationale. 
 
 
2.6. Status as a sensible set of rights and duties  
 
The arguments in the previous section showed that status can be understood both as a legal 
middle term whose function it is to provide for a more “commodious exposition” of rules 
valid in a given legal system as well as a particular set of interrelated rights and duties that 
serves an underlying interest or need. In this section, I will continue to develop this line of 
reasoning by engaging with the works of Jeremy Waldron and Patricia Mindus, respectively.  
Waldron defines status in law as “a particular package of rights, powers, disabilities, duties, 
privileges, immunities, and liabilities accruing to a person by virtue of the condition or 
situation they are in” (Waldron 2015: 134). Waldron’s conception of status is broad, inclusive 
of all sorts of subjective legal conditions and situations. The examples of status that he 
furnishes, e.g. bankruptcy, infancy, being an alien, a prisoner, a member of the armed forces, 
being married etc., attest to the inclusiveness of his conception, which does not refer only to 
“abnormal” individuals or only to some permanent life conditions.26 
Waldron accepts the view that statuses operate as kinds of “abbreviations”, or, what amounts 
to the same, as legal middle terms (Ibid.). His argument for this is substantially the same as 
we have seen above (2.5.). Each proposition that holds in relation to an individual in a 
                                                          
26
 Waldron explicitly object to this characteristic of status provided by Graveson. See Waldron 2012: 57–60. 
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particular legal situation could be spelled out individually: i.e. for someone (X) who is 
considered to be an infant, it could be said that (i) if X is under eighteen, then X has the right 
to support from X’s parents and that (ii) if X is under eighteen, then X does not have the 
power to enter into certain contracts. Instead, be it for “expository convenience” or some 
other reason, we “summarize all this information by saying that in law X is an infant” (Ibid.). 
By understanding the technical (legal) meaning of the term infant (or any other status-term), 
which “carries with it knowledge of the details of the legal position that people with this 
status are in” (Ibid), statements regarding “infants” are rendered meaningful.  
However, Waldron thinks that this is not the only quality of status-words.  Indeed, he says that 
“it is also worth insisting that the list is not arbitrary” (Waldron 2015: 135). Here, “the list” he 
refers to is intended as any set of rights and duties (rights, powers, abilities and disabilities, 
duties, privileges, liabilities etc.) that the status-word is an abbreviation for. The rights and 
duties of a given status are not just any random set thereof; rather, the list “makes sense 
relative to some underlying idea that informs the status in question” (Ibid.). Here we 
recognize the same ideas as were already proposed by Lindahl above. However, the latter 
offered no further arguments or examples in regard.  
Waldron argues that, as far as infancy qua legal status is concerned, propositions such as, for 
example, “If X is under eighteen, then X has the right to support from X’s parents” and “If X 
is under eighteen, then X does not have the power to enter into certain contracts” are not just 
any random or arbitrary legal propositions (Waldron 2015:134). Rather, “[e]ach of them 
makes sense in terms of the underlying idea that human children are much less capable of 
looking after themselves and much more vulnerable to depredation or exploitation by others 
than adults are” (Waldron 2015: 135). But not only individually – these rights and duties (to 
be short) also “make sense” jointly, as a package (Ibid.). It is, therefore, not enough that each 
particular element (a right, an obligation, a privilege, a capacity etc.) responds to some 
circumstance of the overall condition – rather, “[i]t is a matter of their having a common 
rationale which explains how the various rights, duties, and so on hang together, i.e. the 
underlying coherence of the package” (Ibid.).27 
In some of her recent works, Patricia Mindus has been developing a “functionalist” theory of 
citizenship (see Mindus 2014 & 2017). Her theoretical approach to citizenship is particularly 
                                                          
27
 “Hanging together” amounts, I would argue, to more or less the same as Lindahl’s “going together”. See 
above, 2.6. 
41 
 
interesting for this investigation for she not only treats citizenship as a status qua a legal 
middle term, but she also provides a particular theory as to how the internal connection 
between the conditions for status acquisition (“access criteria”) and the normative 
consequences (“entitlements”) stemming from the status could be understood.  
Mindus, following her Scandinavian predecessors and contemporaries (i.e. Ross, Lindahl 
etc.), claims that citizenship, just as many other legal terms like ownership, contract, validity, 
negligence etc., does not, in fact, correspond to anything in the real word. Citizenship, she 
says, is not an empirical concept and, hence, has no semantic reference (Mindus 2014: 264). 
This alone, however, does not make the concept useless, a mere “ideological construct”, or 
even inexistent. To the contrary: such legal concepts are useful, if not indispensable, since 
they serve as “vehicles of inference” or “techniques of presentation” in legal discourse 
(Mindus 2014: 265). As we have already seen, statuses, in this role, are a fundamental 
element of today’s complex legal systems (see above, 2.5.). 
But Mindus, similarly as Waldron, doesn’t believe this citizenship (legal statuses) is only 
about expressive economy.
28
 According to her, a general theory of citizenship (like hers) 
“needs to describe the relationship between entitlements and access criteria” (Mindus 2017: 
51). The former (the entitlements) “are about what citizenship consists in” and constitute the 
concept’s intension; the latter (the access criteria), on the other hand, “determine to whom the 
status is conferred” – in other words, they constitute the concept’s extension (Ibid). And while 
it is true, she adds, that these two components of the status are not fixed and differ among 
legal orders (as well as with time, I should add), they do not do so indefinitely: consequently, 
“[t]heir variation is intelligible and can be studied” (Ibid.). 
The connection between the “access criteria” (the conditioning state of affairs) and the 
entitlements (the normative consequences) is not neutral, random or arbitrary. You will 
remember that both Lindahl and Waldron argued that the entitlements appertaining to a given 
status are not a random or arbitrary set of rights and duties – rather, they depend on the 
underlying idea of the status in question. Their accounts, however, reveal little as to the nature 
of the connection between the entitlements and the access criteria of a status. Mindus, to the 
opposite, provides a specific theory regarding precisely this point. The relationship between 
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 Note that Mindus develops her theory for citizenship only. The extension of the theory – of some of its key 
ideas, is my own proposal. 
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these two components is, on Mindus’s view, a functional one.29 More to the point, Mindus 
argues that “access to status civitatis [i.e. citizenship] is not neutral, but can be conceived as a 
variable of the content of the status”. This, in a nutshell, is the point of the “correlation thesis” 
which is one of the two theses that Mindus develops within her functionalist account of 
citizenship.
30
 What Mindus means when she says that the correlation between the two 
components of status is a functional one is that the “criteria giving access to the status and the 
type of entitlements it entails have to be aligned so that access criteria fit the particular type of 
entitlements connected to the status” (Mindus 2017: 52).31 In other terms, “extension will 
follow intension”, or “to who[m] citizenship is granted must depend on what citizenship 
consists in” (Mindus 2017: 53).  
But how exactly is this fit determined? How, in other words, do we get from the intention to 
the extension; from the entitlements to access criteria “correctly”? For Mindus, the answer 
lies in a mathematical formula: the functional connection is intended in the mathematical 
sense of the word. In this context, Mindus proposes to refer to the extension of the status as 
“codomain” (C) and to its intension as “domain” (D): “The domain is the set of the arguments 
for which the function is defined”, whereas “the codomain is the target set” (Mindus 2017: 
52). The correlation thesis argues, you will remember, that the “criteria for acquisition and 
loss of the status constitute a function of the entitlements it consists in” (Mindus 2017: 53). 
Symbolically, this is represented as f : D ↠ C. In other terms, f is a “surjective function from D 
to C” because “every point in the codomain is the value of f(d) for at least one point d in the 
domain” (Ibid.).  
Mindus argues that if this characterization is correct, “we obtain a standard for evaluating the 
appropriateness of criteria for acquisition and loss” of citizenship or any other status (Ibid.). 
In this way, “the internal consistency” of a given (citizenship) policy can be analysed. This 
standard serves as a test for judging the justifiability of a given status-attribution policy 
(Mindus 2017: 53).  
                                                          
29
 Talk of functions of statuses inevitably invokes associations to Searle's social ontology. While this is not the 
place to enter into the specifics of Searle's “construction of social reality”, it should be noted that according to 
Searle, a status is assigned to some phenomenon by collective intentionality when the accompanying function of 
that status “cannot be performed solely in virtue of the intrinsic physical features of the phenomenon in 
question” (Searle 1995: 46). More on Searle’s theory of constitutive rules, statuses and status functions, see 
Searle 1995: especially 40ff. 
30
 The other is the “constitutional-sensitivity thesis” which I will not be discussing here. See Mindus 2017: 51-
52. 
31
 “If they are not aligned by functional correlation”, continues Mindus, “citizenship becomes an arbitrary 
instrument of social closure: as if we were to distinguish insiders from outsiders randomly” (Mindus 2017: 52). 
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This shows that on the functionalist view, the connection between the entitlements and access 
criteria cannot be of just any kind: the criteria for status acquisition cannot be arbitrarily 
selected, without regard to the rights and duties the status gives access to. Rather, the law-
maker has to choose (determine) which pre-legal (natural or institutional) facts are relevant 
for the status in question, i.e. for the ability to exercise the rights and duties attached to the 
status.
32
 This decision (judgement) is not purely evaluative nor is it completely descriptive 
(see Mindus 2014: 267). It is, rather, a reason-based judgement. Not every personal 
characteristic (potential condition for access) will be relevant for the particular status in 
question. The same characteristic may or may not be held relevant for status-attribution, 
relative to the status to be ascribed – relative to the rights and duties attached the status. The 
relevancy of a particular (personal) characteristic for a given status thus depends on the 
congruence between that characteristic and the particular entitlement (or a set thereof) in 
question (see Mindus 2014: 269). In the final instance, whether there is congruence between 
the two is a matter of reason-giving or (proper, convincing) justification (cfr. Mindus 2014: 
290). 
Mindus’s argumentation needn’t be fully adopted here. For the present purpose there is no 
need to assume that the connection between the access criteria and the entitlements is a 
precise mathematical function from the set of entitlements towards the access criteria. As we 
will later see (see below, 3.1.), other plausible explanations of the way in which access criteria 
are (to be) determined may be offered. But we may suspend the judgment on Mindus’s 
functional theory of citizenship and still benefit from some of her insights. 
First of all, I believe that, mutatis mutandis, her characterization of the status of citizenship 
can be transplanted to any, or almost any, other legal status. Moreover, Mindus convincingly 
shows that there is a strong connection between the access criteria and the entitlements 
pertaining to a status, a connection that does not allow for extensive and rapid manipulations 
of the access criteria or the set of entitlements or both. The two, though they may change in 
time and space, are in such a relation that any change in any of the two sets will require a 
sufficient justification for doing so as well as (potentially) require a modification in the other 
set. Otherwise the “internal consistency” of the status can be undermined and any such 
modification deemed illegitimate. 
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 “Lo standard che propongo invece ci fornisce un metodo per scegliere una regolazione dell’accesso alla 
cittadinanza che sia funzionale (o adeguata) al ruolo svolto dalla cittadinanza all’interno dell’ordine 
costituzionale” (Mindus 2015: 541). 
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* 
Having reviewed several conceptions of legal status, I am now in a position to settle upon one 
that I will be using from now on. The conception that I am espousing is basically the one 
presented in section 2.6. I basically follow Waldron’s work, but accept elements presented by 
other authors as well – as far as they compatible with the former view. Thus, I accept the 
claim that a legal status is in any case  a legal invention and not some natural attribute of the 
individual; that it is, as such, a legal middle term that serves, in part, as a means of 
compressing large bulks of legal information; that, moreover, statuses are always attributed by 
law, regardless of whether the acquisition criteria may be based on some inherent quality of 
an entity; that any attribution of a legal status upon an entity is, indirectly, also a recognition 
of that entity’s capacity for being a holder of rights and duties and thus, of being if not 
necessarily a person in law, at least of not being an object; that any given legal status has, at 
its basis, some underlying reason (an interest) for its existence and for being ascribed to 
particular entities and that, related to this, the content of a status is a sensible set of rights and 
duties that are attached to the status-word in the light of the status’s underlying rationale. 
Finally, I also agree that the relation between the entitlements and the access criteria is not 
random or arbitrary, but rather that the two are strongly interrelated. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
LEGAL PERSONHOOD  
 
The person is one of the fundamental notions of law and legal science. The person as the 
subject of law is at the centre of every legal transaction, statutory, constitutional or any other 
legal norm; indeed, the person is at the core of any and all legal systems as such. All this is 
not controversial. What is, however, much disputed, is who or what can be deemed a person 
in law; and related to this, how the person as a legal institute should best be conceptualized.  
In the previous chapter, I examined the notion of legal status, or better, several conceptions 
thereof. One fundamental distinction between the presented conceptions was between a more 
“substantive” approach which saw a legal status as a special long-term condition of “ab-
normal” individuals (e.g. married women, infants, lunatics etc.) and more “formal” 
approaches which conceive of status as a technical instrument for compressing information. 
At the end of this examination, I espoused one such conception, which sees a legal status not 
only as an instrument of expressive economy but also accepts that any legal status has an 
underlying rationale to it which partially informs its content (the normative consequences or 
entitlements attached to it). On this understanding of status, moreover, the content of a status 
at least partially co-determines the access criteria of that same status. 
In this chapter, I take this idea of legal status and use it to claim that the notion of person in 
law is a legal status that can be represented in more or less the same manner as just described. 
Thus, in the first section (3.1.), I sketch out a proposal for such an understanding of the notion 
of a person in law. I stipulate that the content of the status of person (the normative 
consequences or entitlements) is to be sought a series of legal capacities (3.1.1.). On this 
basis, in the next section (3.2.), I look at a series of competing theories of legal personhood, 
i.e. theories giving different responses as to who or what may count as a person in law. These 
theories can be distinguished into formalist ones (3.2.1.) and substantive ones (3.2.2.). While 
these theories provide greatly diverging views of the person in law, they nevertheless share 
the ontological supposition that, in law, all entities can either be classified as persons or as 
things: tertium non datur. This view, however entrenched it may be, has recently come under 
criticism for it is proving inadequate for explaining the nature of an ever increasing set of 
entities that can neither be described as persons nor as things. Hence, in the last section (3.3.), 
I discuss one recent proposal for expanding the ontological universe in this ambit. 
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3.1. The person as an intermediary legal concept? A proposal  
 
In this section, I sketch out a proposal for understanding the person in law as a legal status 
conformant to the conception developed above (see 2.6.).  
First of all, following our conceptualization, we have to demonstrate that “person” can 
function as an intermediary legal term. For this purpose, the term should be able to pass the 
test proposed by Brożek (above, 2.5.). Accordingly, we should be able to identify a (partial) 
meaning postulate regarding the term person. As we will later see (3.2.), according to certain 
substantive theories of personhood, being a natural-born human being is the prerequisite 
(often the only one) for being deemed a person in law. Thus, we can form a (partial) meaning 
postulate such as “If x is a natural-born human being, then x is a person (in law)”. 
Furthermore, there should also be identifiable a norm in which the term person, used in the 
description of a state of affairs triggers the norm’s application. Being a person in law entails a 
series of normative consequences: for instance, it is often presumed that something like the 
following statement obtains: “If x is a person (in law), then x has the capacity to obtain rights 
and duties (in law)”. These two statements can easily be modified so that the word person is 
omitted from both of them without any loss of meaning. Thus, we can merge two the 
statements into a new statement “If x is a natural-born human being, then x has the capacity to 
obtain rights and duties (in law)”. In this simple way, it is proven, or so I believe, that “person 
(in law)” does indeed function an intermediary legal term – a tû-tû. 
However, as with other legal statuses that we have dealt with (e.g. infancy, citizenship), the 
person, too, should not be seen only as an intermediary legal term. There is more to the notion 
of person than just being an intermediate concept connecting access criteria and entitlements. 
Following the above presented authors (see 2.5. & 2.6.), I have argued that there is some 
“rationale” for the existence of a given status; or that there exists some “underlying idea” as to 
why we have a particular status. The same should then be the case with the status of a person 
as well. So what is that underlying rationale when it comes to the status of person?  
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A comprehensive answer to this question would require (at least) an extensive sociological, 
anthropological and psychological investigation of its own.
33
 But such an inquiry is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. I shall therefore limit myself to giving a very approximate, sketchy 
answer. 
Often legal scholars like to compare law to some game, like chess or baseball or some other, 
because they share many fundamental characteristics.
34
 Such games are, first of all, rule-
constituted. These rules prescribe, among other things, how (by way of which permitted 
actions) one can achieve the ultimate goal of the game, that is, to win the game. The rules of 
the game also prescribe which actions are prohibited in the course of the game and, 
presumably, also determine the sanctions for breaking these rules. However, and more 
importantly for our discussion, the rules of a given game also have to determine (i) who gets 
to play the game and (ii) who (or what) gets to be played with. In other terms, determining the 
active participants (the subjects) of the game and the passive objects of their play is one of the 
constitutive requirements for the establishment and playing of any game whatsoever. 
The same, mutatis mutandis, applies to law. The law, in general, is made of rules that 
determine what is required in order to obtain a certain (desired) normative consequence. For 
instance, if we wish to purchase a real estate, the law will spell out the conditions we need to 
meet in order to perform the transaction (e.g. be legally adults, citizens, have the contract of 
sales authenticated by a notary etc.). The law also contains a series of rules that prohibit, in 
general and for specific areas of law, certain actions in pursuit of the desired aims. For 
example, in selling a real estate, it is not permitted to withhold vital information regarding the 
property to the buyer. Finally, it also prescribes sanctions for the specific violations which 
vary from pecuniary sanctions to sanctions regarding the formal validity of certain acts (e.g. 
nullity) and to more sever criminal law sanctions (e.g. incarceration). 
But as in games, so in the legal game as well, we also need to first and foremost establish who 
gets to participate in it. Which entities will be deemed players of the legal game (i.e. subjects 
of law or persons) and which the objects of that game, will depend, clearly, on the decision of 
the game-creator, in this case the law-maker (the legislator). Whatever that decision may be, 
one thing is certain: upon being deemed either persons or things, the real-world empirical 
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 Cfr. Carrithers, Collins & Lukes (Eds.) 1985. 
34
 Cfr. Marmor 2006. 
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entities
35
 are immediately transformed into artificial entities of the legal game i.e. they 
become subjects of law. Only as such may they actively participate in the game or, 
alternatively, be its passive participants. 
The above said tells us something very important about the status of a person in law, namely 
that legal personhood is a primary or original and a fundamental legal status. This means that 
legal personhood precedes and is a precondition of any other legal status an individual may 
come to hold. One cannot obtain the status of, let say, an infant, a debtor or a university 
professor, if she is not legally a person already. At the same time, legal personhood – at least 
its passive part (see below, 3.1.1.), is also a threshold legal status in that it marks the most 
basic qualitative distinction between entities in law: the one between subjects and objects of 
law (or, between persons and things).  
Another key characteristic of games is that they have a particular purpose or a function. 
Besides the apparent immediate purpose of any given game, i.e. to be somehow finished 
(won) by one or more players, games also usually have other, more profound purposes. In 
reference to one particular game, Marmor (2009: 40) argues that it “can only be understood 
on the background of understanding a whole range of social needs and various aspects of 
human nature, such as our need to play games, to win, to be intellectually challenged, to be 
able to understand a distinction between real-life concerns and ‘artificial’ or ‘detached’ 
structures of interaction, and so forth.” Thus, games are designed to satisfy some important 
human needs. By extension, the same can be said of the function of the roles players of the 
game assume.  
While the analogous answer as to the underlying function (or functions) of law would be 
much more complex – law surely serves numerous different and sometimes conflicting 
functions and satisfies more complex interests than games do –, an attempt to answer the 
question regarding the function of the status of the person in law can nevertheless be made. 
Actually, the answer has already been provided, albeit indirectly. We have said that some 
rules of legal system – and here I should add that they needn’t necessarily be explicit rules – 
must determine who or what can participate in the legal game as an active participant (a 
subject) of the legal game. This being so, the status of a person in law is an instrument 
through which specific players of the legal game are created – and distinguished from the 
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 Here I am ignoring the non-empirical, purely institutional persons whose creation process is somewhat 
different as well as the objects of law. 
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objects of the legal game. As natural entities as such cannot act in law, the role or the function 
of the status of person of establishing players (subjects) of the legal game is fundamental in 
making the legal game possible at all. 
Following our model of status, this underlying and most often implicit “legal-game-enabling” 
function of the status ought to be, in some way, reflected in the status itself that is in its 
content. What does the idea informing the status of person – its underlying function – tell us 
about what content of the status is (ought to be)? In other words, what does it mean that an 
entity is able to participate in the legal game? What does this ability consist of? 
Let us take up the example of the game of baseball. Although I am no expert on the game, I 
am nevertheless certain that its constitutive rules distinguish between those who are active 
participants of the game (the players) and those who are the passive objects of the game. 
Whether or not there is a precise rule with regard I am unsure, but that matters little because 
other rules of the game surely explicitly distinguish between different types of players, such 
as the pitcher, the batter, the shortstop etc., and ascribe to each of these types of players 
certain powers to make certain actions within the game with the respective objects of the 
game. They also preclude these players from performing certain actions by virtue of the role 
that they occupy and provide sanctions for their violations. Likewise, the rules also 
distinguish between different types of objects in the game, like the base-ball, the bat, the bases 
etc. 
The reason why I said that it is irrelevant whether or not there is an explicit game rule that 
distinguishes between players and objects of the game is that the rule of the game by 
explicitly constituting the different types of players also simultaneously determine that all 
these players are, as such, capable of playing the game itself. Thus, the players’ general 
capacity to play the game is implied by the fact that the rules of the game consider them either 
pitchers, batters etc. The same holds for the legal game: legal rules that ascribe different 
statuses to individuals or provide for their capacity to obtain a given legal status or an 
individual right implicitly presuppose (and re-affirm) that the individual has the general 
capacity to have legal rights and duties; that she is, in other terms, a person. An explanation 
that would run counter to this general idea would seem to me quite senseless: how could some 
entity that is not generally recognized as a person in law and thus capable of holding the 
generality of legal rights and duties be also capable of being or be), let say, a university 
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professor or a prisoner? Such an arrangement, though not unknown in our history, strikes me 
as utterly illogical. 
On the basis of the above said, I stipulate that the content of the status of a person in law (that 
is, the normative consequences or the entitlements attached to the status) is a general legal 
capacity to hold legal rights and bear legal duties. In other words, the capacity to play the 
legal game.  It is only in further instances that legal subjects are distinguished on the basis of 
different types of capacities and incapacities to perform specific legal acts or to hold specific 
rights and duties. 
The concept of legal capacity is crucial for this investigation and I will soon have more to say 
about it (below, 3.1.1.). But I should finish this general presentation of the idea of the status of 
person as a (intermediary) legal status by saying something more on the connection between 
the content of the status and the access criteria. We have come to argue that there exists a 
strong interrelation between the two elements of the status. While we needn’t go so far as to 
argue that there exists a functional connection between them (from the entitlements to the 
access criteria), we must nevertheless admit that the access criteria do, at least in part, depend 
on the function (rationale) of the status – and thus indirectly on its content. When it comes to 
the status of a person, a status with particular fundamental importance in law, we may 
furthermore claim that the access criteria depend on more than just the internal, purely 
instrumental function of the status itself. It can be said that the access to legal personhood, 
being a particular threshold status, is, in part, determined also by the deeper social convictions 
about who (or what) ought to be recognized as a person in law. This issue will be further 
touched upon below (see 3.2. and 3.3.). 
 
3.1.1. Specifically on legal capacity  
 
“Legal capacity”, as the purported content of legal personhood, is both an ambiguous and a 
vague notion and as such of little use for our further analysis. It should, therefore, be 
adequately specified.  
The term “capacity” alludes to someone’s ability to do something, to perform a certain action. 
If, for instance, I have the capacity to break the world sprinting record, this means that I have 
the adequate physical abilities to run faster than anyone else in the world. Clearly not all 
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(types of) human beings have the same natural capacities: young children, for instance, are 
not able to perform most of the actions that can adults can. It would therefore be senseless to 
argue that all human beings, as such, have the same capacities. Yet, in law, the notion “legal 
capacity” is widely understood as meaning the general and equal characteristic of all (natural) 
persons for being the (potential) subject of the generality of legal relations of a particular legal 
order (Cuniberti 2006: 476). Often it is even understood as an intrinsic quality of the person 
that, as such, cannot be taken away from anyone (Alpa & Ansaldo 2013: 73, 232).  
However, just as in real life, in law as well it makes little sense to speak of one, general and 
equal legal capacity. As young children are both physically and intellectually more limited 
than adults, it should follow that they should not have the same legal capacity as adults. 
Depending on their age, they are more or less incapable of understanding the long-term 
effects of many, if not all, of their actions and hence cannot assume responsibility for them. 
This, in consequence, is (should be) reflected in law as their inability or limited ability for 
entering into legal (contractual) relations on their own. Law then, does in fact distinguish 
between different types of capacities in law.  
Neil MacCormick (1988 & 2007) proposes to distinguish between (i) passive capacity and (ii) 
active capacity; he then proceeds to further distinguish (i.i.) pure passive capacity and (i.ii) 
passive transactional capacity, on the one side, and (ii.i.) capacity responsibility and (ii.ii) 
transactional capacity, on the other side.  
(i.i) As for the pure passive capacity, MacCormick argues that it is “an entity's capability in 
law to be the beneficiary of some legal provision or provisions, in the sense that these 
provisions are interpreted as aiming at protecting such an entity from some harm or at 
advancing some interest or another of that entity” (MacCormick 2007: 86). In other words, it 
is “the condition of being eligible to receive the protection of the law for one’s own sake 
rather than as a means to some other end for its own sake” (MacCormick 2007: 94).  
It follows from the above definition that whether something will be perceived as having pure 
passive capacity – and in this very limited sense be considered a person, will ultimately 
depend on our interpretation of the “justifying grounds” of a particular law or legal provision. 
For example: a law criminalizing an assault on another individual will normally be interpreted 
as safeguarding the bodily integrity of human beings. Hence, it can be argued that the 
presumed aim of that provision is aimed directly at protecting a given interest of human 
beings. On the other hand, MacCormick gives an example of a law prohibiting demolition of 
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historic buildings and argues that the interest protected in this case is presumably not that of 
the physical identity of the buildings but rather the advancement of cultural interests of human 
beings. Here, then, the protected good is only a means for the advancement of someone else’s 
interests). Finally, MacCormick argues that the case of animal protection laws is in this regard 
a controversial example with some interpreting them as protecting certain human interests and 
others as directly protecting animal bodily integrity (see MacCormick 2007: 86). 
(i.ii) Passive transactional capacity is defined as the “[c]apacity to take the benefit or the 
burden created through a certain transaction” (MacCormick 2007: 87). It is, adds 
MacCormick, “the capacity to be acted upon with legal effect through some form of legal 
transaction or act-in-the-law, whether the effect be beneficial or detrimental” (Ibid.). This 
capacity, then, is relative to legal transactions or other (unilateral) legal acts. In the case of a 
legal transaction, say a contract, it is of course necessary that at least one of the parties 
possesses adequate active capacities in order for the transaction to be legally valid. The active 
party must perform her act(s) “toward or for the behoof of some other, or effecting the 
imposition of some legal burden on another” (MacCormick 1988: 382). Of course, the passive 
party (the recipient of the benefit or of the burden) must also be itself capable of obtaining the 
intended benefit or burden. For instance, in the provided examples of this capacity, which 
include being the beneficiary of a promise although incapable of making a binding promise or 
becoming the owner of a property by gift even if incapable of managing it (Ibid.), a human 
infant (and in certain cases even an unborn human being) can undoubtedly be the recipient of 
such acts-in-the-law, whereas a body of water, such as a river, cannot. Animals are again a 
disputed case.
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According to MacCormick, passive capacity is the threshold that distinguishes persons from 
non-persons: “possession of some at least minimal legal capacity or capacities is of the 
essence of personatness in law” (MacCormick 2007: 94). There is no need that, in order to 
recognize it as a person in law, an entity be empowered with a full set of legal capacities. 
Rather, “passive capacity is fully conceivable as inhering in some being or entity wholly 
lacking in any active capacity. Possession in some measure of some range of passive capacity 
should be considered the minimum element of legal personatenness” (MacCormick 2007: 
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88).
37
 It is precisely for situations in which particular entities lack active capacities to carry 
out legal transactions (to “enforce, secure, uphold or vindicate” their own rights), “that 
various devices of representation have been evolved or developed by law. These ensure that 
some person having active capacity in law is made responsible to act for the interest of the 
person endowed with purely passive capacity (MacCormick 2007: 88; emphasis mine). A 
typical example of such representation is the obligation of parents to care for and administer 
their under-aged child’s property.  
When determining to whom legal personhood can and ought to be ascribed, what matters in 
the final instance is whether “some state of affairs is conceived of sufficient value to merit 
some legal protection for its own sake” (MacCormick 2007: 88). What this is so, continues 
the author, “it may even be the case that conferment of some minimal personate status even on 
inanimate objects can be considered a useful device” (Ibid.; emphasis mine). The attribution 
of such a “thin” legal personhood does not even require that the recipient entity be endowed 
with certain “natural human or at least animal capabilities” (Ibid.). This goes to show that 
virtually any type of entity can be attributed with this kind of legal personhood, regardless of 
its natural capacities. What matters, is that “the law” perceives that there is sufficient value in 
some state of affairs and decides to protect it “for its own sake”. 
Passive capacities, however, are only one part of the system. The whole purpose of law and 
legal personhood is, as I have come to claim, to enable different entities to actively participate 
in the legal game, to engage in legal transactions. As MacCormick reminds us, if law is to be 
seen as (function as) an action guiding mechanism, the idea of active capacities – and of 
actively capable agents – must necessarily, albeit implicitly, be present in a legal system (see 
MacCormick 1988: 385f & 2007: 90). In general, “the (active) legal capacities a person has 
are the conditions in law of his or her being able to act with full legal effect either in the way 
of committing some wrongful act or exercising some liberty of action, or in the way of 
effecting some legal transaction” (MacCormick 2007: 89-90). Thus, the paradigmatic 
examples of a person in law cannot be a purely passive person, such as a child. It is, rather, a 
person that possesses “a full range of passive and active capacities” (MacCormick 2007: 95). 
Paradigmatic examples of such persons are adult human beings of sound mind.  
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 This seems to be in accordance with Allen’s view, for he claims that the passive capacity (to enjoy rights) is 
“an absolutely essential characteristic of personality and can never be divorced from it” and that “[t]o say that a 
person has capacity for enjoying rights is merely to say that he is a person.” See Allen 1930: 291. 
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This distinction between fully legally capable adults and only passively capable children goes 
to show that active capacities are “by law made dependent on enduring (though not 
necessarily permanent) features of a person” (MacCormick 2007: 90). These features are, of 
course, legally determined and can either be non-institutional, such as age, gender, mental 
competence etc. or institutional, such as citizenship, matrimonial status, solvency and so forth 
(Ibid.). In our example, the justifying ground for limiting the active capacities of children is 
their limited cognitive capacities which prevent them from being able to fully comprehend the 
complexities involved in legal transactions, especially the possible consequences of assumed 
burdens. MacCormick distinguishes between capacity-responsibility (ii.i) and transactional 
capacity (ii.ii), respectively. 
(ii.i) Capacity responsibility regards the question “whether or not one can be subjected to 
criminal or civil liability to sanctions for one’s acts” (MacCormick 2007: 91). This capacity, 
MacCormick emphasizes, should be distinguished from “capacity-for-liability”, i.e. the 
capacity to be held liable, which is a form of passive transactional capacity.  Most often the 
two will go hand in hand, but they needn’t. Very young children, for example, cannot, 
according to (modern) law, form a criminal intent – they do not have the capacity to act and 
thus cannot commit a crime (i.e. cannot be liable to be held legally guilty of crimes). On the 
other hand, for some special reason like in the case of diplomatic immunity, individuals are 
not deemed incapable of acting (thus have the capacity to act), but they are incapable of being 
held liable for their actions. Here we should also mention the special case of (US antebellum) 
slaves who though they were not considered persons in law, were nevertheless held criminally 
liable for their acts.
38
 
As law is, in general, a system for governing the actions of rational agents, capacity 
responsibility is its fundamental feature. “It is this ability which is essential to either being 
judged a wrongdoer or being deemed one who does no wrong in respect of some given act or 
omission” (MacCormick 2997: 92-3). Capacity for responsibility necessarily complements 
other active capacities such as the capacity to enter into contracts. That is because, as Kurki 
notes, if individuals were “merely able to perform legal acts but could not be held criminally 
and/or civilly responsible, their practical ability to contract would be severely diminished 
because any potential contractees would have limited legal recourse in the case of non-
fulfilment” (Kurki 2017: 157). 
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 See more on that in Fede 1992: especially Ch.8. 
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(ii.ii) Finally, MacCormick defines transactional capacity as the “ability to exercise legal 
power, that is, to perform some act which is deemed to bring about some valid legal effect” 
(MacCormick 2007: 93). This effect can be seen, for example, in limiting a particular liberty 
(e.g. giving a valid promise – non-performance becomes a wrong towards the promisee) or, 
alternatively, in making permissible something that would otherwise be prohibited (e.g. by 
giving one’s consent for a surgical intervention, one allows that his bodily integrity be 
violated) (see MacCormick 2007: 93). Capacities for transactions are actually numerous and 
certain types of transactions often require additional conditions to be met. Surely the most 
typical example of transaction capacity is the contractual capacity. 
MacCormick emphasizes that the significance of the exercise of a legal power and in the 
consequent creation of a “valid legal effect” is in the “judicial enforceability of sanctions for 
legal wrongs” and in the consequent “judicial duty to give effect by enforcement to all validly 
established legal relations and arrangements” (MacCormick 2007: 93). The key notion in this 
is then the creation of “valid legal effect” through acts-in-the-law. 
Power-conferring provisions, however, are subject to a condition “which determines which 
kinds of persons having what characteristics can bring about this result by a relevant act 
(MacCormick 2007: 93-4). Thus, just as capacity responsibility, transactional capacity is 
likewise subject to qualification. Normally, only entities possessing certain personal 
characteristics (e.g. a certain age, being of sound mind etc.) may exercise certain powers 
(such as making a contract, transferring property etc.). The most classic case of such a 
restriction is the limitation of the contractual capacity of children due to their age (and, as a 
consequence, their limited intellectual capacities). However, as they mature, children are 
gradually acknowledged more and more competences to engage in legal transactions on their 
own. Hence, sometimes between transactional incompetence and full transactional 
competence intermediate categories of limited competences are also constructed. 
* 
The person in law is not, as it has emerged from the above presentation, a static and a uniform 
status; depending on which types of legal capacities an individual entity possesses, its legal 
personhood can either be thicker or thinner. The thinnest persons in law possess only the 
passive capacity for being beneficiaries of some benefit provided by the law; seen from a 
different perspective, it suffices for some entity to be recognized as a person in law that a 
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single right-claim be ascribed to it. On this side of things hardly any limit exists as to what 
kind of an entity may be treated as a person.  
On the other side of this personhood spectrum, the thickest persons possess all four types of 
capacities to the fullest degree. These persons are, at least in principle, fully capable of 
performing any act-in-the-law on their own and for their account. Of course, in order for an 
entity to be endowed with such personhood, it ought to possess certain physical (cognitive) 
capacities, particularly it should be sufficiently intellectually developed in order to express its 
own will freely and be able to comprehend the consequences of its actions. Adult human 
beings of sound mind are paradigmatic examples of this thick kind of persons in law. 
While in this section I focused on the “entitlements” part of the legal personhood status 
construction, I will now proceed with examining different theories that regard the “access 
criteria” part of the same status.  
 
 
3.2. Who is law for?  
 
It is typical for legal scholars to ponder the nature of the law as such and the reasons for 
having law. In so doing they are addressing questions like “what is law” and “what is law 
for”. Countless highly divergent and conflicting answers have been provided regarding these 
questions.  
This thesis, however, is not interested in discussing these questions (at least not directly). As 
has by now become clear, my interest rather lies in understanding who or what can be a 
person in or a subject of law. The question that I am pursuing here is therefore something like 
“who is law for” (Naffine 2009: 1). I shall explore what this question entails as I proceed.  
The questions concerning the “nature” of the person in law are manifold and the literature on 
them too vast to be analysed thoroughly. This is why in the present section I do not pretend to 
be either exhaustive or particularly detailed in my examination of the existing theories of legal 
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personhood.
39
 Rather, I will only provide a basic overview of the most distinct scholarly 
positions on the matter. 
I imagine that for many lawyers the question “who is law for” might appear trivial, if not 
senseless. Most would tell you that law is, of course, for people, human beings.
40
 Law exists 
to guide human behaviour, to protect individuals’ interests, resolve inter-personal conflicts, 
and so forth. The law is made by humans, for humans. All other (living) entities feature in law 
merely as the objects of man’s actions and relations. 
Upon further consideration, however, these lawyers would probably tell you that, as a matter 
of fact, law considers as its subjects not only human beings (who in law are called natural 
persons) but also certain non-human entities, the so-called juridical persons. A typical 
example of such a juridical person is the corporation.
41
 While these entities are not human – 
indeed they are not even physical entities, but rather institutional ones
42
 – the law nevertheless 
ascribes legal personhood to them as well as imputes them with rights and duties as if they 
were their own.
43
 But even though the rights and duties ascribed to a juridical person are 
legally its own – and not of those human individuals who own or operate it –, the underlying 
reason for constructing and maintaining this legal fiction
44
 is ultimately the satisfaction of 
certain interests and needs of human individuals that might otherwise not be protected or 
satisfied.  
It follows from the above said that although the terms person and human being (man, 
individual etc.) are strongly connected, they should not be equated.
45
 In law, the notion of 
person has always had a very technical meaning, different from the meaning it is attributed in 
ordinary, everyday language. It is highly likely that any trained lawyer, regardless of her 
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 Neither does it pretend to be historically detailed.  For the conceptualization of the person in Roman law, from 
where the notion originates, see for instance Marrone 2006: 186-274; for a concise historical overview of the 
legal status of the person, see Orestano 1978: Part III; Tarello 1976 & 1978; Viola 1999; Zarka 1999; Davies & 
Naffine 2001: 57ff;  
40
 Hohfeld, for example, is categorical about this. He argues that “since the purpose of law is to regulate the 
conduct of human beings, all jural relations must, in order to be clear and direct in their meaning, be predicated 
of such human beings.” (Hohfeld  1923: 75; italics are mine). 
41
 Kelsen, for example, defines the corporation as “a group of individuals treated by the law as a unity, namely as 
a person having rights and duties distinct from those of the individuals composing it” (Kelsen 2006: 96). For a 
classical examination of the corporate legal personhood, see Dewey 1926. 
42
 On institutional facts see more in Searle 1995. 
43
 According to Kelsen, “[a] corporation is regarded as a person because there the legal order stipulates certain 
legal rights and duties which concern the interests of the members of the corporation but which do not seem to 
be rights and duties of the members and are, therefore, interpreted as rights and duties of the corporation itself” 
See Kelsen 2006: 96 (italics are mine). 
44
 On legal fictions in general, see Fuller 1967. 
45
 Cfr. McHugh 1992. 
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philosophical or religious background, will tell you that the proper meaning of the notion of 
person in law is something like “the holder, or potential holder, of rights and duties” or “a 
rights-and-duties-bearing unit” and that as such it is primarily a formal legal construct which 
is not to be mistaken for the natural human being (cfr. Naffine 2009: 1).
46
  
This, however, does not mean that law does not also establish a necessary connection between 
the two notions: in numerous legal orders you find provisions establishing, for instance, that 
legal capacity is acquired at birth. It can be argued that in this way law implicitly presupposes 
that legal capacity, as the (supposed) content of legal personhood, can be acquired by, and 
only by, human beings.
47
 While today it may be an established normative principle that all 
human beings are to be considered persons in law, this, however, is neither historically true 
nor conceptually necessary. Historically speaking, we need only to look back some 150 years 
to see that certain human beings were not, just because of the colour of their skin, considered 
persons in law, but rather treated as objects of law, mere property.
48
 As we will see later on, 
this problem has even today not entirely disappeared (see below, Part II: 6.1.). On the 
conceptual side of things, we see that the logic behind the technical-legal sense of the notion 
may lead to the conclusion that the person in law could be “anyone or thing that the law is 
willing to endow with the capacity to bear rights and duties” (Naffine 2009: 7). Indeed, if 
legal personhood is understood technical sense of the word, “[t]here are no logical or formal 
limits to who or even what might be considered a suitable subject for the bearing of rights and 
duties” (Naffine 2009: 7). 
Many, however, would probably object to such an “empty” formalistic and extensive 
understanding of legal personhood. The most radical opponents of such an approach would 
argue, I imagine, that the law(-giver) should not be artificially “inventing” its subject, 
devaluing in this way the central and very special place human beings have in our world. 
Instead, law should but “discover” its subject. On this perspective, “law is always confronted 
with prior natural subjects of rights (real persons before the law in both a temporal and spatial 
sense) to which personifying legal rights and duties must be fitted in a manner which honours 
their nature” (Naffine 2009: 2). Thus, the law’s subject should be merely a reflection of an a 
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 The “legal-person-as-right-holder” position is the paradigmatic and the predominant view of the person in 
legal scholarship. However, recently it has been challenged by Kurki (2017). I will briefly mention his challenge 
in the next section (3.3.). 
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 See, for instance, Art.1 of the Italian Civil Code or Article 8 of the Polish Civil Code. 
48
 On the question of slavery, see for instance: Dayan 2011; Fede 1992; Fehrenbacher 1981; Haney López 2006; 
Harris 1993; Patterson 1982. In general, on the issue of the creation of “equal” legal subjectivity, see Tarello 
1976 & 1978. 
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priori existing moral person – however this latter may be defined. While lawyers subscribing 
to this view of legal personhood might disagree about what it is that makes human beings 
special (be it their rational nature, being made in God’ image, or something else) and in this 
way also disagree as to the proper extension of legal personhood, they would nevertheless 
agree that “the legal person is an expression of some important defining attribute of human 
nature” (Naffine 2009: 22). Hence, on this view, the criteria for attributing legal personhood 
are always pre- or extra-legal. 
The above said leads us to think that in the contemporary discussion on legal personhood we 
are presented with a clear-cut choice: we either accept that the person in law is an artificial 
creation whose extension depends exclusively on criteria determined by the law(-giver) itself 
(the formalist approach) or, alternatively, we acknowledge that the law’s person is only a 
reflection of a law-independent, a priori existing moral person (the Metaphysical Realist 
approach).
49
 Tertium non datur.  
Whether or not these two positions are actually the only way we can think about the person in 
law remains to be seen. Undoubtedly they have been the predominant views on personhood 
for much of our history. However, regardless of the answer to this problem, one thing appears 
to be clear in all this: whichever the philosophical perspective they espouse, scholars agree 
that the concept of the person in law is in some way special or fundamental and stands at the 
very centre of law. This importance of the notion of person for law – and beyond – is well 
expressed by Naffine:  
Through its concept of the person, law helps to define who matters. The scope and nature of 
legal personification are both barometers of social and moral thought and the means of 
practically enforcing those ideas: of giving them the force of law. Law thus absorbs, reflects and 
expresses ideas in the broader culture about what and who is of value and why (2009: 11). 
What this quote reveals, is that the legal conception of the person is fundamentally related to 
social (moral) ideas about who matters. The judgment as to whom (a particular kind of) legal 
personhood will be ascribed is, at least in part, a reflection of some more basic social 
agreement – with “agreement” understood in a very loose sense – as to which entities (beings) 
deserve respect for their own sake and which, alternatively, are seen as only instrumental for 
the good of the former. 
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 Cfr. Brożek (2017: 7) who, differently, claims that the 20th century debate on the notion of personhood has 
developed along two positions: the descriptive conception which defines the person according to certain 
empirical criteria, such as the ability to feel, self-awareness, autonomy etc. and the axiological conception which 
sees the person as “a bearer of values and hence a moral agent, responsible for her actions”. 
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Any such underlying social agreement does not, in my opinion, necessarily repudiate the 
formalist approach to personhood. This is so, because, as Fagundes notes, the law does more 
than just express or reflect social ideas: it also “shapes behavior by creating social norms that 
people use to measure the morality and worth of their actions” (2001: 1760). If the law 
changes peoples’ actions, we speak about its “the behavioral effect”, whereas if it changes 
their beliefs, we speak of its hermeneutic effect. Fagundes argues that in reference to the law 
of persons, the hermeneutic aspect of law’s expressive function is especially relevant: 
When the law manipulates status distinctions through the use of the metaphor ‘person,’ it 
necessarily expresses a conception of the relative worth of the objects included and excluded 
by the scope of that metaphor. These expressions then affect general understandings of 
personhood and regard for the objects of the law, as the law’s values influence society’s value 
(Fagundes 2001: 1760). 
This is corroborated by Naffine, who argues that by distinguishing who counts as a person 
and who does not, the law “powerfully assists in the determination of the normal and the 
abnormal, the intrinsically valuable and that which is mainly for use” (Naffine 2009: 11). 
Thus, while the underlying social views on the issue are streamed into law, they needn’t be 
the exclusive source that informs the law’s person. The law may (semi)autonomously develop 
its own conception of the person, providing its own criteria for status-attribution. By doing so, 
the law also feeds this “new” notion of the person into society, in this way – at least partly – 
modifying the society’s views on the matter.  
Two types of theories on legal personhood have been identified in this somewhat longer 
introduction, namely “formalist” and “substantive” ones. In Naffine’s terminology they are 
called Legalists and Metaphysical Realists, respectively.
50
 In the first subsection (3.2.1.), I 
present the “formalist” conception of personhood in general and Hans Kelsen’s in particular. 
Thereafter (3.2.2.), I discuss several different substantive or “realist” theories of personhood. 
 
3.2.1. A formalist  approach to personhood  
 
Those who subscribe to the formalist account of personhood, “represent the orthodox, 
technical approach to law’s person” (Naffine 2009: 21). On their view, the notion of the 
person is constructed exclusively within the confines of the law itself: “the concept of the 
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 The distinction can also be put, very roughly speaking, in more familiar terms as one between legal positivists 
and natural lawyers. See Davies & Naffine 2001: 52. 
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person is internal to law and essentially a matter of formal legal definition” (Naffine 2009: 
22).  
Formalists believe that law(yers) should not engage in extra-legal, ontological determinations. 
That doesn’t mean that they reject the possibility that there exists some “real” person beyond 
the law, in the natural world – neither do they affirm it. Rather, they are silent on the matter 
and believe that it is unnecessary and undesirable to seek for law’s person outside of the realm 
of law – be it in philosophy, biology, psychology, religion etc. (see Naffine 2009: 22). For 
them, legal personhood is not the law’s recognition of some special nature of certain entities, 
for instance, of the human beings’ cognitive superiority over all other beings. On their view, 
there is “no necessary relation between any given set of human characteristics (say, the ability 
to reason and reflect) and legal personality” (Davies & Naffine 2001: 54). Instead, they see 
legal personhood as merely an instrument, “a formal and neutral device for enabling a being 
or entity to act in law, to acquire what is known as a ‘legal personality’: the ability to bear 
rights and duties” (Naffine 2009: 21).  
Considerations regarding the attribution of legal personhood are therefore primarily 
instrumental according to this view. For example, a foetus may be ascribed legal personhood 
for the purpose of inheritance law, but denied the status when it comes to the issue of abortion 
(see Thomas 2011: 633). For the formalists, the ascription of personhood is not dependent 
upon ideological consideration that advocates, for example, that all human life is sacred and 
should thus be protected by law from conception onwards. Rather, the ascription of 
personhood “depends on, and is formed from, specifically legal purposes” (Naffine 2009: 21).  
Followed to its logical conclusion, this argument holds that the extension of legal personhood, 
i.e. the set of entities to which legal personhood can be ascribed, is not a priori delimited. If 
there is no underlying ideology (philosophy) determining who or what can be a person and if 
the law-giver is free in this respect to follow her instrumental considerations, then in seems 
the case that (more or less) “anything goes, anything or anyone can be endowed with rights 
and so become a legal person” – “as long as it is compatible with the purpose of any particular 
law” (Ibid).51  
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 Cfr. Lawson (1957: 915): “All that is necessary for the existence of a person is that the lawmaker ... should 
decide to treat it as a subject of rights and other legal relations. /.../ Once this point is reached, a vista of 
unrestricted liberty opens up before the jurist, unrestricted, that is, by any need to make a person resemble a man 
or a collection of men” (emphasis mine).   
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Hans Kelsen can be considered a typical representative of the formalist position on the 
question of legal personhood. Let us briefly examine his position. 
In his treatment of the person, Kelsen is true to his Pure Theory which fervorously 
distinguishes between the world of facts and the world of norms (see Kelsen 2002 & 2005). 
The two worlds are to be neatly distinguished and “[n]obody can assert that from the 
statement that something is, follows a statement that something ought to be, or vice versa” 
(Kelsen 2005: 6). Concepts belonging to one sphere should therefore not be mixed with those 
belonging to the other. It is therefore understandable that Kelsen was critical of the traditional 
definitions of the person which held that the person is “the human being as a subject of rights 
and obligations” (Kelsen 2005: 171; 2006: 94). 
First of all, on Kelsen’s view, the above statement is incorrect, because an individual cannot 
be a subject of a right or a duty; she cannot “have” rights and duties. What this statement is 
actually to mean is that “a certain behavior of this individual is the content of a legally 
established obligation [or right]” (Kelsen 2005: 169). Legal cognition, therefore, is not 
interested in and does not deal with the individual as such, with the human being tout court, 
but only with her conduct insofar as it is the content of legal norms. Most of one’s actions lie 
outside of law’s domain so that only a part of her actions, those that are the content of legal 
norms, are of law’s interest. For instance, it is usually of no concern to the legislator whether 
citizens drink their tea with milk or not; the legislator, however, usually is concerned with 
whether or not citizens pay their taxes. Only such actions, then, are relevant for the concept of 
the legal person. If the individual human being cannot “have” rights and duties, it is therefore 
only the person that has them. “The person”, says Kelsen, “exists only insofar as he ‘has’ 
duties and rights; apart from them the person has no existence whatsoever” (Kelsen 2006: 94).   
This leads us to a conclusion I emphasized in the introduction to this section: namely, that the  
the human being is not the physical (natural) person. The two concepts belong to two 
completely different worlds: the human is a concept of the natural sciences (the world of 
facts), while the person is a jurisprudential concept (the world of norms).
52
 The traditional 
definition of the person should therefore be rejected. 
However, according to Kelsen, it is also not correct to say – as I just did – that it is the person 
that “has” rights and duties. That is because, on his view, “the physical (natural) person is the 
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 See more on that in Paulson 1997: 225ff. 
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personification of a set of legal norms which by constituting duties and rights containing the 
conduct of one and the same human being regulate the conduct of this being” (Kelsen 2006: 
94f). It would be redundant and incorrect to say that the person has rights and duties: the 
person is no real entity that can have anything. It is but a legal construct and as such its only 
existence is as a personification of a specific set of legal norms. Its connection with an 
individual human being is in the fact that the personified set of norms refers to the actions of 
one and the same human being (Kelsen 2006: 95). Thus, although the person is an artificial, 
purely legal construct, the rights and duties that form the person can only have as their content 
the behaviour of human beings (Kelsen 2006: 95f). What is, then, correct to say, is that the 
person “is” those rights and duties. As we will later see, this argument represents a huge 
difficulty for Kelsen as it seems to move him away from his formalist background. 
Kelsen of course acknowledged that other entities too can be recognized as persons in law: 
traditionally, there have been other subjects of rights and duties that were not human beings – 
such subjects or persons are normally called “juristic persons”. We have already seen (above, 
3.2. fn. 41) that for Kelsen a corporation, as the typical juristic person, is “a group of 
individuals treated by the law as a unity, namely as a person having rights and duties distinct 
from those of the individuals composing it” (Kelsen 2006: 96). Here the same logic as before 
applies: just as it is not really the human being that is the subject of rights and duties, but 
rather that these rights and duties “belong to” of “are” the (natural) person, so too the juristic 
person is not real the subject of rights and duties ascribed to this fictitious entity. The juristic 
person does not itself act according to its rights and duties. In the end, all rights and duties of 
the juristic person refer to the behaviour of human beings, even if only indirectly. It follows 
that the relation to a human being cannot be the differentia specifica of the natural person. 
Hence, on Kelsen’s view, the “natural” person – being a legal construct and not a real-life 
entity – is also, in this sense, a “juristic” person. If this is the case, then another important 
conclusion follows: “If the so-called physical (natural) person is a juristic person, there can be 
no essential difference between the physical (natural) person and what is usually exclusively 
considered as a ‘juristic’ person” (Kelsen 2006: 96).53 Hence, instead of with two concepts of 
person, Kelsen only operates with one. 
We should add, however, that Kelsen was wary about using the notion of legal or juristic 
person – for either type of entities. His reason for doing so was double: first, because he saw 
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 More on Kelsen’s conception of the juristic person in Kelsen 2005: 174–191; 2006: 96–109. 
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the anthropomorphization of the legal person as a source of great confusion in legal theory; 
second, because he wished to avoid the suggestion that his theoretical concepts are fictions. 
For this reason, he preferred to employ the notion “points of imputation” (cfr. Kelsen 2002: 
48).
54
 Points of imputation, said Kelsen, are normative reference points in the legal system to 
which acts are attributed. By imputation “the legal character of the act is established” 
(Paulson 1999: 33). Imputation, in other words, is attribution (of an act) and “that to which the 
act is attributed is a point of imputation” (Ibid.) .55 The person is such a point of imputation: it 
is a point to which all rights and duties referring to the same human beings are imputed. 
Hence, the person as a point of imputation is simply “a shorthand for a cluster of legal 
relations” (Ibid.).  
 
The (mis)fortunes of the formalist approach 
 
Before turning to the substantive theories of personhood, let us shortly review some critiques 
– as well as advantages – of the formalist approach to personhood. 
Naffine shows that the formalist approach appears to have one significant advantage: namely, 
“that legal persons can be whatever and whoever law is willing to let them be. There is room 
for immense legal creativity: for a proliferation of personality. Within law, it would seem, we 
are permitted to assume a wide variety of personae” (Naffine 2009: 45).56 Put in other terms, 
in the formalist approach to personhood – at least in Naffine’s reading of it – the access 
criteria of the status of a person are not pre-fixed, but rather variable and flexible. Legal 
personhood is not understood as the legal recognition of a pre-existing natural fact that 
somehow makes it necessary to ascribe legal personhood to all entities have that 
characteristic. Rather, legal personhood is a purely instrumental notion, a tool for achieving 
specific legal goals, independent from any extra-legal considerations. The flexibility such an 
understanding of legal personhood allows the legal operators must surely be welcomed thing. 
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 His reason for doing so is double: first, because he saw the anthropomorphization of the legal person as a 
source of great confusion; second, because he wished to avoid the suggestion that his theoretical concepts are 
fictions. See Paulson 1997: 227. 
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 Cfr. a somewhat broader definition of imputation by Ferrajoli (2007: 187), who argues that imputation is the 
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However, Naffine is also critical of the formalist approach. She argues, first of all, that this 
liberty in determining the person is often interpreted in terms of an obligation to “exploit this 
freedom fully” (Naffine 2009: 31). In other terms, the formalist lawyers are often completely 
unwilling to look beyond their approach – “to contemplate the way in which other 
understandings of the person might find their way into law and influence real legal doctrine 
and real people who are regulated by law, which may thus enrich their understanding of their 
subject.” (Naffine 2009: 32).57 The formalists, this objection goes, appear to be stuck in the 
abstract universe of theoretical concepts and out of touch with the diversity of views in the 
legal practice that actually inform the concept. Hence, in the legal practice, the formalist 
approach cannot function. “Law-makers do not, nor cannot, simply content themselves with 
the Legalistic assertion that the legal person is a legal device which can have any content and 
then proceed to personify it with complete licence” (Naffine 2009: 45). When faced with 
particular situations, legal operators (law-makers, judges etc.) must always decide “about who 
and what is to count for any particular legal purpose” (Ibid.). The point is that whenever we 
are faced with particular legal situations a certain philosophical – ideological, if you will – 
basis always informs the choices regarding the attribution of legal personality. Hence, the 
formalist approach is unsustainable. 
This critique seems to be somewhat ill-founded. First of all, because the formalists themselves 
do not appear to hold that the choices in this regard are completely unbound. You will 
remember that even the one radical claim as to who or what can be deemed a person in law 
came with a qualification, namely that anything or anyone can be ascribed legal personhood 
“as long as it is compatible with the purpose of any particular law” (emphasis mine; see 
above). This shows that even the most fervent formalists appear to admit that there are certain 
functional limits to who or what can be a person in law. The attribution of personhood is, in 
other words, at least in part, determined – and delimited – by the function of the status-
ascription.
58
  
Beyond this, Naffine’s critique seems to be founded upon an inexact representation of the 
formalists’ claims. Naffine argues against the formalist approach by saying that in any given 
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context, be it in adopting a law or a judicial decision, the deciding authority will always have 
to make a choice as to who or what will be considered a person – and this choice is always 
based in some substantive consideration. But while this may be true, it needn’t count as an 
objection against the formalists.  As Thomas notes, “Legalists need not deny that, in particular 
contexts, the law makes claims, or relies on tacit assumptions, about the nature of persons. ... 
Nor must the Legalist deny that these claims or assumptions about persons are sometimes 
drawn from lawmakers’ extra-legal, metaphysical conceptions of personhood” (2011: 634).  
All that the formalists (need to) claim is that the concept of person in law “is not built around 
any fixed or singular conception of the person” (Ibid.), that is, that in law as a whole, there are 
great inconsistencies and a diversity of views informing the concept, so much so that it is 
impossible to provide a single definitive answer as to who is the law’s person.59 
Finally, with regard to Kelsen’s approach to legal personhood – and more specifically 
regarding his use of the notion “point of imputation”, Paulson (1999) points to several 
difficulties. We have seen that Kelsen adopted this notion instead of the more traditional 
notion of legal person in order to escape the objection of basing his theory on fictitious terms. 
He argued that points of imputation are notions appertaining exclusively to the legal system 
and thus can only be perceived by means of normative cognition. As such, they are “the 
proper objects of normative cognition, as ‘real’ as anything in the legal system can be” 
(Paulson 1999: 37). The problem that Paulson notes, however, is that the points of imputation, 
which represent legal subsystems, refer to other points of imputation at more fundamental 
levels. Finally, these points of imputation make reference to the legal system itself – which is 
the final point of imputative reference. But, says Paulson, what is its basis? The answer is that 
the legal system, as the final reference point of imputation must presuppose itself (Ibid.). If 
this is so, says Paulson, we have a clear case of a petitio principii. “If the notion of the legal 
system must presuppose itself, then far from providing an independent ground for assessing 
Kelsen’s scheme of pure constructions, the notion simply poses anew the question as to the 
basis of these constructions” (Paulson 1999: 38).  
On the other hand, by using this notion Kelsen sought to escape the widespread problem in 
the legal theory of the time: anthropomorphization. He believed, as we have previously 
emphasized, that the world of facts and that of norms are to be clearly distinguished. In this 
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optics, the human being is out of reach for the legal science – the latter can only deal with its 
own, purely legal concepts, concepts precisely like that of “point of imputation”. If we 
subscribe to this methodological dualism we must admit that there can be no connection 
between the world of facts and the world of norms; between the notions of human being and 
that of point of imputation. However, we have seen that Kelsen also argued that in the final 
instance rights and duties that are imposed upon the person have as their content the actions of 
human beings. Hence, as lawyers we should admit of a fundamental connection between these 
two worlds. The two claims together, of course, are antinomous (see Paulson 1999: 38–40) 
and Kelsen’s theory seems to be inconsistent. 
 
3.2.2. Substantive approaches to personhood  
 
Metaphysical Realists believe that “the legal person is an expression of some important 
defining attribute of human nature” (Naffine 2009: 22). Differently than the Legalists, the 
Realists all believe that the person in law is not some artificial construct, but rather that it is a 
real-life entity which the law ought to recognize as such. The reason an entity is considered a 
person (in real life and consequently in law) is, we said, due to some special, essential 
characteristic of hers. Whatever this personhood-defining feature may be, the law should 
identify it and reflect it in its (legal) subject (Ibid.). 
Although Realists differ as to the exact basis for personhood-attribution and, in consequence, 
regarding the extension of personhood, they all agree that the paradigmatic person is the 
human being – the adult human being of sound mind, I should add –, while also 
acknowledging that legal personhood may be extended to non-human entities as well (here 
they mostly refer to corporations). 
In the following, I will briefly present three major perspectives falling under Metaphysical 
Realism approach.  
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The Rationalists 
 
The Rationalist perspective is informed by the notion of the human being as a rational 
individual, capable of autonomously adopting her own decisions as well as assuming 
responsibility for them.
60
 These qualities, argue the Rationalists, are unique to man and make 
those who possess them persons – both moral and legal. 
In the following passage, Naffine summarizes the basic ideas of this position:  
To Rationalists ... the true legal person is the rational human being; legal rights in essence 
derive from the human ability to reason. Rights run with mental ability or capacity. The focus 
here is on human autonomy and independence as the basis of rights and personality. Law is for 
rational human subjects, for sane rational adults, intelligent agents who because of their 
capacity to reason can assume moral as well as legal responsibility for their actions and so 
enter into moral and legal community with others of a similarly rational nature. Only practical 
reasoners, persons who act for reasons, are the type of people to whom law directly 
communicates its norms (Naffine 2009: 23). 
The Rationalist’s is arguably the most diffused approach to moral and legal personhood in the 
Western world. Pietrzykowski, for instance, argues that the “concept of inherent human 
dignity resulting from the uniquely human capabilities of rational thinking and decision-
making” (Pietrzykowski 2016: 14; 2017: 49)61 lies at the core of Juridical Humanism – the 
philosophical outlook that underlies contemporary Western legal orders. 
The Rationalist view draws, above all, from the Enlightenment philosophy and the liberal 
social contract theory.
62
 This (fictitious) account of the establishment of modern political 
society is based on the idea that rational, free and self-interested individuals voluntarily give 
up a part of their natural freedom in order to join together into a new society that regulates her 
relations with others by imposing on them laws, thus providing them protection and 
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predictability.
63
 What the social contract theory allows, above all, is to focus on the 
importance of the rational and autonomous decision for entering into society. The contract is 
the par excellence instrument of free will and only individuals of sound mind may validly 
enter into one. The standard set by this account for contractual capacity is a fairly high one. 
From these premises, springs the Rationalist view of the person as  
an active, autonomous actor: someone who is positively able to bear legal duties and to assert 
legal rights in their own capacity. This person is imagined as an attentive, articulate litigant or 
defendant, who can appreciate the complexity of law’s demands and respond directly and 
personally, for his own reasons. This is someone who can choose to heed or reject those 
demands and can fairly be blamed if the choice is made to refuse the dictates of law (Naffine 
2009: 60). 
This can be called the “robust and sophisticated reasoner” approach or, alternatively, the thick 
concept of the person.
64
 This view of the person is perhaps most influenced by Kant’s 
philosophy. On Kant’s view, man is naturally endowed with reason and morality. The 
capacity for reason enables her to arrive at the universal law that all rational beings (including 
herself) ought to be treated not as means (as instruments) but rather as ends in themselves. 
“[A] rational being”, argues Kant, “belongs as a member to the realm of ends if in this realm it 
gives universal law but is also itself subject to these laws. It belongs to it as supreme head, if 
as giving law it is subject to no will of another” (Kant 2002: 51f). This is the core of Kant’s 
notion of autonomy which, in turn, is central for explaining the dignity of human beings.
65
 
Those that are not autonomous are, in Kant’s view, no persons at all.  
Kant’s theory of personhood is purely theoretical or speculative. As Naffine notes, Kant “saw 
no need to turn to the study of society or anthropology or to any of the empirical sciences for 
his account of the nature of reason, properly understood” (Naffine 2009: 64), because he 
believed his moral philosophy to be based on natural, objectively ascertainable laws. This, 
however, made Kant blind for the true empirical experience of law in which numerous weak, 
sub-normal or feeble-minded individuals nevertheless participate in the legal theatre. 
Alternatively, there are scholars who argue that the standard should be lowered and we should 
rather “seek to define and assert the minimal cognitive abilities needed for self-management 
and self-determination” (Naffine 2009: 60; emphasis mine). These thinkers, for instance, 
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would acknowledge that mentally impaired adults and young children, to name just two 
groups, should also count as persons in law. This may be deemed the thin conception of the 
person.
66
 
The “robust” or “sophisticated thinker” conception of the person lends itself well to the so-
called will theory of rights.
67
 In extreme synthesis, the will theory of rights “says that having a 
right of some kind is to do with the legal or moral recognition of some individual’s choice as 
being preeminent over the will of others as to a given subject matter in a given relationship” 
(MacCormick 1976: 20).
68
 On this view, having, let’s say, a property right over an object, 
means having the power to determine whether or not and if, in what manner, others may 
interact with that object. In this sense, right-holders are “sovereigns” over the objects of their 
rights. 
The major downside to this theory of rights is that it “cannot acknowledge any rights in 
beings incapable of exercising sovereignty” (Wenar 2015) since “sovereignty”, or control 
over another’s duty, is the essence of the will theory of rights. Thus, it is impossible on this 
view that young children or the comatose adults would hold rights.
69
 
Besides this objection against the will theory of rights and, in general, against the overall 
theory of personhood, other objections against the Rationalist approach have also been 
wielded. Naffine presents the following: 
First, the cultural specificity objection. According to this objection, the supposedly universal 
character of this rational agent is, in fact, highly culturally specific and belongs to the modern 
Western world. This world is highly individualistic, with the individual “self” understood as 
the basic unit of society, whereas in some other cultures, “the self, including its boundaries, is 
primarily defined in terms of its relationship to others” (Naffine 2009: 76).70 That the 
“rational thinker” view of the person is proper to the Western legal tradition is confirmed by 
other authors as well (see the Juridical Humanism thesis above). What may, however, be 
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problematic with this objection is that it is not clear whether the Rationalists Naffine has in 
mind actually deny the cultural specificity of their position (see Thomas 2011: 635). 
Second, the staticness objection. It is said that the rational agent presumed by the law is “a 
curiously static being: a permanent, autonomous, rational adult, unaffected and undiminished 
by time and circumstance” (Naffine 2009: 76). Referring to the subject imagined by social 
contract theorists, Naffine adds: “Not only is he without a birth, but he is without a death. 
Physical decline and cessation are not parts of the story. He is a perpetual mature adult, 
possessed of an enduring, abstract, autonomous will” (Naffine 2009: 77). Thus, the theory 
lacks explanation for all the phases of the human life, from early childhood to old age, in 
which an individual’s cognitive capacities are not fully developed – being either still 
underdeveloped or declining.  
Third, the exceedingly rational objection. Here, Naffine takes up John Grey’s argument about 
how human beings think of themselves as intelligent, rational agents, while being, in fact, 
quite different kinds of creatures: the kind “who tend to act unthinkingly, reactively and 
barely know [their] own minds” (Naffine 2009: 77).71 Gray, in Naffine’s reconstruction, is 
quite harsh with the Rationalists and insists that “our actions are not the products of our 
conscious decisions, of our free will. We are not really rational beings who know our own 
minds, whose thoughts control our actions” (Naffine 2009: 78). On my mind, while it may 
certainly be true that human beings are not as rational as the Rationalists would have us 
believe, the opposite notion that our actions are utterly out of our rational control also seems 
exaggerated. The truth, I believe, lies somewhere in between: while certain, more complex 
actions are the results of wilful and deliberate processes, other, simpler and repetitive actions 
result from unconscious or automatized reactions.  
Finally, given the demanding conditions for status-attribution, the Rationalist perspective ends 
up with a very small batch of potential legal persons. This objection was already raised with 
regard to the will theory of rights. Here we can repeat that the demanding criteria for status 
attribution exclude from consideration all those who lack one (or more) of the essential 
characteristics of personhood: on the one hand, the biologically human beings that for some 
reason have never (and will never) or do not yet or no longer possess sufficient cognitive 
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abilities; and on the other hand, it also excludes from personhood non-human animals that are 
cognitively highly developed – but are not biologically human.72 
Rationalism remains the dominant philosophical perspective on legal personhood – despite 
the fact that advances in science and technology are seriously undermining its viability. 
Pietrzykowski, for instance, argues that certain “implications of the discoveries and inventions 
of our times undermine the belief in human exceptionalism being the backbone of the modern 
legal approach to personhood” (Pietrzykowski 2016: 15).73 
 
The Religionists 
 
We have seen that on the “sophisticated reasoner” approach, the Rationalist theory cannot 
justify the ascription of legal personhood to “borderline cases”, such as human foetuses, 
demented or comatose individuals and even young children. A fortiori, it is unable provide 
justification for the legal personhood of non-human animals, no matter how evolved their 
cognitive capacities are. 
Conversely, the Religionist approach does appear able to provide the necessary justification 
for the personhood of at least some of these groups. It does so by arguing, contrary to the 
Rationalists, that intellect, consciousness or freedom of choice do not represent the defining 
characteristics of the human – and thus of the person. Indeed, on the Religionist view these 
attributes could even be altogether absent and yet one would not cease to be a person (see 
Naffine 2009: 110).  
That is because the diferentia specifica that separates men from other beings is to be found 
elsewhere: namely, in their (human) sanctity – which is often equated with the notions of 
(human) dignity and ensoulment. To invoke human sanctity, or dignity, is to invoke the idea 
that human beings, for no other reason but for being human, are “innately special and that we 
are somehow always elevated above the animal world, regardless of our individual abilities 
and capacities” (Naffine 2009: 100). This means that all human beings, regardless of their 
individual cognitive capacities, should be considered as persons. Whether or not they are able 
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to make their own decisions (in law), is irrelevant: “Human life alone generates legal claims 
that arise out of the sheer fact of humanity. One does not need to be able to engage directly 
and in person as a rational agent with other rational agents to be said to be a fitting legal 
subject” (Naffine 2009: 23f). Given that this characteristic is inherent, it is also pre-legal: 
“The sacred human person is said to possess inherent value with or without law expressing 
that value” (Ibid.). Law, in order to be considered legitimate, should recognize this fact and 
properly reflect it.  
Clearly, this kind of reasoning is based on religious grounds. In the orthodox teachings of the 
Catholic Church, the human being is placed at the centre of all things (of the universe), for she 
is created by God in his own image (imago Dei). Being endowed with “a spiritual and 
immortal soul”, man is superior to all other beings. As God’s creature, the human is endowed 
with inherent dignity, which serves as the foundation of human rights (see Naffine 2009: 
110). 
While deeply entrenched in religious philosophy, the notion of human sanctity isn’t foreign to 
Rationalist thinkers. Some (perhaps most) Rationalists would be willing to accept the notion 
of sanctity as providing for the protection of all human beings, regardless of their capacities 
(Naffine 2009: 101). Thus, in law, the term might be used in such a way as to blur the lines 
between the religious and the secular basis. Both types of thinkers may agree on the value of 
the human being and needn’t enter into disagreement because of the terms employed for 
expressing it. Indeed, for the most part, Religionists and Rationalists may overlap in their 
conceptions of the person. Nevertheless, they will probably disagree in fringe cases that 
regard the beginning and the end of life.  
Let us first briefly look at an area where the two approaches are easily compatible (human 
rights) and then proceed to an issue where they appear to clash (abortion). 
The idea that human beings, as such, possess inherent and absolute worth is the cornerstone of 
the post-World War II human rights philosophy.
74
 Whether this idea is expressed in terms of 
human sanctity or human dignity makes little difference. The 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) is a paradigmatic example of such an understanding of human rights. 
The story of its drafting process is especially illustrative of the fact that with the 
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transplantation of the notion of human sanctity into the legal ambit we easily lose track of its 
religious origins.  
The UHDR, in its opening lines, bears a striking resemblance to the Enlightenment-era human 
rights declarations: the first paragraph of the Preamble states that the “recognition of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is 
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”. Clearly, the UDHR bases its 
legitimacy on the idea of an inherent human dignity, equally present in all human beings, as 
the basis of inalienable human rights.  
In a pluralist environment, as the UDHR drafting committee certainly was, terms such as 
human sanctity or human dignity tend to become a kind of “umbrella terms” that anyone can 
quickly agree upon, while at the same time differ greatly in the exact understanding of its 
meaning. According to Morsink, the use of such language created a presumption “that the 
drafters of the Universal Declaration had an Enlightenment view of human or natural rights as 
somehow located in human beings simply by virtue of their own humanity and for no other 
extraneous reason” (Morsink 1999: 281). This, however, was not the case, as Morsink notes 
that “most of the drafters of the Universal Declaration did not share this Enlightenment belief 
in a single, transcendent source of value” (Morsink 1999: 283). Indeed, given that they came 
from very different ideological backgrounds, the drafters, although believing that rights were 
grounded in human nature, “did not think that the rights in the Declaration were attached to 
any particular characteristic or set of characteristics” (Ibid.). Thus, in order to reach some 
internal agreement, but also to appeal to the broadest (universal) community, a compromise 
with regard to the specification of the source of human value had to be made. The Declaration 
was consequently intentionally stripped of its essentialist, Enlightenment, religious and other 
ethically “tainted” characteristics (cfr. Morskink 1999: 289).75 
Famously, Ronald Dworkin attempted to reconcile the religious and the secular (Rationalist) 
approaches in his analysis of human sanctity. While he believed that the notion can be given 
both a religious and a non-religious interpretation, he actually ended up exposing an important 
rift between his, more Rationalist-leaning approach and the orthodox religious views of the 
Catholic Church. 
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On Dworkin’s view, human sanctity is an objective, intuitively ascertainable and universal 
truth. He believes we all (or almost all) share in this idea that each human being has intrinsic 
value. However, what makes Dworkin’s position particular is that he also espouses ideas that 
are inherently Rationalist and even proposes a Naturalist origin of human worth. Namely, 
Dworkin holds that reason and choice are fundamental to a human life; that they are what 
makes life worth living. Moreover, he also acknowledges the role of evolution in bringing us 
to this point. We are the result of natural selection and random mutation, Dworkin argues, but 
this result has special, absolute value (Naffine 2009: 106).
76
  
As Naffine notes, these ideas have some interesting consequences when it comes to issues of 
abortus and euthanasia. On Dworkin’s view, human foetuses also possess intrinsic value, for 
they are developing human beings and thus it would be bad to end their lives. However, as the 
early foetus cannot think or feel, it cannot develop its own interests and thus cannot have its 
own rights. Nevertheless, the foetus does have “detached” value – some intrinsic worth that is 
independent from any proper interest or right the foetus might have (Dworkin 1993: 11). 
Thus, while it would be wrong to talk about foetuses as persons, Dworkin nevertheless 
believes that, within US law, the State, at some point, does have a particular interest in 
preserving the foetus and thus may intervene with the mother’s right to privacy by prohibiting 
abortion of late-term foetuses.
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On the subject of euthanasia, Dworkin’s views on the “life worth living” are particularly 
important. Thus, while Dworkin maintains the principle of the sanctity of all life, it is, for 
him, particularly important that a life has some meaning – that it is worth living. If, on 
account of permanent incapacitation, one cannot be expected to ever again make use of her 
uniquely human abilities, then, on Dworkin’s view, life loses its special value – and the right 
to die should be granted.
78
 
These views, however, bring Dworkin squarely at odds with the Church’s dogmas, for the 
latter sustains that “it is not intellect, consciousness and freedom that define the person” – 
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these characteristics can even be altogether absent from an individual; it is the “natural dignity 
which each human person is endowed [with], as God’s creature, [that] provides the foundation 
of human rights and such rights are said to apply ‘to every stage of life’” (Naffine 2009: 110, 
quoting The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church). As regards the right to life, 
on the Church’s view, it is the most fundamental human right which “endures ‘from 
conception to its natural end’ and so ‘implies the illicitness of every form of procured abortion 
and euthanasia’” (Naffine 2009: 111). 
Let us now briefly look at three objections that Naffine wields against the Religionist 
approach. 
First, the Religionist approach has illiberal consequences. If absolute value is placed on all 
human life, and hence the right to life is recognized to the human being from conception 
onwards, then it is clear that the price to pay for this recognition is the reduction of “respect 
for individual autonomy and personal choice”, in this case of the pregnant woman (Naffine 
2009: 116). 
Secondly, Naffine is perplexed by the notion of the soul, so central to the Religionist view, yet 
replete with paradoxes. For instance, discussing Finnis’s definition of the person79 she is 
baffled by the fact that “the soul is a life force which is somehow present from conception 
until death; it requires a human body and yet it is fully present in a fertilised human egg; it 
entails the ‘radical capacity’ to reason but is nevertheless to be found in the embryo and the 
terminally unconscious” (Naffine 2009: 114). She wonders about the nature of this 
“mysterious human essence” and the reason why the law should have to make it the criterion 
of its concept of the person. “In the absence of a Christian belief in the soul”, says Naffine, 
“this essence seems to have little meaning, nor does its translation into law” (Naffine 2009: 
117). 
Finally, while on the Religionist account the extension of legal personhood is wider that on 
the Rationalist view, Religionists still promote a kind of speciesism (human exceptionalism). 
On this view, “humans, and only humans, possess special value and fundamental rights simply 
because we are human” (Naffine 2009: 116f). Human rights then are for the fruition of human 
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beings while non-human beings, such as animals, are still to be excluded from their 
protection.
80
   
 
The Naturalists 
 
“[T]he Second World War and its immediate aftermath”, says Naffine, “served to consolidate 
the species divide in the name of natural human rights and to affirm a strong metaphysical 
stance: that law is for humans essentially understood as non-animals – as moral and spiritual 
persons” (Naffine 2009: 122). Indeed, our contemporary (Western) legal systems are based on 
the philosophical view – which some call Juridical Humanism  – which neatly distinguishes 
between persons and things, putting human beings (and certain other entities such as 
corporations) in the former box and all other living and non-living entities in the latter.  
Despite significant advancements in scientific knowledge about human genetics as well as 
about cognitive and other abilities of animals, the moral and legal understanding of the 
human-animal divide has not changed significantly. Naturalists, however, argue for and offer 
a possible justification for extending legal personhood to (at least some) animals. 
The Naturalists build their argument on scientific grounds, taking inspiration in Darwin’s (and 
his successors’) evolutionary biology. The basic idea springing from this branch of scientific 
knowledge is that humans are but one of the animal species that has in time evolved from a 
common form of life. Consequently, all life on Earth is biologically related, with the human 
species finding its closest genetic relative in the Great Apes. It follows that man is not in any 
way special, qualitatively different from other animals. The Naturalist therefore dispense with 
the idea of human exceptionalism and speciesism. 
One would image that these findings – corroborated and further developed by the most recent 
discoveries regarding animal cognition which prove that certain types of animals, especially 
large apes, possess skills such as symbolic communication, tool-making, morality etc. (see 
Pietrzykowski 2017) – would resonate in and have an important impact on our social and 
legal understanding of non-human animals. “In particular”, says Naffine, “we might have 
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 This, however, does not mean that animals cannot be provided with some kind of legal protection. The 
Religionists needn’t oppose to animal protection laws granted that they are not based on the idea of some special 
worth of animals but rather on some interest of the human beings. 
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expected some modification of the legal conceptual divide between persons and property as it 
applies to humans and animals respectively” (Naffine 2009: 122). But such a shift has not 
occurred – or at least not to a significant degree. “Instead, there remains a firm cultural and 
legal understanding that humans and animals should be characterised in quite different ways: 
humans as persons; animals as property” (Ibid.).  
While Naturalists ideas have yet to fall on more fertile grounds, they have nevertheless 
recently been gaining in import, with several courts and legislative bodies around the world 
already ascribing certain fundamental rights to animals and even declaring particular animals 
and even non-animal beings as legal persons.
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Naffine describes the common core of the Naturalist approach as the view that “we are best 
regarded as natural corporeal beings who can feel pleasure and pain, and who live natural 
mortal lives, and that this is how law should think of us” (Naffine 2009: 24). However, 
Naturalists disagree as to how the question of animal personhood should be resolved.  
There are, on the one hand, those who (in the most extreme version of the argument) argue for 
the abandonment of the fundamental (legal) divide between humans and animals. On their 
view, humanness should not be the (exclusive) criterion for attributing moral and legal value 
(personhood). Depending on what personhood-attributing criteria they propose, these authors 
argue for a more or less extensive granting of personhood to non-human animals. On the other 
hand, there are less radical – and also more influential – voices arguing that the human-animal 
divide is legitimate and should be maintained but that the law should rather be “better attuned 
to our biological natures” (Naffine 2009: 125). For the purposes of this presentation only the 
former group of Naturalists scholars is taken into consideration.
82
    
Within this stream of Naturalist scholarship there are different proposals as to how far (legal) 
personhood should be extended and on the basis of which reasons should this be done. The 
utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer – widely considered the father of the animal liberation 
movement – argues that the relevant criterion for attributing moral (and thus legal) worth is 
not intelligence or rationality, but rather sentience, i.e. the ability to suffer (Singer 2015: 38). 
Regardless of the being’s nature, on Singer’s view, “the principle of equality requires that its 
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 For instance, in 2014 an Argentinian court declared an orangutan to be a non-human person who was 
unlawfully held in captivity in a ZOO, whereas in 2017 a river in New Zealand was granted legal personhood by 
a special law adopted by the Parliament. For a classical theoretical argument for environmental rights, see Stone 
2010. 
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suffering be counted equally with the like suffering ... of any other being” (Ibid.). However, 
for Singer, beings that have self-awareness, a sense of the past and the future and are able to 
relate to others – beings that Singer calls persons – have greater moral value as he shows that, 
for instance, killing a person is morally more reproachable than killing a sentient being that is 
not a person (see Singer 2011: Ch. 4). Thus Singer rejects speciesism and rather embraces the 
criteria of sentience and self-awareness – both of which admit of degree.  
Singer’s position is controversial because he follows his argument to the conclusion that some 
animals – those which are self-conscious – have greater moral value than certain human 
beings – those that are not self-conscious, such as new-borns. Thus, on Singer’s view, “there 
could be a person who is not a member of our species”, just as there “could also be members 
of our species who are not persons” (Singer 2011: 74). This leads Singer to conclude that 
infants do not have a strong claim on the right to life and it may even be, under appropriate 
conditions, justifiable to deprive them of their lives.
83
  
On the other hand, Steven Wise, a leading animal activist and legal scholar, focuses on 
dispelling the rigid human-animal division by arguing that the ample scientific evidence on 
the cognitive similarities between animals and humans prove the divide to be morally (and 
legally) unsustainable. On Wise’s view, it is not sentience but cognitive capacities that are the 
appropriate criteria for personhood-attribution.
84
 For this author, legal personhood means “the 
capacity to hold at least one legal right” (Wise 2010: 1). Wise argues for the ascription of 
dignity-rights to (some) non-human animals – by that he means especially bodily integrity and 
bodily liberty (see Wise 1998: 823; 2013: 1282). The capacity to hold rights, however, is not a 
matter of some natural characteristics that make it possible for the right-holder to effectively 
exercise that right; rather, it is a matter of recognition. It is not that animals are (physically) 
incapable of possessing rights – rather, they lack this capacity because they are not legally 
recognized as persons (Wise 2010: 5).
85
 Should they be recognized as having this capacity, 
they would be also recognized as persons. 
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 It should be noted that Singer is an utilitarian and thus applies a utilitarian calculus when discussing and 
deciding on such questions. 
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 This is so for purely pratical reasons: Wise notes that common law judges do not accept sentience as a 
sufficient condition for legal personhood. See Wise 2013: 1286. 
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 Wise’s position in this regard seems to follow Salmond’s (1913). He too believed that a person “is any being 
whom the law regards as capable of rights and duties. Any being”, Salmond argued, “that is so capable is a 
person, whether a human being or not, and no being that is not so capable is a person, even though he be a man” 
(Salmond 1913: 272). For a critique of Wise’s position, see Kurki 2017: especially ch. 3. 
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Wise argues that – in common law jurisprudence at least – autonomy is a sufficient basis for 
being ascribed human rights – and so for being recognized as a legal person. Practical 
autonomy – “the minimum level of autonomy sufficient for legal personhood” (Wise 2013: 
1283) – has, on Wise’s view, three elements: i) sufficient cognitive complexity for being able 
to want something; ii) the ability to act intentionally in order to achieve one’s desires; iii) a 
sufficiently complex sense of self so that “it matters to whether one’s achieves one’s own 
goals” (Ibid). Wise then shows that there is ample scientific evidence proving that certain 
animals possess the same basic cognitive capacities as human beings do: highly cognitively 
developed animals, shows Wise, are self-conscious, possess communication, have a theory of 
mind etc.
86
 This shows that there is actually no sharp qualitative divide between humans and 
animals but rather that the differences between them are a matter of degree. Certain animals 
are much more similar to human children, than they are to inanimate objects.  “Whether we 
call it self-determination, autonomy or volition,” argues Wise, “it is sufficient for basic legal 
rights” (Wise 2002: 30). By analogy, then, certain highly intelligent animals should be 
declared capable of holding at least one legal right and hence, declared legal persons. If in the 
past intelligent beings like women and black men were consigned to the status of property – 
but with time were acknowledged as persons, it is now time that intelligent animals are also 
welcomed within that family.
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Legal data shows that Wise’s characterization of the thick wall separating humans from 
nonhumans is exaggerated. More or less all Western contemporary legal systems contain 
some kind of animal protection laws. Cass Sunstein, for example, even claims that “it would 
not be too much to say that [US] federal and state law now guarantees a robust set of animal 
rights, at least nominally” (Sunstein 2000: 1336). Hence, he believes that US law does not 
treat animals as mere objects (Ibid., note 14). Pietrzykowski, for his part, shows that there is a 
growing number of legal orders that are ceasing to formally treat animals as things, with some 
countries even providing constitutional-level protection of animals (see Pietrzykowski 2017: 
53). On this view, therefore, animals have a mixed legal status: they are “a heavily-protected 
form of property, endowed with some basic rights” (Naffine 2009: 138). 
While one needn’t necessarily agree with the claim that animals are already endowed with 
rights, their mixed or intermediate legal status is nevertheless a matter of fact. This de facto 
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 The analogy with slaves and women is common in this respect, yet, as Berg rightly points out, there is a 
nevertheless difference between these groups for women and slaves are biologically human, whereas 
chimpanzees are not. See Berg 2007. 
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intermediate category, however, lacks proper theoretical (as well as doctrinal) elaboration as 
we are currently still working within the basic dichotomy of persons and things. In the next 
section, I will discuss a novel theoretical proposal for a just such new formal intermediate 
legal category. 
 
 
3.3. New conceptualizations in the personhood debate  
 
I believe that the above-presented theories, despite their substantial differences, all share at 
least three common suppositions: first, they all view the person as fundamentally a rights-and-
duties-bearing unit; second, they all accept the ontological dichotomy between persons and 
things; and third, all accept that the paradigmatic person in law is the (adult, mentally and 
physically sane) human being. While the last supposition appears to be firmly established – I 
know of no one who would claim that human beings do not, as a matter of course, qualify as 
persons in law –, the former two have been disputed at various times. I imagine that it is due 
to its widespread acceptance and historical entrenchment that the “person as rights-and-duties-
bearing unit” has only recently received a full-scale critique (see Kurki 2017). A 
comprehensive discussion of this critique and its potential incorporation into this thesis are 
impossible at this time and I believe nothing of relevance is lost if I continue to assume the 
standard conception of the person as a rights-and-duties-bearing unit. Thus, in this subsection, 
I will focus on the second presupposition. More precisely, I will show that the exclusive 
conceptual person-thing dichotomy is today no longer sustainable and will present one 
proposal for the expansion of our conceptual universe in this matter. 
I should emphasize that this section of the thesis bears no immediate relevance for the 
remainder of my arguments. The main purpose of its inclusion in this chapter, then, is 
completeness of the argument. I find it appropriate, when discussing questions relating to the 
extension of legal personhood, to include reference to issues that are currently at the centre of 
scholarly debate and may have significant consequences for the way we conceptualize legal 
personhood in the future. 
 
82 
 
 
Juridical Humanism & its insufficiencies 
 
I said that of the three suppositions shared by all contemporary theories of legal personhood 
(at least of those presented above), the one about the adult human beings being the 
paradigmatic persons in law is the most firmly established and practically undisputed.  
The entrenchment of this idea in contemporary legal philosophy can be explained by what 
some have called the Juridical Humanism Thesis (Pietrzykowski 2016 & 2017). The thesis 
holds that “one of the key philosophical foundations of the contemporary legal order is the 
belief that the law ultimately serves to promote human good and that the community of law is 
actually composed of all but only human beings” (Pietrzykowski 2016: 14). Put simply: the 
human being is both the creator and the main subject of law; the law exists because of human 
beings and it exists in order to protect and further their interests.
88
  
Ours, then, is an utterly anthropocentric world – and consequently the law as well.89 In this 
world, the human being is placed in the centre of all things: the human, because of some 
special distinguishing feature of hers, reigns supreme over all other earthly creatures (so-
called human exceptionalism). This view of the world is said to be the result of a combination 
of Christian personalism (see the Religionist position) and the Enlightenment rationalist 
thinking (see above the Rationalist position) (Pietrzykowski 2017: 52).
90
 On this (mixed) 
view, it is the unique reasoning capacities and consequent dignity that sets men apart from the 
rest of the natural world:
91
 because of these qualities human beings are imbued with inherent 
worth, whereas all other creatures only have instrumental worth. 
Of course, this central position of human beings does not mean that in law other entities have 
no place amongst its persons. As we well know, artificial, non-human constructs, such as 
corporations, have historically also been attributed the status of persons in law: such entities 
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 Cfr. Douzinas, how, for example, argues that “[l]egal humanism posited man as the author and end of law and 
culminated in the idea of human rights” (2000: 243). 
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 For a comprehensive and radical criticism of anthropocentrism in this ambit, see Braidotti 2014. 
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 Cfr. Brożek (2017: 1.3.), who argues that the 20th century debate on the notion of person is, broadly speaking, 
held between the “descriptive” conception of the person which defines the person on the basis of certain 
empirical criteria and the “axiological” conception which holds that the person is a “bearer of values”. 
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 Cfr. Pietrzykowski (2016: 14) who argues that the Juridical Humanism Thesis “relies on the concept of 
inherent human dignity resulting from the uniquely human capabilities of rational thinking and decision-
making”. 
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have usually been called juridical persons in order to distinguish them from natural persons, 
i.e. human beings qua persons in law. 
However, the reasons for the attribution of legal personhood to human beings differ 
significantly from the reasons for the ascription of personhood to these artificial entities. 
While attribution of personhood to human beings is functional to the protection of their own 
interests, the attribution of personhood to artificial entities serves to protect and promote the 
interests of others – that is, of (the currently recognized) natural persons.92 In other terms: 
whereas the attribution of personhood to human beings is based on moral reasons, the 
attribution of personhood to artificial entities is based on instrumental reasons (cfr. 
Pietrzykowski 2017: 49). This distinction is reflected in the fact that “natural persons are 
entitled priority over juridical persons in a hierarchy of rights” (Berg 2007: 374). This doesn’t 
mean that juridical persons cannot be granted the same level of legal protection as natural 
persons are; rather, it means only that the level of rights-attribution to juridical persons will be 
determined by the interests natural persons have with regard. “[N]atural persons”, says Berg, 
“function as the baseline against which other rights allocations are judged” (Ibid.). Ultimately, 
the human good (interest) lies at the basis of all law (Hominum causa omne ius constitutum 
est). 
Regardless of the extension of legal personhood in a given time and place – whether, for 
instance, personhood is ascribed only to fully capable adult men or also to other human and 
even non-human entities – it is a fact that our legal systems have long been based on a neat 
division between persons and things (subjects and objects). The origins of this distinction can 
be traced to Roman law and its classical division of law into persons, things and actions.
93
 An 
entity in law is either qualified as a person – and thus granted the capacity to hold rights and 
duties – or, alternatively, it is qualified as a thing – and is as such considered an object of the 
rights and duties of others (i.e. persons). The dualism of persons and things is an exhaustive 
one: an entity is either a person or a thing (cfr. Pietrzykowski 2017: 51). Tertium non datur.
94
 
This strict division persists still today, despite scientific and technological advancements in 
psychology, neurology, genetics etc. providing ample proof of the similarities between human 
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 Cfr. Ferrajoli 2007: 181-2 who similarly argues that subjects have a status in virtue of which they are not 
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beings and great apes as well as evidence of cognitive and other capacities of these and other 
non-human animals. While we might assume that these discoveries will have led towards a 
relaxation of the division, if anything, the opposite seems to be the case. As I have already 
indicated when discussing the Naturalist theories of personhood above (see 3.2.2.), the horrors 
of World War II have only served to deepen this divide and reaffirm the belief in human 
exceptionalism. This trend can easily be seen in the numerous human rights declarations and 
national constitutions adopted in the immediate aftermath of the Great War, with all of them 
declaring the human being with its inherent dignity which is protected by inalienable human 
rights to be the cornerstone of the juridical system. 
What are the reasons for the persistence of this state of affairs? Why does this conceptual and 
normative abyss between human and non-human beings still exists? Surely some changes 
have occurred in this respect: animals are today more legally protected than ever before, with 
even some sporadic cases of personhood attribution to animals like dolphins and chimpanzees 
already occurring; indeed, recently in New Zealand a former national park has been legally 
declared a person in law.
95
 These changes in law no doubt reflect, at least in part, altered 
social perceptions as to who – and why – ought to be valued for its own sake. However, these 
changes are too few and far apart to enable us to talk about any significant structural 
conceptual and jurisprudential changes taking place. The basic division between persons 
(humans) and things is so deeply entrenched in our underlying social habitus that it prevents 
too sudden and too extreme changes in the superimposing law.
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Changes, however, both in our common understanding as well as in the legal sphere, are 
called for. This necessity for re-defining the notion of person is not so much brought about by 
the “traditional” hard cases of human embryos, anencephalic infants or patients in a 
permanently vegetative state as it is by “potentially more devastating challenges ... [that] 
include the status of higher animals, human-animal biological mixtures, the cyborgization of 
the human body and brain, as well as the development of artificial autonomous agents” 
(Pietrzykowski 2016: 15). These cases provide a real challenge for the foundations of 
Juridical Humanism. The Juridical Humanism Decline Thesis, as Pietrzykowski calls it, is 
based on the claim that “some implications of the discoveries and inventions of our times 
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undermine the belief in human exceptionalism being the backbone of the modern legal 
approach to personhood” (Ibid.). 
This conceptual inadequacy of the traditional ontology is perhaps most clearly seen on the 
example of animals and their legal status. Historically, animals have been understood as 
things: both legally as well as in our common imaginarium: be it as tools used in fields and 
factories or as food, animals have always been exploited to serve human interests and desires. 
However, scientific discoveries regarding animal consciousness – realizations that animals, 
especially higher ones, possess similar cognitive and emotional structures, as well as skills 
that have previously been considered uniquely human, such as communication, tool-making, 
morality etc. (see Pietrzykowski 2017: 52) – have gradually influenced both our social 
understanding and legal treatment of animals. The growing awareness “that animals are 
sentient creatures which may have their own interests deserving recognition and respect in the 
form of laws protecting them for their own sake”, in this way, “undermines the image of the 
world composed only of persons and things” (Pietrzykowski 2017: 54). This may be seen, for 
instance, in the development of anti-cruelty laws: a growing number of legal orders have been 
engaged in the process of dereification of animals, i.e. excluding them from the category of 
things (for some examples see Pietrzykowski 2017: 53). These efforts that try to instil the 
image of animals as “living creatures endowed with sensitivity” or “creatures capable of 
suffering” are morally speaking highly laudable. As a consequence, however, they provide a 
real challenge for our philosophical and theoretical distinction of all entities into persons and 
things. In the legal practice today, animals (at least some highly developed ones) are , as a 
matter of fact, understood neither as things nor as persons, finding themselves in a sort of 
conceptual limbo.  
 
The necessity of conceptual refinements: the introduction of non-personal subjects of law 
 
In order to resolve this conceptual, but in the final instance also a practical legal problem, 
Pietrzykowski (2007: 56) suggests that one of two things should be done: either we revise our 
approach to personhood or we revise the conceptual division (the ontology) as such. The first 
approach is taken by the “animal welfare” activists (see above 3.3.1.) seeking to obtain 
recognition of personhood for animals – specifically, the status of non-human persons.  
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Pietrzykowski finds this approach inopportune. It is true that at least some (vertebrate) 
animals are sentient, having morally relevant interests of their own and should not, as a 
consequence, be reduced to things having only instrumental worth for men. However, 
according to this author, animals fit neither of the two categories of persons that we 
traditionally identify (i.e. natural and juristic persons). It would make little sense – and would 
miss the moral point – to fit animals within the category of juristic persons: juristic 
personhood, you will remember, is based on instrumental reasons related to the promotion of 
human interests, whereas the whole point of a possible attribution of personhood to animals is 
to protect and promote their own interests and with that “restrain rather than expand the ways 
in which human good may be legitimately pursued by means of the instrumental use of 
animals” (Pietrzykowski 2017: 57).97 On the other hand, animals, quite clearly, cannot be 
fitted within the category of natural persons either. Despite all their similarities, human 
beings, in general, are unique among animals as regards the scope of their cognitive abilities 
since they are “able to intentionally control their own behaviour, acting upon specific kinds of 
reasons and volitions” (Ibid.). It is this capacity, says Pietrzykowski, that is crucial for the 
idea of personhood as it is necessary (the capacity) for the attribution of most personal rights. 
These empirical differences between humans and other animals heavily influence the 
underlying philosophical views on personhood. Thus, as said before, the philosophical (and 
consequently legal) conception of a person is “intimately related to the capacity to act 
rationally and deliberately decide about one’s own actions (Pietrzykowski 2017: 58). All this 
makes it the case, according to Pietrzykowski, that attempts at fitting animals within the 
existing conceptual categories are doomed to failure. 
Lack of personhood-defining properties should not, however, automatically relegate these 
entities to the status of things. “[N]ot being a person should not be identified with an inability 
to have any subjective interests that matter morally and deserve legal protection solely for 
their own sake” (Ibid.). Animals have subjective mental states and thus relevant interests of 
their own. These interests should therefore be given appropriate legal protection. This could 
be achieved if the traditional idea that personhood is a necessary prerequisite for right-holding 
would be abandoned (2017: 58). If rights would be conferred upon entities without having to 
simultaneously ascribe legal personhood upon these right-holders, that would mean that 
animal interests could be given the appropriate legal protection while the status of personhood 
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would remain reserved for human beings. The way to achieve this state of things is, says 
Pietrzykowski, in constructing a new, intermediate, conceptual category, different from both 
personhood and thing-hood.
 98
  
These new subjects of law – which the author calls non-personal subjects of law – are, on the 
one hand, opposed to object-hood (thing-hood), since the underlying idea implies “the 
capability to possess one’s own subjective interests, the moral relevance of which may merit 
legal consideration” (Pietrzykowski 2016: 21). Given that animals have subjective mental 
states, they consequently have morally relevant interests that ought to be granted some kind of 
legal protection. On the other hand, this new status is opposed to personhood as well, since it 
does not “imply the ability to make intentional use of rights or to be held liable for the 
fulfilment of duties” (Ibid.). This shows the key difference between persons and non-personal 
subjects of law: whereas the former can be ascribed both with interest-rights as well as with 
choice-rights, the latter lack the capacities for holding choice-rights.
99
 Thus, their status is 
only dedicated to protecting their interests. Indeed, according to the author, “the essence of 
non-personal subjecthood of law may be reduced to the legal recognition of one single right 
only, namely the right to be taken into account” (Pietrzykowski 2017:59).  
What is the point of this right and what does it entail?  
The attribution of the right to be taken into account upon certain entities would render their 
interests legally relevant, i.e. it would transform their moral claims into “legitimate legal 
considerations that have to be accounted for in each case of a practical decision” 
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342–346), who argues that all persons are legal subjects (and all legal subjects are subjects), the opposite is not 
also the case: legal subjects such as the nasciturus or, in international law, collective subjects such as peoples, are 
not also persons. 
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(Pietrzykowski 2017: 60). This basically means that in any legally relevant case in which the 
interests of such a right-holder would be in play, the decision-maker (be it the legislator, a 
judge or some other legal operator) would be required to take the interests of such a subject 
seriously when handing down her decision. This, as Pietrzykowski points out, does not mean 
that such interests are indefeasible – that they cannot be outweighed by other, more relevant 
considerations. “It means only”, he says, “that the subjective good cannot be ignored and has 
to be balanced with all relevant considerations following the general principle of 
proportionality applicable in resolving such conflicts” (Pietrzykowski 2017: 59).  
To whom the right should be extended, what should be the extent of the interest of such 
subjects that ought to be taken into consideration and what weight ought to be ascribed to 
them, are questions that cannot be answered apriorily. The answers to these questions rather  
depend on concrete circumstances of each case, as well as of the type of right-holder in 
question. Any such decision should be, according to Pietrzykowski, based on available 
scientific data as to the capacities of different kinds of animals for having subjective 
experiences (Pietrzykowski 2017: 62). Seeing how this capacity is necessary for having 
subjective interests, the author argues that the status surely could not be ascribed to non-
sentient organisms, both non-animal and animal alike. Moreover, he does not believe this 
conceptual category would be applicable to artificial intelligent agents (see Pietrzykowski 
2017: 64). He does, however, believe that it could be extended to some species of invertebrate 
animals, and, of course, to vertebrate animals, particularly mammals and birds.
100
 
Pietrzykowski defends his approach in light of a possible objection that affording only one 
very general legal right to non-personal subjects instead of a longer catalogue of more specific 
rights is somehow selling the idea short. He offers two arguments in his own support. The 
first argument is a conceptual one and is based on the qualitative distinction between persons 
and those who could (potentially) hold the status of non-personal subjects. Persons are aware 
of their legal situations and have the capacity to plan their future behaviour on the basis of 
predictable (legal) consequences of their actions. It is thus imperative for their autonomous 
decision-making that they have rights determining their legal position that are specific as 
possible (see Pietrzykowski 2017: 60). Non-personal subjects of law, on the other hand, do 
not have such capacities. The protection of their interests does not depend on their individual 
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human-animal chimeras and hybrids. Finally, he believes the status could be helpful in finding solutions to the 
controversial cases of purely human creatures that are not recognized as persons, such as, above all, human 
foetuses. See Pietrzykowski 2017: 63. 
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choices and preferences – instead, it is much more paternalistic, as it is basically constructed 
by third persons on the basis of their best understanding “of the species-typical needs and the 
preferences of a given species of animals” (Ibid.). Given that the individual will of a particular 
non-personal subject is not fundamental for the protection of its interests, “there is no point in 
granting an animal specifically defined rights that would let it rationally plan and self-govern 
its own situation” (Ibid.). 
The second argument in support of the author’s approach is a pragmatic one. Pietrzykowski is 
a realist about the possible changes in the social attitudes towards animals. He knows that 
there is no chance that humans will accept full abandonment of animal exploitation practices 
any time soon. In such circumstances, any workable framework for animal rights “has to be 
reconcilable with the most existing practices of human use of animals, bringing together some 
potential to gradually improve the boundary conditions in which they may take place, as well 
as to influence the perception of animals exploited in such practices” (Pietrzykowski 2017: 
61). This is why Pietrzykowski proposes a flexible framework, one in which the concrete 
protection of non-personal subjects could be adjusted on a case-by-case basis as to “reduce 
the risk of producing results that would be unacceptable from the point of view of 
predominant social attitudes to animals” (Pietrzykowski 2017: 60-61). Law cannot be used in 
order to force some radical change in social attitudes – any sudden or extreme change in this 
respect would surely be met with great aversion. That is why animal interests should not, from 
the beginning, be given specific and/or high legal value. However, requiring that individual 
animal interests be taken into consideration when adopting a given policy decision – even if 
such interests are ultimately overridden by other, human interests – may serve to provoke 
certain changes in the underlying social attitudes. Such an approach may contribute the 
development of the view that “each individual animal [is] an entity whose subjective good 
counts under the law” (Ibid.).  
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CONCLUSION  
 
In this first Part, I attempted to shed some light on two important legal notions that form the 
backbone of this thesis. “Legal status” and “person” are concepts that are often overlooked in 
theoretical discussions, dispensed with hastily, or presupposed to mean this or that without 
much emphasis being given to what exactly this or that meaning is. I also declared in the 
beginning that I will be defending a claim that the person in law is a particular kind of legal 
status.  
Upon analysing several conceptions of legal status, I came to accept the view that a legal 
status is, on the one hand, an intermediary legal term that connects the access criteria of a 
status and the normative consequences attached to it; on the other hand, it is also an institute 
that exists due to some underlying reason (a social interest to be satisfied or protected) and 
whose point it is to address that very reason (i.e. to satisfy or protect the underlying interest). 
This is achieved by ascribing to the status a content (in the form of entitlements, rights and 
duties) that ought to enable the underlying reason to be properly addressed; in consequence, 
access criteria enabling acquisition of the status cannot be random or arbitrary, but rather 
reasonably determined so that they correspond to the rights and duties attached to the status – 
so that the holder of the status will be, at least in theory, able to exercise the rights and duties 
in a way that properly addresses the underlying rationale of the status. 
The person, for its part, is one of the central concepts in our culture and has, as such, been 
extensively discussed in numerous fields such as sociology, anthropology, psychology, 
(bio)ethics, theology etc. It is also a fundamental legal concept, indeed, a constitutive element 
of law as such as well as a key element of any specific legal system. There can be no law 
without there being a subject of law. Considering the person as a legal status in the earlier 
described sense, I proposed that it be seen as an intermediate legal term just like any other. 
The person, however, is much more than just any legal status: it is, I claimed, a primary and a 
fundamental legal status that by constituting subjects of law enables the game of law to be 
played in the first place; as a consequence, it is also a threshold status enabling the distinction 
between subjects of law and objects of law. 
In order to be able to actively participate in the legal game, law’s person must of course be 
adequately equipped: hence, I further argued that the content of the status of a person in law is 
to be seen as specific legal capacities – capacities for being a beneficiary of legal provisions 
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aimed at protecting some entity’s interest; capacities for being ascribed certain benefits or 
burdens of legal transactions; capacities for being held liable for one’s own actions; and 
capacities for autonomously performing legal acts with valid legal effect. Not all entities, 
however, are equally capable – both in real life as well as in law. If we take the example of 
children, who in our contemporary legal systems possess passive incidences of legal 
personhood but not the actives ones, we may concluded that entities, considered as persons by 
a given legal system, may be endowed with legal personhood to a different degree. Both the 
reasons for the attribution of different types (thicknesses) of legal personhood as well as the 
actual (physical) capacities needed to sustain them differ: it suffices for the attribution of the 
thinnest kind of legal personhood that some “state of affairs is conceived of sufficient value to 
merit some legal protection for its own sake”; consequently, the so endowed entity needn’t 
possess any kind of human- or animal-like capacities in order to sustain such a personhood. 
However, common to all persons in law – being the reason why they are considered persons – 
is that the law finds certain of their interests of sufficient value to provide them with a 
particular kind of protection. Persons and their interests are valued for their own sake, while 
objects, which do not have their own interests, are valued only instrumentally. The law, then, 
is for persons – and persons are those entities that are, according to the law, valuable for their 
own sake. 
Next, I enquired into which entities – and for what reasons – have been normally conceived as 
eligible for legal personhood: theories of legal personhood, which can simply be distinguished 
into formal and substantive ones, determine which access criteria should be prescribed for 
acquiring the status. Formal theories of personhood, arguing that the status is a purely legal 
construct and hence independent of any extra-legal criteria, settle on no fixed criteria for 
personhood-attribution; rather, they rely on reasons for attribution on a case-by-case basis. 
Hence, if a given entity’s interests are deemed sufficiently valuable on their own, legal 
personhood can be ascribed to such an entity – be it real or institutional, animate or inanimate. 
On the other hand, substantive theories of personhood focus on extra-legal criteria of 
personhood, claiming that law should only recognize as legal subjects those entities that are, 
because they possess a certain determining characteristic, already (morally speaking) persons. 
Depending on the selected criterion, the extension of legal personhood varies in these 
theories: while some would extend personhood only to born alive human beings, others argue 
for a more liberal approach to personhood, including also cognitively highly developed non-
human animals. Regardless of their differences, however, all theories agree that the 
92 
 
paradigmatic person in law is the adult human being of sane mind. In the continuation of this 
thesis, if nothing will be specified, I will take as the model of a legal person precisely such a 
fully capable adult human individual. 
In discussing legal personhood, I have made two crucial realizations: first of all, it is 
necessary to distinguish the notions of human being and that of a person. The two notions 
belong to two different ontologies even though today we take it almost for granted that legal 
personhood is unconditionally ascribed to all human beings (to leave aside all controversial 
cases). It is precisely this presupposition that I intend to put to the fore and show that this 
arrangement is not one of necessity. What I will attempt to show is that legal personhood is 
not some inalienable feature of each and every human being, but rather that it is, depending 
on concrete circumstances, susceptible to manipulations, limitations, deformations, 
diminutions etc. As legal personhood admits of degrees, so too can it be gradually (or fully) 
taken away. 
There are numerous historic examples on which these problems could be analysed. In Part II 
of the thesis I will focus on the case of the Erased citizens of former Yugoslav republics in 
Slovenia. The case primarily regards deprivation of citizenship and permanent residency, but 
as I will hopefully show, it also resulted in alterations in the personhood status of the affected 
individuals.  
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PART  II. 
LEGAL PERSONHOOD &  THE ERASURE  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
In the previous Part, we established that legal personhood is a status admitting of degrees: 
depending on the reasons for personhood-attribution and the actual capacities to sustain it, 
persons are “thicker” or “thinner” – they are endowed with more or less legal capacities. 
While persons differ in their specific capacities, they all have access to a certain minimum 
level of legal protection of their interests. If an entity’s interests are in no way legally 
protected or if they are not protected in the entity’s own interest but rather in the interest of 
someone else, then that entity cannot be considered a person in law. For the above-stated 
reasons, legal personhood can be characterized as a threshold legal status (the persons-things 
distinction) as well as a primary or fundamental legal status of persons. 
While undoubtedly of fundamental importance, legal personhood, especially in its thinnest 
version, is by itself quite inert. Interests can be furthered and desires realized only if persons 
effectively acquire different rights and duties. Rights and duties an individual person may 
acquire differ in many respects and may have different personal value for the individual as 
well as impact his or her legal position to various degrees. Inheriting a painting from one’s 
grandmother, for example, may be of great personal value, but this acquisition has little 
importance for one’s overall legal position. On the other hand, some legal statuses may have a 
sweeping effect on one’s legal position. Citizenship is one such fundamental legal status 
because it grants access to a broad array of important rights, such as the right to participate 
(actively and passively) in the political life of one’s country, the right to diplomatic protection 
on the territory of a foreign state, and a wide host of other fundamental rights. While many of 
these rights are granted to non-citizens as well, often the full extent of legal protection in the 
territory of a given state is available only to its citizens. Nowadays residency in a given 
country is an equally important status. Residency status usually gives one, regardless of her 
citizenship status, access to a series of important, especially socio-economic rights on the 
territory of the country of residence.  
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Citizenship in particular has often been seen as having a very strong connection with 
personhood. This bond was established by the great human rights declarations of 18
th
 century, 
such as the American Declaration of Independence (1776) and especially the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789). While they declared the natural 
and inalienable rights of all men, these acts were fundamentally intended to legitimize the 
power of the new nation-States which, as the name already suggests, emphasize nationality 
above everything else and so make citizenship (nationality), not personhood, the primary 
source of recognition and rights protection.
101
 Hannah Arendt (1973) famously argued that the 
right to citizenship is actually the most fundamental of all rights, a right to have rights as she 
called it. Without it an individual may find herself utterly rightless, nothing but a bare life. 
Ferrajoli (1999), for his part, has shown that the two concepts have often been confounded: 
citizenship is interpreted as a fundamental legal status that gives access to a broad set of civil, 
political and social rights. As this scholar notes, interpreted in this way, citizenship actually 
overlaps with status personae. The strong connection is felt on the level of social practices as 
well. As Dal Lago (2012) demonstrates, individuals (refugees, migrants) who because of the 
way they had entered and reside on a territory of a foreign country are labelled as “irregular” 
or “illegal”, will often suffer not only legal problems but also social exclusion in the host 
country. Extensive marginalization and social exclusion from all aspects of a community’s 
life has led this author to describe the condition of these individuals as one of non-persons. 
The profound connection between the statuses of a person and that of a citizen cannot 
therefore be denied. On my interpretation of legal personhood, should something (an event or 
an action) cause an individual to lose her status as a person in law, that would, of necessity, 
result in the loss of her citizenship as well as all other legal statuses. The loss of legal 
personhood equals relegation to thing-hood, i.e. being considered a potential object of rights 
and duties of others (persons). Enslavement is, of course, a typical example of this. However, 
as Arendt and Dal Lago, among others, have shown, the connection also seems to work in the 
opposite direction. Namely, it appears possible that the loss of citizenship status, due to their 
strong interlacement, brings about changes (loss or limitation) in the personhood status. This 
claim, if it can be proved correct, appears problematic for the understanding of legal statuses I 
have come to adopt. How could it be that a loss of a legal status, whose acquisition is only 
possible upon the prior holding of a more fundamental legal status, can cause alternations and 
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2014: especially 116–120. 
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even the loss of this latter status as well? We understand that if we cut the trunk of a tree, the 
whole of the tree will fall down, branches included. But how can it be that if we chop off a 
branch, we take the rest of the tree with it as well? Something does not seem right in all this. I 
will explore this key problem in the present and the following part of the thesis. 
Some of the scenarios in which this troublesome link between personhood and citizenship has 
or still may emerge have already been indicated above: for one, the radical redrawing of 
European borders as a result of the end of World War I left millions of individuals stateless 
and, in consequence, without any legal protection whatsoever; a few decades later, the almost 
total eradication of millions of Jews during the second World War was made significantly 
easier if not possible only once these people were stripped of their citizenships and all other 
legal bonds. Today, wars and increasingly devastating natural disasters are causing millions of 
people to leave their homes, with most of them coming to Europe and North America without 
any proper legal basis, often carrying no personal documents at all. With European countries 
(seemingly) unable to process all of them in accordance with valid international norms, many 
of these individuals are either put in administrative detention centres, which function as kind 
of legal black holes or are left to their own devices, to wander Europe illegally and 
unprotected, exposed to unchecked violence and any number of legal sanctions. Finally, the 
recent announcement of “Brexit” – the exit of the UK from the EU – is already stirring much 
debate about the possible consequences for individuals “trapped” on both sides, i.e. citizens of 
EU Member States in the UK and UK citizens in EU states. Resident non-citizens who until 
today were in almost every sense equal to counterparts with citizenship now face losing all 
their acquired rights of UK’s decision to dissociate from the EU (cfr. Mindus 2017). 
Our history as well as present times are replete with cases demonstrating the force to radically 
alter legal statuses of individuals. While events may be at the root of such changes, by 
themselves they are inert – it takes conscious actions of men in order to enforce particular 
changes in the legal (and other) sphere. It took the Nuremberg Laws to exclude Jews from 
German (Reich) citizenship, just as now it takes active omission of the exercise of binding 
international agreements to cause thousands of refugees in Europe to be left with no legally 
regulated status. In order to fully understand the mechanisms of such status-deprivation in 
relation to such “conditioning events”, one would need to examine all or at least some of them 
in greater detail. Here, however, I do not have sufficient space to conduct such an extensive 
investigation. Rather, I will focus on just one such example. 
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The Erasure, as has popularly came to be known, was an act performed by Slovenian state 
authorities in the early 1990s, whereby more than 25.000 individuals – residents in Slovenia 
hailing from other SFRY countries – were deprived of their status as permanent residents. The 
cancellation of their residence status, including the physical destruction of their personal 
documents, followed their unwillingness or inability to obtain citizenship of the newly-created 
state of Slovenia following its secession from SFRY in 1991. This (administrative) act left the 
larger part of the affected individuals almost completely rightless, in a legal situation that 
could best be described as a state of “legal limbo”: some were deprived of any citizenship and 
were thus left stateless; having lost their residency status all of them found themselves 
without a legal basis for being on the Slovenian territory which made them vulnerable not 
only to constant administrative sanctions and imprisonment, but also to deportation; the loss 
of residency also meant the loss of a legal basis for a whole range of other rights, such as the 
right to work, medical insurance, pension rights, right to education, etc. By being pushed to 
the fringes of law, these individuals often found themselves also socially marginalized, left 
without any kind of a social safety net. For a long time, their existence as a specific group was 
unknown, for they were left without a proper voice in the public arena. The legal aspects of 
Erasure are the subject of Part II of the thesis. 
This Part has three chapters. In Chapter 4, I present the legal framework necessary for 
understanding the Erasure. Specifically, in section 4.1., I examine the legal regulation of 
citizenship and residency in the former SFRY, that is, prior to Slovenia’s secession. In 4.2., I 
then present the most important legal acts relating to the secession of Slovenia from SFRY 
and for the establishment of a new sovereign state. Finally, in section 4.3., I analyse the 
crucial “independence legislation”, namely the Citizenship Act and the Aliens Act: the former 
regulated the modes of citizenship acquisition in the newly-established state, including 
specific provisions for this particular group of residents, whereas the latter act regulated the 
position of foreigners on Slovenian soil, but also included special norms on the legal position 
of those individuals who were eligible to obtain the new Slovenian citizenship but, for one 
reason or another, did not. 
In Chapter 5, I build on the analysis conducted in the previous chapter in order to examine in 
detail the legal mechanisms implemented in the Erasure. Narrowly looking, the Erasure 
regarded the deprivation of residency status; however, the citizenship policy implemented by 
the newly-formed Slovenian state is actually the key for understanding the phenomenon in its 
wider sense. Thus, in section 5.1., I demonstrate how the disenfranchisement of a particular 
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group of individuals on the territory of the newly sovereign state proved to be a crucial step in 
the Erasure. Here disenfranchisement should not be understood in the narrow sense of the 
word – after all, strictly speaking, the affected individuals were free to take up the Slovenian 
citizenship offered to them. Rather, it should be seen as a more complex process of excluding 
a specific population from the Slovenian body politic. Indeed, it was only when these 
individuals were both left without the legal protections offered to citizens as well as socially 
stigmatized as enemies, anti-citizens, the Others etc. that the authorities were able to proceed 
with the Erasure in the narrow sense. The latter is the subject of section 5.2. There, I examine 
in detail the exact manner in which more than 25.000 individuals were deprived of all their 
most fundamental legal rights. I look at the Instructions the Ministry of the Interior 
transmitted to the local administrative offices that were charged with putting the Erasure to 
effect.  Finally, in section 5.3. I present the most important judicial decisions relating the the 
Erasure in the wider sense. Here two decisions of the Slovenian Constitutional Court as well 
as the verdict of the ECtHR in the case Kurić and others v. Slovenia will be examined and 
their most important findings highlighted. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I first discuss (6.1.), in a general manner, the consequences State actions 
may have on the legal personhood of specific, vulnerable groups of individuals. On the basis 
of the argument that even today legal personhood can still be, if not completely deprived at 
least diminished in its effects, I proceed (6.2.) with an analysis of the consequences of the 
Erasure for the underlying status of a person. One important realization that stems from both 
this and the previous section is that legal personhood is highly interconnected with other legal 
statuses. Hence, in the last section (6.3.), I first propose how this connection should best be 
visually represented. Seeing, however, how this model has great difficulties, I finally propose 
de lege ferenda a different visual representation that is also an invitation for re-thinking and 
re-modelling these fundamental relations between legal personhood and all other legal 
statuses. 
I should emphasize that the following is not a detailed and comprehensive analysis of all legal 
and social aspects of the Erasure in the wider sense, which includes the period prior to the 
actual Erasure as well as the acts and events following the Erasure itself. Rather, I focus on 
the facts that I perceive as immediately relevant for the thesis at hand. I will therefore omit 
reference to many historical facts that had occurred prior to the Erasure as well as to 
numerous legal and broader social developments in the aftermath of the Erasure. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
A  RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
 
In this chapter, I will address the following questions: first, what was the legal regulation of 
citizenship and residency status in the former SFRY, given its federal form of government? In 
this regard, I will be particularly interested in knowing, what was the status of citizens of one 
republic on the territory of another republic: under what conditions could they travel to, work 
or reside in another republic? What were their rights and duties in this regard?  
Second, with regard to Slovenia’s separation from SFRY, I will be looking into the legal and 
political foundations of this process: which political acts and legal declarations, laws, 
constitutional acts etc. provided for the legitimization of the secession as well as the legal 
basis of the new State? Related to this issue, the legal position of those residents of Slovenia 
who at the time of its separation from SFRY held the citizenship of one of the other republics 
will be of particular importance. How were these individuals treated legally in this transition 
period? What was their role in the secession process: were they a disruptive, counter-
productive presence or were they in some way a positive factor in the independence efforts? 
Were they, in other words, treated by the authorities as foreign elements in need of being 
eliminated or were they rather seen as an integral part of the body politic?  
Finally, upon independence the new Republic of Slovenia had to, among other key political 
decisions, determine its citizenship policy – in other words, it had to determine who and under 
which conditions will be able to obtain its citizenship. What kind of a citizenship policy did 
Slovenia choose? Was the model it chose a liberal and extensive one or more conservative 
and restrictive one? Was its citizenship policy built on the idea of the primacy of the nation, 
understood as a group preceding the creation of the State and determined by a common ethnic 
(blood) origin, culture and language; or was it rather built upon an idea of a nation that is 
constructed only once the population of a given territory is given its own State? Moreover, in 
relation to the citizens of other SFRY republics residing in Slovenia, I wish to see whether the 
new authorities respected their promises given in the transitional period. Could these 
individuals automatically obtain Slovenian citizenship or were they given some special 
conditions under which they could apply for it? Were they now that the ethnic Slovenians 
obtained their own country still seen as an integral part of the political body? What was to be 
their destiny in the newly formed independent and sovereign Slovenia? 
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4.1.  Citizenship & permanent residence in the form er SFRY  
 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
102
 was a federal state composed of six 
republics and two autonomous provinces.
103
 Stemming from this structure was the regulation 
of citizenship, which was two-tiered: each citizen held both the federal and the republican 
citizenship. The predominant citizenship-acquisition principle at the federal level, which was 
followed by all the republics as well, was jus sanguinis,
104
 although other manners of 
acquiring citizenship were also possible (i.e. by naturalization, in accordance with 
international agreements or by birth on the territory if the child’s parents or their citizenship 
could not be identified or if they were stateless). All Yugoslav citizens were considered equal 
before the law in their rights and duties, regardless of their national, racial, religious, gender, 
language or any other difference.
105
 The same applied to their republican citizenship as well. 
Two phases can be distinguished in the relationship between the federal and the republican 
citizenship: until 1974 the federal citizenship was “the primary” one, meaning that only 
Yugoslav citizens could hold citizenship of one of the republics and, consequently, that the 
loss of federal citizenship also meant the loss of the republican one. After the adoption of a 
new constitution in 1974, which began a process of decentralization, republican citizenship 
took precedence: Art. 249/2 of the Constitution stated that each citizen of a republic is also a 
citizen of the SFRY and that citizens of one republic have the same rights and duties on the 
territory of any other republic as its own citizens. It should be noted that each republic had to 
adopt its own internal laws regulating citizenship which had to be harmonized with the federal 
law. In practice these laws differed between each other only in less important issues. 
This shift of primacy from the federal to the republican citizenship was mostly theoretical as it 
had little or no practical effect. In both phases, all Yugoslav citizens, regardless of their 
republican citizenship, held equal rights and duties and were able to move freely, work and 
                                                          
102
 The name SFRY was introduced in 1963. Until 1918 the territory was part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. 
After World War I, the country became known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In 1929 it was 
renamed as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In 1945, after World War II it was first named Democratic Federal 
Yugoslavia and soon thereafter renamed as Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. 
103
 The republics were: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, whereas 
the two provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, were initially part of Serbia. 
104
 Ius sanguinis can be defined as principle according to which “a person’s nationality is determined on the basis 
of the nationality of his or her parents – or one (particular) parent – at the time of the person’s birth” (Bauböck et 
at. 2006: 121). 
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reside in any republic they wished. Yugoslav citizens frequently exercised this right and 
moved often, especially for work-related motives. In this way, a considerable number of 
individuals resided outside of the republic of their origin. In Slovenia, for instance, the 
number of non-Slovene residents at the time of its secession in 1991 was approximately 
200.000, which made for roughly 10% of the entire population. Moreover, changing the 
republican citizenship was fairly easy: although conditions differed slightly from republic to 
republic, the essential requisite was that the applicant, being of full age, was able to prove 
residence in the specific republic at the time of filling the application. It has been noted that 
due to the unproblematic nature of the republican citizenship and the full equality enjoyed by 
all citizens, “many (perhaps most) SFRY citizens did not devote much attention to this feature 
of their citizenship; many may not even have known which republic’s citizenship they held” 
(Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 40).  
Seeing how federal citizenship guaranteed all the same civil rights, regardless of their 
republican citizenship, one's day-to-day legal relations were significantly more influenced by 
her (permanent) residency status. Yugoslav citizens were able to register their permanent (or 
temporary) residency in any of the republics, granted that it was the republic where they 
effectively lived. Permanent residence was in SFRY, and still is its successor countries, 
including Slovenia, a fundamental legal status in that it gave access to a series of socio-
economic rights, including the right to health care, a host of social benefits, the right to work 
and to study etc.; additionally, in certain cases it even gave access to the right to vote (and still 
does).
106
 Hence, for any Yugoslav citizen, his or her residency status was, within the country 
itself, the most important legal status, determining the greater part of his or her public rights 
and duties. 
The keeping of citizenship and residence records is a special chapter in the Erasure story. A 
detailed and a comprehensive presentation of regulation of this area would require much more 
space and it is not my intention here to go into detail on the matter. I shall only point to 
matters that I find particularly relevant for a general understanding of the Erasure.  
For one, it is important to note that all population registers in Yugoslavia (from 1945 until 
1991) were kept only at the level of the republics. Municipalities were obligated to keep 
records on their (permanent) residents and citizenship was recorded in the place where the 
                                                          
106
 See more in Ragazzi & Štiks 2010: 3. 
101 
 
individual had her permanent residence.
107
 After 1963, however, republican citizenship was 
no longer consistently recorded. “Beginning in that year”, notes Kogovšek Šalamon, “the 
population registers contained records on all SFRY citizens, regardless of the republic in 
which they had citizenship” (2016: 45).108 Soon thereafter population registers began to be 
abandoned. While in 1976 separate citizenship records were abolished and information on 
citizenship was entered into the birth registers, in 1982 population registers were abandoned 
altogether (see more in Kogovšek Šalamon 2006: 45, including note 69). 
In order to better understand the complexities of the legal regulation in this area as well as the 
consequent confusion it created among the affected individuals – constituting in this way a 
relevant element of the Erasure –, I should add that in addition to the two statuses – 
citizenship and (permanent) residency – the SFRY introduced in 1976 the “unique personal 
identification number” (EMŠO).109 The EMŠO allowed for unique identification of each 
individual and it was used for the maintenance of population databases, the integration of data 
in various such databases and for the purposes of other official bodies authorized to use the 
EMŠO. A federal law defined the structure of the number and the obligation to enter it into 
certain documents, while the republics were in charge of all other aspects of its 
implementation. In Slovenia, all permanent residents obtained the EMŠO, including those 
permanent residents who did not held Slovenian republican citizenship. This fact proved to be 
one of the biggest problems in the time of the Erasure since “many erased individuals 
erroneously thought that their ‘Slovenian’ personal identification number was proof that they 
were not obliged to apply for Slovenian citizenship, thinking that they would not have 
received the Slovenian personal identification number unless they held Slovenian republic 
citizenship” (Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 42).110  
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In summary, three points relevant for understanding the Erasure should be emphasized in 
relation to the just discussed matters. First, while individuals in SFRY held a dual citizenship, 
the republican citizenship had almost no practical value. The practically most relevant legal 
status was rather permanent residence. Individuals were often unaware of their republican 
citizenship and the data entered into population records was frequently incorrect or outdated. 
All this proved particularly important at the moment of the break-up of Yugoslavia when, 
with federal citizenship ceasing to exist, the republican citizenship became the main criterion 
for determining one’s citizenship of one of the newly formed states. Secondly, citizenship and 
residency records were kept at the level of the republics. However, due to constant changes in 
the legislation, their maintenance was highly irregular and thus the data they contained 
became unreliable. This fact proved critical when Erased individuals attempted to provide 
proof of their citizenship and residency but were unable to do so. Finally, due to a mix of 
political and legal circumstances (promotion of Yugoslavianism, freedom of movement and 
equal rights regardless of republican origins), as well as of a widespread disinterest, there was 
both a lack of information as well as misunderstanding regarding the functions of the various 
statuses (federal and republic citizenship, permanent residence, unique identification number), 
including lack of knowledge about one’s own precise legal situation. 
All these facts proved to be crucial for the events that followed. Since the secession of 
Slovenia from SFRY and the transition from one legal system to another is highly relevant for 
understanding the Erasure, the next step is to look at the most important documents adopted 
by the Slovenian authorities at that time.  
 
 
4.2. The transition: legal foundations  for the independent state  
 
The process of Slovenia’s secession from the SFRY began in the 1980s.111 With the 
overarching influence of Tito gone, the growing economic crisis and the rise of nationalist 
tendencies, the Yugoslav federation began to crack. Serbian calls for greater centralisation 
were met with resistance from the other states, especially Slovenia and Croatia. Following the 
amending of the federal constitution in 1988, which sought to give more powers to the central 
                                                          
111
 Here, I am only interested in certain internal legal aspects of the Slovenian secession. For the internal law 
perspective, see for instance Iglar 1992, Radan 2002, Crawford 2007. 
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government on the account of the republics, in 1989 the Slovenian authorities also began 
amending their republican constitution – presumably in order to bring it in line with the 
amended federal constitution following the principle of the supremacy of the federal 
constitution. However, the amending process in fact served to begin the process of 
dissociating Slovenia from the federation.
112
 The adopted amendments paved the way for the 
transition into a new, independent and sovereign state by seeking, among others, greater 
liberalization of politics and economic life, strengthening democratic processes and, most 
importantly, providing the legal foundations for the re-acquisition of sovereign powers which 
were (temporarily) transferred to the federation. One of the most important amendments 
(Amendment X) explicitly declared the right to self-determination of the Slovenian people, 
including the right to secede from the federation (see Iglar 1992). 
Although the process of disassociation was met with criticism, both internally and 
internationally, the Slovenian authorities pressed on and in April of 1990 the first multiparty 
elections after the Second World War were called in Slovenia. One of the defining moments 
in the process was the referendum on the sovereignty and independence which took place on 
23 December 1990 (the plebiscite). The plebiscite was called on the basis of the Referendum 
on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia Act (the Referendum Act) 
adopted on 6 December 1990.
113
 The Referendum Act set the date of the plebiscite, 
determined the question and defined the electorate. It also established that if the majority 
would vote in favour of the secession, the parliament was to adopt within six months all the 
necessary measures and legal acts in order for the Republic of Slovenia to assume the exercise 
of all of its sovereign rights. With regard to the electorate, the Referendum Act stated that all 
persons who had the right to vote under the Law on the Elections to the National Assemblies 
had the right to take part in the referendum. That meant that all adults over the age of eighteen 
with permanent residence in Slovenia on the day of the plebiscite were able to participate – 
that included non-nationals from other SFRY republics with permanent residence in Slovenia. 
On the same day as the aforementioned act, the Statement of Good Intentions (the Statement) 
was adopted.
114
 The Statement, likewise adopted by the National Assembly, was intended as a 
reassurance of the domestic and the international public as to the future actions of the 
Slovenian authorities following the (positive) result of the referendum. It laid out the basic 
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political intentions of the new state: it declared, for instance, that once independent, Slovenia 
will be a democratic and a welfare state governed by the rule of law and will safeguard civil 
rights and liberties. It vowed continued protection of the Italian and Hungarian national 
minorities and promised all other ethnicities and nationalities the right to a comprehensive 
cultural and linguistic development. Most importantly for our purposes, the Statement clearly 
provided that citizens of other republics with permanent residence in Slovenia will be able to 
obtain Slovenian citizenship if they will so desire. 
In this context, we should add that on the same day (6 December 1990), all parliamentary 
parties and groups signed an agreement on joint action at the plebiscite (the Agreement). In it 
(point 9) they pledged that the political status of the members of the Italian and the Hungarian 
national minorities, as well as of all members of other Yugoslav nations will not be altered 
because of the referendum – they poetically declared that these individuals will “share our 
common destiny”. They finally reiterated the pledge that members of other Yugoslav nations 
with permanent residence in Slovenia will be able to acquire the Slovenian citizenship if they 
wanted to. 
The plebiscite was held on 23 December 1990: the turnout was 93,2% with those voting in 
favour of the independence amounting to 88,5% of all eligible voters. On the basis of this 
overwhelming decision in favour of the secession and independence, the national authorities 
were obligated to begin preparing the legal basis for establishing a new sovereign state. In the 
six months following the referendum decision, the National Assembly adopted a series of 
crucial legislation which was symbolically called “the independence legislation” (see below, 
4.3.). The process culminated in the adoption of the Basic Constitutional Charter on the 
Independence and Sovereignty of the Republic of Slovenia (the Basic Constitutional Charter) 
on 25 June 1991.
115
 The Charter is the most important state-founding legal act as it was with 
its adoption that Slovenia formally declared its independence.
116
 Besides its general 
fundamental importance, the Charter and the Act for its implementation
117
 are particularly 
relevant for evaluating the Erasure. Among the reasons for the secession, the Preamble of the 
Declaration states that the SFRY no longer functioned as a state ruled by law and seriously 
violated human rights. Moreover and more importantly, Article III of the Declaration states 
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that Slovenia guarantees the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all 
persons on its territory, regardless of their nationality, without any discrimination. Finally, we 
need to bear in mind Art. 13 of the Constitutional Act which determined that citizens of other 
SFRY republics with permanent residence in Slovenia who actually resided there on the day 
of the referendum held equal rights and obligations as citizens of the Republic of Slovenia – 
that is, until they obtained the Slovenian citizenship (under the conditions set in the 
Citizenship Act) or until the deadline specified in the Aliens Act expired. 
The documents I have briefly presented just now legitimized and legalized Slovenia’s 
secession from the SFRY. They represent the basis upon which the transfer of powers from 
the federation to the new sovereign state was made (albeit unilaterally). They set up the 
fundamental political and juridical characteristics of the Republic of Slovenia (i.e. a 
democratic republic, founded on the principles of rule of law and respect for human rights 
etc.). Beyond this fundamental State-constituting role, these acts also demonstrate the legal 
(constitutional) and political commitment of the new authorities towards all of its residents, 
especially those who were not ethnic Slovenes. While members of the Italian and Hungarian 
national minorities were already prior to independence granted privileged protection, these 
acts served to appease the significant population of citizens of other SFRY republics who 
(permanently) resided in Slovenia. The pledges made in these documents represented an 
important legitimization of the new state, especially for the international community, while at 
the same time they aimed to convince as many of these individuals to vote favourably in the 
referendum and back the independence efforts. By allowing citizens of other SFRY republics 
with permanent residence in Slovenia to vote in this all-important referendum, the Slovenian 
state demonstrated, both legally and symbolically, that it perceived them as co-equal members 
of its body politic.
118
 In so doing it raised in them legitimate expectations that once under the 
rule of the new sovereign State, they will be treated equally to Slovene nationals and will be 
afforded the right to obtain the Slovenian citizenship.  
The manner of the acquisition of the new Slovenian citizenship was determined by the new 
Citizenship Act. This and relevant other “independence” laws are examined in the next 
section. 
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4.3. The “Independence legislation”  
 
As is well established in international law, one of the fundamental conditions of statehood is a 
permanent population.
119
 When a new state emerges, it is crucial that it determines who its 
citizens will be. There is no pre-fixed rule of international law determining how the new state 
should go about determining the status of the individuals residing on its territory at the time of 
its coming to be. The determination of who its citizens will be is largely a sovereign right of 
each country, although certain limitations of this right do exist. The State must, above all, 
respect each individual’s right to nationality, prevent statelessness, assure equality of men and 
women and respect the principle of non-discrimination.
120
 Particular rules of international law 
in regard apply in cases of state secession (see Dedić 2003: 39–49).  
Having declared its secession from the SFRY, Slovenia had to establish who, and under what 
conditions, it will treat as its citizens. The basic principles of this policy were already 
determined in the independence documents presented in the previous section. These principles 
were then elaborated in the Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia Act (the Citizenship 
Act).
121
 Below, I discuss the pertinent elements of the Citizenship Act, especially with regard 
to citizens of other SFRY republics. Pertinent in this regard is also the Aliens Act,
122
 which I 
will also examine below.  
 
The Citizenship Act 
 
In its general clauses, the 1991 Citizenship Act determined the normal manners of acquiring 
and losing citizenship, as well as the manner of keeping the citizenship records. For our 
purposes, however, the most important clauses are found in its transitional provisions.  
These provisions determined two ways in which Yugoslav citizens coulbe be “transformed” 
into Slovenian citizens. Article 39 determined that all who until then were citizens of the 
(Socialist) Republic of Slovenian and of the SFRY automatically become citizens of the new 
Republic of Slovenia. Thus, for Slovene nationals the acquisition of citizenship was automatic 
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or ex lege.
123
 This continuity with the former republican citizenship represents one 
manifestation of the general rule of continuity with the former legislation, established in the 
Constitutional Act.
124
 More importantly, this principal policy choice demonstrates that 
Slovenian citizenship is based on the idea of the Slovenian nation as the primary bearer of 
statehood.
125
  
The other manner was “application-based”: following Art. 13 of the Constitutional Act, 
Article 40 of the Citizenship Act determined the conditions under which citizens of the former 
SFRY could obtain the new Slovenian citizenship.
126
 Eligible to receive citizenship under this 
article were individuals who, 
- were citizens of one of the other SFRY republics, 
- had their permanent residence registered in the Republic of Slovenia on the day of the 
independence referendum (23 December 1990) and 
- actually resided on the territory. 
In order to obtain the citizenship under these favourable conditions,
127
 the eligible individuals 
had to submit their applications within six months from the day of the enforcement of the 
Citizenship Act (25 June 1991).  
Given the fundamental importance of this provision for the subsequent Erasure, let us shortly 
look at the named conditions. 
In order to satisfy the first condition, individuals were required to provide birth certificates as 
proof of their citizenship. If they weren’t able to obtain them or could not prove they were 
citizens of one of the other SFRY republics, they were denied Slovenian citizenship and were 
subsequently erased. This manner of satisfying the first criterion, subsequently upheld by the 
Supreme Court,
128
 has been criticized by Kogovšek Šalamon (2016: 58). She argues that this 
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requirement was excessively burdensome for the applicants, since these facts should have 
been available to public officials from official records. The same author also argues that this 
was an overly formalistic requirement that disproportionately affected certain individuals. 
The second condition, that of having a registered permanent address on the day of the 
independence referendum, was based on the pledge made in the Statement of Good Intentions 
and in the Agreement and followed Art. 13 of the Constitutional Act. This basically allowed 
access to the citizenship to those residents who were not already Slovenian citizens but were 
nevertheless allowed to vote in the 1990 referendum. While formally this statutory criterion 
does not seem problematic, several authors have nevertheless found it too narrow and 
formalistic. 
Kogovšek Šalamon argues that the supposed underlying reason for the introduction of this 
condition was to assure that citizenship went only to those who had genuinely strong ties with 
Slovenia (2016: 58). Following such a narrowly determined criterion, however, prevented 
many individuals who nevertheless had strong and effective ties with Slovenia from accessing 
the citizenship. For instance, individuals who for one reason or another registered their 
permanent residence after the prescribed date, although they actually resided in Slovenia for a 
longer period and had here the centre of their economic and other activities, were not eligible 
for citizenship. Likewise, individuals with only a temporary residence permit who similarly 
exercised all their social and economic rights in Slovenia, were unable to obtain citizenship 
(cfr. Jalušič & Dedić 2008: 94f).  
Kogovšek Šalamon also argues that the distinction between permanent and temporary 
residence should not have been made so relevant. She argues that there were numerous 
reasons why someone did not register his or her permanent residence in Slovenia, despite 
actually residing there for a longer period of time: they may have been unaware of the 
possibility or did not devote sufficient attention to the matter (see above, 4.1.); moreover, in 
some situations it was actually impossible to register permanent residency – as when, for 
instance, foreign workers lived in special dormitories (see Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 59).129 
On the other hand, Kogovšek Šalamon notes that an individual who only recently moved to 
Slovenia and registered her permanent residence only shorty before the referendum was 
eligible to receive Slovenian citizenship (Ibid.). In light of the established principle in 
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international law, according to which States, especially in cases of succession, ought to take 
an individual’s “genuine and effective link”130 with the host country in consideration when 
deciding on granting its citizenship or not, Kogovšek Šalamon’s criticism appears justified. 
The individuals she is referring to undoubtedly had just as strong a connection with Slovenia 
at the time of its independence (on the date of independence referendum) as did their 
compatriots who registered their permanent residence in Slovenia. From this perspective, their 
a priori exclusion from the possibility of obtaining Slovenian citizenship on the basis of 
Article 40 was unjustified. 
The last condition – the condition of actually living in Slovenia, was not included in the pre-
independence acts (the State of Good Intentions and the Agreement), but was rather inserted 
only in the Constitutional Act and then the Citizenship Act. It has been argued that the motive 
behind its inclusion was to further guarantee that the recipients of the citizenship indeed held 
genuine ties with and were “loyal” to the country.  
The condition is a so-called “indeterminate legal concept”, whose content needs to be 
specified in each individual case. Such concepts are used whenever the legislator is unable to 
foresee all possible situations that may occur or prove relevant in a given case. While its use 
does give the decision-making officials sufficient freedom to take into consideration different 
circumstances, this freedom is limited. The deciding officials must “take into consideration 
the meaning and the purpose of the law or regulation and the nature of the matter concerned” 
and in so doing pay sufficient respect to the principle of equality before the law. This means, 
above all, that the administrative authority must follow the way in which previous like cases 
were decided and decide in a like manner – if there are no justified reasons for deviations (see 
Constitutional Court decision Up-77/94, from 16 September 1997).
131
 
Kogovšek Šalamon’s analysis of the Supreme Court’s case law on this criterion demonstrates 
that the said criterion was interpreted narrowly, with numerous circumstances understood as 
manifesting one’s termination of actual residence in the territory. Thus, while the condition as 
such does not appear illegitimate, I would agree with Kogovšek Šalamon who claims that “it 
should have been interpreted in its wider sense while taking into account the constitutional 
principle of proportionality” (2016: 65). Numerous reasons could have prevented the eligible 
individuals from being permanently present of the territory of Slovenia from the date of the 
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plebiscite until the resolution of his or her application. If the authorities were truthful in their 
intention of granting citizenship to those individuals who actually held strong and effective 
ties with Slovenia, they should not have based their evaluation only on the objective fact of 
one’s physical presence on the territory, but rather also on the subjective fact of whether or 
not that individual actually had the intention to permanently reside in that territory (cfr. 
Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 64). 
 
Subsequent amendments to the Citizenship Act: “The Exclusion Clauses” 
 
Less than two weeks prior to the expiration of the deadline for presenting the applications, an 
amendment to Art. 40 of the Citizenship Act was passed, containing two new “exclusion 
clauses”.132 These two amendments provided for the possibility of rejecting applications for 
citizenship if the applicant had committed a criminal offence against the State (Art. 40, Par. 2) 
or if one was judged to present a threat to the public order, security, or defence of the State 
(Art. 40, Par. 3). While Par. 2 proved to be useless – and so all cases intended to be processed 
under it were subsequently processed under Par. 3,
133
 the latter’s purpose – so it is argued by 
its critics – was primarily to legitimize the “blacklist” that was previously compiled for 
excluding from citizenship and prohibiting entry in Slovenia of certain individuals – primarily 
officers of the YPA.
134
  
These provisions were introduced in order to enable the protection of “the national interest”, 
i.e. of the public order and of the State. However, the amendments manifest at least three 
large problems: first, with their introduction, “the legislator further curtailed the promise 
given in the Statement of Good Intentions, as well as the provision in Article 13 of the 
[Constitutional Act], which did not contain conditions of exclusion” (Kogovšek Šalamon 
2016: 68; cfr. Zorn 2007: 25). Moreover, the late introduction of the amendments which were 
applied to cases that were at the time pending raises serious questions in relation to the 
prohibition of retroactivity.
135
 I confront this issue below (see Part III, Ch. 9.2.3. & 10.2.3.). 
Finally, as argues Zorn, these new provisions allowed for arbitrary decision-making of the 
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executive authorities which could now base their decision on their evaluation of the 
applicant’s personality, i.e. on moralistic reasoning (Zorn 2007: 26).136 
On 26 December 1991, the deadline for submitting the application for citizenship under 
Article 40 of the Citizenship Act expired. By that date the majority of eligible individuals 
applied for citizenship and successfully acquired it.
137
 Those citizens of other SFRY republics 
who permanently resided in Slovenia but did not obtain the new Slovenian citizenship until 
that date were to become foreigners (aliens). Their legal condition was now regulated by the 
Aliens Act. 
 
The Aliens Act 
 
The legal position of foreigners in Slovenia is regulated by the Aliens Act.
138
 The Act in 
general regulates the conditions for entering and staying in the country for foreigners – 
defined as all those who are not citizens of the Republic of Slovenia –, required 
documentation, conditions for forced removal of aliens from the territory, the position of 
refugees, records of aliens on the territory etc. While the larger part of the statute regulates the 
legal position of individuals who are only entering the State for the first time, the transitional 
provisions of the 1991 Aliens Act also regulated the legal position of two further “types” of 
foreigners: first, those individual who already had alien status under SFRY law and second, 
those individuals who were citizens of other SFRY republics with permanent residence in 
Slovenia but did not apply for citizenship or had their applications rejected. 
As far as the first group is concerned, Art. 82, Par. 3 determined that permanent residence 
permits issued to foreigners with permanent residence on the territory of the Republic of 
Slovenia under the SFRY law on aliens continue to be valid even after the adoption of this 
law.  
On the other hand, the legal position of the latter group was regulated by Art. 81. Paragraph 1 
of the said article determined that the Act’s provisions will not apply to those citizens of 
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former SFRY republics with permanent residence in Slovenia who had (or will) applied for 
Slovenian citizenship within the deadline prescribed by Art. 40 of the Citizenship Act. This 
provision followed the guarantee established by Art. 13 of the Constitutional Act (see above).  
Par. 2, however, applied to individuals who either did not apply for, or had their application 
for citizenship denied. It determined that the provisions of the Aliens Act will become 
applicable for them two months after the expiration of the deadline for applying for 
citizenship or, alternatively, two months after their application was denied. Hence, the 
provisions of the Aliens Act, in respect to this group of individuals, came into force on 26 
February 1992 at the latest.  
This regulation reveals two important points: first, by explicitly determining the legal status of 
those foreigners who held permanent residence status under SFRY law but not doing the 
same, mutatis mutandis, for those individuals who were now for the first time “becoming” 
foreigners, the Aliens Act introduced a discrimination between “the old” and “the new” 
foreigners.
139
 Secondly, the Aliens Act did not regulate the legal status in the 2-month transit 
period between the expiration of the 6-month application period and the date of the 
enforcement of the Aliens Act of those individuals who under Art. 40 were eligible for 
Slovenian citizenship but did not apply for it. Nevertheless, their legal position was protected 
on the basis of Art. 13 of the Constitutional Act which afforded them equal rights with 
Slovenian citizens. 
And here, we might say, lies the crux of the matter. The citizens of other SFRY republics with 
permanent residence in Slovenia at the time of its secession who either did not apply for the 
new Slovenian citizenship or had their application rejected were considered, until 26 February 
1992, as equal in rights and duties to Slovenian citizens – and not, as one could assume, to 
other foreigners. After that date, however, when they officially became foreigners, their legal 
position was not regulated in the same manner as that of other foreigners who also held 
permanent residence under SFRY law – these latter continued to hold the same status under 
Slovenian law as well. Rather, the Aliens Act was silent as to the exact legal position of the 
“new” foreigners. Specifically, it was not made clear, as it was for the “old” foreigners, 
whether their residence permits will continue to be valid – though they had every reason to 
believe that they will, given the promises made by the authorities prior to independence and 
seeing how up to the last moment they were equal to Slovene citizens in almost every aspect. 
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Yet, as we will see in Chapter 5, it was precisely this legal gap, created by the ambiguous and 
underspecified language of Article 81, Par. 2 of the Aliens Act that created the basis for the 
Erasure (cfr. Zorn 2007: 28). 
* 
The coming into force of the Aliens Act is one of the defining moments of the Erasure. It 
signified the moment in which those individuals who were eligible to obtain Slovenian 
citizenship under Art. 40 of the Citizenship Act, but for one reason or another did not, 
officially became foreigners in the Republic of Slovenia. This consequence was not 
unexpected and it was, moreover, willed by the affected individuals – at least the greater part 
of them.  
However, the relevant provision (Art. 81) of the Aliens Act was not at all clear as to the exact 
nature of the foreigner status of these individuals. Indeed, the provision was vague and 
indeterminate and provided little support for a proper understanding of these individuals’ 
future legal status.  
What did it mean that the (provisions of the) Aliens Act will become applicable for the 
individuals who did not obtain Slovenian citizenship on the basis of Art. 40 of the Citizenship 
Act? Perhaps more importantly, what did or could the affected individuals expect will happen 
on the relevant date?  
Consider, first, that the pre-independence acts (especially the Statement of Good Intentions 
and the Agreement of all the political parties) declared that the new Slovenian citizenship will 
be available to all those who will so desire – implying that they were not in any way required 
to obtain it – and that, moreover, their political status will not be altered. Consider also that 
the “independence acts” of constitutional status, especially the Constitutional Act, determined 
that these individuals will have the same rights and duties as Slovenian citizens until they 
have obtained the citizenship in accordance with the Citizenship Act. This provision also 
applied to those individuals who did not apply for citizenship until the expiration of the 
deadlines determined in the Aliens Act (see Art. 13 of the Constitutional Act). Consider, 
finally, that citizenship is a status quite different and independent from the status of 
permanent residence. Our previous discussion has shown that many individuals were not fully 
informed as to the meaning of these various statuses and were not well aware of their own 
legal position. Many believed, for instance, that due to being born in Slovenia or because they 
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lived and worked in Slovenia for so long, they were somehow entitled to its citizenship 
automatically; others believed that by obtaining this citizenship, they would lose the other one 
– and they did not want that; others still “simply did not want to apply for citizenship because 
they wanted to continue to live in Slovenia as foreigners with a permanent residence permit” 
(Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 83). Finally, there are reports of those who attempted to apply but 
whose applications were never resolved or had their requests arbitrarily rejected by 
administrative officers.
140
  
All of the above said generates a picture of individuals who legitimately expected that their 
legal status after the relevant date will not be altered beyond that what they anticipated and 
wished for – that is, that they will become foreigners with permanent residence in Slovenia. 
This was indeed the status they already held and they did not anticipate, nor had they any 
reason to, any further and more profound implications for their legal position. 
 
  
                                                          
140
 Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 83-4; see also different stories in Dedič, Jalušič, Zorn 2003. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
THE LEGAL MECHANISMS OF THE ERASURE  
 
The previous chapter provided us with the necessary historical context and legal framework 
for understanding the Erasure. When we talk about the Erasure, we should distinguish 
between (i) Erasure in the narrow sense, i.e.  the act of cancelling (erasing, removing etc.) a 
specific set of individuals from the register of permanent residents of Slovenia that took place 
on 26 February 1992; and (ii) Erasure in the broader sense. 
In Section 5.2., I will deal with the Erasure in the narrow sense. There, I will be interested in 
the way the Erasure was executed: on the basis of which legal acts, and on whose authority 
was the cancellation performed. I will also inquire into the exact manner in which this 
enterprise was organized: was it perhaps a centrally coordinated affair or did legal officials 
rather act uncoordinated? These questions may lead to answers that go beyond the narrow 
technical confines of the section. The broader legal context of the Erasure will be discussed in 
Part III (Ch. 8) of this thesis. 
The Erasure can also be understood in a broader sense. In this sense, I understand the Erasure 
as the whole set of legal acts and actions preceding and enabling the Erasure in the narrow 
sense, as well as the activities of the authorities following the cancellation itself. A key feature 
of the Erasure in the broader sense is what may be called “disenfranchisement” of the relevant 
group of individuals. For the purposes of this work, disenfranchisement should not be 
understood in its narrow, technical sense of intentional deprivation of one’s citizenship rights, 
especially the right to vote (although this aspect should of course be considered an integral 
part of the meaning); rather, it should be understood as a complex process, a series of legal 
and extra-legal actions of Slovenian authorities, prior to and immediately after the secession 
from SFRY, that resulted in the exclusion of the targeted set of individuals from the Slovenian 
“body politic”. This process, as we will see, was crucial for the subsequent Erasure in the 
narrow sense. This problem will be the subject of the next section (5.1.), where I will be 
seeking answer to the following questions: first, what was the nature of the citizenship policy 
instituted by the new Slovenian authorities? Second, how did this new policy, if at all, 
contribute to the Erasure (in the narrow sense)?  
In the last section (5.3.), I examine the most relevant judicial decisions pertaining to the 
Erasure. 
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5.1.  Disenfranchisement as a precursor to the Erasure  
 
The problem that I will be addressing in this section is this: the Erasure from the registry of 
permanent residents affected individuals who did not wish (or were otherwise unable) to 
obtain Slovenian citizenship on the basis of Art. 40 of the Citizenship Act. Prior to Slovenia’s 
independence, these citizens of other SFRY republics with permanent residency in Slovenia, 
were, however, considered equal members of its polity: though not Slovenian citizens, they 
were, formally speaking, as SFRY citizens and permanent residents, equal to their Slovenian 
counterparts in virtually all rights and duties. Beyond that, the authorities of the nascent 
independent Slovenia conferred on them the right to vote in the plebiscite on the founding of 
the new state, hence treating them as its co-founders. 
Yet, in February 1992, these same individuals were deprived of their residency status and 
made “illegal”. How then can their erasure from the registry of permanent residents be 
explained? In particular, how can their exclusion from the political and legal community be 
made sense of in light of their status as co-founders of the new sovereign state? 
I believe an answer should be sought in the construction of Slovenia’s citizenship policy. In 
particular, I argue that the new state orchestrated a radical, yet almost undetectable shift in its 
official citizenship policy. Independence and sovereignty enabled Slovenian authorities to 
modify the extension of subjects that were considered the state’s demos. While prior to the 
secession inclusion was based on the affectedness principle, upon independence the leading 
criterion became ethnic affiliation. This modification enabled the exclusion of those 
individuals who no longer fitted the new citizenship criteria. This tentative answer clearly 
requires further qualification. 
Above (see 4.1.), we established that in the SFRY federal citizenship prevailed over the 
republican one, which was of little practical value. Yugoslav citizens had equal rights and 
duties in the territory of the entire federation. One thing this shows is that despite the fact that 
citizenship acquisition policies in the SFRY were built primarily on the principle of jus 
sanguinis, and thus put emphasis on ethnic affiliation, there were certain superior values (i.e. 
the philosophy of pan-Yugoslavism, embodied in the ideology of “brotherhood and unity”) 
that prevailed over the ethnic policies of individual republics, both politically as well as 
legally speaking. 
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Formal equality of all permanent residents in (the Socialist Republic) Slovenia, citizens or 
not, was fully accepted by the pre-independence authorities in developing their secession 
policies. Their equally was also substantive, which is perhaps most clearly seen in the 
determination of the electorate for the plebiscite (independence referendum). We should 
remember that the Referendum Act, and all other independence-related acts, based their 
legitimacy on the right to self-determination of the Slovene nation (people). From the very 
beginning, then, the new state was to be a state of the Slovenian nation foremost.
141
 However, 
by including resident non-nationals into the electorate for this all-important referendum, the 
authorities made a bold statement that these individuals counted as an equal part of the 
nascent state’s demos.  
Democracy (dēmokratía) literally means “rule of the people”. Bobbio argued that any 
meaningful discussion of democracy (as a system distinct from autocracy) is possible if 
democracy is considered “as characterized by a set of rules (primary or basic) which establish 
who is authorized to take collective decisions and which procedures are to be applied” (1987: 
24). One common sense principle in this regard is that in order for a decision to be accepted as 
a “collective decision”, binding on all members of the community, it ought to be adopted by 
all those individuals who are or will be affected by it. This, in short, is the essence of the so-
called all-affected principle, a fundamental principle of democratic government (cfr. Mindus 
2016: 105).
142
 While today most collective political decisions are adopted by elected 
representatives (representative democracy), some are also taken directly by all (almost all) 
members of the polity (direct democracy). “For there to be direct democracy,” argues Bobbio, 
“there should be no intermediary at all between those who make decisions and those affected 
by them” (Bobbio 1987: 52). Referendums are the most effective instruments of direct 
democracy nowadays – according to Bobbio even “the only mechanism of direct democracy 
which can be applied concretely and effectively in most advanced democracies” (Ibid.) – but 
are (should be) used only in extraordinary circumstances. Surely a vote on secession from one 
state formation and establishment of a new one qualifies as such a circumstance. Hence, given 
the gravity of the decision, it appears correct to assume that the Slovenian authorities were 
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 I discuss this dimension in greater detail below. 
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 Here, I should note that scholars have come to distinguish between the all-affected principle and the all-
subjected principle. The latter “takes the existence of a political unit for granted. It assumes the state as a primary 
boundary or threshold for inclusion and exclusion and then argues that all those subjected to a political rule 
within its boundaries ought to have a say in its making” (Näsström 2011: 117). Given the context of my 
discussion, I will be referring to the all-affected principle in this latter sense. 
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obligated to follow the all-affected principle in determining the eligible voters in the 
upcoming plebiscite. 
Establishing the appropriate extension of the right to participate in political decision-making 
requires, first of all, a determination of who is to be seen as affected by a given decision. 
Different definitions of affectedness have been proposed: for instance, on a minimal 
definition, an individual is affected (by a political decision), if he or she is present on the 
territory of a given state and thus de facto lives under its jurisdiction (Mindus 2016: 105); on a 
“thicker version”, the right to participate in decision-making ought to go only to those 
individuals whose “interests are likely to be in a significant way affected by the decision” 
(Lagerspetz 2015: 9; emphasis mine).  
Regardless of the definition of affectedness we adopt, I argue that the circumstances of our 
case clearly show that the relevant batch of subjects (i.e. non-national residents in Slovenia) 
met the condition of affectedness: they were both present on the territory in question and were 
significantly affected by the decision in the referendum. You will remember that these 
individuals often resided in Slovenia for decades prior to the secession, were employed and 
raised their families there, and were also very active participants in the life of their local 
communities. Thus, I do exaggerate when I say that they had an important stake in the future 
destiny of the territory and the political community which was inextricably tied to their own.  
Having thus established that the relevant population met the affectedness criterion, we may 
conclude that the decision to extend the right to vote in the plebiscite to all permanent 
residents of Slovenia, that is, to all those who actually lived (often for a very long period of 
time) and had the centre of their economic and social interests there, was a correct one and it 
consequently provided a strong political legitimization of the independence plebiscite.
143
 
With the overwhelming majority of the voters in favour of secession, the authorities declared 
the establishment of a new independent and sovereign Slovenian state on 25 June 1991. It is 
from this point onwards that we must examine the changes that occurred in the legal treatment 
of non-national residents. What were some of the most relevant circumstances that affected 
these changes? 
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 It should be emphasized that this decision was not entirely autonomous. Seeing how initially the international 
community was not in favour of Slovenia’s secession, this meant that “if Slovenia’s bid for international 
recognition was to succeed, the state had to demonstrate respect for human rights norms and democratic 
principles”. This caused even the most fervent nationalist politicians to acknowledge “the need to extend 
Slovenian citizenship to residents from other republics of the SFRY”. Rangelov 2014: 131. 
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Foremost, with the declaration of independence Slovenia ceased to be part of the SFRY and 
became an independent and sovereign state. Among the consequences stemming from this 
fact, the following two are particularly relevant: first, with Slovenia no longer a part of the 
SFRY, the latter’s federal citizenship and other policies lost any import they previously had 
on the territory of the new state; second, as a sovereign state, Slovenia gained the right to 
determine its own “original” demos as well as its own (future) citizenship policy. 
Slovenia chose a nationalist-oriented, ethnic-based citizenship: the clearest sign of this policy 
was the decision that Slovenian nationals (holders of the former republican citizenship of the 
Socialist Republic of Slovenia) will automatically obtain the citizenship of the new state and, 
moreover, that the principle jus sanguinis will be the primary citizenship-acquisition criterion 
(see above, 4.3). On the contrary, non-national residents were not automatically extended the 
new citizenship but rather had to apply for it. Thus, differentiation between the two groups 
began immediately. 
This decision is certainly open to criticism: why didn’t these individuals, co-founders of the 
new state, also automatically obtain Slovenian citizenship? Why, if they had an equal say in 
the decision to secede from SFRY as others, did they not also share their faith with regard to 
citizenship acquisition? While these doubts are, in my view, valid ones and certainly pose a 
challenge for the legitimacy of the entire independence project, the differentiated treatment of 
these individuals as such nevertheless cannot be judged unfounded or illegal. It has to be 
admitted that all pre-independence documents indicated, more or less clearly, that after the 
secession these individuals will be able to obtain the citizenship if they will so desire – 
indicating, thus, that they will not obtain it automatically and will be required to apply for it. 
None of this, however, explains, and much less excuses, the consequences that the individuals 
who did not choose to obtain the citizenship suffered as a result of this choice.
144
 For it was 
not only that they became foreigners in Slovenia – a consequence they were aware of and 
accepted and whose legitimacy we will not put in question here – but they were, for this 
reason alone, also subsequently deprived of their residence status, which in effect turned them 
into illegal aliens. This crucial step – from Erasure in the broader sense to the Erasure in the 
narrow sense – which is difficult to understand, still needs to be made sense of. 
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 A fortiori the matter is that less justifiable with regard to those who did apply for citizenship but were 
rejected. 
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I believe that the Erasure can be explained as a kind of sanction or a punishment for those 
who did not wish to voluntarily take up the new Slovenian citizenship when presented with 
the opportunity (a type of punitive disenfranchisement). I should emphasize that this is a 
purely speculative argument – however, I do believe I can provide several convincing reasons 
to sustain it. 
First of all, similar exclusionary practices where loss of rights follows some prohibited or 
undesired act come to mind, such as, for example, felony disenfranchisement. Felony 
disenfranchisement is the deprivation of the right to vote of individuals convicted for 
particular criminal offences.
145
 While felony disenfranchisement policies differ greatly from 
country to country in the types of offences that lead to the loss of voting rights, in the length 
of disenfranchisement and in other modalities,
146
 they are more or less all philosophically 
founded on the underlying idea that “serious offenders are generally morally corrupt and that 
the process whereby the policies and laws are decided should not be open to the influence of 
such people” (Beckman 2009: 134).147 In broader terms, felony disenfranchisement rests on 
the idea that individuals who have gravely violated the social contract ought to be excluded 
from it (at least temporarily if not permanently).
148
 A fundamentally similar argument for 
exclusion seems to underlie the Erasure. 
This argument, however, cannot here be sustained in this form. It fails because, as Mindus 
(2016) notes, felony disenfranchisement – along with other such types of disenfranchisement 
as that of mentally handicapped individuals or children – is an exceptional type of 
disenfranchisement. Mindus distinguishes between ordinary and extraordinary types of 
disenfranchisement with the requirement of justification being the distinguishing criterion: 
whereas the latter types of disenfranchisement “are those that the system does not presuppose 
or take for granted, those for which there is a requirement of reason-giving” (Mindus 2016: 
109), the former are the ones “that the system presupposes or takes for granted, those for 
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 In general on this issue, see for instance Beckman 2009. 
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 For a comparative analysis of criminal disenfranchisement laws, see Ispahani 2009. 
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 The issue of felony disenfranchisement is fascinating for our discussion also because of its historical ties to 
the medieval institutes of civil death and slavery. Dayan (2011: Ch. 2) shows how in the US after the abolition of 
slavery states made increasing use of the institute of civil death for a wide variety of felonies. She refers to a 
1998 Human Rights Watch report which clearly links contemporary felony disenfranchisement laws to civil 
death. It states: “Disenfranchisement laws in the U.S. are a vestige of medieval times when offenders were 
banished from the community and suffered ‘civil death’. Brought from Europe to the colonies, they gained new 
political salience at the end of the nineteenth century when disgruntled whites in a number of Southern states 
adopted them and other ostensibly race-neutral voting restrictions in an effort to exclude blacks from the vote.” 
See: Human Rights Watch 1998. The Sentencing Project (2016) claims that the vast majority of the estimated 
6.1. million Americans who today are disenfranchised as felons are blacks. 
148
 Cfr. Demleitner 2009: 100; Beckman 2009: 55ff. 
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which therefore there is no requirement of reason-giving or justificatory practice” (Ibid.). 
Exclusion of non-nationals is just such a form of disenfranchisement.
149
 The exclusions of 
non-nations from the right to vote in the country of their residence is not only an ordinary 
form of disenfranchisement, it is a form of exclusion that is constitutive of the very system 
(Mindus 2016: 111).  
To understand this point, we need first to understand the distinction between two conceptions 
or models of citizenship. Following Marshall (1950), Patricia Mindus distinguishes between 
the political and the legal conception of citizenship.
150
 The former is related, above all, with 
the issue of political (democratic) legitimacy, i.e. the legitimacy of the power to adopt 
decisions binding on the collective (cfr. Mindus 2014: 61–64).151 In this conception of 
citizenship, says Mindus, “legitimacy in principle stems from the participation of ‘the people’, 
i.e. the sum of citizens, in shaping the common rules under which they live” and so exclusion 
from such participation must be motivated (Mindus 2016: 112). The citizen, on this view, “is 
the active member of the state, contributing to the formation of collective auto-determination 
by making decisions or voting for representatives” (Mindus 2014a: 738). On the other hand, 
those who are excluded from decision-making (from citizenship) are deemed “subjects” – 
they are those individuals “to whom directives and norms are addressed yet ... are not entitled 
to take part in shaping these norms, in whatsoever form. The subject”, adds Mindus, “is under 
the political obligation to obey the laws to which he or she has not given direct or indirect 
consent (Mindus 2016: 109, n. 9).
152
  
Different than the political model, which is concerned with democratic legitimacy, the legal 
model of citizenship  stresses the principle of state sovereignty and the consequent right of the 
state to determine who it will include – i.e. who it will consider its citizens; and who it will 
exclude – who, from the perspective of its legal order, will be considered an alien. The 
principle of sovereignty allows the state to follow virtually any substantive criteria for 
determining its citizens: the state's power to include and exclude is utterly discretionary.
153
 
Indeed, the state may even reserve for itself the power to exclude from citizenship individuals 
who possess the same characteristics as those who participate actively in its political life (cfr. 
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 Remember, however, that what is on trial here is not the disenfranchisement itself, but rather the Erasure! 
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 Mindus, in general, distinguishes three types of citizenship. Besides the two already mentioned she also 
identifies the sociological conception of citizenship. See Mindus 2014. 
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 It is this conception of citizenship that we dealt with above in this section. 
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 More on the political model of citizenship in Mindus 2014: Ch. 2. 
153
 For a criticism of this approach and a proposal for instituting an obligation of justification, see Mindus 2014: 
Ch. V (especially 293ff). 
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Mindus 2014: 75). It may do so, moreover (and more importantly), without having to provide 
any reasons for its decision (Ibid.; see also Mindus 2016: 112).   
 
With the rise of the modern nation States, citizenship became heavily confounded with the 
principle nationality and so the dichotomy established here is one between citizens/nationals 
and aliens/non-nationals: included into citizenship are those who belong to the nation, 
whichever way we understand it, be it based on some natural affiliation (jus sanguinis) or as 
some particularly strong political bond (jus soli).
154
 Excluded, on the other hand, are all those 
who do not belong to the nation – the aliens, foreigners, the Others. 
 
The two central concepts of this model of citizenship, namely the principle of sovereignty and 
the principle of nationality allow us to further understand the actions undertaken by the 
Slovenian authorities. For one, the principle of sovereignty makes it easier to understand – 
though offers no justification – how it was possible for the authorities of the new state to 
(morally) dissociate themselves from the promises made prior to independence to that part of 
its population that were not Slovene nationals. The explanation, I submit, is quite simple. If 
the independent and sovereign state of Slovenia was formally established with the adoption of 
the Basic Constitutional Charter that the Republic of Slovenia on 25 June 1991, and if it was 
in that moment that the state authorities were vested with all the rights accruing to a sovereign 
state, including the right to determine its own citizens, then it may have seen reasonable to 
them that they were not in any way bound by the promises made and decisions adopted by the 
authorities and the people in the former state. That there is some validity to this interpretation 
can be seen, for example, by the evolution of the language used in the relevant legal acts 
which increasingly emphasized the right to self-determination of the Slovene nation and its 
“property” of the new state and, on the other hand, continuously piled new conditions for the 
“acceptance” of non-nationals into the citizenship.155 
For its part, the principle of nationality is fundamental for understanding the Erasure. 
Comprehending its underlying role in the creation of citizenship policies ought to provide us 
with the answer to the pressing question of how it was possible that the authorities dealt with 
individuals who did not take up the offered citizenship in such an extreme manner. While the 
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 This bifurcation is of course simplified and also surpassed. Pure models cannot be found in practice. See 
Mindus 2014: 120–125. 
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 This reasoning, however, can be refuted by the fact that in general the principle of continuity with the former 
legal system was respected: all legislation that did not directly contradict the new constitutional order was, until 
the adoption of new laws, left in place. Indeed, there are still today several SFRY-era laws in vigour in Slovenia. 
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influence of this principle extends to all levels and aspects of the Erasure, I will here focus to 
exploring only its immediate influence on the creation of nationalist citizenship policies in 
Slovenia.  
As argued, Slovenia adopted a nationalistic citizenship policy, basing acquisition criteria 
primarily on ethnic grounds. Nationalism, in this context, should be seen as “a form of 
discourse premised on a particular theory of legitimation of state power, one that ‘regards the 
nation as the only source of legitimacy’” (Rangelov 2014: 7). When “nation” is used as a 
(quasi)legal category for the purpose of devising a particular citizenship policy, as it was here, 
it is usually defined “in ethnocultural terms, emphasizing markers such as descent, language, 
or religion” (Rangelov 2014: 21). In the specific case, it has been noted that the consolidation 
of Slovenian ethno-nationalism began in the 1980s with a particular emphasis given to the 
problem of the Slovenian culture and language as key elements of Slovenian identity that 
were being supressed in the context of the SFRY (cfr. Rangelov 2014: 120ff; Zorn 2007: 20–
22).  
Invocations of nation-hood as part of political strategies are diverse and depend on the 
specific political and legal context as well as the goals pursued by those who invoke it. One 
such strategy specifically targets exclusion by way of asserting “‘ownership’ of the polity on 
behalf of a ‘core’ ethnocultural ‘nation’ distinct from the citizenry of the state as a whole” 
(Rangelov 2014: 19).
156
 The strategy, then, is based upon a differentiation between different 
types of citizens. While formally equal, on this view, a state’s citizens are actually to be 
distinguished: on the one side, we have members of the “core nation”, who are in some way 
the only “true citizens” and thus (ought to) enjoy privileged status; on the other side, there are 
those (presumably the minority) who do not belong to that nation and are (again: ought to be) 
as a consequence relegated to second-class status. Such differentiation of citizens, “defined in 
ethnic terms and enshrined in law” is the hallmark of the concept of “ethnic citizenship” as 
defined by Rangelov (2014: 21).  
The tendency to “appropriate” the state on the basis of the nationalist principle and 
establishment of ethnic citizenship is evident from the Slovenian fundamental constitutional 
documents. For one, the Basic Constitutional Charter opens with the assertion that the 
plebiscite result represents the “will of the Slovene nation” (and residents of the Republic of 
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 Here Rangelov quotes R. Brubaker, 2004: In the Name of the Nation: Reflections on Nationalism and 
Patriotism. In: Citizenship Studies 8 (2004) 2: 117. 
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Slovenia). More importantly, the Constitution in its Preamble bases the foundation for its 
adoption, among others, on “the fundamental and permanent right of the Slovene nation to 
self-determination”; moreover, in the first paragraph of Article 3, it states that Slovenia is a 
state of all its citizens and again reiterates that it is founded on the permanent and inalienable 
right of the Slovene nation to self-determination.
157
 References to “the Slovene nation” and its 
inalienable right to establish an independent state are thus plentiful in the crucial 
constitutional acts; so much so that critics have pointed out that this “inflation” of 
constitutional provisions emphasizing the national character of the republic leads to a 
differentiation between citizens who are Slovenes and those who are not. If the constitutional 
order is not based on the equality of all its citizens before the law, goes the argument, than we 
can no longer speak about a truly democratic regime, but rather of something like a ethno-
democratic one (see Zorn 2007: 58; cfr. Kuhelj 2011).
158
 
Here, it should be noted that the nationalist principle was imbued into all level of the 
Slovenian legal system, not only into the most important constitutional provisions, but also 
into systemic legislation (i.e. the Citizenship Act and the Aliens Act) and – as we will shortly 
see in the next section – it was also furthered in the sub-statutory decrees of executive 
authorities. The permeation of the “constitutional and legal structure that privileges the 
members of one ethnically defined nation over other residents in a particular state” has been 
named “constitutional nationalism” (Rangelov 2014: 23f).159 
Ethnic citizenship, in its legal guise, can be employed in the context of different nation-
building strategies. Rangelov distinguishes between strategies of incorporation, “which 
produce differentiated frameworks of first- and second-class citizens” (2014: 22) and 
strategies of exclusion that are “aimed at restricting access to citizenship or revoking 
citizenship status and rights of particular groups” (Ibid.).  
Rangelov notes that that constitutional nationalism related with incorporationist strategies 
“does not neglect, marginalize, or seek to assimilate cultural difference; instead, it tends to 
reify it by adopting a monolithic, billiard-ball understanding of culture and paves the way for 
the incorporation of minorities in a constitutional association of unequal status and power 
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 This same right is invoked in the Referendum Act as the grounds for the calling of the plebiscite. 
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 Sammy Smooha, the first to coin the term ethnic democracy, defines it as “a democratic political system that 
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 The definition is originally Hayden’s. See Robert M. Hayden, 1992: Constitutional Nationalism in the 
Formerly Yugoslav Republics. In: Slavic Review 51 (1992) 1: 1–15. 
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relations” (Rangelov 2014: 24). He adds that constitutional law in such cases serves to 
perform two functions: first, “to distinguish between members and nonmembers of the nation” 
and second, “to incorporate them in a framework of first- and second-class citizenship” 
(Rangelov 2014: 25). As far as the association of ethnic citizenship with strategies of 
exclusion are concerned, he argues that “minorities with legitimate claims to citizenship are 
transformed into denizens and may even become stateless persons, with harsh consequences 
for those affected” (Rangelov 2014: 28). 
Turning to the Slovenian situation, we may contend that the Slovenian citizenship policy was 
very particular, indeed contradictory, as Rangelov puts it, incorporating both strategies of 
incorporation and of exclusion. Here is how the author describes the contradictory character 
of Slovenia’s citizenship policy (Rangelov 2014: 112): 
On the one hand, the vast majority of permanent residents who were ethnic non-Slovenes were 
able to acquire Slovenian citizenship on the basis of the publicly adopted legislation and the 
procedures put in place for its implementation. On the other hand, the same body of law 
opened up the possibility for serious abuses and discriminatory policies adopted by executive 
decision and pursued covertly by the agents of the state. 
 
It is true that the larger part of ethnic non-Slovenes were able to acquire Slovenian 
citizenship.
160
 This, in part, can be explained – or so argues Rangelov – by the distribution of 
influence of different conceptions or positions regarding and during Slovenian 
democratization. Rangelov holds that the fact that the large majority of non-Slovene residents 
were able to acquire citizenship speaks to the relative strength of the position, promoted by 
civil society movements, “which associated democracy with pluralism and respect for 
minorities” (2014: 123).161 However, I believe that these same facts also help to explain the 
reasons for the Erasure. While one may agree with Rangelov that the relatively small number 
of the Erased speaks of the relative weakness of the exclusivist position, I believe, however, 
that the focus should be put on the intensity of the Erasure, rather than on its extent. We have 
already seen that due to both external and internal forces, the authorities were unable to 
execute a wide-scale, all-encompassing disenfranchisement of the ethnically non-Slovene 
population. Such a feat was more or less “successfully” performed, for example, in the Baltic 
countries in the same period of time. In Estonia, for instance, highly restrictive citizenship 
acquisition conditions prevented almost a third of the residence from being able to acquire 
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 The other was a conception that promoted and conflated concepts of “ethnos” and “demos”. Cfr. Rangelov 
2014: 124. 
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citizenship, thus being left without a regulated citizenship status; the number was 
approximately the same in Latvia.
162
 In circumstances that made such a full-scale exclusion 
difficult, if not impossible, it does not seem impossible to understand that the focus of 
Slovenian authorities rather turned to the question of the intensity of the exclusion. Hence, I 
believe (and I repeat that this is purely speculative) that this new strategy conceived the 
exclusion of a much smaller number of individuals that were now made to serve as symbolic 
representatives of the entire ethnically non-Slovene population. In simple terms: what the 
authorities could not do in terms of numbers they compensated in intensity. 
 
I should like to add one final point in defence of the argument I have been sustaining here. On 
my view, the intention to disenfranchise the entire ethnically non-Slovene population 
originating from the former SFRY can be seen in the fact that only a few years after the 
Erasure, a bill was proposed in the National Assembly which would enable the withdrawal of 
the citizenship of ethnic non-Slovenes, i.e. of those individuals that had acquired it on the 
basis of Art. 40 of the Citizenship Act. At the time, the public opinion was strongly against 
the “new” citizens – partially this was due to the nationalist politicians who pushed for the 
revision of the citizenships acquired on the basis of Article 40, invoking the problem of dual 
citizenship; other reasons for the increasingly hostile treatment of this segment of citizens 
were to be found in the economic crisis and especially the growing unemployment numbers, 
with the blame somehow always passed on “the Southern immigrants”.163 Ultimately, it is 
true, the Constitutional Court (see decision U-I-266/95, from 20 November 1995) did prohibit 
the referendum on the initiative, citing potential violations of the right to personal dignity and 
the right to privacy and the principle of the rule of law should such a law be adopted; 
however, the intention of the authorities to perpetrate a full scale exclusion was, in my mind, 
obvious. 
 
To summarize. The nationalist, ethno-centric policy was embedded in the core of the nascent 
Slovenian state from the beginning. A wholesale exclusion (disenfranchisement) of all ethnic 
non-Slovenes, though surely contemplated at one point or another, was made impossible by a 
series of internal and external factors: for instance, by a strong liberal civil society, 
fundamental in the independence efforts, which was calling for a more liberal, pluralistic and 
inclusive approach to citizenship; or, by the external pressure created by the need to legitimize 
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the independence referendum in front of the international community suspicious of the 
secession which resulted in the necessity to include all permanent residents into the electorate 
for the referendum and in formal promises to these individuals that after the independence 
they will be able to acquire the citizenship. The necessity for ethnical auto-identification by 
way of exclusion of ethnic non-Slovenes, however, remained. Since the strategy of extensive 
exclusion was unrealistic, plans focused on the intensity. The most obvious target were those 
citizens of former SFRY republics who did not obtain the citizenship despite being given the 
chance. These individuals, now symbolic representatives of all ethnic non-Slovenes, were 
branded as traitors, speculators, profiteers and the likes. Justifying their exclusion in such 
conditions was not a difficult task for the authorities.  
 
 
5.2. The Erasure in the narrow sense (deprivation of residency status)  
 
On 26 February 1992, 25,671 individuals were erased from the registry of permanent 
residents in Slovenia when the Aliens Act became applicable with respect to those permanent 
residents who were citizens of other SFRY republics and did not obtain Slovenian citizenship 
in the six months following the implementation of the Citizenship Act. This act has become 
known as the Erasure. 
As detailed above (4.3.), the statutory basis of the Erasure can be found in Art. 81, Par. 2 of 
the 1991 Aliens Act which determined that the it was to become applicable to all those 
citizens of other SFRY republics who either had not applied for Slovenian citizenship (within 
the prescribed six-month period) or had their applications rejected. The provision itself was 
indeterminate: what did “applicability” mean in this case? Were these individuals simply to 
become foreigners with permanent residence – a consequence they expected and, for the most 
part, desired? This wasn’t immediately clear. The uncertainty was increased by the fact that 
the following provision (Art. 82) clearly stated that those foreigners who prior to 
independence held valid permanent residency permits will have their validity extended ex 
lege. Art. 81, on the contrary, was silent on the matter. However, if the same consequence was 
not to apply for the addressees of Art. 81/2 – what exactly was to occur? Most importantly: 
was this consequence foreseeable? 
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Preparations and the first instructions 
 
The day when the Aliens Act became effective – and the Erasure was carried out – may have 
come as a surprise to the affected individuals, but it certainly wasn’t so for the Slovenian 
authorities. As I shall argue, the Erasure was well-planned and there is ample evidence that 
when the Aliens Act was being adopted in the National Assembly the possible consequences 
of its implementation, specifically of Art. 81/2, were already well-known to the political 
authorities.
164
  
The physical acts of erasing individuals from the registers had to be carried out at the local 
level, that is, by the officials of local administrative units that were charged with keeping the 
registers of permanent residents. In order to ensure that the Erasure would be implemented in 
a uniform manner, the actions had to be centrally coordinated. The task of preparing the 
Erasure and coordinating the efforts fell to the Ministry of the Interior. For that purpose, the 
Ministry organized a series of “consulting sessions” with the local administrative bodies in 
order to train them for the new procedures that came into force when Slovenian became an 
independent country; moreover, the Ministry communicated all the relevant information 
regarding the treatment of Yugoslav citizens, and of the future Erased in particular, by way of 
“detailed unpublished in-house instructions” (Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 100). In what 
follows, I will briefly present the instructions most relevant for the Erasure and only insofar as 
they relate immediately to our investigation.
165
 
The first instruction (n. 0016/8-S-010/14-91), dated 26 June 1991, issued in order to guarantee 
a uniform implementation of the “independence legislation”, particularly the Aliens Act, 
emphasized the difference between two groups of citizens of other SFRY republics. Those 
who had their permanent residence registered in Slovenia on the day of the plebiscite (23 
December 1990) were eligible to apply for citizenship (see the conditions in Art. 40 of the 
Citizenship Act) and had, on the basis of Art. 13 of the Constitutional Act, until the resolution 
of their application or, alternatively, until the expiration of the six-month application deadline, 
equal rights as Slovenian citizens. On the other hand, those who did not have their permanent 
residence registered on the date of the referendum – either because they registered it later or 
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because they only had temporary residence – were not eligible to obtain Slovenian citizenship 
and were to be considered as aliens with unregulated legal status.  
Related to this was another instruction (n. 0016/8-S-010/4-91) from 30 July 1991, which 
overrode the previous the instruction with regard to the second of the two groups mentioned 
above. Given the implementation of the Brioni Declaration, which imposed a three-month 
moratorium on all independence activities,
166
 the Ministry notified the local administrative 
units that the individuals in question ought to be now treated as all other citizens of SFRY, 
thus as equal in rights to Slovenian citizens and not as foreigners without a properly regulated 
legal status.
167
 
Criticisms of the distinction between SFRY citizens on the basis of possessing permanent 
residence at the time of the referendum have already been mentioned (see above, 4.3.). I will 
not repeat those criticisms here – suffice it to say that the former of two mentioned 
instructions served only to reaffirm the already exceedingly strict construction of citizenship-
acquisition criteria and related it to a very narrow interpretation of the legal status of the 
individuals who did not register permanent residence in Slovenian prior to the independence 
referendum. 
Despite the moratorium, the Ministry of the Interior nevertheless continued with preparations 
for the eventual enforcement of Par. 2, Art. 81 of the Aliens Act – for “the administrative 
processing” of individuals who they knew would eventually be erased (see Kogovšek 
Šalamon 2016: 102). Given the ambiguous wording of the said provision, direct 
administrative action on its basis was impossible. Hence, further clarifications and 
instructions by the Ministry were necessary. A new set of instructions from early 1992 
focused on explaining “the rules to be applied when issuing visas, temporary and permanent 
residence permits, revoking residence permits, expelling foreigners from the country, and 
handling their personal documents” (Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 102).168 It should be noted that 
these instructions did not refer only to individuals who would eventually be erased, but more 
generally to all SFRY citizens who did not obtain Slovenian citizenship. These instructions 
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are particularly relevant because, firstly, they referred to some of the most important legal 
statuses and personal documents used to prove them (citizenship and passports, residency 
(permits), visas, work permits etc.) and, secondly, as a rule, they prescribed – in violation of 
fundamental constitutional principles – either a more narrow interpretation of status-
acquisition criteria then determined by the law or provided additional conditions that were not 
contained in the relevant legislation.
169
   
 
Instructions authorizing the Erasure 
 
On 26 February 1992 the two-month transition period (following the six-month timeframe for 
the acquisition of citizenship on the basis of Art. 40 of the Citizenship Act) expired. On the 
following day, on 27 February 1992, the Ministry of the Interior issued the Instruction on the 
implementation of the Aliens Act that effectively ordered the Erasure.
170
 
The language of the Instruction was apparently straightforward and highly technical. It the 
first paragraph, it recalled that with the expiration of the aforementioned deadline in the 
Aliens Act its provisions will enter into force in relation to citizens of other SFRY republics 
who did not apply for Slovenian citizenship or who had their applications denied. Thus, 
continued the Instruction, these individuals’ status had to be “resolved” (or fixed). 
Simultaneously the “clearing” of registers was to take place. In the second paragraph, the 
Instruction explained that any document, even if issued by competent Slovene authorities and 
still valid, cease to be valid for these individuals given the change in their status.
171
 
With these words, the Erasure in the narrower, technical sense was ordered. The “logic” of the 
Ministry’s interpretation of Par. 2, Art. 81 of the Aliens Act is here made explicit: because 
these individuals did not apply for Slovenian citizenship in the prescribed timeframe, or had 
their applications denied, and thus were to become foreigners, as a consequence they also lost 
their right to reside as permanent residents in the Republic of Slovenia (cfr. Kogovšek 
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Šalamon 2016: 105). Officially, then, their status had (to be) changed into that of aliens – now 
residing on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia without legal permission, hence illegally.  
The (distorted) logic of the Ministry’s interpretation of the situation can also be seen in its 
treatment of problems related with deportation. The police insisted that individuals who were 
to be deported because they entered or resided illegally on the territory ought to be served 
with appropriate orders before being deported. The Ministry refused this interpretation and 
argued, along the lines of a strictly literal interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, 
that such an official decision was required only when the foreigner in question resided in 
Slovenia legally;
172
 however, if the alien in question has entered the territory illegally and 
resided here without permission, no such decision was necessary and the person was to be 
escorted to the state border by the police. The problem was, as Kogovšek Šalamon has shown, 
that “citizens of other SFRY republics who lived in Slovenia did not need to present these 
documents when they entered Slovenia, because at the time Slovenia was still part of 
Yugoslavia and there were no borders between republics” (2016: 107). Hence, they had no 
way of proving that they had entered the territory legally. 
On 15 June 1992, the Ministry issued further explanations and instructions regarding the 
treatment of records of the erased individuals.
173
 The Ministry was very clear as to the 
condition of these individuals: it stated that individuals, who are not Slovenian citizens cannot 
be entered in the registry of permanent residents. Upon establishing that an individual is not a 
Slovenian citizen, the local administrative officials were ordered to instruct the individual to 
regulate his or her status as an alien as well as to remove that individual from the registry of 
permanent residents. The same Instruction determined that if such individuals were in 
possession of an ID card issued in the Republic of Slovenia, the card was to be destroyed. 
* 
One of the more interesting aspects of the Erasure is that the language used by the Ministry in 
its Instructions was impersonal and technical, specifying in great detail the different technical 
administrative operations to be carried out. In this way, it seems, the “human” aspect of the 
operation was brushed aside as administrative officials were focus on these purely technical 
operations. In general, this kind of modus operandi, including rule by executive decree or 
internal orders, focus on technical details, operational secrecy, impersonal treatment of 
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individuals etc., is characteristic of the way the bureaucratic apparatus functions. (In Part III, I 
discuss in greater detail the role of the bureaucracy, of its organizational structure and work 
organization, on the Erasure).  
The consequences of the Erasure were profound and long-lasting: individuals who only a day 
ago were entitled to the same rights as Slovenian citizens found themselves in a situation of 
quasi-, if not total, rightlessness.
174
 Already without Slovenian citizenship, they were now 
also considered illegal aliens without a regulated residency status. As we will later see, the 
deprivation of the latter status caused a cascade-like effect whereby the affected individuals 
were deprived of numerous public rights and were virtually unable to re-obtain their previous 
status. Many of them faced violations of their most basic human rights by being exposed, 
among other things, to incarceration and even deportations. 
 
 
5.3. The unlawfulness of the Erasure  
 
For Rifet, whose story you will remember from the Prologue, it was a mid-day encounter with 
a couple of police officers doing routine check-ups in the city centre; for Srečka, whose story 
was also featured in the Prologue, it happened during a visit to the social services office, 
where she went to take care of her son’s kindergarten application; others had to renew their 
expired identity documents, while some were even awakened in the middle of the night by the 
police. 
These are just some of the ways in which the Erased individuals found out about the 
“changes” that had occurred in their legal status after 26 February 1992. The Erasure was 
conducted in secrecy, without forewarning or notification of its effects. Most Erased 
individuals only found out that they had been erased by chance and always ex post facto.  
The legal consequences of the Erasure were profound for the affected individuals and 
expanded to all areas of their lives. Without a Slovenian citizenship and a valid residency 
permit, without any valid personal document – which were often seized and destroyed in front 
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of their eyes –, the Erased individuals were consequently deprived of numerous, if not all, 
civil and economic rights that (in)directly depended upon the former statuses.
175
  
While in Ch. 6, I will analyse the specific consequences of the Erasure for the status of a 
person in law, let me here just quickly sketch the various ways in which the Erased were 
affected: they were, for instance, deprived of their social security benefits, including financial 
assistance for unemployment, child benefits or pension; they were unable to acquire or renew 
their driver’s licences and were so exposed to fines and having their vehicles confiscated; they 
had great difficulty in obtaining and renewing work permits which put their day-to-day 
survival at risk; they also lost their housing rights, often evicted from their homes and left 
homeless; secondary and tertiary education was suddenly made unavailable to them; due to 
the loss of their legal statuses, they lost their right to stay on the territory and so were exposed 
to deportations and expulsions. In addition to a more or less complete “de-legalization” of 
their lives, the Erasure also produced serious physical and psychological distress among the 
affected – in some case, due to poor health and lack of medical assistance, death was an 
(in)direct consequence of the Erasure.
176
 Finally, even though it was primarily a legal matter, 
social marginalization was a process that greatly contributed to the Erasure and was also one 
of its most important consequences.
177
 
For years, details of the Erasure were unknown to the public – although, it should be 
emphasized that the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman in Slovenia noted the problem 
as early as in 1995 in its first annual report. The secrecy of the Erasure was surely the prime 
cause of this situation,
178
 but the attitudes of the affected individuals were also relevant in this 
regard: they often perceived the Erasure as somehow being their own fault, a bureaucratic 
mistake or just bad luck; often times they did not even mention to anyone what had happened 
because they were too ashamed of their situation. The problem was furthered by those cases 
that did end up before the courts. In the initial period, the lower-level court proceedings often 
lasted unreasonably long and the courts tended to interpret the legislation narrowly,
179
 
confirming the actions of the executive authorities. The Supreme Court especially played out 
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an important pro-establishment role in this regard. With respect to the role of the Supreme 
Court, Kogovšek Šalamon argued that it [the Supreme Court] 
“acted as a proxy for the executive branch of the government. It only corrected the restrictive 
administrative practices of the Ministry of the Interior minimally, and failed to deal with 
important issues such as the retroactive application of declarations of a threat to the public 
order, security, and defence of the country. Despite the unconstitutionality of the Aliens Act, 
the court confirmed the practice of local administrations that deprived people of their status” 
(Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 173).180 
 
The legal resolution of the Erasure was in great part due to the positive and active role of the 
Slovenian Constitutional Court. Kogovšek Šalamon is even convinced that were it “not for the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling, the erasure would probably never have been recognised as 
unlawful” (Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 223).181  
Kogovšek Šalamon here raises an important point for this thesis. Namely, if the Erasure was 
positively declared illegal, unconstitutional and a violation of the ECHR-protected human 
rights, why then, should this be an interesting legal problem? Why would we want to study 
the legal mechanisms of Erasure, hoping to learn something particularly interesting regarding 
the “dark side” of the law, if we firmly know that all of this was done in direct violation of 
constitutional principles and fundamental human rights?  
This illegality objection is here, I believe, irrelevant and for the following reasons: first of all, 
we should remember that the Erasure was conducted in 1992 whereas Slovenia became a 
member of the Council of Europe (and hence acceded to the ECHR) only in 1994. Hence, the 
Erasure in the narrow sense, as you will see below, was never part of the ECtHR’s review. 
Second of all, as you are about to see, the first time the Erasure was declared unconstitutional 
was only in 1999, that is, seven years after the Erasure had taken place. In the meantime, 
thousands of individuals lost their houses, employment and other (legal) means of survival, 
with many of them either deported to other countries or, if at the time of the Erasure they were 
already outside of the country, unable to return. While I do not possess the exact numbers, I 
can nevertheless claim that due directly or indirectly to the Erasure, many individuals died. 
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All of this means that that for seven years, the legislation that enabled the Erasure and the 
consequent actions of the executive officers were the law of the land, confirmed as such 
several times by the Supreme Court, the highest judicial authority in the land. It is true that 
consequently, with the two major Constitutional Court’s decisions and the ECtHR pilot 
judgment, the consequences of the Erasure were annulled and the condition of the affected 
individuals ex tunc restored into their original condition. This, however, does not change the 
historical fact that one, the Erasure did take place and did produce concrete consequences (for 
some even permanently) and two, that at a given historic moment it was considered legal. It 
makes little difference for this argument that this state of affairs lasted “only” seven years: it 
could easily have lasted fifty or even a hundred years. In this latter case, we can only imagine 
law students would have learned about the Erasure as if it were a legal act and how many 
scholarly works would have been created in that period, discussing the legal details of this 
particular phenomenon. For these reasons, I believe that the illegality argument is here of little 
importance and the investigation into the legal aspects of the Erasure justified. 
In this Section, I will look at the most pertinent findings and conclusions from the leading 
Constitutional Court decisions on the Erasure. In the end, I will also discuss the 2012 ECtHR 
decision in Kurić and others v. Slovenia which authoritatively decided on the matter. 
Besides the two mentioned leading, or “systemic” decisions, the Constitutional Court decided 
in numerous other cases dealing with the Erasure; these cases include petitions for the review 
of constitutionality of different legislation, individual constitutional complaints for (alleged) 
violations of human rights as well as decisions on the constitutionality of proposed referenda 
on the matter.
182
 With regard to the latter, one decision in particular should be highlighted: 
namely, in its decision U-I-266/95 from 20 November 1995, the Constitutional Court decided 
that the proposal for a referendum on the revocation of citizenship of those individuals who 
acquired it on the basis of Art. 40 of the Aliens Act was unconstitutional and thus prohibited 
the referendum. The Court found that should the referendum succeed and the proposed statute 
be passed, there would have been a violation of the right to personal dignity and security (Art. 
34 of the Constitution), the right to privacy and personal rights (Art. 35), as well as of the 
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principles of a state based on the rule of law (Art. 2), especially of the principles of legal 
security and of confidence in the law.
183
 
 
The first “systemic” decision: the unlawfulness of the Aliens Act 
 
On 4 February 1999, the Constitutional Court handed down the first of two so-called systemic 
decisions on Erasure (decision U-I-284/94).
184
 Deciding on the constitutionality of the Aliens 
Act, it unanimously held that Art. 81/2 was unconstitutional for failing to determine the 
conditions for the acquisition of permanent residence permits of individuals who were eligible 
for obtaining Slovenian citizenship on the basis of Art. 40 of the Citizenship Act upon the 
expiry of the time period prescribed in the latter provision (or – if they did apply – after the 
date of finality of the decision on refusal to grant citizenship). The Court ordered the 
legislator to eliminate the unconstitutionality within six months. Moreover, the Court also 
decided that pending the elimination of the said unconstitutionality, no further deportation of 
citizens of former SFRY republics who actually lived in Slovenia and had permanent 
residence in Slovenia can be carried out. 
It its reply to the challenge of constitutionality brought by two Erased individuals, the 
Government argued that the Aliens Act in fact did not contain provisions that would regulate 
the residency status of the identified group of individuals but that for this reason their legal 
position was in no way less favourable and that the Aliens Act was always implemented in a 
way that did not violate the principle of legal security. Moreover, it argued that in issuing 
permanent residence permits it correctly used the provisions of the Aliens Act and so there 
was no discrimination of these individuals compared to those foreigners whose permanent 
residency permits were extended ex lege (see Par. 1.–4. of the decision). It is important to note 
that the Government did not deny that the “removal” of these individuals from the registry of 
permanent residents had actually taken place – the Government even claimed that this 
operation was based on a specific sub-statutory act (the Rule on Permanent Residence 
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Registration and Cancellation Form, Personal and Household Records and the Manner and 
Maintenance of the Register of Permanent Residents).
185
 
The Court established that the lack of special provisions regarding the particular legal position 
of these individuals represented a legal gap,
186
 which in practice had been filled in different 
ways and that, in turn, led to different consequences for the individuals in question (Par. 9). 
The first of these consequences was that the legal status of these individuals was altered and 
the Aliens Act became applicable to them, without having been informed about it and 
instructed on their new condition (Par. 10). The Aliens Act provisions, however, were 
intended to regulate the legal position of “regular” aliens, i.e. individuals who were only 
entering Slovenia for the first time with the intention of remaining on the territory for a 
shorter or a longer period of time. As the Court noted, these provisions were not suited to 
regulate the particular condition of individuals who already held permanent residency permits 
in Slovenia and actually lived there. These two circumstances distinguished the two groups of 
foreigners and so the legislator ought to have regulated the position of this latter group “in a 
special manner in transitional provisions of the ZTuj [the Aliens Act] or in a special statute” 
(Par. 13).
187
 
In Par. 14 of its decision, the Court provided a clear condemnation of the Erasure. It argued 
that the competent authorities should not have carried out “the transfer” of these individuals 
from the register of permanent population ex officio, without any official decision or 
notification addressed to the concerned persons. The act, added the Court, had no statutory 
basis whatsoever and the Government was not authorized by law to impose a different 
regulation of the matter than the one provided for in the statute. The Government, when it 
determined that the given legislation could not be directly applied in the practice, should have 
proposed to the legislator to properly regulate the matter and not use executive decrees to 
assume legislative powers. 
Consequently, the Court established that due to their legal position being unregulated, the 
individuals in question were put in an insecure position, unable to positively know their legal 
status on the day the Aliens Act became applicable for them. Hence, the Court held that there 
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had been a violation of the principle of legal security (predictability), a sub-principle of the 
principle of legality (Rule of Law), enshrined in Article 2 of the Constitution. Finally, the 
discriminatory treatment of these persons, compared to those foreigners whose legal status 
was regulated on the basis of Par.3 of Art. 82 of the Aliens Act (the “old” foreigners), 
constituted a violation of the principle of equal treatment, established in Art. 14, Par. 2 of the 
Constitution. 
Despite the insistence of the Ministry of the Interior that its acts were lawful, the Court’s 
decision was nevertheless implemented without great controversy – the so-called Legal Status 
Act was adopted in July that same year.
188
 Kogovšek Šalamon contributes this rapid and 
relatively uncontroversial implementation of the Court’s decision to the EU accession talks 
that were ongoing at the time and the consequent Government’s desire to present itself in the 
best possible light to the European community (Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 228f).189  
The Legal Status Act determined that individuals who were erased and continued to actually 
live in Slovenia from the day of the Erasure onwards are to be issued permanent residency 
permits. It determined the same for those citizens of other SFRY republics who on 25 June 
1991 (i.e. the day of Slovenia’s independence) resided in Slovenia without a permanent 
residence and who actually and uninterruptedly lived in Slovenia from that day onward (Art.1 
of the Legal Status Act). The Act determined that applications for residency permits were to 
be presented within a three-month period after its enforcement (Art. 2).  
The positive aspect of this arrangement was the inclusion of individuals who were not entitled 
to obtain Slovenian citizenship on the basis of Art. 40 of the Citizenship Act because they did 
not have permanent residence registered at the time of the referendum (cfr. Kogovšek 
Šalamon 2016: 229f).190 However, the Act demonstrated two major flaws: first, it introduced 
a new condition for applying for the status and second, it prescribed an unreasonably short 
deadline for applications. As I deal with this latter problem in Part III of the thesis (see Ch. 
8.2.6), I will here focus only on the former question.  
The novelty introduced in Art. 1 of the Legal Status Act was the condition of continuous 
living in Slovenia from the day of the plebiscite onwards. The reason for introducing this 
                                                          
188 The Act Regulating the Legal Status of Citizens of Former Yugoslavia Living in the Republic of Slovenia, 
Official Gazette of RS, n. 61/1999. 
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 Rangelov (2014) comes to the same conclusion. See 5.1., supra. 
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 See more on this group of individuals being excluded from citizenship-eligibility above, 4.3. 
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additional requirement did not stem from the Court’s decision – but it was emphasized in the 
concurring opinion of one of the judges.
191
 The problem, of course, was that a long time had 
passed since the independence referendum (roughly 7 years) and so the personal 
circumstances of the Erased might have drastically changed. For instance, the Erasure caused 
many individuals to leave the country, either on their own or due to deportation (cfr. 
Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 232). This meant that they were unable to fulfil the requirement, 
even if they were somehow able to return to Slovenia at a certain point.  
What made matters worse was that the condition was introduced retroactively which “meant 
that the erased people had to prove that they had actually lived in Slovenia for a long period in 
the past, during which time they could not yet have been aware of the requirement that was to 
be set many years later” (Ibid.).192 Hence, the requirement violated the principle of reasonable 
(or legitimate) expectations. Given the purpose of this legislation which was to remedy a past 
violation of human rights, the conditions for re-obtaining the residency permits should have 
been the same as they were at the time of the Erasure (i.e. citizenship of another SFRY 
republic and permanent residence in Slovenia at the time of the plebiscite). 
Two further problems of the Legal Status Act should be mentioned: first, the Act awkwardly 
referred to the relevant group of individuals as “citizens of other successor states of the former 
SFRY”,193 whereas all preceding relevant legislation (as well as the Constitutional Court’s 
decision) talked about “citizens of other SFRY republics”. This change caused problems when 
the Ministry of the Interior required proof of such citizenship (not citizenship of the former 
SFRY republics) since there were several individuals who did not (could not) acquire such 
citizenship and were left stateless or have in the meantime gained citizenship of some other 
country. Moreover, due to the Constitutional Court’s decision (supposedly) being unclear on 
this point, the Legal Status Act did not determine whether the new residence permits were to 
be valid ex nunc (thenceforth) or rather ex tunc (from the outset or retroactively). That the 
latter should have been the case stems both from the reasoning of the Court’s decision in this 
case as well as from other subsequent decisions of the Court which confirmed the 
precedent.
194
 
                                                          
191
 See concurring opinion of Judge Ude. 
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 On the problem of retroactivity in the Erasure see also Ch. 8.2.3. below. 
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 Meaning the citizenship of one of the new States that were created after the break-up of Yugoslavia. 
194
 In this regard, one individual appeal, Up-333/96 from 1 July 1999, was particularly relevant. In it, the Court 
ordered the Ministry of the Interior to re-enter the appellant to the register of permanent residents. Although it 
did not state whether the re-entry ought to be retroactive and if so from which day onwards, it did identify 26 
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These shortcomings were addressed in the subsequent amendments of the Citizenship Act,
195
 
as well as in second systemic decision of the Constitutional Court.
196
 
 
 The second “systemic” decision: an attempt at remedying the inadequacies of the Legal 
Status Act 
 
The decision U-I-245/02 was adopted on 3 April 2003. The Constitutional Court established, 
among other things, that the Legal Status Act violated the Constitution because it did not 
recognize the erased individuals’ permanent residence from the date of the Erasure onwards. 
Moreover, it declared null the three-month time limit set for filing applications for the 
issuance of permanent residency permits. The legislator was given six months to remedy these 
(and certain other) violations. Finally, it directly ordered the Ministry of the Interior to issue 
by official duty supplementary decisions to those individuals who had already obtained 
permanent residency permits on the basis of the Legal Status Act or the Aliens Act 
establishing permanent residence status from 26 February 1992 onwards, i.e. from the day of 
the Erasure (ex tunc). 
The Court emphasized that the legislator should have regulated the legal status of the Erased 
for the entire period from the Erasure onwards and not only prospectively. While this 
obligation might have been ambiguously determined in the U-I-284/94 decision, its 
subsequent decisions stated this obligation in no uncertain terms (see Par. 14). Seeing how the 
challenged Act did not allow for the re-instatement of permanent residence ex tunc, these 
individuals were for years left in an unregulated state of affairs and suffered from legal 
uncertainty. Hence, the Court found that the challenged Act violated the principle of legal 
certainty which falls under Art. 2 of the Constitution (a State governed by the rule of law) 
(Par. 15). 
The Court also established that Art. 2 of the Constitution had been violated because the 
legislator did not prescribe adequate measures for establishing the fulfilment of the condition 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
February 1992 as the day when the illegal consequences set in. Beyond that, following this decision, the Ministry 
sent all local administrative authorities a circular ordering them to re-enter the erased individuals into the 
permanent residents registry if they so requested. See Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 234. 
195
 See the Act Amending the Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia Act, Official Gazette of RS, n. 96/2002. 
See also Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 236-7. 
196
 Despite the problems of the Legal Status Act, more than 11.000 individuals were able to obtain a permanent 
residency permit on its basis.  
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of actual presence for acquiring a permanent residency permit. This notion, newly included 
among the conditions for acquiring the permit, was highly indeterminate and led to different 
interpretations. Given the particular situation of the Erased individuals and the various reasons 
for their absence from the territory, as well as the long period that has passed since the 
Erasure, the Court argued that in accordance with the principles enshrined in Art.2 of the 
Constitution, the legislator “should have defined what actual presence means according to [the 
Legal Status Act]”. Moreover, from the perspective of the principle of equality, the Court 
argued that “the status of citizens of other Republics should not have been worse than the 
status of those persons who had had the status of foreigner already prior to the Republic of 
Slovenia gaining independence”.197    
Finally, regarding the challenge of the three-month application period, the Court argued that 
the prescribed time limit was indeed too short. In determining this limit, the legislator did not 
adequately consider all the possible circumstances that could impede individuals from filing 
their applications on time. It should have especially considered “that due to the fact that their 
legal position was unregulated for a long period of time, citizens of other Republics could not 
have expected that such a short time would be prescribed for the regulation of their status. In 
particular they could not have envisaged that not applying within such a short period would 
result in a loss of the right to acquire a permit for permanent residence” (Par. 34). These 
individuals reasonably expected a longer timeframe for regulating their legal status. Hence, by 
not determining a longer time limit and thus preventing every individual that fulfilled the 
necessary conditions from being able to obtain the permit, the legislator violated Art. 2 of the 
Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court ordered: first, that the legislator adopts a new law in order to remedy 
the established violations of the Constitution; second, that supplemental (declaratory) 
decisions be issued to affected individuals by the Ministry of the Interior. 
Unlike the previous one, the implementation of this Constitutional Court decision did not 
proceed so easily. This was mainly due to a political climate that did not favour a resolution 
of the matter along the lines dictated by the Court.
198
 One of the major obstacles to the 
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 In addition, the Court argued that the interpretation of this condition should not be, in any way, stricter than 
the interpretation of the same condition in the case-law relating to the acquisition of Slovenian citizenship (see 
Par. 30). 
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 In 2004, a right-wing Government came to power, composed of parties that actively opposed the 
implementation of the Court's decisions on the Erasure from the outset. See more in Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 
242f. 
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implementation of the decision was the prevailing view that the Court’s decision itself is not a 
sufficient basis for issuing the supplementary decisions but rather that a special law needed to 
be passed before. Following this line of reasoning, the Government proposed two separate 
pieces of legislation: a “technical” law for the implementation of the order given to the 
Ministry of the Interior to issue supplementary decisions and a “systemic” law for the 
implementation of all other requirements of the Constitutional Court.
199
 Neither of the two 
proposals was adopted, nor did the centre-right Government put forward a proposal for a 
constitutional law which sought to circumvent the previous decisions of the Constitutional 
Court. Lacking the support of the opposition parties, the bill did not garner the required two-
thirds majority needed to pass. 
It was not until 2008, when a new minister for the Interior was named that the supplementary 
decisions began to be issued. The processes ended in March 2010 with more than 6000 such 
decisions being issued. Moreover, in 2010 the Government prepared amendments to the Legal 
Status Act in order to implement the rest of the Constitutional Court’s decision.200 While the 
amendments tackled the unconstitutionalities exposed by the Court’s decision, one of the most 
problematic elements of the previous law was retained, namely the requirement of actual 
residence in Slovenia after the plebiscite. The amendment determined that an absence lasting 
no more than a year was acceptable under this condition, while a longer absence was only 
justifiable if it could be subsumed under one of the enumerated exceptions. The problem here 
was with a further part of the amendment which determined the longest possible acceptable 
absence from Slovenia (ten years) along with other conditions that the applicants had to meet. 
As Kogovšek Šalamon sustains, these exemptions “were introduced for the benefit of those 
erased persons who, until that point, could not yet secure legal status due to a prolonged 
absence from the country”; however, additional requirements inserted into the amendments 
“effectively annulled the purpose and the meaning of the law” (2016: 247). 
Nevertheless, the same author argues that despite its flaws, the Legal Status Act should be 
valued positively since it provided the possibility of legalizing one’s legal status almost 
twenty years after the Erasure. This was especially relevant since there were, at the time, still 
individuals living in Slovenia that were without any legal status as well as individuals who 
wished to return to Slovenia (Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 250). 
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 For a presentation of both these laws, see Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 238 – 242. 
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 Act Amending the Act Regulating the Legal Status of Citizens of Former Yugoslavia Living in the Republic 
of Slovenia, Official Gazette of RS, n. 50/10 (ZUSDDD-B). 
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 The final resolution: Kurić and others v. Slovenia201 
 
On 4 July 2006 eleven individuals lodged an application to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) against the Republic of Slovenia, claiming violations of Articles 8 (right to 
private and family life), 13 (right to an effective remedy), 14 (prohibition of discrimination) 
as well as of Art. 1 of the 1. Protocol (right to private property) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR).
202
  
Before I tackle the case on its merits, several procedural question that were raised during the 
process should be mentioned: first of all, the Third Section of the Court decided that two of 
the applicants, who in the meantime have already received both ex tunc and ex nunc residency 
permits, have had their situation adequately resolved and so could no longer maintain victim 
status. Consequently, their applications were not considered admissible (see Par. 311 and 
312of the Section judgment). Moreover, the Section found that with regard to the purported 
violation of Art. 1 of Protocol n.1, the applicants did not exhaust all domestic legal remedies – 
and so also found their application in this regard inadmissible (Par. 313-314). Before the 
Grand Chamber, the question of the exhaustion of domestic remedies came up again: this 
time, the Court upheld the Government's objection that two of the applicants never took any 
(sufficient) legal steps in order to regularise their residency status in Slovenia. In this way, 
they demonstrated insufficient interest in the matter and so the Court decided that their 
applications should be considered inadmissible. In the final instance, then, the Court (the 
Grand Chamber) only considered six applications.  
Secondly, the question of the Court's jurisdiction ratione temporis was raised, seeing how the 
Erasure was effectuated before the ECHR was ratified in Slovenia (in June 1994). The Section 
dismissed the objection claiming that it did have the competence to examine the facts of the 
case that occurred prior to the date of the ratification of the Convention by Slovenia 
“insomuch as they could be considered to have created a continuous situation extending 
beyond that date or may be relevant for the understanding of the facts occurring after that 
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 Application no. 26828/06. Section judgment from 13 July 2010; Grand chamber judgment from 26 June 
2012. 
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 Note that the case was initially entered as Makuc and other v. Slovenia. However, during the procedure Mr. 
Makuc passed away and so the case was later registered as Kurić and others v. Slovenia. 
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date” (Par. 304). The Grand Chamber later confirmed this position (Par. 241-242 of the Grand 
chamber judgment).  
Finally, after the Section judgment, which unanimously declared that there had been a 
violation of Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention,
203
 six of the eight applicants were granted 
both ex tunc and ex nunc permanent residency permits. Consequently, the Government argued 
that, just as the two other applicants in the case before the Third Section, these individuals 
could now no longer claim victim status. The Grand Chamber, however, took a different 
stance than the Section: although the violation had been acknowledged by the State and the 
residency permits granted to the applicants, the Court held that due to the long-term effects of 
the Erasure which lasted nearly twenty years and during which time the applicants experience 
insecurity and legal uncertainty, the issuance of the residency permits did not constitute 
“appropriate” and “sufficient” redress at the national level (Par. 267).  
On 13 July 2010, the Third Section of the Court handed down a unanimous decision on the 
violation of Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention. It did not, however, find it necessary to 
review the claims regarding the violation of Art. 14. Likewise, all other complaints made by 
the applicants were also declared inadmissible. In October 2010, the Slovenian Government 
asked for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber. The Chamber’s final decision was 
published on 26 June 2012. Herein the main arguments from the Grand Chamber's reasoning 
are succinctly presented.  
As far as the purported violation of Art. 8 is concerned,
204
 the Court initially emphasized that 
the Government did not contest that the Erasure and its consequences “had had an adverse 
effect on the applicants and amounted to an interference with their ‘private or family life’ or 
both” (Par. 339). This being so, the question for the Court was whether the interference was 
compatible with the second paragraph of Art. 8, i.e. whether it (i) was in accordance with the 
law, (ii) pursued a legitimate aim, and (iii) was necessary in a democratic society.  
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 The Section did not find it necessary to examine the claims regarding the violation of Art. 14, seeing how it 
already found violation of Art. 8 (Par. 400). 
204 “(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance 
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
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The Court argued that the relevant legal provisions, i.e. Art. 40 of the Citizenship Act and 
Art.81 of the Aliens Act, were sufficiently accessible to any interested person. Hence, these 
individuals could foresee that not applying for citizenship will meant that they will become 
(be treated as) foreigners.  However, they “could not reasonably have expected, in absence of 
any clause to that effect, that their status as aliens would entail the unlawfulness of their 
residence on Slovenian territory and would lead to such an extreme measure as the ‘erasure’” 
(Par. 343). Indeed, the Erasure itself lacked legal basis, whereas the existing legislation lacked 
any provision for the regulation of “the transition of the legal status of the ‘erased’ to the 
status of aliens living in Slovenia”. In consequence, they were unable to apply for permanent 
residence anew, only having access to temporary residence as if they were entering Slovenia 
for the first time (Par. 344). The Court determined that the consequences of the Erasure were 
not clearly regulated at least until 2010. Therefore, argued the Court, “not only were the 
applicants not in a position to foresee the measure complained of, but they were also unable to 
envisage its repercussions on their private and family life or both” (Par. 348). In consequence, 
the Court found that the interference was not in accordance with the law and so in violation of 
Art. 8. 
Despite the established violation, given the widespread consequences of the case, the Court 
decided to continue and examine the other two requirements as well.  
As far as the question whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim, the Court accepted 
the Government’s argument that the independence legislation was intended to protect national 
security (see Par. 351-353), which is one of the legitimate aims covered by Art. 8/2 of the 
Convention.  
As to the question of the necessity of interference, the Court found that the Erasure, as a 
consequence of not acquiring citizenship, was a disproportionate measure in the pursuance of 
an otherwise legitimate aim of controlling the residence of aliens on the territory and of 
creating a corpus of Slovenian citizens. The State ought to have provided for the possibility 
that these people regularise their residency status even though they did not seek or were 
unable to obtain Slovenian citizenship. “The absence of such regulation and the prolonged 
impossibility of obtaining valid residence permits”, argued the Court, “have upset the fair 
balance which should have been struck between the legitimate aim of protecting national 
security and effective respect for the applicants’ right to private and or family life or both” 
(Par. 359). 
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Regarding the violation of Art. 13
205
 (in connection with Art. 8), the applicants claimed that 
none of the available remedies at the material time had proved capable of addressing their 
complaints and award them appropriate relief. Despite two leading Constitutional Court 
decisions, the Government did not adopt a comprehensive legal solution for remedying the 
situation. 
Despite the Government’s objections detailing the various legal possibilities that the erased 
individuals had for remedying their situation (e.g. the administrative proceedings, individual 
constitutional complaints etc.), the Court emphasized that the two leading Constitutional 
Court’s decisions on the issue, which ordered the Government to adopt general measures for 
resolving the situation, were not implemented for several years each. Moreover, the 
administrative procedures that the applicants did initiate lasted unreasonably long and the 
overall situation in which they found themselves in, one of vulnerability and legal insecurity, 
caused in them feelings of helplessness and frustration with the entire system. Consequently, 
the Court established that these legal remedies were not “adequate” and “effective” and so 
held that there had been a violation of Art. 13 in conjunction with Art. 8 of the Convention 
(Par. 372). 
Finally, whereas the Third Section did not discuss the merits of the purported violation of Art. 
14 (prohibition of discrimination),
206
 the Grand Chamber nevertheless believed the question 
ought to be examined given the importance of the problem of discrimination in the case at 
hand (Par. 383).
207
 According to the Court’s case-law, there is discrimination when persons in 
relevantly similar situations are treated differently without and objective and reasonable 
justification – that is, when no legitimate aim is pursued or if there is no reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aims to be realized (Par. 
386).  
Accordingly, the Court, first established that after Slovenia’s independence the situation of 
the “old” aliens and these “new” ones, i.e. citizens of former SFRY republics who did not 
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acquire Slovenian citizenship, was comparable: the two groups were both composed of aliens 
holding citizenship of a State other than Slovenia or stateless people – yet only one of the two 
groups kept their residence permits. Hence, there was a difference in treatment of two 
comparable groups (Par. 391-392). The Court flatly rejected the Government’s argument that 
the differential treatment was required by the necessity of forming a corpus of Slovenian 
citizens, especially in view of the upcoming 1992 parliamentary elections. This argument, 
said the Court, is invalid, since a failure to apply for citizenship cannot justify the deprivation 
of residence permits and secondly, because residency status does not confer the right to vote. 
Hence, the Court found that there had been an unlawful and unjustified nationality-based 
discrimination of the concerned individuals. 
Finally, in accordance with Art. 46 of the Convention, the Court may impose on the 
respondent State the adoption of individual or general measures for the resolution of an 
existing situation. In the present case, the Court found that the established violations 
“originated in the prolonged failure of the Slovenian authorities, in spite of the Constitutional 
Court’s leading judgments, to regularise the applicant’s residence status following their 
‘erasure’ and to provide them with adequate redress” (Par. 408). Also, the Erasure concerned 
a large number of persons – an entire category of former SFRY citizens residing in Slovenia 
who were (systemically) denied compensation for the infringement of their fundamental rights 
(Par. 412). Hence, in accordance with its internal Rules, the Court established that the present 
case was suitable for the adoption of a pilot-judgment procedure (Par. 413). The Court 
consequently indicated that the Government should, within one year, set up an ad hoc 
domestic compensation scheme.
208
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CHAPTER 6. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF T HE ERASURE &  LEGAL PERSONHOOD  
 
In the previous two Chapters, we examined the legal background of the Erasure: in Chapter 4, 
I presented and discussed the relevant normative framework regarding citizenship and 
residency prior to Slovenia’s independence as well the new legal regulations enforced 
immediately after its declaration of independence, the Citizenship Act and the Aliens Act in 
particular. In Chapter 5, I focused on the two main “exclusionary steps” in our story: first, the 
disenfranchisement of those individuals who did not apply for Slovenian citizenship (or 
whose applications were denied) and second, the Erasure in the narrow sense, that is the 
administrative, decree-based operation, which left more than 25,000 individuals without 
almost any political, social or economic rights, as illegal aliens in a state of legal limbo. 
In this Chapter, I will take a closer look at the consequences the Erasure had for the legal 
position of the affected individuals. The three stories of erased individuals in the Prologue of 
this thesis suggest the extent and the gravity of these consequences. While the Erased were 
deprived of their rights in a wide range of areas and to various degrees, I will focus on the 
consequences the Erasure had on their status as persons in law (legal personhood). I will 
claim that while the Erasure did not result in a comprehensive deprivation of legal 
personhood, different kinds of limitations – more generally, a weakening – of the underlying 
personhood status can be established. 
This Chapter has the following structure: in the first section (6.1.), I introduce the problem of 
the effects exclusionary practices may have on the status of a person in law. Here, I draw from 
Hannah Arendt's discussion of the plight of the stateless migrants after World War I and its 
subsequent rethinking by Ayten Gündoğdu. In this discussion particular emphasis is given to 
the fundamental role of legal personhood as the normative basis for rights recognition. On this 
basis, in the next Section (6.2.), I focus on Erasure's impact on the personhood status of the 
affected individuals. More specifically, I look at how the four (MacCormick-ean) legal 
capacities comprising legal personhood had been affected by the loss of citizenship and 
residency statuses. In doing this, I lean on the concepts presented and developed in the first 
Part of the thesis. The analysis that I conduct deals in abstractions, that is, it does not consider 
every possible particularity of the erased people’s stories; rather, it is limited to looking at the 
Erasure in general terms, disregarding most the surrounding contingencies, as the opposite 
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would require too much time and space. The analysis’ results lead me to reconsider how the 
various legal statuses interact with one another. Thus, in the last Section (6.3), I claim that 
even though legal personhood is a condition for the acquisition of other legal statuses, 
including citizenship and residency, manipulations with the latter two statuses did, in this 
concrete case, have a negative impact for the legal personhood of affected individuals. In my 
opinion, these findings require an altered view of the connection between legal statuses. 
 
 
6.1. Precariousness of legal personhood  
 
In her classic, The Origins of Totalitarianism,
209
 Hannah Arendt demonstrated that there 
exists a particularly strong connection between citizenship status and legal personhood. In her 
analysis of the post-World War I Europe, Arendt noted that the reshaping of the state borders 
had left an unprecedented number of people stateless.
210
 In the interwar period, with the rise 
of totalitarian regimes and their emphasis on national sovereignty, these “legal freaks”, as she 
called them, found themselves “outside the pale of law”: they lived outside the jurisdiction of 
the laws of the countries of their residence and were not protected by them (Arendt 1973: 
286). On the figure of the stateless person Arendt built her critique of human rights. 
Arendt saw that there is an inherent paradox in the way human rights were perceived. The 18
th
 
century declarations of human rights, beginning with the 1789 French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen, professed that these rights were not God-given or 
customary but rather, as the name suggests, that man himself was their origin (cfr. Arendt 
1973: 291). These rights grew from man’s “nature” and belonged to her on the sole basis of 
her birth; as such, they were ahistorical, universal, unalienable and independent of any 
political community (cfr. Arendt 1973: 291; also Arendt 1990: 149).  
These declarations also mark the first time in history that the legislator accepted these theories 
(of human rights). From that moment on they were no longer mere philosophical theories,
211
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as “the most symptomatic group in contemporary politics” (Arendt 1973: 277). 
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but were rather put in the centre of a new, limited conception of the State. As Art. 2 of the 
1789 Declaration states, the goal of any political association is the conservation of the natural 
rights of man. The protection and promotion of human rights therefore became the foundation 
of a legitimate government (cfr. Parekh 2008: 21). With the State government now charged 
with protecting human rights, the paradox of human rights became apparent. While human 
rights (supposedly) originated in man as such, their protection was entrusted with the nation-
State. As Arendt argued, just as “Man appeared as the only sovereign in matters of law”, so 
was the people “proclaimed the only sovereign in matters of government” (Arendt 1973: 291). 
The sovereignty of the people, Arendt continues, “was not proclaimed by the grace of God but 
in the name of Man, so that it seemed only natural that the ‘inalienable’ rights of man would 
find their guarantee and become an inalienable part of the rights of the people to sovereign 
self-government” (Ibid.). It was in this way that human rights became tied to national 
sovereignty (cfr. Parekh 2008: 23).  
This, however, also meant that just as soon as Man appeared “as a completely emancipated, 
completely isolated being who carried his dignity within himself without reference to some 
larger encompassing order ... he disappeared again into a member of a people” (Ibid.). In 
other words: in this new ordering of the world into nations with their nation-States, the rights 
of Man became more concrete, but they also lost in their universality. They became positive 
(law) rights, but they were rights of Man only as long as (s)he was a member of this or that 
particular State that recognized them (Bobbio 2005: 23). In reality, the Rights of Man were 
transformed into the rights of citizens of individual nation-States.
212
  
The 20
th
 century demonstrated the destructive force inscribed in this construction, something 
Arendt was well aware. She argued: 
The full implication of this identification of the rights of man with the rights of peoples in the 
European nation-state system came to light only when a growing number of people and 
peoples suddenly appeared whose elementary rights were as little safeguarded by the ordinary 
functioning of nation-states in the middle of Europe as they would have been in the heart of 
Africa. The Rights of Man, after all, had been defined as ‘inalienable’ because they were 
supposed to be independent of all governments; but it turned out that the moment human 
beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no 
authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them (Arendt 
1973: 291-2). 
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The “inalienable” Rights of Man, human rights, ultimately “proved to be unenforceable – 
even in countries whose constitutions were based upon them – whenever people appeared 
who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state” (Arendt 1973: 293).  
One of the most important marks of statelessness is the loss of government protection, which 
means not just the loss of legal status in one’s own country, but in all of them (Arendt 1973: 
294). “Treaties of reciprocity and international agreements have woven a web around earth 
that makes it possible for citizens of every country to take his legal status with him no matter 
where he goes .... Yet, whoever is no longer caught in it finds himself out of legality 
altogether” (Ibid.). In such conditions, it appears that the loss of one’s State implied 
something much more profound than just the loss of citizenship rights. Arendt understood 
statelessness as meaning both the loss of one’s country as well as the impossibility of finding 
protection from another one – in short, it meant the loss of the right to belong.213 However, 
such an absolute loss of polity in the context were nation-States were the primary, and indeed 
the only institutions to protect human rights, effectively meant the loss of all rights. “The 
point is not merely that statelessness means that rights cannot be protected,” argues one 
author, “but worse, that the very existence of rights are abolished in becoming stateless” 
(Parekh 2008: 21). Statelessness, in other words, signified a condition of rightlessness (cfr. 
Arendt 1973: 293–295; Gündoğdu 2015: 94; Parekh 2008: 11).214 
On Gündoğdu’s view, three dimensions of rightlessness can be distinguished:  
Legally speaking, the term denotes the loss of legal personhood that guarantees equal standing 
before the law. Politically, it captures the loss of an organized community, where one’s 
actions, opinions, and speech are taken into account. In addition, the term also indicates the 
precarious human standing of the stateless, highlighting their expulsion from the human world 
established and maintained through the activities of labor, work, and action (Gündoğdu 2015: 
95f; emphases mine).
215
 
Herein, I will focus on the legal dimension of rightlessness, i.e., on the question of the 
purported loss of legal personhood as a consequence of the loss of citizenship rights.  
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 On this, so-called  “right to have rights” see Arendt 1973: 296f; Benhabib 2004: ch.2. 
214
 In this regard, Arendt (1973: 299) famously argued: “The conception of human rights, based upon the 
assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to 
believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and special 
relationships – except that they were still human. The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of 
being human”. 
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 Cfr. the three dimensions of, or three conceptions of citizenship in Mindus 2014. 
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In order to render the idea of the utter lack of legal relevance of the stateless clear, Arendt 
vividly compares the legal position of a stateless man with that of a criminal offender (Arendt 
1973: 286). On her view, a criminal offender, even though he is an exception to the norm, the 
exception is legally envisaged and so the criminal is legally taken into account. A criminal 
offender is provided with every legal guarantee foreseen by the (criminal) legal system – she 
has the right to a fair trial, to be represented by counsel, to be jailed only on the basis of a 
guilty verdict etc. The stateless, on the other hand, is an “anomaly for whom the general law 
[does] not provide” (Ibid.). She is not protected by any such legal mechanism but is rather 
subject to arbitrariness and can be jailed, tortured or deported without having committed any 
crime whatsoever. Indeed, as Arendt notes, “[i]nnocence, in the sense of complete lack of 
responsibility, was the mark of their rightlessness as it was the seal of their loss of political 
status” (Arendt 1973: 195).  
The stateless qua rightless were legally invisible, irrelevant, deprived of any legal protection 
and so exposed to any kind of arbitrary exercise of power against them. The “worse-than-a-
criminal” treatment afforded to stateless that Arendt describes proves this (cfr. Arendt 1973: 
286f). The problem of these individuals, as Arendt argued, was “not that they are not equal 
before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed but that nobody 
wants even to oppress them” (Arendt 1973: 265-6). The rightless are indeed “beyond the pale 
of law”. 
The explanation for the legal invisibility and irrelevance of these individuals lies, on my view, 
in the fact that as bare life, as nothing but human beings, they were not entitled to the 
protection of human rights. Legal human rights are not attributes of “naked” human beings – 
rather, they are a quality pertaining to persons in law.
216
 
In On Revolution, Arendt provides her understanding of the term persona, which, for the most 
part, corresponds to the understanding of legal personhood as an artificial construct that 
makes of individuals rights-and-duties bearing units (cfr. Arendt 1990: 106f).
217
 Gündoğdu 
(2015: 100) argues that Arendt’s discussion of personhood is crucial for understanding her 
                                                          
216
 On the naked human being, the “homo sacer”, see Agamben 1995. 
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 I say for the most part, because Arendt argued that the “mask” of the person actually had two functions: it had 
to hid or replace the “actor’s” face, “but in a way that would make it possible for the voice to sound through” 
(Arendt 1990: 106). For Arendt speech is of utmost importance as it is that which makes man a political being. 
See Arendt 1998. 
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arguments about statelessness and human rights. It is also, in at least three respects, relevant 
for today’s discussions on rightlessness. I will focus on two of these arguments.218  
First of all, Arendt’s account of personhood draws attention to the artificial nature of rights as 
such as well as of the subject of rights. By emphasizing the fabricated nature of legal 
personhood, Arendt aligns herself with the so-called “legalist” approach and against the 
“metaphysical” approach to personhood.219 This, of course, brings her at odds with the 
traditional human rights discourse which held that human beings have (are ascribed) rights in 
virtue of their (human) nature. Arendt had tried to show that the “quest for a real, true, and 
essential being that is hidden behind the mask, that precedes it, and that is entitled to rights by 
virtue of its nature” (Gündoğdu 2015: 101) is a dangerous affair. The experiences of the 
stateless had clearly shown that this metaphysical conception of rights is doomed to failure. 
Arendt rejected the possibility that individuals “stripped of all political and social 
qualifications, will be recognized as equals” (Gündoğdu 2015: 102); an individual without 
any legal or political standing “has actually lost the very qualities that enabled other people to 
treat her as a fellow human being” (Parekh 2008: 26). For Arendt, the experience of the 
stateless revealed that “equality is not a given or natural condition but instead the result of 
legal and political efforts to achieve equalization among a community of actors” (Gündoğdu 
2015: 102). Or, in Arendt’s words: “We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a 
group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights” (Arendt 
1973: 301). Hence, equality, on Arendt’s view is not inherent among human beings – rather 
“it needs to be established by, and continuously reinforced with, relatively stable institutional 
guarantees”. Legal personhood is perhaps the most important such mechanism (Gündoğdu  
2015: 102). 
Secondly, Gündoğdu argues that Arendt’s “legalistic” understanding of legal personhood is 
also helpful in understanding the broader statelessness debate. Accepting that personhood is 
“not an inherently given essence”, but rather a conceded artificial construct, we are confronted 
with the possibility that “not every human being is automatically recognized as a person” 
(Gündoğdu 2015: 102). Formally speaking, then, human beings can either be recognized as 
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 The aspect that I will not be discussing regards the fact that Arendt’s particular understanding of legal 
personhood which functions not only as an artificial mask covering the individual behind it thus enabling her to 
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given community”. See Gündoğdu 2015: 104–106. 
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 Cfr. Part I, Ch. 3.2. 
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persons or not.
220
 Today, however, as we will soon see, formal deprivation of legal 
personhood, like in the case of slavery for instance, appears impossible. Nonetheless, “even 
when one has the formal recognition,” says Gündoğdu, “it is conceivable that personhood can 
be taken away, and if not completely taken away, it can be undermined so much so that some 
human beings might be effectively rendered semi-persons or non-persons” (Ibid).  
These arguments may today appear somewhat surprising, even unconvincing and inconsistent 
with what we know about our law. After all, much has changed since Arendt wrote on 
questions of citizenship and personhood and so we should take these changes into 
consideration.  
A key milestone with regard to our changed view of the human being and her legal condition 
– is undoubtedly the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 
1948. According to Bobbio, the UDHR represents the third and final phase in the 
development of human rights, whereby the rights affirmed therein are both universal and 
positive: they are universal in the sense that their addressees are no longer just citizens of 
some State but rather all men; and they are positive in the sense that this Declaration puts in 
motion a process at the end of which human rights ought to be no longer just proclaimed or 
ideally recognized but effectively protected even against the State that violates them. At the 
end of this process, Bobbio prophesized, rights of citizen will be transformed into rights of 
Man (Bobbio 2005: 23f). 
One of the most important aspects of the UDHR, from our point of view, is the inclusion in 
Art. 6 of the right to recognition as a person before the law.
221
 This right had never before 
been conceptualized and indeed many of the drafters either did not fully understand it or saw 
little reason for its inclusion into the UDHR.
222
 Nevertheless, the still fresh memory of the 
horrors perpetrated by the Nazi regime against the Jews, who were first deprived of their 
citizenship and every legal attribute or affiliation before they were herded into concentration 
camps and executed on a massive scale, led the framers of the UDHR to realize that some 
basic legal recognition of every individual (man, woman and child, citizen, foreigner or 
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 The substantially same right is also included into the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Art. 26), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Art. 5), the American Convention on Human 
Rights (Art. 3) etc. 
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 For a short drafting history of this article, see Morsink 1999: 43–45. 
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stateless) is a necessary precondition of a civilized life.
223
 Nowak, among others, confirms the 
fundamental importance of this right – which he calls a “right to existence” (2005: 369) – 
when he argues that “in a State governed by the rule of law,” any individual “requires the 
recognition of his or her existence before the law, that is, of his or her legal subjectivity. 
Without this right the individual could be degraded to a mere legal object, where he or she 
would no longer be a person in the legal sense and thus be deprived of all other rights, 
including the right to life” (Ibid.). Given this overarching importance, the right to recognition 
as a person before the law henceforth became one of the cornerstones of the international 
human rights law.
224
 From that point on, then, legal personhood – and not citizenship – had 
become the fundamental (human) right and the precondition for the attribution of all other 
rights (cfr. Gündoğdu 2015: 6ff; Bosniak 2010: 11).  
The UDHR itself, as well as other human rights instruments, directly or indirectly on its basis, 
include numerous rights that aim at preventing statelessness and protecting the legal 
personhood of every human being (e.g. the right to asylum, the right to nationality etc.). With 
such emphasis given on legal personhood and prevention of its loss, it would be easy to 
assume that today’s international human rights system is indeed based upon a notion that is a 
kind of a natural an inalienable characteristic of every human being. In this sense it might 
appear that human rights are much more entrenched than before and that it has become 
virtually impossible to deprive them from anyone. Yet if we only look at the experiences of 
contemporary illegal migrants and refugees we are reminded that things are not as simple. 
Today, 
migrants are still more likely to be subject to numerous forms of violence and abuse, 
including, among other things, arbitrary detention, illegal confinement, and inhuman and 
degrading treatment. In addition, various types of official and unofficial discrimination, as 
manifested in police profiling and racial segregation, can make it much more difficult for 
migrants to make use of the protections offered by human rights. These problems are further 
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Cfr. Arendt (1973: 295f): “The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, and the 
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 It should be admitted, however, that international human rights bodies (e.g. the Human Rights Committee) 
have produced very little case law regarding this right. For an analysis of the jurisprudence regarding art. 16 of 
the ICCPR see Nowak 2005: 373 ff. 
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complicated by the fact that most migrants cannot access protective legal mechanisms to 
effectively challenge or remedy the multifarious forms of discrimination and abuse they face. 
In fact, they are often very hesitant to assert their rights in fear of retribution (Gündoğdu 2015: 
10).  
 
These words serve to remind us that we would be mistaken were we to take personhood for 
some natural and inalienable characteristic of men. Rather, we would be wise to face the 
reality and see it for what it is: a fragile legal artefact which can be curtailed in numerous 
ways (cfr. Gündoğdu 2015: 103). As Bosniak notes, it is not necessary for legal personhood to 
be formally withdrawn: it can still be “diminished in its effect, evaded, effaced, diluted, 
displaced” (Bosniak 2010: 14). Thus, rightlessness today needn’t be understood as rigidly as 
Arendt did; we needn’t see it as lack of legal recognition tout court. Taking into account the 
mentioned post-World War II developments in the international human rights law, Gündoğdu 
rather “suggest[s] that ‘rightlessness’ denotes the fragility of these formal guarantees, which 
can be unmade in ways dispossessing various categories of migrants of their legal standing” 
(Gündoğdu 2015: 107). Hence, rightlessness in these new circumstances is understood as “the 
precarious legal, political, and human standing of those who are juridically or effectively 
deprived of the protections of citizenship status” (Ibid.). 
Hannah Arendt was arguably the first to have noticed the paradox of human rights and what 
their actual conceptual foundations were (and functioned); and while her observations were 
limited to the concreted conditions of the world after the First Great War (and should as such 
still be so understood), we see that her penetrating analysis and questioning of the 
fundamentals of the way our law functions, fifty or so years later, in a world much different 
than hers or the one she discussed in her book, is still very much relevant. Gündoğdu, for her 
part, focused on the contemporary plights of migrants and has shown that today’s border 
control practices, deportations and detentions of refugees all over the world have the capacity 
to cause legal personhood to be manipulated – despite the fact that numerous international, 
regional and nation human rights acts demand that countries treat every individual on their 
territory (in their jurisdiction) as a person and hence as entitled to the protection of a series of 
fundamental human rights.
225
 On the other hand, in the next Section (6.2.) of this chapter, I 
will focus on the Erasure, an event that took place only some twenty years ago, and attempt to 
demonstrate how the actions of Slovenian authorities, directly target at depriving individuals 
of citizenship and especially residency status, also (indirectly) affected these individuals’ 
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personhood status. Thus, while times may be very different, the problems appear to be 
fundamentally the same: legal personhood was then, and it is now, a precarious legal status, 
quite different from what our initial presuppositions. It is Arendt’s merit that we are still today 
vigilant of this fact. 
 
 
6.2.  Consequences for the status of a person  
 
The immediate consequences of the Erasure were obvious: individuals who already prior to 
the Erasure were left without Slovenian citizenship – with many of them being without any 
citizenship whatsoever (stateless) –, having been erased from the registry of permanent 
residents lost the legal grounds for their residence in Slovenia. On the territory of Slovenia 
they were illegal aliens. In addition, they had their personal identification documents 
confiscated and destroyed by the local administrative officials.  
The negative consequences of the Erasure, however, do not stop there. Besides these 
immediate ones, the Erased also suffered numerous indirect and less obvious losses and 
injuries. Herein, I refer to just some of them.
226
  
(i) For one, due to their unregulated status, the Erased often unwillingly violated employment 
laws – more often than not they found themselves working without a work permit (and unable 
to obtain one), thus also without a regular employment contract. In consequence, they were 
also left without all work-related rights, such as the right to health care, safe working 
conditions, equal pay, unemployment benefits, pension contributions etc. (cfr. Kogovšek 
Šalamon 2010: 116f & 125ff; 2016: 120–124).  
(ii) The Erased also faced great adversity in regulating their housing conditions. After 
independence, Slovenian citizens were given the possibility of purchasing the socially owned 
apartments in which they lived, under very favourable terms. Citizens of other SFRY 
republics who did not acquire Slovenian citizenship were not, however, able to buy real estate 
in that period (see Art. 16/2 of the Constitutional Act). This did not change even after the 
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adoption of the Housing Act in 1991.
227
  If they were able to rent an apartment in that 
intermediate period (from the day the Housing Act came into force until the day of the 
Erasure), the Erasure in effect ended their tenancy rights – without valid rental agreements, 
these individuals were exposed to evictions. Most of them became dependent for 
accommodation upon the good will of their friends and family, while the most unfortunate 
ones became homeless (see Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 124–126). 
(iii) Finally, the Erased suffered numerous other losses of rights on the account of having no 
regulated status: as far as their political and civil rights are concerned, they often found 
themselves exposed to arbitrary police stops and searches; having no identity documents, they 
were also often fined as well as detained and even expelled from the country and when that 
happened they were often unable to return; they could not vote or stand in elections, were 
unable to marry etc. (see Kogovšek Šalamon 2010: 86 – 121). As far as their other socio-
economic rights are concerned, I should only mention their inability to pursue secondary and 
tertiary education, loss of all social security (pension, unemployment benefits etc.) and of 
basic health care protection (see Kogovšek Šalamon 2010: 121–132). 
The above description regards rights and statuses that are in one way or another directly tied 
to or dependent upon the statuses of citizenship and permanent residency (at least in the 
Slovenian legal system). How the Erased ended up in such a position can perhaps most easily 
be understood if we imagine legal statuses as structured in a kind of pyramidal structure: we 
can assume that legal personhood, as the most basic of all legal statuses, can be found at the 
basis of this structure. (For the time being, I will not problematize the role of this status and 
its interaction with other statuses. I will address this issue below). Immediately above it, we 
may position citizenship and permanent residency, whereas the other rights and statuses that 
are dependent upon these latter two, have their place at the upper levels. From what we know 
of pyramids, these structures can be more or less solid (depending on the materials used, the 
quality of the design etc.); but regardless of its strength, elementary laws of physics tell us 
that if we were to destabilize any layer (entirely or partially), the layers above it would 
inevitably crumble. This very much simplified image should help us understand how it was 
possible that the Erased suffered so much more than just the loss of citizenship and permanent 
residency. Due to the high level of interconnection of legal statuses (and especially the 
dependence of numerous statuses and rights on citizenship and permanent residency), the 
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Erasure resulted in a wide-spread loss of rights on the part of the Erased individuals, a loss 
that effectively pushed them to the brinks of legality, into a kind of legal limbo. This idea of 
the pyramidal-like interconnection of legal statuses will be further explored in the next 
section. 
As anticipated, I am here interested primarily in the consequences suffered by the erased in 
relation to their status as persons in law. One of the premises of this analysis is that legal 
personhood is the basic (primary) legal status and a necessary precondition for obtaining all 
other legal statuses (including citizenship). Being their precondition, legal personhood should 
therefore also be independent of citizenship, permanent residency or any other legal status. In 
other words: a reasonable presumption would be that any manipulation, diminution or even 
loss of citizenship, permanent residency or any other “derivative” legal status should have no 
effect on the underlying legal personhood. If the opposite were the case, it would be as if the 
collapse of a higher-level building block (say, of citizenship) on our pyramid caused the 
bottommost level (legal personhood) to collapse as well. Intuitively, there is something odd in 
this. Yet, the discussion of the plight of today’s (illegal) migrants in the previous Section has 
demonstrated that this might nevertheless be possible, i.e. that even today, deprivation, at least 
in some manner and to a certain degree, of legal personhood is indeed possible. 
In my analysis, I conceive the status of personhood according to MacCormick’s account of 
legal capacities (see above, Ch. 2.6.). While not all persons in law possess all these capacities 
– for instance, infants have only passive capacities –, it can be assumed that an average adult 
human being of sound mind will likely be endowed with “the fullest degree of legal 
personality ” (MacCormick 2007: 95). Herein, I will take the latter as the model of the erased 
and I will base my conclusions in reference to such an individual.
228
 
Recently, Visa Kurki (2017) has employed MacCormick’s classification in the development 
of his theory of legal personhood. Kurki argues that legal personality consists of separate yet 
interconnected incidents, both passive and active in kind, and that paradigmatic legal persons 
are endowed with them, whereas paradigmatic nonpersons lack them (2017: 133).  
The passive incidents legal persons are endowed with, he distinguished into:  
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i) substantive passive incidents, i.e.(fundamental) protections of life, liberty and bodily 
integrity; the capacity to be the beneficiary of special rights; the capacity to own property; and 
insusceptibility to being owned; and 
ii) access to legal remedies, i.e. standing; capacity to undergo legal harms which may 
lead to restitution or compensation; and victim status in criminal law (Kurki 2017: 104). 
As far as passive legal personhood in concerned, Kurki holds, that it has to do primarily with 
“the conferral of benefits in the form of claim-rights” (Kurki 2017: 150), although it may also 
involve liabilities and liberties. Holding a claim-right means, very simply, that someone else 
(or everyone else) has a certain duty towards that individual.
229
 We should remember that on 
MacCormick’s view, passive legal personhood has to do with being the beneficiary of a legal 
protection either from some harm or aimed at advancing some personal interest (pure passive 
capacity) as well as being the beneficiary of (alternatively: liable for) some legal transaction. 
A typical example of an entity normally endowed only with passive legal personhood is a 
child: a child “holds various claim-rights ‘against the world’ that protect him or her primarily 
from physical and some psychological harm” (Kurki 2017: 152). The duties that either his 
parents (or some other responsible care-taker) or everyone else have against the child are 
meant to protect and further the child’s interests. He or she may likewise benefit from some 
legal transaction, say inherit the parents’ patrimony. For all active legal acts, the child 
requires, of course, legal representation of a fully competent legal person.  
Let us now proceed with an examination of some of the incidences of passive personhood and 
the way they were affected by the Erasure.  
(i) First, the protections of life, liberty and bodily integrity are among the most fundamental 
safeguards of individuals qua persons. They usually find their place in statutes or 
constitutional bills of rights, as well as in numerous (non-)binding supra-national treaties and 
conventions. Formally speaking, they function as prohibitions directed against the legislator 
from adopting measures that would unduly interfere with individuals’ life or liberty. Given 
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personhood is fundamentally based on this type of analysis). We should remember that claim (right) in this 
parlance an individual X has a claim towards another individual Y to p if and only if Y has a duty towards X to 
p. Liabilities are correlated to powers: An individual X has a power if and only if X has the ability to alter her 
own or someone else’s Hohfeldian incidents. Finally, X has a liberty (or a privilege) to q if and only if X has no 
duty to q. See more on this in Hohfeld 1923; Wenar 2015; Kurki 2017: Ch. 3. 
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the legislator’s inability to pass such measures, “that liberty is accompanied by a 
corresponding immunity vis-à-vis the parliament, rather than a liability” (2017: 106).230  
In relation to the Erasure, we find, first, that the residing illegally on the territory left the 
Erased exposed to arbitrary police stops and arrests which often led to prolonged 
interrogations where it was not uncommon that the police used violence against them; 
moreover, many of these individuals were detained in the Aliens Centre even for very long 
periods of time, without any proper judicial ruling; a significant number of the Erased were 
also deported whereby they often found themselves on the territory of countries where the war 
was already ravaging. Many of these individuals were then recruited into the armed forces of 
one or another country. With that, many suffered, at least indirectly, a violation of their right 
to life (cfr. Kogovšek Šalamon 2010: 87). 
(ii) “Owning property,” says Kurki, “is a very important hallmark of legal personhood” as it 
ties together various incidents of legal personality (Kurki 2017: 112).
231
 Related to this 
incident is also that of not being oneself an object of ownership. Normally, those who can 
own property, i.e. legal persons, cannot themselves be objects of property. Nevertheless, 
Kurki notes that “X’s legal personality and X’s being an object of ownership are not 
inherently incompatible” – a typical example of that is the corporation (Kurki 2017: 113). 
The Erased suffered an important limitation in their capacity to own property, in particular 
real estate. Art. 16, Par. 2 of the Constitutional Act determined that until the right of 
foreigners to own real estate was not regulated (by a special statute), they could not obtain 
ownership or any other real property rights on real estate in Slovenia – with the exception of 
real estate acquired on the basis of inheritance and on the condition of reciprocity. This, in 
and of itself, was not the problem. The problem was that while the Erased individuals could 
formally inherit real estate, they could not effectively exercise their right. Being, for the most 
part, without valid personal documents, they “could not register an inherited property in the 
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significance,” says MacCormick, “may wish to reflect on the fact that a gift of property on trust for the benefit of 
a baby is valid, whereas one for the benefit of a pet dog is not” (MacCormick 2007: 87). 
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land register in their name”.232 De facto, therefore, their formally acknowledged right was 
unexercisable, due directly to the Erasure. It should be added that in her analysis, Kogovšek 
Šalamon found no violation of the prohibition of slavery in the strict sense of the term, 
although she did wonder whether the miserable and rightless situation in which many of the 
Erased lived in does not constitute a kind of “modern type of slavery” which is marked by 
being unable to refuse work and receiving payment only sufficient for bare survival (cfr. 
Kogovšek Šalamon 2010: 88).233 
(iii) Finally, Kurki lists access to legal remedies as an important incidence of passive legal 
personhood. Usually, only legal persons can be parties to a lawsuit.
234
 Christopher Stone has, 
in relation to the possible standing of trees or other natural object, argued that legal 
personhood is fundamentally related to the possibility of requiring an authoritative review of 
actions that threaten the essence of a purported right (cfr. Stone 2010: 4f). On Kurki’s view, 
two aspects of standing should be distinguished, namely the nominal aspect or “the articulated 
recognition that X has a ‘stake in the outcome’ which renders enforceable any of X’s claim-
rights that are affected” and the competence-related aspect or “the competence of X to pursue 
the case in court” (Kurki 2017: 118). Another similar incidence of passive legal personhood is 
the capacity to count as a victim and to be legally harmed. Not all harms are recognized by 
law as worthy of redress – which kinds or harm will be legally appreciated will depend, in no 
small part, on whether the harmed party is a legal person or not (cfr. Kurki 2017: 121). Harm 
caused to animals, for instance, is usually not recognized as a legitimate basis for affording 
the harmed animal compensation. If compensation will be recognized in such a case, it will 
most likely be afforded to the owner of the animal.
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As far as the possibility of the Erased to seek judicial protection of their rights and 
compensation for the harms suffered is concerned, the available materials do not indicate any 
major problems with accessing the courts in the sense that their abstract capacity to bring a 
lawsuit before a court would be challenged. Neither, it seems, did the Erased, on the whole, 
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 Indeed, the same problem presented itself whenever an Erased would engage in any legal transaction that 
would require proof of personal identity. This question, however, regards the exercise of one’s active capacities 
with which I deal below. 
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 Critical legal scholars, when discussing the Erasure, sometimes nevertheless use such terms as 
“objectivization” and “depersonalization” to emphasize the severity of the consequences of the Erasure. See, for 
example, Zorn 2003. 
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 It is sometimes the case that national legislation permits standing to non-personal entities with particular 
interest in a given matter. An example of such an entity is a group of apartment owners in a residential building. 
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 Matters are somewhat more complicated when it comes to harm to foetuses. Recall the discussion in Part I 
(3.3.). 
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suffer from the lack of available remedies. Kogovšek Šalamon notes that while many of the 
Erased never sought judicial protection or were too late in doing so, “many others made use of 
every legal remedy available to them at the time of their legal battle” (2010: 105). “These 
included”, says the same author, “lawsuits with administrative courts in the cases of rejected 
applications ... complaints when the administrative bodies failed to respond to their 
applications ... appeals to the Supreme Court ... lawsuits with the Labor and Social Court ...” 
(Ibid.). While access to the courts was not problematic, this initial period was, however, 
marked with an almost total lack of effectiveness of judicial remedies: Kogovšek Šalamon 
notes that of those few who initiated actions for compensation not one received a favourable 
final judgment. Indeed, the question of compensations is still today, even after the ECtHR’s 
final judgment, which ordered the establishment of a compensation scheme, a heavily 
disputed matter (cfr. Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 268–271; 2017).  In any case, it is a fact that 
“the most important judicial remedy that the erased people had at their disposal was the 
constitutional appeal” (Kogovšek Šalamon 2010: 105). The Slovenian Constitution offers 
individuals access to the Constitutional Court via constitutional complaints which an 
individual may file if she believes her human rights and fundamental freedoms had been 
violated by individual acts of public authorities (see Art. 160 of the Constitution). The 
constitutional complaint proved to be a very important tool for the Erased, since many such 
cases were resolved in their favour.
236
 This said, it should be noted that, as we discussed 
already before, the implementation of these and other Constitutional Court’s decisions 
regarding the Erasure was nevertheless less effective with the appropriate authorities reluctant 
to implement them. 
In addition to passive incidences of legal personhood, “active legal persons” such as adults of 
sound mind are, also endowed with:  
i) legal competences, which enable them to enter into contract and perform other legal 
acts; and 
ii) “onerous legal personality”, i.e. the capacity for being held responsible for one’s 
own behaviour (Ibid.). 
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 The constitutional compliant is an instrument that does not exist in every legal system, even in those with 
specialized constitutional courts. Notable cases include the German Verfassungsbeschwerdeand the Spanish 
recurso de amparo. 
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Perhaps the most obvious distinction between infants and adults of sound mind is the capacity 
of the latter to actively, i.e. of their own volition and for their own account (or someone 
else’s), perform different “acts-in-the-law” with valid legal effect as well as to be held 
responsible (liable) for their actions. Active incidents of legal personality are thus (i) the 
capacity to perform acts-in-the-law (legal competences) and (ii) legal responsibility (onerous 
legal personality).  
(i) Human beings usually obtain more and more legal competences (and responsibilities) as 
they age. The justification behind this age-related limitation of legal competences lies in the 
fact that “[t]he capacity to perform acts-in-the-law presupposes a certain degree of 
understanding of the institutional reality and in particular of the way in which one can avail 
oneself of the institutions through the use of symbols” (Kurki 2017: 150).237 Individuals who 
are, by law, deemed incompetent to perform such acts (Kurki calls such persons dependent 
legal persons) must have some other, competent individual supervising her and, when needed, 
performing such acts in her (the principal’s) name and for her account.238 Legal competences 
are numerous in kind, with the contractual capacity surely being the most prominent one. 
In the specific case of the Erased, limitations of this capacity can be noted. Let us mention just 
a few examples. For one, the Erased could have had difficulties with even such banal 
transactions as buying alcohol or tobacco at a supermarket.
239
 That is because the purchase of 
such goods is age-restricted. The means of proving one’s legal age is usually via a personal 
identification document. However, as we know, the Erased did not possess valid legal 
documents and so the only possible way to acquire such goods was either illegally or through 
other people. Secondly, Kogovšek Šalamon reports that the Erased were unable to get married 
in Slovenia. Marriage is, legally speaking of course, a private law contract between two 
individuals that hinges, among other things, on the presentation of a series of documents. 
Again, the Erased were unable to provide the appropriate documents in order to get married, 
be it a personal identity document or a birth certificate, passport or some other citizenship-
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 MacCormick argues that legal capacities “are by law made dependent on enduring (though not necessarily 
permanent) features of a person”. These features may be legally determined but non-institutional, such as age, 
gender or mental competence or they can be institutional features, like citizenship, matrimonial status, solvency 
or some other. See MacCormick 2007: 90. 
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 Kurki comments that the justification for such limitations is usually moral and not conceptual: there are no 
conceptual limitations “that would prevent most minors or mentally disabled individuals from being able to 
exercise competences wholly independently,” he adds. Kurki 2017: 159. 
239
 I use the conditional tense here, because I am only suggesting this might have been a problem based on the 
“logic” of things. I have no material proof to support this claim. However, as a theoretical example, I do believe 
it is on solid grounds.  
165 
 
confirming document (cfr. Kogovšek Šalamon 2010: 112). As Kogovšek Šalamon further 
reports, some individuals resolved this problem by marrying their partners (Slovenian 
citizens) in a foreign country. The author finally claims that since the relevant law on the 
matter (Marriage and Family Relations Act) in Slovenia did not (does not) require one to have 
Slovenian citizenship in order to marry, the right to marry, enshrined both in international acts 
(e.g. Art. 12 of the ECHR or Art. 16 of the UDHR) as well as in the Slovenian Constitution, 
was violated (Kogovšek Šalamon 2010: 113). Finally, with regard to the ability to purchase 
real estate, you will remember that the Erased were prevented from acquiring it by Art. 16/2 
of the Constitutional Act, that is de jure and not only de facto as was the case when they 
inherited real estate. In order to circumvent this limitation, the Erased often engaged the 
services of Slovenian citizens (be it their relatives or friends or some third person) who then 
acquired real estate (most often their previously socially-owned apartments in which they 
lives) for the account of the Erased individual. This, of course, put the latter in a highly 
precarious position having paid for the apartment but not being its official owner. The 
nominal owner could have easily sold the apartment to a third person without including its de 
facto owner into the transaction (cfr. Kogovšek Šalamon 2010: 116). 
(ii) Finally, I should discuss the so-called onerous legal personhood. This element of 
personhood consists of legal responsibility (or capacity-responsibility as MacCormick calls 
it), both criminal and civil, and can be ascribed to those entities who can hold legal duties.
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The most uncontroversial type of entities which are endowed with legal responsibility, are 
adult human beings of sound mind (Kurki 2017: 158). But they are not conceptually the only 
ones who can hold legal duties: “the medieval animal trials serve as a reminder of the fact that 
contemporary limitations on the scope of criminal law which exclude, say, infants and 
animals from its purview, are not conceptual limitations but rather moral limitations” (Ibid.). 
Both children and animals can physically perform prohibited acts and they can be punished 
for them. Whether such responsibility-attribution is just, is of course a different matter, one 
which I have no intention of discussing here. Kurki also notes that onerous personality 
demonstrates “the interconnectedness of the incidents of legal personality”: for instance, tort 
liability is often only feasible if an individual can also own property. Yet, criminal 
responsibility does not always follow this principle. Indeed, slaves in the antebellum US were 
famously criminally responsible for their actions even though they were for the rest treated as 
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object of law (property).
241
 Closer to our time, as I have already mentioned above, Hannah 
Arendt had argued that stateless individuals, utterly rigthless otherwise, could have been held 
criminally responsible. Not only that – Arendt controversially argued that committing a 
criminal offence actually improved the legal position of a rightless individual (cfr. above; 
Arendt 1973: 286f). 
What can be said in this regard about the onerous legal personhood of the Erased? Given the 
numerous recorded cases and statements made by the Erased themselves it is safe to say that 
the Erased had their criminal legal responsibility fully recognized. Due to their condition, they 
were held liable and often convicted for numerous administrative misdemeanours, such as not 
possessing personal identification documents, being employed without a contract, driving a 
car without a proper licence and without registration etc. A fortiori, the same goes for more 
serious criminal offences. But what is most striking about the Erased is that they were also 
often punished – arrested, fined, interrogated by the police, expelled from the country etc. – 
“without suspicion of a criminal offence. They were punished merely because they found 
themselves in a specific situation, and on top of that one that was created by the ruling power 
itself and over which they had no influence” (Zorn 2003: 123). In other words: “their very 
existence and residence in Slovenia were considered a violation of the law” (Zorn 2003: 118). 
For this reason, because they were often pushed to the brinks of legality, being utterly 
vulnerable and in a precarious legal position, Zorn has come to claim that  
“[b]y committing a criminal offense, the erased individuals would have won for themselves 
the right to which persons prosecuted for crimes are entitled. They would have been handed an 
official document stating their alleged criminal offense against which they would have been 
able to complain. Such a person would know what he/she was accused of and what 
punishment is prescribed for such an offense. Instead of being an ‘anomaly’ not envisaged by 
law, he/she would be an ‘anomaly’ (a criminal) envisaged by law. But the erased people did 
not know for what offense they were being punished by the state, what could befall them 
during that time, how long the »punishment« was going to last, nor on which basis and to 
whom to complain” (Zorn 2003: 124-5). 
Thus, we may conclude that in line with the past examples of US slaves and post-World War I 
stateless refugees, the Erased too maintained their criminal legal responsibility. This appears 
to be the one incidence of legal personhood that human beings never find themselves deprived 
of, regardless of how much their other legal capacities are limited. 
 
                                                          
241
 On the slaves’ criminal responsibility, see Fede 1992: especially 161f.  
167 
 
 
6.3. The interconnection of legal statuses: an inverted pyramid or a web?  
 
Above, I invoked the image of a pyramidal structure as representative of the way legal 
statuses interact with each other. Seen in this way, legal personhood lies at the bottom of the 
status-structure: it is the basis for all other legal statuses and “covers” all further statuses of an 
individual. Relative to the case at hand, I argued that immediately above legal personhood, 
citizenship and permanent residency should be posited as two of the most important legal 
statuses any individual may come to hold within the Slovenian legal system. The choice of 
these second-level statuses is of course contingent: neither in the concrete case nor generally 
speaking is it necessary that a given individual will actually possess these two statuses. Their 
choice here is conditioned by the facts of the case at hand. Nevertheless, legal personhood is a 
necessary condition of acquisition of both these statuses. Citizenship and residency, in turn, 
are the condition for access to a series of legal statuses and rights that we should therefore 
position on the third level of our pyramid. For instance, health care rights, social security 
benefits and work-related rights are all for the most part dependent on residency status, 
whereas political rights such as the right to vote presuppose citizenship. 
This utterly simplified representation of the relationships legal statuses form amongst each 
other appears to correspond to what we (think we) know about them: it shows, for one, that 
legal personhood stands at the basis of the status structure as the precondition every other 
legal status an individual in law holds. No legal status, right or duty can be obtained outside 
the cover of the all-embracing legal personhood. Moreover, the pyramidal structure also gives 
an reflects the perceived stability of this structure: legal personhood as the bottommost layer 
is firmly entrenched and even though the uppermost layers may falter (statuses may be lost or 
relinquished), the basis remains in its place – in other words, legal personhood may never be 
taken away. 
However, as our investigation has shown (6.1. & 6.2.), this portrayal is problematic. Namely, 
we have seen that although legal personhood may not be formally taken away there are still 
numerous ways in which it can be diminished when other, dependent or “higher-level” legal 
statuses are either limited, hollowed, or themselves lost or taken away. It would appear, then, 
that we are in need of a better representation of the way our legal statuses are structured and 
interact with each other. 
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Why, one might ask, is all this worth discussing anyway? What difference does it make if we 
picture the way in which statuses function in the form of a pyramid, a tree-like structure or 
some other thing? If we know that despite our best normative efforts legal personhood is still 
a precarious legal status, shouldn’t we rather focus on finding ways to better understand what 
exactly is wrong with our current model of legal statuses and what changes we could 
introduce to international human rights law in order to prevent such occurrences as we 
discussed above from happening? 
Well, I believe it does matter whether we are able to and, if so, in what way we represent 
certain complex structures and connections. It matters because, if for no other reason, being 
able to represent such a complex matter in so simple terms shows that we have a good grasp 
of the problem, that we, in other terms, “see the whole picture”. But it also matters for other, 
more important reasons. For one, abstract visual representations of complex structures 
facilitates our understanding of a given phenomenon – their simplified form helps to reveal 
the weaknesses and allows us to focus on the more important points of the phenomena. 
Moreover, such representations might also be useful from the normative point of view: while 
it may sometimes be difficult to pinpoint problematic instances in complex, multi-layered 
phenomena in order to promote changes, their simplified representations may enable easier 
identification of problem areas and in allow for improvements to be introduced to the 
underlying model. This is what I wish to do here. 
What, then, would be a better way to represent the connection of legal statuses if we have to 
take into account the information about the influence “higher-level” statuses have – their loss 
or diminution – on the more basic ones, including on legal personhood? How can this more 
fragile and instable structure be symbolically represented? Seeing how the pyramidal 
representation was capable of symbolizing different salient features of legal statuses, can we 
somehow retain it and still be able to make sense of these new facts? Indeed, perhaps what we 
need to do is not change the symbol but look at it from another perspective. And what better 
way to do that than flipping things upside down. What we end up with is quite simply an 
inverted pyramid. If you think about it, an inverted pyramid indeed seems to be a better 
representation of our reality: on the bottom of the structure we still find legal personhood – in 
this image it is represented even more realistically as a single and unassuming building block; 
immediately above it we may again put, according to our needs, citizenship and (permanent) 
residency statuses. Laying above them, on their basis, we find all other legal statuses and 
rights attaching to individuals in virtue of these more fundamental legal statuses. The 
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advantage of this representation in relation to the former one is that it is much more capable of 
depicting the fragility of the whole status structure and especially of legal personhood. This 
single status carries on its shoulders the weight of all other legal statuses of an individual, 
becoming in this way itself highly fragile: removing just one of the two “second-level” 
statuses (citizenship and permanent residence), for instance, suffices to destabilize the whole 
structure; removing both would cause the entire upper structure to come crashing down on the 
bottom status. These, of course, are all just metaphors and should not be taken too literally. 
Yet, they nevertheless have the power to vividly represent what I have tried to demonstrate in 
the preceding parts of this thesis.  
This representation, therefore, appears to me to be descriptively more appropriate than the 
former one. As we noted above, however, the condition in which legal personhood is such a 
precarious legal status is certainly not a normatively desirable one. What would wish that 
legal personhood is a more entrenched legal status, unsusceptible to manipulations, 
diminutions, deprivation etc. Indeed, legal personhood would ideally be constructed as a kind 
of natural, absolute, indefeasible right to have rights.
242
 The idea of constructing the right to 
legal personhood (Art. 6 UDHR) as a modified Arendtian right to have rights appreas to me a 
fascinating one. This not the appropriate place or moment for developing a comprehensive 
proposal along these lines as it would require too much space and time. I will therefore not 
pursue this issue beyond providing a short and simple proposal of a different manner of 
representing the problem at hand – one which could, so I hope, stimulate a discussion as to the 
necessary changes required for achieving the above-mentioned goal.  
I propose that the image after which we should model the relationship between our legal 
statuses, and particularly with legal personhood, is that of a (spider’s) web.243 I submit that 
such a model would be both descriptively accurate and normatively favourable in comparison 
to the prior two. It would be descriptively accurate because it would still positions legal 
personhood in the centre of the structure and show how all other statuses stem from it. It 
would also be normatively favourable because it would provide the idea of how a strong 
interconnection can exist between legal statuses without running the risk that damage to (loss 
of) one legal status, no matter how important it would be, does not have to end up causing 
damage to the centre of the web as well, i.e. to legal personhood. The central part of the 
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spider’s web remains intact even though there is damage to various other points on the web, 
because damage is, in this model, always localized. For instance, in real life this could 
translate into a regulation that would enable an individual not to lose the right to pension to 
which she was entitled because she would happen to lose permanent residence in that country 
(but would, let’s say, still have temporary residence permit); or, in another example, it would 
make it possible for an EU citizen residing in the UK who is able to vote in local and EU 
parliament elections there, to retain this right despite the fact that the UK will have left the EU 
at a certain point. 
If and how all of this can be translated into legal reality is, of course, a different matter. 
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CONCLUSION  
 
The purpose of this part of the thesis was to address the problems related to the legal status of 
being a person in law in connection with the Erasure; in particular, to examine the influence 
the loss of citizenship and the deprivation of permanent residency status had on the legal 
personhood of the affected individuals. Doing so required understanding how legal 
personhood interacts with other legal statuses, derivative thereof; in relation to the Erasure, it 
was particularly important to understand its interaction with citizenship and permanent 
residency status, respectively. 
In the Introduction to this segment of the thesis, I alluded to the fact that, historically, legal 
personhood has been tightly connected with citizenship status. This connection, however, 
gave rise to a paradox noted by Hannah Arendt when discussing the condition of individuals 
who after the First World War were left without any country of their own. The paradox is 
seen in that the loss of citizenship (the condition of statelessness) had caused these stateless 
individuals to be left without the protection of fundamental human rights wherever they found 
themselves. Rights that ought to appertain to an individual in virtue of being human were 
inaccessible to those who were not citizens of any nation. Human rights, then, proved 
themselves actually being the rights of citizens. Consequently, the loss of citizenship had 
meant the loss of human rights as well (the condition of rightlessness).  
The “statelessness-as-rightlessness” paradox is troubling because it contradicts what could be 
called “the normal” understanding of the way legal statuses (of any given individual) operate 
and interact with each other.  This understanding, which can symbolically be represented by a 
pyramid, puts legal personhood at the basis of this structure and all other statuses onto 
progressively higher levels, their position depending on their relative importance and 
conditions of acquisition. Thus, citizenship (as well as permanent residence in our example) 
will most likely be positioned immediately above legal personhood, whereas other statuses, 
such as those of being married, owning a real estate or being the President of Slovenia, will 
find there place in the higher strata of the pyramid. On this view of things, should an 
individual lose a given status, the loss ought not to influence her statuses on the lower strata: 
if, for instance, one loses the status of being the owner of a real estate, this fact should have 
no consequence for her status as a citizen. Equally, the loss of citizenship should have no 
bearing on her underlying legal personhood.  
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The explanation for how the rights paradox comes to be was already explored by Arendt 
herself and many others after her and regards the fact that when human rights were being 
declared as positive rights for the first time (with the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen), this was being done within the context of the emergent nation-States, 
which in so doing guaranteed themselves legitimacy for their nation-building projects. Simply 
put, human rights became in this context conflated with the rights of citizens and so 
citizenship, very inconspicuously, substituted personhood as the basis of rights recognition. 
Today, we believe that rightlessness is a phenomenon that is no longer plausible: human 
rights mechanisms, developed in the aftermath of World War II, are based on the 
presupposition that each human being, regardless of her personal circumstances, including 
citizenship or lack thereof, is equally worthy and so equally entitled to the same human rights 
as everyone else. Human rights are, the supposition goes, equally guaranteed to all individuals 
in every part of the globe. As rights are independent of any individual government and 
inalienable, rightlessness is a contradiction in terms. In consequence, the problem whereby the 
loss of one’s citizenship would negatively affect one’s personhood, should no longer be 
possible. 
Yet, this presupposition is challenged by numerous counter-examples: be it the quasi-slave 
workers in the fields of Sicily or the construction sites in Qatar who are forced to perform 
manual labour all day long in blistering heat for miserable (if any) payment, deprived of their 
passports, forced to live in squalid conditions and exposed to arrests and deportations due to 
their precarious status; the Guantanamo Bay prisoners, who have for years been incarcerated 
in inhuman conditions without having been charged, yet alone convicted of any crime; or the 
millions forced to flee their homes in Syria because of the devastating war, who find 
themselves on the borders of Europe, crammed into “identification” facilities, where they are 
in effect deprived of their personal freedom and subjected to a system of abuse and coercion, 
all the while being constantly at risk of expulsion. The list could go on, but these few 
examples should do – they provide sufficient evidence for us to be able to claim that day we 
still face essentially the same predicaments as Arendt noted. Albeit it may be impossible in 
this day and age to formally deprive someone of her legal personhood as such, numerous 
mechanisms exist for depriving, limiting, distorting the various active and passive incidents of 
one’s legal personhood. How can we make sense, legally speaking, of these phenomena in our 
time? 
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In order to answer this puzzle, I endeavoured to examine one particular case, which I believe 
demonstrates many of the “exclusionary qualities” seen in the above cases, i.e. the Erasure. 
Examining the legal basis for the perpetration of the Erasure, I established that the new 
Slovenian authorities chose to establish a nationalistic, ethnicity-based citizenship policy 
which caused one segment of the population – the ethnic non-Slovene permanent residents 
who were citizens of other SFRY republics – to be treated differently and less favourably then 
their ethnic Slovenian counterparts, despite the fact that just prior to the secession these same 
individuals were granted the right to participate in the independence plebiscite – thus being 
considered co-equal founders of the new State. While these individual were given the 
opportunity to obtain the new Slovenian citizenship under favourable circumstances, not all of 
them decided to take advantage of this opportunity as they were under no legal obligation to 
do so. The consequences of this decision, logically ascertainable from the valid legislation, 
were clear to them: refusal to obtain the citizenship will result in them becoming foreigners – 
with, we should emphasize, permanent residence. Thus, the “disenfranchisement” of the said 
individuals in this case cannot be deemed illegal (although the legitimacy of the reasons for 
not extending citizenship to these individuals automatically or ex lege, as it was to ethnic 
Slovenes, is a different and much more disputable matter). This moment nevertheless 
represents a crucial phase in the Erasure story, as it was in this way that the set of individuals 
who were later to be erased – i.e. deprived of their residency status – was determined. For 
their decision, these individuals came to be represented publicly as enemies of the State, anti-
Slovenes, speculators, the cultural Others. Social stigmatization and marginalization was an 
important facilitating factor in the eventual legal exclusion of these people. In consequence of 
the analysis, I have come to hold that the Erasure can be explained, at least in part, as a 
particular kind of punishment for the decision not to accept (apply for) the offer for obtaining 
Slovenian citizenship and becoming, in this symbolic way, members of new Slovenian body 
politic.  
The analysis of the consequences the Erasure had on the affected individuals has shown that 
the loss of the permanent residency status resulted in the loss of numerous social and legal 
rights that are (in)directly tied to the said status. These losses appear consistent with our 
proposed pyramidal model of statuses: the removal of an underlying building block upon 
which others are based will inevitably cause them to fall as well. However, the analysis also 
demonstrated that the deprivation of the residency status, jointly with the lack of citizenship 
status (in some cases even statelessness), resulted in various kinds of limitations of both 
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passive and active incidents of legal personhood. Their inability to effectively exercise legally 
acquired real estate, get married or even buy age-restricted products in the supermarket, is 
evidence of the fact that even the deprivation of “derivative” legal statuses, such as citizenship 
and residency, may have adverse effects on the “original” status of personhood. In 
consequence, we may confirm that legal statuses do not, in fact, function as we have come to 
believe, as neatly stacked up in a perfect pyramidal structure whereby the bottommost layer 
(here being the legal personhood) would be untouchable. Clearly, a different understanding of 
the status’ structure is needed. 
Drawing from the findings of the preceding analysis, as well as from the studies of the 
adversities refugees all over the world face every day in their struggle to be accorded at least 
some minimal legal recognition, I have come to claim that legal statuses do not, in fact, 
function as a traditional pyramid, but rather as an inverted (upside down) pyramid. The 
symbolic representation of statuses as structuring themselves in this manner, gives us a much 
better understanding of the fragility of the underlying legal personhood in relation to its 
supervening statuses, such as citizenship and residency. Looking at things from this 
perspective, it is not difficult to understand how it is possible that the deprivation of a given 
(relevant) status results in limitations or, more generally, modifications of even the most basic 
and fundamental status as is the legal personhood of a given individual. 
One final piece of the puzzle remains missing: we have come to understand what means were 
used in the Erasure and to what effect; we have seen that the deprivation of the permanent 
residency status, ordered by the Government, using internal decrees (instructions) which were 
based on the law regulating the position of foreigners in Slovenia, and executed by 
administrative government officials, has proven that legal personhood is indeed a much more 
precarious legal status as it is normally believed to be. But knowledge of the mechanisms of 
the Erasure does not, of itself, explain how these precise consequences (above all the 
limitation of legal personhood) were possible. What we still have to understand is what 
exactly was it about these mechanisms that enabled such results to occur. What was it about 
the Aliens Act that enabled the Government to order the deprivation of residency status of 
nearly 1% of the population? What made the government officials follow the orders and not 
question neither their legality nor the possible consequences of their actions? What enabled 
the Erasure to remain a legal (as opposed to illegal) manoeuvre, confirmed as such by the 
Supreme Court, for more than seven years? These and other questions are confronted in the 
last Part of this thesis. 
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PART  III. 
THE ERASURE &  THE RULE OF LAW  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The analysis in Part II led us to conclude that Slovenia was established as a state of the 
Slovenian nation first and foremost – an ethno-democracy with in-built nationality-based 
discriminatory mechanisms. While upon independence the majority of ethnic non-Slovenian 
residents were able to obtain Slovenian citizenship and were thus afforded the same 
fundamental and civil rights as their ethnic Slovenian counterparts, those (c. 25,000) who did 
not acquire the citizenship, found themselves erased from the registry of permanent residents 
and, in consequence, their status on the territory changed into that of illegal aliens.  
While the previous Part was dedicated to examining the mechanisms of the Erasure, here we 
must find the answer as to what exactly it was about these mechanisms that enabled such 
results to occur. 
In his book Nationalism and the Rule of Law, Iavor Rangelov analyses the particular 
relationship that runs between nationalism and the Rule of Law. He argues that the most 
important common characteristic of these two fundamental political theoretical concepts is 
that they both “elaborate a set of attributes that can be understood as principles underpinning 
the legitimacy of political order” (Rangelov 2014: 7). In other words, both nationalism and 
the RoL are important sources of political legitimacy. Depending on the context, nationalism 
and RoL may function harmoniously: thus far, nation-States have provided the most 
favourable environment for the development of the RoL (Rangelov 2014: 8). However, most 
of the time, their relationship is characterized by tensions and contradictions. In systems that 
institutionalize ethnic citizenship and taint other fundamental legal institutes with nationalistic 
content, requirements of formal legality, such as generality and prospectivity of laws are often 
compromised; equally, such legal regimes can’t easily be reconciled with the demand for the 
primacy of human rights and equality before the law (Rangelov 2014: 32). When nationalism 
is institutionalized and brought within the constitutional system in the form of “ethnic 
citizenship” and nationalist-laden institutes that are democratic only on the face of things, 
then law becomes but an instrument promoting subjugation, inequality and exclusion. 
176 
 
Our analysis of the Erasure has also demonstrated the existence of such of tensions embedded 
in the Slovenian legal and political system. On the one hand, the original citizenship-granting 
policy which established a differentiated regime for ethnic non-Slovenes is seems a clear 
example of the tendency to discriminate on the basis of nationality. Numerous references to 
the constitutive character of the Slovene nation corroborate the judgment about the quality of 
the newly-established Slovenian state. I have even argued that at one point a much broader, 
comprehensive disenfranchisement of all ethnic non-Slovenes (citizens of other SFRY 
republics) was contemplated. This result, however, was prevented by the functioning 
mechanisms of the RoL and a series of other institutional barriers and external and internal 
political pressures, reflecting and promoting the requirements of legality. Hence, the erasure 
of a much smaller number of individuals, yet conducted in a much more intense manner, can 
be seen as a result of these two opposing powers clashing.  
In order to understand how the consequences of the Erasure could come about, I propose to 
submit the legal mechanisms employed in the Erasure – and analysed above in Part II – to an 
investigation informed by the principle of the Rule of Law. For reasons to be stated, the 
proposed analysis will be based on the requirements of a formal conception of the RoL. 
There are several reasons why I believe such an investigation is worthwhile. The concrete 
circumstances of the case provide one important reason. Among key reasons for Slovenia’s 
secession from SFRY, the Basic Constitutional Charter stated that the SFRY no longer 
functioned as a stated governed by law and where human rights and the rights of nations were 
violated. Indeed, non-democratic regimes are often seen as violating the requirements of 
legality: laws that citizens are expected to abide by may not all be public, but rather published 
in secret gazettes; owing to ideological reasons, legal provisions may be lengthy, impossibly 
complicated and vague as to impede normal comprehension of what is required or prohibited; 
in such regimes, it is not uncommon that activities permitted one day suddenly become 
retroactively prohibited and sanctioned the next day. Thus, if violations of the basic 
requirements of legality represented a key argument for secession, it seems important to 
examine whether and how Slovenia integrated at least the minimal conditions of formal 
legality within its newly established democratic institutions, especially in such important area 
as is citizenship legislation. 
The second reason is likewise related to the concrete characteristics of the studied case. Given 
the specific qualities of the Slovenian constitutional system that we have identified as an 
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ethnic democracy, it would be easy to cast aprioristic judgments about its inherent 
illegitimacy and violations of fundamental legal principles such as equality before the law. 
But doing so would blind us to the fact that these contradictions are not as clear cut and the 
supposed illegalities not as obvious as it might seem: they do not manifest themselves in all 
matters in the jurisdiction of the State and they are not everywhere and always present with 
the same intensity. An “ethno-democratic” system cannot so easily be deemed illegitimate 
tout court. The complexities involved in such cases are too great for such sweeping 
conclusions. What an analysis from the formal conditions of RoL ought to enable is that this – 
or any other – case is confronted without any a priori value judgments. That is because the 
instrument is content-independent and politically neutral (cfr. Summers 1993: 135-136). This 
means that the formal RoL is compatible with almost all kinds of political systems and thus 
allows for their unbiased analysis. The notion of the formal RoL only proposes elements that 
any legal system (any legal rule) ought to possess of necessity. It follows that the conclusions 
of such an analysis can be expected to gather more legitimacy among the different stake-
holders, since the analysis does not second guess the foundations of any political system but 
only furnishes criteria for establishing whether the law is able to effectively guide human 
behaviour. Possible criticisms based on such analyses are therefore also more likely to fall to 
fertile grounds. 
Finally, with one eye on the larger project on legal exclusionism indicated in the introductory 
chapter of this dissertation, the formal RoL concept appears well suited for the task: as an 
instrument of analysis and critique it enables not only the analysis of diverse legal systems at 
a given moment in time (i.e. diachronically) but also through time, i.e. synchronically. If what 
is at stake are the most fundamental qualities that any system of law is to possess if it is to 
effectively guide human behaviour, comparative analyses of as diverse systems of law as 
were the US Antebellum slavery law, the German Nazi Anti-Semitic system and the newly-
established Slovenian constitutional order are rendered possible. 
One possible objection against the kind of analysis I propose here could be raised on the basis 
of the fact that the Erasure, as we have seen in the last Part (5.3.), had been declared a 
violation of both the Slovenian Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Why then, some might ask, should we bother with an analysis of the violations of the RoL 
criteria when we know definitively that the Erasure – different aspects of it – was an illegal 
act of Slovenian authorities?   
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The reasons for the reasonableness and usefulness of this analysis are, I believe, independent 
of whether or how this case was ultimately decided by judicial authorities. Beyond these 
broader reasons, the “illegality objection” can also be replied to in concreto: first of all, 
strictly speaking, most of the activities related to the Erasure in the wider sense, including the 
Erasure in the narrow sense itself, were concluded before the day the ECHR became a binding 
human rights mechanism for Slovenia. Indeed, as you remember, the ECtHR never decided 
on the Erasure stricto sensu – which is the central object of this investigation. Thus, as far as 
the Erasure in the narrow sense is concerned, the argument of illegality is irrelevant. But we 
could also imagine a reply along more theoretical, speculative lines: what if the ECHR was 
not at all binding on Slovenia? What if Slovenia was not its signatory? In practical terms this 
idea might seem impossible for a series of reasons – yet it is not at all theoretically impossible 
to fathom. Since we are here interested in a broader, theoretical argument about mechanisms 
of legal exclusion, this consideration should not be easily dismissed. If Slovenia was not a 
European country and a member of the Council of Europe, the entire argument regarding the 
violations of fundamental Convention rights in this case would be utterly senseless. 
What about the violations established by the Slovenian Constitutional Court? Surely the 
above reasons do not apply for the domestic level? They do not, of course; however, it would 
not be absurd to imagine that the unconstitutionality of the Erasure would have never been 
established by the Constitutional Court. Indeed, this could have occurred for different reasons: 
for one, cases brought by the Erased before the Court could have been declared inadmissible 
for some reason or another – today, for instance, the level of constitutional complaints and 
other cases brought before the Court that are dismissed outright is due to the Court’s 
overburdening extremely high; even if considered by the Court, it could still have decided in a 
way that would not so clearly determine the Erasure’s unconstitutionality – do not forget that 
for over seven years before the first Constitutional Court decision, the Supreme Court did not 
find fault with the Erasure; moreover, the Court could have allowed any one of the different 
referendums proposed on the issue – and if they would have passed, it is very likely that 
constitutional amendments would have been adopted effectively legalizing the Erasure at the 
Constitutional level. 
This Part has two chapters. In the first (Chapter 7), I present the basic elements of a formal 
conception of the RoL. After resolving some conceptual matters in the introductory paragraph 
(7.1.), in the next two subsections (7.2. & 7.3.), I analyse each of the eight criteria of formal 
legality that virtually every formal conception of RoL accepts. Particular emphasis is given on 
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the criterion of congruence (7.3.); in the context of this subsection several fundamental 
characteristics of the formal structure and inner working mechanisms of bureaucratic 
institutions are also presented and discussed. The same chapter structure is repeated in the 
next chapter (Chapter 8). The conceptual framework developed in abstract in the previous 
chapter is here applied to the specific case of the Erasure.  
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CHAPTER 7. 
THE RULE OF LAW  
 
7.1.  Introduction 
 
The Rule of Law (RoL) is one of the major juridico-political ideals of contemporary political 
morality (Waldron 2016).
244
 As such – and on par with concepts such as democracy, human 
rights, economic freedom etc. – it is a widely discussed and controversial notion.245 The 
purpose of this chapter is not to engage in some general discussion of the RoL: heaps of 
academic writings on the subject prevent this from being possible. But neither is this the 
intention here. Rather, the aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the elements of a 
formal conception of the RoL. In the next chapter, I will then apply these criteria to the 
example of the Erasure. 
In this introductory paragraph, I wish to provide a general framework of the topic at hand as 
well as to discuss certain conceptual difficulties regarding the formal conception of the RoL. 
The latter parts of this chapter, on the other hand, will be devoted to providing a more detailed 
understanding of the mentioned conception of the RoL and its elements. 
As a first approximation of the meaning of the term RoL, the first idea that comes to mind is 
that in a given political community we should have “the rule of laws, not of men”.246 The 
meaning of this familiar slogan should not be taken at face value: laws as such cannot rule by 
themselves – they need men to create and implement them. Rather, the idea behind this 
catchphrase is that public power should not be exercised “in an arbitrary, ad hoc, or purely 
discretionary manner” (Waldron 2016), on the basis of personal preferences of the people 
wielding it. Rather, such power should be exercised “within a constraining framework of 
well-established public norms” (Ibid.; cfr. Raz 1979: 212f). Thus, the basic idea is not that 
men should not have anything to do with governing; rather, it is that law as a particular form 
of governance, regardless of its content, is to be preferred over other means of social control 
(Marmor 2004: 4).  
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 Among the foremost authors who have dealt with the Rule of Law from the 19th century onwards are Dicey 
(1915), Hayek (2006 & 2011), Fuller (1969) etc. I should note that the present is not intended to be an historical 
analysis of the concept. For that, see Tamanaha 2004. Rather, I will only refer to those works that serve the 
immediate purpose of this thesis. 
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 In this regard, see Waldron 2002. 
246
 The idea is associated with Aristotle’s Politics. 
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This first approximation does not, of course, exhaust the meaning of the RoL. Presumably, we 
all agree that governments should rule by way of laws and not by fiat and arbitrary uses of 
physical force. But is this all? If all we mean by the RoL is that “all government action must 
have foundation in law, must be authorized by law” (Raz 1979: 212), we have said very little 
– this is a mere tautology (Ibid.). If the notion of RoL is to have any sense, it ought to be 
related to one or both of these dimensions: it ought to be related either to the question of what 
content the law should have in order to be seen as (morally) good law or, alternatively, it 
ought to provide meaningful criteria for the identification of the necessary formal qualities of 
law. These alternatives are the basis for the distinction between substantive and formal 
conceptions of the RoL.  
The fundamental characteristics of formal theories of RoL are succinctly presented by Craig – 
he argues that, generally speaking,  
[f]ormal conceptions of the rule of law address the manner in which the law was promulgated 
(was it by a properly authorised person, in a properly authorised manner, etc.); the clarity of 
the ensuing norm (was it sufficiently clear to guide an individual’s conduct so as to enable a 
person to plan his or her life, etc.); and the temporal dimension of the enacted norm (was it 
prospective or retrospective, etc.) (Craig 1997: 467; emphases mine). 
 
On the other hand, substantive conceptions of the RoL build upon the former but propose that 
besides such formal attributes – which form but one element of the concept – there are also 
some substantive standards that properly characterize a legal system. Such essential criteria 
are often held to be either respect for (protection of) private property, equality, fundamental 
human rights etc. (see Waldron 2016; Tamanaha 2004: Ch.8).  
Both approaches have their inherent and context-specific strengths and weaknesses and which 
will be espoused will ultimately depend on the specific context and goals of one’s project. It 
seems, for one, that the thicker (substantive) versions of RoL are more representative of the 
“common understanding” of the notion RoL, at least as the notion is used in liberal Western 
societies. On this view, the formal requirements of legality are but one part of the whole 
meaning, which normally also includes at least the requirements of democracy and 
fundamental rights. As Allan notes, the RoL, on this view, “is an amalgam of standards, 
expectations, and aspirations: it encompasses traditional ideas about individual liberty and 
natural justice, and, more generally, ideas about the requirements of justice and fairness in the 
relation between the government and governed”; but the notion also encapsulates certain 
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institutional concepts: “The fundamental notion of equality, which lies lose to the heart of our 
convictions about justice and fairness, demands and equal voice for all adult citizens in the 
legislative process: universal suffrage may today be taken to be a central strand of the rule of 
law” (Allan 1993: 21f). 
The downside of these substantive theories is that they are much more disputable than the 
thinner (formal) ones. As Waldron puts it: “Once we open up the possibility of the Rule of 
Law’s having a substantive dimension, we inaugurate a sort of competition in which everyone 
clamors to have their favorite political ideal incorporated as a substantive dimension of the 
Rule of Law ... The result is likely to be a general decline in political articulacy as people 
struggle to use the same term to express disparate ideals” (Waldron 2016). Moreover, it is not 
true that the common Western conception of RoL needs to be universally applied and that its 
three components (formal legality, democracy, human rights) are necessary elements of the 
concept (cfr. Tamanaha 2004: 112).  
As said, formal conceptions of the RoL are spared many controversies that plague the 
substantive accounts. That is because they do not “seek to pass judgment upon the actual 
content of the law itself” (Craig 1997: 467). Moreover, they do not tell us by whom the laws 
should be made (by democratically elected parliaments or tyrants). Rather, they regard only 
the essential formal features of law, i.e. the essential characteristics that ought to always be 
present if we are to speak of law. Indeed, “[n]o legal system can operate without those 
essential attributes, regardless of the time or the place” (Kramer 2007: 101). These qualities 
render the formal conceptions of RoL more politically acceptable across the ideological 
spectrum. According to Summers, “far more people from all segments of the political 
spectrum can be enlisted to support the rule of law and to criticize departures from it” 
(Summers 1993: 136-7). 
Let us then focus on the formal conception of the RoL. What does it involve? According to 
Summers, a formal theory of the RoL has three (or two) basic components: the conceptual-
institutional one and the axiological one (Summers 1993: 129). The author puts the idea of 
this theory in the following terms: 
The ideal of the rule of law consists of the authorized governance of at least basic social 
relations between citizens and between citizens and their government so far as feasible through 
published formal rules congruently interpreted and applied, with the officialdom itself subject 
to rules defining the manner and limits of their activity, and with sanctions or other redress 
against citizens and officials for departures from rules being imposed only by impartial and 
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independent courts or by similar tribunals, after due notice and opportunity for hearing 
(Summers 1993: 129). 
 
The idea of the RoL is, on this view, institutionalized through formal rules which are then 
interpreted and applied by certain fundamental institutions of legal system (courts and 
administrative agencies, for instance). In this chapter, I will focus on the necessary formal 
characteristics of legal rules as well as on certain characteristics of the State administrative 
apparatus – one of the two most important State institutions (besides the judiciary) charged 
with enforcing the State’s body of law.  
 
Which, then, are the characteristics that rules of a legal system (the law as such) have to 
possess if they are to be considered law proper? Craig’s quote (above) indicates that these 
criteria regard the manner of norm-production, the clarity of these norms as well as their 
temporal dimension. Different lists of essential formal elements of the RoL have been 
proposed;
247
 most of them, however, are some version of the famous “eight demands of law’s 
inner morality” put forth by Lon Fuller (1969: Ch. 2; see also Finnis 1980: 270; Raz 1979: 
214–218). For the purposes of this dissertation, I will adopt Fuller’s list of conditions of 
legality.
248
 The conditions that I will hereafter discuss are: i) generality (7.2.1.); ii) publicity 
(7.2.2.); iii) prospectivity or non-retroactivity (7.2.3.); iv) intelligibility or clarity (7.2.4.); v) 
consistency or non-contradictoriness (7.2.5.); vi) practicability or non-impossibility (7.2.6.); 
vii) stability or constancy (7.2.7); and viii) congruence (7.3.). 
  
While these characteristics are jointly necessary for the existence of a legal system, the extent 
to which they are present in a particular instance thereof can vary: norms of a legal system can 
be, on the whole, more or less public; most can be future-looking with some others 
retroactive; some are directed to an undefined number of addressees (e.g. traffic rules), while 
others regulate the position of a specific individual (e.g. the President of the country). In any 
case, while total absence of one or more of these qualities indicates a failure of the legal 
system as a whole, it is not the necessarily case that the more these elements are present in a 
given legal system, the better the system will be for it. This is not so for two reasons: first, 
because the more one of these qualities is present in a given law, the more likely it is – for this 
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 While I will not discuss them in detail, I nevertheless agree with Waldron that certain procedural and 
institutional elements are a necessary part of how we should understand the concept of law. For his list of these 
essential elements, see Waldron 2011: 6. Cfr. also Raz’s list (1979: 216–218). 
248
 This does not mean, however, that I necessarily espouse all of his views on their content or his understanding 
of their value for law in general. 
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reason – to come into conflict with one, or more, of the other qualities. For instance, the more 
a norm is general in character, the more abstract it is. Inevitably, the more a norm is abstract, 
the less it is clear. Hence, the criteria of generality and clarity conflict (see Kramer 2007: 
108f.). The second reason is that some of these criteria are intended not as exact quantifiable 
benchmarks, but rather as rough standards to be generally satisfied (Marmor 2004: 9). The 
typical example of such an approximate standard is the criterion of temporal stability (see 
below, 7.2.7.).  
These latter realisations lead me – as they did Fuller – to accept that the fulfilment of each 
criterion of legality, and hence of the RoL as such, is necessarily “a matter of degree” (Fuller 
1969: 43; cfr. Raz 1979: 222). This, of course, does not mean that any minimal compliance 
with these criteria will do. Rather, each criterion has to be fulfilled at least to a certain, 
relatively high, threshold level.
249
 “Above that level,” however, “any further compliance with 
each principle will enhance the clarity and robustness of the status of a legal system as such 
but will not be indispensable for the very applicability of that status” (Kramer 2007: 109). 
Then again, it is also the case that not every minor defect of the law in complying with the 
legality criteria is already a reason to deny it the character of law. While a total failure in any 
or more criteria is a sufficient reason for denying something the quality of law, minor failures 
in one or more criteria do not justify the same conclusion. 
Summers argues that the “[i]nstitutionalization of the rule of law is one thing, the values it 
serves, another” (1993: 131). In general, the values the RoL serves can be distinguished into 
functional ones and non-functional ones. In principle, the criteria of the RoL serve to 
determine whether a given legal system is capable guiding the behaviour of its subjects 
through its rules (see Raz 1979: 214). Therefore, a part of the answer about the value of the 
formal criteria of legality is already at hand. If a feature x (where x is any of the listed criteria 
of formal legality) is necessary for law to fulfil its function y (in this case to effectively guide 
human behaviour), then having x is functionally good for law (see Marmor 2004: 7). Hence: 
“To the extent that certain features are functionally necessary for law to guide human conduct, 
and to the extent that the law purports to guide human conduct, these features of the rule of 
law make the law good, that is, good in guiding human conduct” (Marmor 2004: 7).  Insofar 
as the elements of the RoL are necessary for law to perform its function, and a given system 
of norms is shown to have them, they can be said to be a functional good for the law itself. 
                                                          
249
 Of course, as you might expect, what this level is cannot be precisely specified (see Kramer 2007: 105). 
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Apart from being functionally valuable, the RoL is also said to further or promote other 
values as well. What kind? Summers (1993: 131), for one, proposes a list of values that a 
formal theory of RoL serves, which includes: i) legitimate government); ii) certainty and 
predictability of governmental action and of the legal effects of private law-making; iii) 
private autonomy; iv) facilitation of free choice and planning; vi) respect for the dignity of the 
individual; vi) freedom from arbitrariness of official action.  
Fuller and Raz, for their part, emphasize that observing the RoL is, in the final instance, 
“necessary if the law is to respect human dignity” (Raz 1979: 221). Respect for human dignity 
is understood by Raz as “treating humans as persons capable of planning and plotting their 
future” (Ibid.).250 Thus, if law is, among other things, public and prospective, individuals 
subject to its directives will be in a position to plan their activities around and in conformity 
with the law (cfr. Murphy 2005: 241). Fuller similarly argued that subjecting human beings 
and their conduct to the requirements of law “involves of necessity a commitment to the view 
that man is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable of understanding and following rules, 
and answerable for his defaults” (Fuller 1969:  162). That is why he believed that any 
“departure from the principles of law’s inner morality is an affront to man’s dignity as a 
responsible agent” (Ibid.). 
These considerations raise an important question: namely, is there a necessary connection 
between the RoL and morality? In other words: is a legal system that conforms to the 
requirements of the RoL necessarily a morally good legal system? On the other hand, is a 
legal system that is defective with regard to the formal quality of its laws necessarily a 
morally corrupt system?  
Fuller certainly believed that there is such a necessary connection between the form of the law 
and its claim to morality.
251
  For one, Fuller believed that “[a] total failure in any one of these 
eight directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is 
not properly called a legal system at all” (Fuller 1969: 39). If, for example, rules are secret, 
then we cannot reasonably expect individual to abide by them. Thus, the answer to the second 
question is that a formally defective system of rules does not (on Fuller’s view) even have the 
character of law, so the question of its moral quality does not even present itself. On the other 
hand, Fuller believed that there is an inherent connection between respecting the criteria and 
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 In the following, I briefly touch upon one of the question that determined the so-called Hart – Fuller debate. 
For the entire debate, see Hart 1958 & 1983 (Essay 16), 1994; Fuller 1958 & 1969. 
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substantive goodness. He argued that “respect for the internal morality of law will incline the 
legislator toward the making of laws that are just in their substantive aims” (Fuller 1965: 661; 
cfr. Fuller 1958: 636). The idea is that the respect for the RoL opens government actions to 
public scrutiny. In such conditions, it is presumed that the legislator and government officials 
will be much less inclined to pass obviously unjust laws as such laws are much harder, if not 
impossible, to defend in the public arena. 
Fuller’s critics, on the other hand, have argued against him by saying that he had confused 
efficacy and morality (see Fuller 1969: 200). Raz’s critique is perhaps the most representative 
in this respect. For Raz the essential feature of law is its claim to offer (authoritative) reasons 
for action. For obedience to be possible, laws must be capable of guiding human behaviour. In 
this Raz accepts Fuller’s claims regarding the necessary characteristics of law as an action-
guiding phenomenon. But he offers an analogy to demonstrate his point. He parallels the 
property of sharpness of knives with the realization of the RoL. A sharp knife is a good knife, 
says Raz. Being sharp “is an inherent good-making characteristic of knives” (Raz 1979: 225) 
– but this does not mean that there is anything morally good in this fact. A sharp knife can be 
used to do good – cut food, open an envelope etc., but it can also be used to kill someone. 
And so it is with law. As Raz noted, observing the RoL is necessary for respecting human 
dignity, but it does not guarantee it (Raz 1979: 221). Conformity with the demands of the RoL 
is completely compatible with even the most atrocious violations of human rights (see Raz 
1979: 211 and 220f). However, just as there is an inherent relation between the sharpness of 
the knife and the nature of being a knife, so it is with the RoL and law itself. “Conformity to 
the rule of law is essential for securing whatever purposes the law is designed to achieve” 
(Raz 1979: 224). These purposes, we have seen, can be either good (like ending racial 
discrimination in employment) or bad (establishing slavery). Law’s direct purposes are 
achieved if individuals act according to the adopted law – by “guiding human behaviour” we 
mean exactly the fact that law, through its rules, guides individuals towards certain goals. 
Hence, we understand that if the pursued purposes are to be achieved, the law must be able to 
effectively guide human behaviour. “[T]he more it conforms to the principles of the rule of 
law the better it can do so,” says Raz (1979: 225). This essential link between the law and the 
RoL is, however, in no way a moral one: conformity to the RoL is equally essential for 
achieving good purposes as it is for achieving bad ones (Ibid.). “[T]he rule of law is an 
inherent virtue of the law, but not a moral virtue as such” (Raz 1979: 226). 
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In his objection, Raz proposes that there is no inherent non-instrumental value in the RoL; and 
even if we were to accept that it has some non-instrumental moral value, “the goodness of the 
rule of law [would be] extremely thin, because respecting the rule of law is consistent with all 
kinds of terrible behavior” (Murphy 2005: 250). However, Murphy believes that it would be 
mistaken to take this Raz’s objection “as showing that the rule of law is merely and only 
instrumentally valuable”; rather, what his reply shows is that the non-instrumental value of 
the RoL is conditional in nature (Murphy 2005: 252). Raz shows that there are cases in which 
the respect for human dignity (and reciprocity) that the RoL expresses fails to be realized at 
all. Moreover, Murphy notes that Raz’s answer also shows that “the rule of law, and its 
constitutive values, can be realized to a greater or lesser degree in different contexts” (Ibid.). 
However, she points out that Raz’s argument draws its force from a “disputable claim”, 
namely “that conceivability entails (real practical) possibility” (Ibid.). Her point is that the 
pursuance of unjust ends may conceptually or logically be possible within the framework of 
rules that fully comply with the requirements of formal legality – but the practical possibilities 
of that happening are very slim. Following Fuller, she too argues that it is unlikely that 
governments will pursue unjust ends while fully complying with the requirements of the RoL 
for that would expose them to numerous problems. In general, then, it can be said that respect 
for the RoL necessarily limits the possibilities of a government for acting unjustly. That 
doesn’t mean, says Murphy, that individual unjust laws that fully respect the RoL may not be 
adopted – that is of course possible. There may even be cases “where racism and prejudice 
against a particular group in society makes it likely that actions viewed as impermissible 
against the dominant group seem justifiable against a minority group” (Murphy 2005: 260). 
But what Murphy stresses is that that respect for RoL is incompatible with “the pursuit of 
systematic injustice” and that even in cases as the above ones, “the rule of law can play a role 
in limiting injustice” (Ibid.).  
This view seems to be corroborated by Fuller himself: he did not believe that following the 
RoL requirements predetermines which goals can or should be followed by a legal system. 
Instead, he believed that the internal morality is “over a wide range of issues, indifferent 
toward the substantive aims of law and is ready to serve a variety of such aims with equal 
efficacy” (Fuller 1969: 153). But he also believed that not all aims can be equally 
accommodated – especially not systemically evil aims (cfr. Krygier 2010: 117).252  
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 In this, Fuller seems to follow Gustav Radbruch, who held that in a conflict between justice and positive law 
(legal certainty as he put it), generally speaking, positive law should take precedence even if the content of the 
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The above considerations, while fragmented and tentative, should nevertheless offer a 
sufficient conceptual frame of the central problems underlying the theoretical discuss on the 
formal conception of the RoL. Not all problems touched upon in this introduction will, 
however, be directly relevant in the upcoming presentation and the subsequent analysis of the 
Erasure. In the next paragraph (7.2.1.–7.2.7.), I present the first seven criteria of the formal 
conception of the RoL. In the last one (7.3.), I focus on the criterion of congruence. 
 
 
7.2.  The requirements of the Rule of Law  
7.2.1. Generality 
 
If law is to guide behaviour of its subjects through the dictates of its rules, it is trivially the 
case that there must be rules (laws) of some kind in the first place (Fuller 1969: 46). This is 
the first element of the principle of generality. Beyond that, the principle of generality has two 
aspects: on the one hand, it refers  (i) to the type of conduct regulated and, on the other hand, 
(ii) to the subjects of its rules. In the first case (generality of application) general norms are 
opposed to “situation-specific directives”, whereas in the second case (generality of 
addressees) to norms directed at particular individuals (Marmor 2004: 9–15; cfr. Hart 1958: 
623).  
(i) The generality of application requirement is crucial for law’s conduct-guiding function. 
Take, for example, the unlawful act of taking another man’s life. It would be absurd, and 
indeed impossible, for law to spell out in advance all manners in which it is prohibited to take 
another man’s life (by shooting him, poisoning him, splicing his head with an axe and so on). 
To avoid such a muddle, the law-maker instead adopts a general norm prohibiting murder 
which, in the most general sense possible, groups together in one disposition an ex ante 
unspecifiable number of acts by way of which another man’s life may be (unlawfully) 
taken.
253
 It is only through a system of norms that “relate cognate situations to one another” 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
law is unjust and does not benefit individuals. That is, argues Radbruch, “unless the conflict between statute and 
justice reaches such an intolerable degree that the statute, as ‘flawed law’, must yield to justice” (Radbruch 2006: 
7). Cfr. also Hart 1958: 617. 
253
 It is then up to the appropriate judicial body to determine whether the concrete action fits the general 
standard. 
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(Kramer 2007: 111), that legal authorities in a given system can effectively coordinate the 
activities of ordinary individuals as well as their own functioning.  
The level of the prescribed act-type’s abstraction (generality) is a matter of degree.254 While 
generality of application is a fundamental RoL desiderata, a norm that is too general may not 
be able to provide actual guidance (cfr. Marmor 2004: 12). If too great a level of generality 
becomes a systemic phenomenon, law’s principal function of guiding behaviour may become 
jeopardized.
255
 Thus, a certain level of content-specific directives is both desirable and 
necessary. However, it is not necessarily the best idea to expect of the legislator to provide 
such specific directives. Indeed, “there are good reasons ... why the legislatures are often 
justified in leaving the specification of their statutes to agencies and the courts” (Marmor 
2004: 14). Such reasons may have to do with the greater expertise of administrative agencies 
in dealing with highly specific issues or the assessment that courts are more equipped for 
dealing with rapid changes in a particular area of law or some other reason. Yet, seeing how 
content-specific (particular) norms “run counter to the basic idea of the rule of law” (Raz 
1979: 216), two conditions must be observed in such cases: first, the particular rules 
themselves should, to the greatest possible extent, follow the other Rule of Law desiderata; 
second, “particular laws of an ephemeral status [should be] enacted only within a framework 
set by general laws which are more durable and which impose limits on the unpredictability 
introduced by the particular orders” (Ibid.). 
(ii) Generality of addressees is likewise essential for law. Norms that are general in this sense 
address a certain ex ante undetermined set of individuals who share a particular pertinent 
feature.
256
 Any given legal system will surely contain both such general norms as well as 
norms that address particular individuals. However, in order to have a well-functioning legal 
system, most norms will have to be of the former, general kind. As Kramer points out, in large 
societies, attempting to address different sets of norms to every individual would be utterly 
impossible: “To gauge the permissibility or impermissibility of each person’s conduct, the 
officials responsible for policing would have to know the identity of everyone and the 
contents of the individualized set of norms to which each person is subject” (Kramer 2007: 
112).   
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 Often times, a distinction is made between rules and principles (or standards) in this regard. On the difference 
between rules and principles see, of course, Dworkin 1977. 
255
 The problem of leaving legal prescriptions too vague undermines its action-guiding function. See Marmor 
2004: 13f. I talk about the problem of vagueness in the context of the principle of congruence (below, 7.3). 
256
 Such a norm would have the following structure: “All X's with feature F [norm-subjects] ought to φ.” 
(Marmor 2004: 9). 
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In this regard, a problem may emerge whether a given norm addresses the “right” subjects. 
From this perspective, norms can either be over- or under-inclusive.
257
 Over- or under-
inclusiveness of a given norm with respect to its addressees can be 
determined by the substantive relevance of the feature F, by which the norm-subjects are 
identified, to the norm-act, φ, that the rule prescribes. The reasons for identifying the norm-
subjects by feature F must be derived from the reasons for prescribing the norm-act φ 
(Marmor 2004: 10). 
Generality as a RoL virtue is, on Marmor’s view, precisely this “essential connection between 
the reasons for prescribing the norm and the appropriate characterization of its norm-subjects” 
(Ibid). In what he calls the “generality-relevance principle”, Marmor holds that whatever the 
purpose of a given legal norm, it will be defeated if the relevant subjects are not addressed by 
the norm (see Marmor 2004: 10-11). Thus, for example, if a law is designed to regulate the 
speed of vehicles on a highway, its purpose would be defeated if the text of the law would be 
used only with respect to automobiles (their drivers) and not to motorcycles as well – the 
norm, in such a case, would be under-inclusive. 
Marmor argues that the generality-relevance principle is valuable beyond its pure action-
guiding function, for it also “serves as a safeguard against favoritism or partiality” (Marmor 
2004: 11). It does so by demanding that “the norm’s subjects be those who qualify as such 
only on the basis of the reasons for enacting the norm in the first place” (Ibid.). Therefore, the 
law should act on the basis of general (and not particular) reasons and should promote legal 
equality and fairness; it should evade too many individualised directives or any other kind of 
“generality-forsaking devices” (see Kramer 2007: 148).  
All this, however, does not mean that individual norms or differentiating (more or less 
favourable) treatment of individuals is never permitted. Individual(ized) norms are the 
(necessary) final step in the implementation of general laws by courts or administrative 
bodies: as Kelsen argues “the application of a general norm to a concrete case consists in the 
creation of an individual norm – in the ‘individualization’ or ‘concretization’ of a general 
norm” (Kelsen 2005: 230). As far as favoritism is concerned, Marmor notes that the 
generality principle, of itself, cannot prevent law from being biased or unjust towards certain 
categories of people. In the Apartheid South Africa, for instance, the law respected the 
generality-relevance principle, distinguishing groups of people on the basis of what was then 
and there considered pertinent reasons. On Marmor's view, the generality-relevance principle 
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 Cfr. Schauer 2002: 31–34. 
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requires only that “uneven results [be] justified by the right reasons which apply to the case” 
(Marmor 2004: 11). 
 
7.2.2. Publicity 
 
Law purports to guide human behaviour by providing its addressees with reasons for 
action.
258
 If it is to do so, one of the basic conditions is that its subjects are made aware of the 
norms – and consider their commands as reasons for action (cfr. Marmor 2004: 16). Hence, 
for law, as an action-guiding phenomenon, it is imperative that its prescriptions be made 
known to its addressees. 
With regard to the principle of publicity, three questions appear pertinent: (i) What exactly do 
we mean, when we say that legal prescriptions need to be made known to the addressees? (ii) 
To whom precisely must particular legal directives be made known? (iii) In what manner must 
these directives (laws) be communicated to their addressees? 
(i) As to the first question, I should first point that, like other RoL criteria, publicity is also a 
criterion whose fulfilment is “a matter of degree”. This means that it is not always the case 
that the more the prescriptions will be public (in the widest sense of the word), the better the 
legal system will be off. There may be good reasons why in a given context other interests or 
values, like for example national security, will outbalance the value of publicity of laws.
259
 In 
any case, the principle of publicity certainly does not require that we should “try to educate 
every citizen into the full meaning of every law that might be conceivably applied to him” 
(Fuller 1969: 49).  
Moving on to the merits of the first question, a first (perhaps trivial) response would be that 
publicity means the opposite of secrecy.
260
  Secret laws violate the requirement of publicity is 
an obvious way: if individuals are unaware of the existence of norms or of their content, they 
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 See Raz 1999: Ch. 1. 
259
 Cfr. Kutz 2009: 204–206; see also Kramer 2007: 153. 
260
 See Kutz 2009 who distinguishes between various types of secrecy in laws. First, he distinguishes between 
“secrecy as such” and “low-salience secrecy”. Whereas the former term denotes what we usually mean by 
secrecy, i.e. some information about the law that is kept unknown to us, the latter idea can be represented by the 
example of the habit emperor Caligula had in publishing his laws in very small print and hanging them so high 
up that no man could possibly have been able to read them. Thus, low-salience secrecy basically means that 
laws, while formally not secret, are promulgated in such a manner as to make their content practically 
unattainable. 
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cannot be guided in their actions by these norms – the norms, in other terms, do not provide 
reasons for action of these individuals.
261
 While the question of secret laws is very much an 
important issue, there is more involved in the publicity requirement than just the prohibition 
of secret laws. Clearly, laws must be public and made known to their addressees. But is it 
enough that each of the law’s addressees knows the law? Is, for example, this requirement met 
if a given regime sends each of its citizens a sealed envelope containing all the laws of the 
country? Or at least all the laws that refer to each of them personally? Celano, who invites us 
to think about such a possibility, argues that mere knowledge by each addressee of the laws 
does not fulfil the publicity requirement (see Celano 2013a: 123). Rather, he holds that the 
principle of publicity should be understood in terms of the relevant norms being a matter of 
common (or mutual) knowledge among its addressees. Something can be considered common 
knowledge among the members of a given group when each of them not only knows a 
particular piece of information, but also knows that each of the other members knows it as 
well.
262
  
Celano provides several reasons for why the requirement of publicity should be understood in 
these terms. Two of them seem particularly relevant for our purposes.
263
 The first has to do 
with law’s instrumental value in guiding human behaviour. Common knowledge of the law is 
necessary both in cases when the law requires the performance of joint actions by its 
addressees,
264
 as well as when no coordination is required in the performance. Even in the 
latter type of cases the effective performance of the prescribed action by the addressees will, 
in part, depend on their expectation that everyone else will also comply: “everybody 
complies, in part, because each has this set of expectations about the others’ expectations and 
conduct” (Celano 2013a: 132). Such expectations may be a matter of some subjective 
motivation or of objectively good reasons for compliance. Requirements such as paying taxes 
                                                          
261
 Kutz also distinguishes between mere secrecy, whereby “the fact of the secrecy is itself known, if not the 
content of the secret” (Kutz 2009: 206) and meta-secrecy, whereby “the fact of the secret is itself unknown” 
(Ibid.). In reference to these two types of secrecy, the author argues that the latter (meta-secrecy) represents a 
much graver danger to the Rule of Law. With regard to examples of mere secrets, i.e. covert operations, 
prosecutorial guidelines or secret budget items, he finds reasons that legitimize such lack of transparency. Given 
that their existence is not a matter of secret, but only their content, they nevertheless “provide a target of 
accountability for other political actors” (Kutz 2009: 206). 
262
 Or, to be more precise: p is common knowledge among the members of group G if and only if each one of the 
members of G (1) knows that p; (2) knows that each one of the members of G knows that p; (3) knows that each 
one of the members of G knows that each one of the members of G knows that p; and so on, ad infinitum. Celano 
2013a: 130. 
263
 For the other two see Celano 2013a: sects. 7 & 8. 
264
 By “joint act” Celano (2013a: 131) intends “an act by two or more people who must, in general, intentionally 
co-ordinate their separate actions in order to succeed” (the definition is taken from H.H. Clark & T.B. Carlson, 
1982: Speech Acts and Hearers’ Beliefs, in: Mutual Knowledge. Ed. N.V. Smith. London: Academic Press.) 
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or traffic regulations are, Celano notes, “such that it would make no sense to comply with 
them unless one expected most of the others to comply as well” (Celano 2013a: 132f). 
 
Beyond being instrumentally valuable, publicity also furthers other values, such as human 
dignity. If individuals are to act as autonomous agents, they need to be able to predict the 
responses of the system to their actions; but they must also be able to predict how the system 
will react to the actions of other addressees. Thus, “[c]ertainty of the relations between the 
law and its subjects requires that an individual can form reliable expectations about the 
behaviour of government’s officials and of the other citizens (and of government’s officials in 
relation to other citizens, and vice versa), in respect of existing legal standards” (Celano 
2013a: 134).
265
  
 
(ii) As to the second question: we have established at the outset that the principle of publicity 
does not require that all law be made public to all individuals within a given jurisdiction at all 
times.
266
 What, then, is required in terms of the extent of the individuals who need to be 
informed about the law and its specific commands? 
 
The simple answer would be that the law must be made known to those individuals “whose 
behavior it purports to regulate” (Marmor 2007: 17). That seems about right – but what does it 
actually mean? There are, I believe, two possible answers to this question. The first holds that 
the norm-addressees are the individuals who are covered by the norm’s antecedent. Take, for 
instance, the norms “No one ought to take another’s life” and “All university professors are 
required to wear a neck-tie in the classroom”. In both these cases the norm-addressees are all 
those individuals that fall within the conditions established by the norm’s antecedent: in the 
first case this is every person that falls under the jurisdiction of that particular legal order; and 
in the second case all those (presumably male) individuals who hold professorships at some 
university. According to this interpretation, then, it is the individuals that are determined by 
the norm itself as its subjects that need to be made aware of the relevant norms pertaining to 
their legal position.  
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 We should not forget that in this context it is equally important that individuals get to know both substantive 
as well as procedural rules that guide decision-making in their cases. Cfr. Waldron 2011.  
266
 On this, there seems to be wide agreement. Cfr. Fuller, Marmor, Kramer etc. 
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On the other hand, it is argued that all legal norms are, in the final instance, addressed to the 
law-applying organs – and so it is only them that should by necessity know the laws. 
According to Kelsen, “[o]nly the organ can, strictly speaking, ‘obey’ or ‘disobey’ the legal 
norm, by executing or not executing the stipulated sanction” (Kelsen 2006: 61).267 Note that if 
this is so, then, in principle, law’s secrecy in relation to common individuals, is compatible 
with the RoL.
268
  
 
This latter position seems untenable to me, and I argue that it is the first answer that should be 
accepted. I offer two short arguments in favour of this position. The first is of a purely 
practical nature: if law purports to be an effective system of conduct-guidance it makes no 
sense to reduce the knowledge of its directives to the limited class of officials charged with 
applying sanctions when the prescriptions are not obeyed by the relevant subjects. While in 
such a scenario a subject may even come to obey the law, such a result would necessarily be 
purely contingent. Keeping the citizens in the dark regarding their obligations (or at least 
allowing them to be) drastically reduces, if not nullifies, law’s capacity for being an efficient 
system of guiding human behaviour.  
The second argument goes beyond law’s instrumental value and holds that there is something 
(intrinsically) unjust in withholding knowledge of legal rules its addressees. As Celano puts it: 
“ceteris paribus, it is unjust to judge an agent blameworthy, and to punish them, for having 
violated a norm that has not been made known to them” (Celano 2013a: 127). Celano argues 
that this holds under the condition (proviso) that the relevant norm “be a norm that an agent 
can gain no knowledge of unless it is made known to them – i.e. a norm with which an agent 
cannot become acquainted with unless it is somehow communicated to them” (Ibid.). Positive 
law provisions are such norms. The reason for this, argues Celano (via Raz), is that punishing 
individuals for violations of law that was not made known to them represents a violation of 
their dignity – of their capacity for making autonomous, informed choices regarding their 
lives.
269
  
I would add that in virtue of protecting and promoting the dignity of its subjects, the 
obligation of the State to make laws known is proportional to the impact those laws have on 
the existing legal situation (status quo) of these individuals. If, for instance, a new law, or a 
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 Only if we introduce the notion of secondary norm can the subject of the norm obey or disobey it (see Kelsen 
2006: 61). 
268
 See also Kutz 2009:210. 
269
 See more in Raz 1979; cfr. also Kramer 2007; Waldron 2011. 
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change of an existing one, severely encroaches upon the existing rights of individuals, the 
State has a positive obligation to ensure the affected individuals are made aware of the 
relevant norms.
270
 
(iii) Finally, as to the manner of publication, this will inevitably vary from system to system 
and their recognized authoritative sources of law. Such differences, however, should not 
represent deviations from the fundamental requirement that law be presented in “authoritative 
written formulations” (see Kramer 2007: 116).271 Indeed, such written publications of laws 
are crucial for the functioning of any given legal system, for they allow “each person to 
acquire knowledge of law’s general demands and permissions and authorizations” (Ibid.). It is 
in this way that law can affect the practical reasoning of individuals. 
 
7.2.3. Prospectivity  
 
Prospectivity (non-retroactivity) is yet another essential quality that the law must possess if it 
is to effectively guide the actions of its addressees. Law’s directives, if they are to have any 
effect, should refer to the subjects’ future actions, not their past, concluded ones. A law that 
regulates such past actions is said to be retroactive. “[A] law is retroactive with respect to an 
act if and only if the law was created at a given time, the act was done before that time, and 
the law altered the legal status of that act” (Munzer 1977: 381).272  
The fundamental problem with retroactivity is that if the subjects in a particular legal system 
are uncertain as to the future legal status of their concluded actions, their capacity to decide in 
the present with regard to the future is, in an important way, limited. If a legal system is to 
fulfil its functions (both instrumental and ethical), laws should consist of mostly prospective 
rules.
273
 Mostly, I say, because in certain circumstances retroactive laws may not only be 
tolerated, but “may actually be essential to advance the cause of legality” (Fuller 1969: 53).  
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 In a similar manner, Fuller argued that the extent of publication of particular laws depends “upon how far the 
requirements of law depart from generally shared views of right and wrong” (Fuller 1969: 50). 
271
 Cfr. Celano 2013a: 143, who argues that an official public record of legislation should be available and its 
existence should be a matter of common knowledge among the citizens. 
272
 Munzer (1977: 383) in relation to the impact a retroactive law has on earlier acts in the period prior to its 
creation distinguishes between weak and strong retroactivity: while in the former case, “retroactive law changes 
the legal status of an earlier act only prospectively”, in the latter case “it also does so retroactively”. 
273
 This requirement holds both for rules governing the behaviour of ordinary individuals as well as the rules that 
authorize some to act as legal officials. See Kramer 2007: 119. 
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For one, it is beneficial to introduce retroactive laws in order to correct a previously made 
mistake.
274
 The typical example of such retroactive legislation found in the literature is when 
a series of marriage ceremonies, conducted without meeting certain technical requirements 
due to some technical flaw, are nevertheless ex post declared legally valid by way of a statute 
adopted at some later moment (see Fuller 1969: 53-4; Munzer 1977: 381). In such cases, says 
Fuller, though taken by itself, such a statute violates the principle of legality, given the 
circumstances, retroactivity “alleviates the effect of a previous failure to realize two other 
desiderata of legality: that the laws should be made known to those affected by them and that 
they should be capable of being obeyed” (Fuller 1969: 54).275 
Sometimes retroactivity is unavoidable in the context of judicial decision-making. Whenever 
judges overrule their decision in a previous similar case, they, in effect, argue that the law at 
the moment of their previous decision was not as they argued then, but as it is held to be now 
(Fuller 1969: 57).
276
 This, however, regards only civil cases. Retroactivity in criminal cases is 
an altogether different matter. The maxim Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege praevia is a 
standard of legality in practically any normal modern legal system. Accordingly, no law may 
be adopted creating a new type of criminal offense with retroactive effect. Such a law would 
be an utter failure from a functional perspective, for it could not possibly guide (future) 
conduct; but it would also fail from an ethical point of view, for it would represent “an affront 
to human dignity and freedom” (Marmor 2004: 20). “People”, argues Marmor, “deserve to be 
treated in a rational and dignified way, whereby the law must set its standards of conduct in 
advance, standards with which we can either choose to comply or willingly disobey” 
(Ibid.).
277
 The maxim also applies to cases of judicial interpretation of criminal statutes. If a 
court is faced with a relatively undetermined criminal norm, it should interpret it strictly so 
that “no one is to incur criminal penalties for conduct that was not determinately unlawful at 
the time of its occurrence” (Kramer 2007: 120).278  
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 Munzer argues that in such cases retroactive laws do not perform their general normative (action-guiding) 
function, but rather some other (social) function. See Munzer 1977: 392f. 
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 See criteria of publicity (9.1.2.), above, and practicability (9.1.6.), below. 
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 Distinguishing is another similar, though less direct manner of causing retroactive effects of the law. See 
Marmor 2004: 22. 
277
 In this point, the effects of retroactive rules come close to the effects of unpublished rules (see above, 7.2.2.). 
Here, again, we may invoke Celano (2013a: 126) who argues that it be unjust for an agent to be punished “for 
having acted against a standard of conduct ... that was unknown to them”. He calls this the ignorantia legis 
excusat principle. 
278
 Fuller nevertheless warns that complete determinacy even in criminal statutes is not always possible. It may 
happen, argues Fuller, “that a criminal statute may be so drawn that, though its meaning is reasonably plain in 
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Retroactive laws upset our understanding of how law should treat human beings. Such laws 
are not only unable to guide future behaviour of their subjects – more importantly, they 
“deprive a person of the opportunity to decide what to do with knowledge of the law that will 
be applied to him” (Munzer 1997: 391). In other words, retroactive laws frustrate legitimate 
expectations individuals have regarding the legal character and consequences of their acts 
(Ibid.; cfr. Raz 1979: 222). 
Like the other RoL desiderata, prospectivity of law is also only a threshold condition for 
having law in the first place, and as such does not require full realization. As argues Marmor 
(2004: 23): “People ought to have a certain range of legitimate expectations about the future 
normative environment, but they are not entitled to assume that nothing will change in the 
future.” Indeed, given the rapidly changing circumstances in our environment, a certain level 
of flexibility of law is legitimately permissible under this RoL criterion. 
 
7.2.4. Intell igibility 
 
If individuals are to accommodate their behaviour to the dictates of law, the latter should be 
such that that their addressees are able to understand them. For instance, if the national tax 
code is so vast and complex that most citizens need to hire professionals just to be able to turn 
in their mandatory tax return – then there is something obviously problematic with that law.279 
Likewise, if an administrative decision denying social welfare benefits is written in a highly 
technical legal language, incomprehensible to the addressee who is not a legal expert on the 
matter – how, then, if she cannot grasp the arguments offered in the decision, can she be 
expected to protect her right before the courts? 
It is often remarked that the language in which the law is expressed is excessively complex – 
some even speak of a special legal language, the so-called legalese. The legal language is said 
to be too technical, archaic and formal; that it uses too many impersonal and passive 
constructions; that it contains long and complex sentences, redundancies and so forth 
(Tiersma 2006). Such assessments are difficult to deny, and the consequences of law’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
nine cases out of ten, in the tenth case, where some special situation of facts arises, it may be so unclear as to 
give the particular defendant no real warning that what he was doing was criminal” (Fuller 1969: 58). 
279
 See, for instance, the US National Taxpayer Advocate’s annual report to Congress in which the problem of 
incomprehensive rules is listed as the number one problem of the US tax legislation: 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/reports/2016-annual-report-to-congress. 
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relative unintelligibility are seen both in its reduced efficiency as well as in the higher costs of 
legal transactions. Yet, here we are not interested in discussing the characteristics of law’s 
language as such nor in the consequences its complexity produces in everyday life. What I am 
interested in, however, is establishing whether these characteristics may – and if so, under 
what conditions – represent a violation of the clarity requirement. 
The answer to this question will, at least in part, depend on our answer to a prior question: 
namely, to whom should the law be made understandable in the first place. If this question 
sounds familiar, it is because it is essentially of the same kind as the one regarding the 
publicity of law (see above 7.2.2.). As you will see, the structure of the response will be 
analogue to the one offered there. 
Two answers appear possible. The first is offered by Kramer (2007). He argues that given the 
complexity of legal language, its clarity should not be measured “by reference to an ordinary 
person’s understanding and knowledge”, for that would “significantly overestimate the 
unclarity of the law in virtually every society” (Kramer 2007: 123). Kramer proposes that the 
true measure of law’s clarity should rather be “the competent legal expert’s comprehension” 
(Ibid). Given the abundance of technical expressions in the language of any system’s law, 
lawyers play a central role in its operation. It should therefore be their understanding of legal 
directives that matters: if they “would regard the wording of some statute or regulation as 
clear and precis, then the statute or regulation is squarely in compliance with Fuller’s fourth 
principle of legality” (Ibid).  
Kramer’s claims are based on an argument that I find unconvincing. Namely, he believes that 
because the legal language is necessarily highly complicated and because, as a consequence, 
trained lawyers are necessary if the law is to operate effectively, then it is imperative that 
individuals have widespread access to the services of legal experts (presumably attorneys). 
Rightly so, Kramer also believes that without such assistance, many legal directives could not 
provide proper guidance to its subjects. What is striking to my mind is, however, that Kramer 
believes such assistance by legal experts is readily available to citizens (see Kramer 2007: 
123).
280
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 Beyond this, I also do not agree that the legal language is necessarily so technical and complex. Sweden has 
arguably been the world’s leader in efforts to create legal regulation that is as clear and simple as possible. See, 
for instance, Ehrenberg-Sundin 2008. 
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To my mind this supposition is unsustainable both practically and conceptually. With the 
exception of criminal cases and such cases in which individuals are too impoverished to be 
able to afford an attorney, legal assistance by attorney is not a right effectively guaranteed to 
all. Most of the time, whenever individuals find themselves perplexed and unsure as to what 
the law requires of them, they will either have to pay high attorney fees or be left to their own 
devices. With the increasing pervasiveness of law into all spheres of individuals’ lives, it is 
practically impossible that individuals, whenever troubled as to what exactly are their legal 
obligations, would seek expert help. This is true even in cases that most profoundly impact 
one’s legal position. Thus, while widespread access to legal experts is certainly a desirable 
goal, it is certainly not the reality.  
From a conceptual point of view, I believe Marmor (2004) provides a more sustainable 
argument. Marmor’s proposal is simple: law’s directives should be understandable to those 
“who need to understand what the law is” (Marmor 2004: 26). As I see it, this basically means 
that if a particular law (legal directive) is addresses directly to legal experts (legal officials), 
then it is acceptable if the language in which these directives are expressed is imbued with a 
higher level of legalese. If, however, the law directly addresses and affects common 
individuals, it is only right that they be able to understand by themselves what it is that is 
required of them. Moreover, I would add a further requirement that the more a legal directive 
encroaches upon an individual’s existing legal condition (especially her acquired rights), the 
more it is important that the norm be made intelligible to that person.
281
 If what is at stake is a 
general norm, then the level of intelligibility should be set by reference to a standard like 
“comprehensible to an average person” (whatever average is supposed to mean); if, however, 
the norm in question is an individual one, then, the law-making body should in formulating 
such a norm take into consideration all of the personal conditions of the norm-addressees 
(including her age, level of education, medical condition, mastery of the language etc.). 
Clarity of law is also a “matter of degree”: a certain level of unclarity is inevitable – indeed, to 
a certain extent it is even necessary. A typical example of useful and necessarily unclear 
norms are legal standards, such as “in good faith” or “with due care” (cfr. Fuller 1969: 64). 
By employing such broad standards, the legislator allows the law-applying organs sufficient 
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 The “plain language movement” in law proposes that legal text should be presented in plain language where 
this means a “language and design that presents information to its intended readers in a way that allows them, 
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document” (Adler 2012: 68). Numerous benefits derive from such a use of plain language in law, namely it is 
more precise, contains fewer errors, is more persuasive and even more democratic. On the benefits of the use of 
plain language in law see Adler 2012: 71f.  
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flexibility to adapt the law to changing circumstances. What matters is that the general level 
of clarity of laws does not fall below a certain – necessarily difficult to specify – threshold. 
Laws that are so vague as to make their interpretation and application impossible can be said 
to constitute no law at all.
282
  
 
7.2.5. Consistency 
 
A further requirement of the RoL is that there be no inconsistencies in law. 
Usually, when we speak of inconsistencies between legal prescriptions, we refer to logical 
inconsistencies. By that, three things can be understood (Celano 2013b: 137): i) conflicts 
proper, where “one and the same action A is both obligatory and forbidden”; ii) 
contradictions, whereby “it is both obligatory that A and permitted that not A; or, A is both 
forbidden and permitted”; iii) “cases where two conditional directives, referring, respectively, 
to the condition that p and the condition that q, reconnect to these conditions either conflicting 
or contradictory deontic consequences ... and, further p and q jointly occur.” 
Prohibition of inconsistency is only a normative requirement, not a factual claim. Given the 
great diversity of agents that at different times create and modify the law, it would be 
illusionary to expect that the whole body of law at any given moment will, as a matter of fact, 
represent a coherent set (cfr. Marmor 2004: 27). It might even be that inconsistent 
prescriptions are purposefully placed in a legal system (cfr. Celano 2013b). Whatever the 
reason for their presence, logical inconsistencies are, as a matter of fact, found in legal 
systems (cfr. Guastini 2014: 225). But the RoL does not require that there be no such 
inconsistencies: what is required is only that “for the most part” they be avoided. The 
fulfilment of this desiderata, in other words, is also a matter of degree.  
When such antinomies do actually occur – or better, when they are discovered,283 different 
techniques exist for resolving them. The specific constellation of these techniques will depend 
on each particular legal system. Nevertheless, our legal culture has developed some typical 
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 It is not impossible to argue that a law that is so vague that it makes impossible to derive from it any kind of 
directive constitutes a secret law. This problem can be seen, for instance, in Art. 81/2 of the Aliens Act. See 
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 Antinomies are, we should be mindful, the result of interpretative processes. More on the relationship 
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instruments that are common to most contemporary legal systems. Thus, for example, if an 
antinomy occurs between norms from different sources of the same level (two different 
statutes, for example), the norm which was adopted at a later moment will defeat the norm 
that was adopted earlier in accordance with the principle lex posterior derogat legi priori. On 
the other hand, if the contradictory norms belong to different levels of normative sources (a 
constitutional and a statutory norm, for example), then the norm belonging to the superior 
source will be applied based on the principle lex superior derogat legi inferiori.
284
 
Not only logical inconsistencies can be found in legal systems. According to Marmor, there 
may also exist pragmatic and moral contradictions.
285
 As to the first, Marmor argues that 
“[t]he law is pragmatically incoherent when it actually promotes aims, policies, or patterns of 
conduct which practically conflict” (Marmor 2004: 28). This might be the case when one 
legal provision (or a statute) provides for a certain tax exemption, attempting in this way to 
encourage individuals to save their money whereas another part of the law provides for very 
low interest rates, dissuading in this way those same individuals from saving and rather 
encouraging them to spent their money (Ibid.). In such cases, the law, as a matter of fact, 
creates opposing incentives regarding human behaviour.
286
  
Finally, the law is morally incoherent when its “various prescriptions and their underlying 
justifications cannot be subsumed under one coherent moral theory” (Marmor 2004: 29). An 
example of such a theory is Dworkin’s thesis of “law as integrity”.287 Such theses are, 
however, both untenable and undesirable. They are untenable given the fact that each legal 
system is the result of a wide variety of different political and legal doctrines applied over 
time and conflicting among each other (Guastini 2014: 225). They are also undesirable 
because any such requirement would presuppose a “winner takes all” approach to the matter 
in what is otherwise an essentially liberal and pluralistic society (see Marmor 2004: 31). 
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 Here I use the terms inconsistency, contradiction and incoherence as mutually interchangeable. 
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 Marmor (2004: 29) argues that, in fact, “whether a pragmatic incoherence actually exists or not” is a 
controversial matter and will “largely depend on economic, social, or psychological theories which are 
notoriously inconclusive.” 
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7.2.6. Practicability 
 
Law’s action-guiding capacity is also fundamentally dependent on whether the prescriptions it 
furnishes can be complied with at all: in other words, if law is to succeed in its purpose, the 
performance of the required acts must be possible.
288
  
This requirement can be understood in two ways (Celano 2013b: 141): first, as a logical or 
conceptual possibility; second, as being “humanly possible”. In this second sense – the sense 
in which in my opinion the RoL’s requirement should be understood – the prescribed acts, “in 
addition to being logically or conceptually possible, and physically possible,” need to be such 
that their “performance is generally within the scope of the abilities and capacities of normal 
(whatever that may mean) human beings” (Ibid.).  
Note that here two different standards are proposed: that something be “physically” or 
“humanly” possible and, alternatively, that something be within the capacities of a “normal” 
human being. In line with my train of reasoning thus far, I would argue that yet another 
standard could be proposed: namely, that the required actions can be complied with by, or be 
possible for, their addressees specifically.  
This addressee-relative standard has, in my opinion, the quality of escaping problems that 
plague the other two proposed standards: on the one hand, it avoids the problem of defining 
what is at any given moment, humanly possible. While this standard is apparently universal, 
what is humanly possible is in fact “subject to historical change”, as Fuller himself 
acknowledged (Fuller 1969: 79). On the other hand, it also avoids the indeterminacy of the 
standard of a “normal” person: normality is highly context-dependent and thus varies in time 
and space as well as in relation to different subject-matters. The addressee-relative standard 
that I propose does not escape these problems altogether, but it is significantly more resistant 
to them. 
Regardless of the standard we adopt, we do find, in our legal systems, examples of norms that 
require the impossible. In such cases we must necessarily distinguish between impossibilities 
that are, in some way, legitimate and those that are not. A classic example of legitimate norms 
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requiring the impossible are the so-called “strict liability” clauses (in Civil Law context this 
form of liability is usually known as objective responsibility) which determine an individual’s 
responsibility for damages caused by his actions or omissions regardless of fault or intent.
289
 
The responsibility regarding the demolishing of an apartment building is one such example of 
strict liability by the operator in charge of the activity. The usual justification for the 
imposition of strict liability is that certain activities, as such, represent a greater risk for 
society and so, according to the economic principle, “the foreseeable social costs of an 
enterprise ought to be reflected in the private costs of conducting that enterprise” (Fuller 
1969: 75).  
On the other hand, illegitimate uses of impossible prescriptions can also be identified. Such is 
the case, for instance, when the legislator prescribes as obligatory a course of action that he 
well knows to be impossible. He does so in order to invoke in the subjects a feeling of guilt 
for failing to do that which was required (cfr. Celano 2013b: 142 ff.). 
Thus, while rare and justified deviations from the principle of compliability are tolerable and 
even necessary, such cases must remain exceptional if the law is to maintain its character as a 
legitimate action-guiding phenomenon. 
 
7.2.7. Constancy 
 
That law does not change too frequently in time is also a necessary condition for having a 
functional legal system.  
This standard is perhaps the most flexible of all the desiderata on our list. One cannot, with 
any precision, determine just how much change is still within the permissible limits. 
Basically, the only thing that this standard points out is that “gross deviations from it, in both 
directions, constitute a deficiency” (Marmor 2004: 34). If change is too rapid, the results will 
be very similar to those stemming from retroactivity: faced with constantly changing laws, 
individuals will be unable to adapt their behaviour to their requirements.
290
 Law will therefore 
lose its behaviour-guiding function. It will also reduce the individuals’ capacity for long-term 
planning and, consequently, encroach upon their character as autonomous agents (see Raz 
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1979: 214f.). On the other hand, if changes are too few, it might happen that the legal practice 
(the decisions of administrative agencies and judges) gradually alienates itself from the 
demands of written laws – thus bringing the legal system to violate the last of the eight Rule 
of Law desiderata (the requirement for congruence between prescribed rules and officials’ 
actions). 
 
 
7.3.  Congruence 
 
The formal characteristics of adopted law are but one part of the story. Whether or not law 
will succeed in its primary function and whether or not it will succeed in promoting further, 
non-functional values will ultimately depend on the way it is implemented in the legal 
practice by the officials of the system. The last criterion on Fuller’s list is the only one that 
regards not the manner in which laws should be made but rather the manner in which they 
should be applied. Unlike the other criteria, it looks at law not as a static phenomenon (the 
law on the books), but rather as a dynamic one (the law in action). And while it is not a purely 
formal criterion of legality, it is neither a clearly procedural one (cfr. Waldron 2011) – rather, 
it is a “bridge” criterion, connecting the two types. Regardless of how we categorize it, 
congruence is a crucial RoL criterion for it reminds us that if the law (on the books) is to 
successfully guide human behaviour, “its promulgated rules must be the rules which are 
actually applied to specific cases by the various law enforcement agencies” (Marmor 2004: 
34). 
There is also a very practical and immediate reason for a somewhat more extensive treatment 
of this criterion. It is true – as we will see in the next chapter – that the relevant legal acts in 
our example suffered many deficiencies from the perspective of the formal criteria of RoL. 
However, the key moment of the Erasure (in the narrow sense) regards specifically the acts of 
administrative officials in the application of the pertinent legislation and other rules. If we are 
fully to understand the Erasure, it is therefore imperative to grasp the mechanisms that 
rendered their actions possible.  
Before proceeding with the specific analysis of the ways in which the Erasure in the narrow 
sense was actually perpetrated (see below, 8.3.), it is crucial that we first obtain some basic 
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understanding on how administrative (bureaucratic) agencies function, i.e. how they are 
positioned in the system of a State’s separation of powers system; what is the nature of their 
procedures for implementing the law; what is the nature of their internal organization and the 
position of the individual official within them etc. 
In any modern legal system based on the system of separation of powers,
291
 the application of 
law is principally entrusted with the judiciary and the executive (public administration), 
whereas its creation is in the domain of the legislator.
292
 Notwithstanding the fact that they 
are both principally law-applying bodies, the judiciary and the public administration widely 
differ in many aspects: these include their relationship with the legislator, particularly the 
level of autonomy with respect to the latter; their organizational structure and internal rules 
and procedures; the type of legal acts they produce and so on. While the role of judges in our 
contemporary (constitutional) democracies, especially their law-making powers (or lack 
thereof) and the related questions on their democratic legitimacy, have been widely discussed 
in legal-philosophical literature, the same cannot be said of the State’s administrative officials 
and the nature of their work. 
The present discussion is not intended to fill this gap in any important way. Nevertheless, the 
role of administrative officials in applying the law and the system in which they operate is of 
central interest for the present work. In it, therefore, necessary that I pursue these questions 
further. I will, in particular, concentrate on two sets of questions: first, I will enquire into the 
relationship between the public administration and the legislator. Here, I shall presuppose that 
the administration’s primary goal is governance, i.e. the effective implementation of 
governmental policies and laws. To effectively pursue this goal, administrative bodies are 
often afforded broad discretionary powers. In pursuing the goals of governance, the public 
administration may come into conflict with the requirements of legality. It is therefore 
necessary to attempt to bring these two fundamental principles in balance. Secondly, the 
institutional design of administrative agencies and the principles informing it are in great part 
responsible for the particular way in which bureaucracies work. I will inquire into some of 
these particularities that greatly contribute to the stereotypical image of bureaucracy we have, 
such as the strict hierarchical structure and the meticulous division of labour, and relate these 
formal characteristics with their consequences on the psychological mind frame characteristic 
of bureaucrats.  
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To begin with, I should clarify what I mean by terms such as “administrative bodies”, “public 
administration”, “State bureaucracy” etc. I use these terms more or less interchangeably to 
refer to all those bodies (organs, agencies) of the executive branch of the government whose 
primary function is neither law-making nor dispute-resolution (see Guastini 2014: 330f). I say 
not primarily because administrative bodies often also perform both of these functions. Within 
these limits, the functions administrative bodies actually perform are extremely broad and 
include the use of public force (policing), the collection of taxes and spending of public 
money (for a variety of reasons), inspection of compliance with legislation by other public 
and private bodies and so forth (Guastini 2014: 331). The bodies charged with executing these 
functions go about different names, depending on the particular system of government, but 
they usually include governmental ministries and their subordinate organs, independent 
regulatory agencies, local administrative offices, the police and other law-enforcement 
agencies etc. When I use these notions, I do not, however, refer to the executive or the 
government stricto sensu, i.e. the political leadership of the executive branch of 
government.
293
  
Clearly, the exact role and position of the public administration within a particular system of 
government will depend on the contingencies thereof. We may expect, for instance, important 
differences in the position of administrative agencies within parliamentary and presidential 
systems of power.
294
 Generally speaking, however, the traditional doctrine of the separation of 
powers provides for the administration’s (the executive’s) specialized and more or less 
independent position in respect to the other two branches. In relation to the legislator, it is 
specialized in the sense that the latter does not (again, in general) have the power to adopt 
individual and concrete legal acts; and it is independent from the legislator in that it is not 
nominated or elected by it.
295
 On the other hand, administrative bodies are both logically and 
legally subordinated to the legislator. They are logically subordinated to the legislator because 
the exercise of their functions – indeed, their existence as such – presupposes the existence of 
laws that are to be implemented and thus presupposes the existence of the legislator.
296
 Their 
subordination is also legal as dictated by the principle of legality understood in the strict 
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sense.
297
 In virtue of this principle, the administrative bodies are prohibited from doing 
anything they are not explicitly authorized to do by the law (cfr. Corso 2014: 17). In other 
words, any authoritative act of administrative bodies presents two conditions of validity: first, 
it must be based upon a power-conferring norm and second, it must conform to norms 
regulating its form and content (Guastini 2014: 140f). The law may regulate the content of an 
(sub-statutory) act in at least two ways – or at two different levels of intensity. It can, on the 
one hand, (positively) bind it, prescribing the proper way of its creation and implementation; 
on the other hand, it can (negatively) limit it to certain confines. In the former case, the act 
authorized by the law can only take a certain, predetermined content. Such an approach is 
used by the legislator to bind the judicial bodies. In the latter case, however, the act authorized 
by the law can have different contents – the law-applying body has a certain margin of choice, 
i.e. a certain discretion as to how it will decide cases. Such an approach to regulation is used 
in respect to administrative bodies (Guastini 2016: 148f). 
With the growing complexities of everyday modern life brought about by technological 
advancement and the related expansion of their powers, especially in the fields of economy 
and welfare, States have increased their administrative apparatuses both in scope and in 
intensity. Not only has the normative production of statutory law increased manifold in the 
last century or so, but it now also regards ever more complex issues. Seeing how abstract and 
general legislation has of itself become an insufficient instrument of regulating social life, 
States have become increasingly reliant upon administrative bodies not only for the 
implementation of the vast body of law – they have also begun to delegate more and more 
law-making powers to them.
298
 The legislator is increasingly limited to furnishing principle 
guidelines and policy-aims (the framework), whereas the specialized and expert-laden 
agencies are charged with designing more specific rules in areas of their competence. Some 
have come to call this phenomenon “the rise of the administrative state” (cfr. Vile 1998: 399; 
Rosenbloom 1983: 225; Jacoby 1973).
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 In effect, the seizure of law-making and dispute-
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resolution powers by the administrative apparatus – the collapse of the government function 
into the administrative branch – has led many to speak of the development of a fourth branch 
of government (see Vile 1998: 400; Rosenbloom 1983: 225; cfr. Rodriguez 2008: 3).  
Such developments have naturally put a strain on the classic conception of power-separation 
as well as on the principle of legality. Yet, the above-described phenomenon is not the only 
way in which the administrative agencies have obtained (can obtain) greater substantive 
powers. Apart from explicit delegation in the sense just described, the legislator may also 
implicitly delegate law-making powers to the administrative bodies. It may do so by adopting 
legislation that is “vague and inconclusive, leaving the [agencies] little choice but to settle 
broad policy questions” (Richardson 1999: 311). There are many reasons why legislation is 
made vague:
300
 due to a genuine mistake of the legislator or as a result of a compromise 
between opposing forces in the process of adopting the law (see Richardson 1999: 312); but it 
can also be a technique of (deliberate) power-delegation. Whichever is the case, vague 
legislation contradicts the requirements of the RoL because it gives rise to possibilities of 
arbitrary government (Endicott 1999: 3-4).  
Whether it be due to an error or a deliberate decision on the part of the legislator, vagueness is 
an unavoidable element of law. Can we ever hope to appease this inherent vagueness in the 
language of law with the requirement for legality in the works of administrative agencies? 
Richardson, for one, argues that statutory vagueness, by itself, is not a threat to the RoL in this 
context. “The reason” for this, he says, “is that the administrative agencies of modern states 
have evolved ways of making policy that themselves satisfy the requirements of the rule of 
law” (1999: 314). Policy decisions in individual cases are made on the basis of administrative 
rules they themselves adopt. While some vagueness and ambiguity will inevitably remain 
even in such cases, Richardson nevertheless holds that such administrative rules comply with 
the RoL, especially when taken together with the general rules they are supposed to specify 
and interpret (Richardson 1999: 314-5).
301
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 “An expression is vague if there are borderline cases for its application” (Endicott 2000: 31). Following 
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Administrative agencies therefore needn’t necessarily be seen to function in opposition to the 
requirements of legality. Properly understood and regulated, their work may be seen as 
consistent with the legislative aims and as furthering the public interest. If administrative 
bodies stay within more or less broadly defined parameters in their implementation of laws in 
specific cases, they respect the principle of legality. It is only when – and if – the 
administration runs amok and the law they implement has little or nothing to do with the law 
adopted by the legislator, that we can say that “a weirdly bifurcated system of governance has 
supplanted any genuine legal system that may have existed” (Kramer 2007: 136). Such a 
system, then, is no longer compatible with the principle of congruence in particular and the 
principle of legality in general. 
Before I turn to the questions regarding the inner structure and workings of bureaucratic 
organizations, I should point that the above discussion is based on an important 
presupposition. Namely, that congruence between official action and formal rule is of (moral) 
value only insofar as we are working with a “benign” legal regime – that is, a regime that, on 
the whole, functions according to the principles of legality and respects the fundamental 
constitutional principles and rights of individuals. Kramer notes as much when he says that 
the principle of congruence only holds when “a liberal-democratic regime of law is 
flourishingly in existence” (Kramer 2007: 175). This might seem like an obvious point to 
make. Not so, if we consider that the exact same compliant attitude on the part of legal 
officials in a “wicked legal system” does not represent these officials’ allegiance to the rule of 
law – quite the opposite: it assist in promoting and perpetuating the evil planted in the law by 
the regime. Indeed, officials (both judges and administrative officials) in such legal systems 
play a key role in realizing the wicked goals of such regimes. A paradigmatic example 
confirming this claim is no doubt that of Nazi Germany.
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Let us now turn to the second issue of interest in this segment: namely, the particulars of the 
institutional design of the modern administrative apparatus and some of the typical 
psychological mind-patterns of administrative officials that develop as a result of operating 
daily in such an environment. While any serious study of the bureaucratic phenomenon 
requires skills in different fields of study such as sociology and psychology – skill which I do 
not possess –, I will here only present some of its key features. This should suffice for our 
discussion of the Erasure below (8.3.). 
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Although nearly a century has passed since its publication, Max Weber’s Economy and 
Society (1978) remains today the most authoritative source on the matter. While the scientific 
study of bureaucracy has since developed greatly, Weber’s ideal type of the bureaucratic 
institution still serves as the model and the basis for most investigations on the matter. 
According to Weber (1978: 956–958), several characteristics define a modern bureaucratic 
institution (system): 
i) the work of officials in a given organization – their official duties – is clearly 
devised into a system of “jurisdictional areas”, on the basis of fixed (and thus stable) 
rules;  
ii) there is in place a clear hierarchal system of super- and sub-ordination. Such a 
system, among others, allows for appeals against the decisions of lower officials – 
who conduct their decision-making duties individually (as monocratic organs);  
iii) the management of the work is based on a precise system of written documents and 
registers;  
iv) employment of officials presupposes specialized training in the area of their 
expertise; moreover, officials are employed exclusively based on merit;  
v) an official’s work is conducted on a full-time basis (as “a vocation”);  
vi) the internal management (organization) is guided by stable, more or less exhaustive 
and clear general rules. 
An administrative (bureaucratic) apparatus is, above all, a formalized and rationally organized 
social structure. Such a structure “involves clearly defined patterns of activity in which, 
ideally, every series of actions is functionally related to the purposes of the organization” 
(Merton 1940: 560). Any given bureaucratic institution is also composed of a series of 
hierarchically organized “offices” with clearly determined competences and responsibilities. 
Officials working in such offices act only “within the framework of preexisting rules of the 
organization” (Ibid.). Strict formal relations are prescribed both for the officials’ internal and 
external relations (the relations with their “clients”). 
Such an organization, it is claimed, has certain technical advantages over any other form of 
organization (Weber 1978: 973; also Jacoby 1973: 148). Among them are greater speed and 
precision of work, continuity, reduction of costs and so forth (Weber 1978: 973). But above 
all, according to Weber, bureaucratization – the expansion of the above-described model of 
organizing work – offers “the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of 
specializing administrative functions according to purely objective considerations” (Weber 
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1978: 975). An increasingly complicated and specialized world requires an equally growing 
number of specialized law-applying administrative agencies. These, in turn, require an 
increasing number of experts working within the administrative system.
303
  
As a formal and rationally organized system, the bureaucratic organization is itself a rule-
based system. Rules determine all aspects of the organization’s workings, from its internal 
structure and functional division of labour (jurisdiction), to the system of salaries and 
promotion of officials, the manner of communication within and without the organization and 
so forth. Such dependence on rules facilitates the officials’ work, for it “preclude[s] the 
necessity for the issuance of specific instructions for each specific case” (Merton 1940: 561); 
in consequence, efficiency as well as the predictability of administrative decision-making 
greatly increases. Predictability is particular important for the efficiency of economic and 
other activities which require stability and predictability of law for their functioning.
304
 It is 
also particularly apt for the modern democratic State, which has, as was already mentioned, 
greatly expanded the scope of its influence. Indeed, the bureaucratic organization with its 
reliance on (general) rules is a perfect means of organizing social activities on a large scale.  
A corollary of rule-reliance is “categorization”: the arrangement (the tendency to) of 
individual cases and problems to specific categories on the basis of determined criteria (see 
Merton 1940: 561). Categorization is an important rationalizing process through which the 
whole set of possible differences between individuals (individual cases) are reduced to only 
those that are (on the basis of rules and established practices) considered relevant for the 
resolution of the case. Individuals and their problems are therefore not seen in their entirety, 
but are rather abstracted to only legally relevant (pre-determined) characteristics. This process 
is, in part, what Weber had in mind when he argued that officials should discharge their duties 
“without regard to persons”. Reliance on general and abstract rules is intensely connected 
with and facilitates the respect of the principle of formal equality (equality before the law) 
(cfr. Weber 1978: 983). On this principle, officials must be blind to the particularities of 
individual cases, to specific circumstances of individuals they are confronted with: no 
personal characteristic of the individual that is not strictly relevant for the case at hand should 
have any bearing on the official decision. This is the positive side of rule-reliance. 
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 Cfr. Weber 1978: 974, regarding the importance of such a system for the capitalist market economy. 
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Such heavy reliance on rules, however, and the related de-personalization of the officials’ 
work, also has certain negative effects. This pre-established impersonal approach extends to 
both the clients of administrative agencies as well as to their employees, the officials 
themselves. The clients, for their part, are not treated as individuals “of flesh and blood”, with 
particular identities and stories of their own. They are, rather, turned into “cases” (cfr. 
Rosenbloom 1983: 220) – a typical bureaucratic category whereby “the peculiarities of 
individual cases are often ignored” (Merton 1940: 566).305 Such categorization, however, does 
not bode well with individuals convinced that the particularities of their problem demand 
exceptional treatment (Ibid.). In such cases, the otherwise welcomed impersonal and 
formalistic approach of the officials which, in theory, guarantees formal equality, clashes with 
cries for individualized, substantive justice (cfr. Weber 1978: 980).  
On the other hand, officials themselves are not spared the de-personalization process. Indeed, 
the whole of the organization of the work within an bureaucratic agency tends to eliminate 
any kind of personalized or individualized treatment of employees. Officials are usually 
employed on the basis of de-personalized standardized examinations to fill specific posts with 
a predetermined jurisdiction. Their working area is but a fraction of the entirety of the 
agency’s. Each individual official represents, as Weber put it vividly, “only a small cog in a 
ceaselessly moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march. 
The official is entrusted with specialized tasks, and normally the mechanism cannot be put 
into motion or arrested by him” (Weber 1978: 988). Strict division of labour, thus, inevitably 
results in the individual official’s inability – especially of those in the lower rungs of the 
administrative hierarchy – to “see the whole picture”, that is, to fully comprehend the entire 
work process from the initial contact with the client to the final decision. This “fragmentation 
of knowledge” (Luban, Strudler & Wasserman 1992)306 leads to a kind of alienation – the 
creating of a physical and emotional distance between the individual official and the destiny 
of each particular client/case which, in turn, results in de-responsabilization on the part of the 
official: the official, limited in understanding and in his powers, perceives himself as unable 
to affect the final decision, regardless of how he personally feels about the issue in general.
307
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 As Hummel explains, “[a] case is never a real person. A case is a series of characteristics abstracted form 
persons; it is a model of those characteristics that a potential client must display in order to qualify for the 
attention of a bureaucracy” (Hummel 2008: 28). 
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 The typical excuse of bureaucrats regarding the effects of their work, “I didn’t know!” can be named “the 
epistemological excuse”. See Luban, Strudler & Wasserman 1992: 2352. 
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 Cfr. Arendt (1970: 38-39), who argues that bureaucracy is the “rule of an intricate system of bureaus in which 
no men, neither one nor the best, neither few nor the many, can be held responsible” and is best called “rule by 
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With de-responsabilization comes the substitution of the feeling of moral responsibility (for 
the final outcome) with so-called “technical responsibility”.308 Technical responsibility is 
characterized by a “displacement of goals” (Merton 1940: 563) – virtues that otherwise would 
be seen as instrumental now become end values. “Technical responsibility”, says Bauman 
(1989: 101), “differs from moral responsibility in that it forgets that the action is a means to 
something other than itself”. Discipline and strict rule-following thus become ultimate ends. 
This displacement of goals may become so extreme as to represent a perversion of the original 
idea. In such cases it becomes “exaggerated to the point where primary concern with 
conformity to the rules interferes with the achievement of the purposes of the organization” 
(Merton 1940: 563).  
Finally, I should like to highlight one other important, indeed fundamental consequence of 
this shift in focus. Individuals working in large bureaucratic systems tend towards “total 
identification with the organization” (Bauman 1989: 21). Such identification involves the 
“readiness to obliterate one’s own separate identity and sacrifice one’s own interests” (Ibid.). 
In this regard, Weber noted that “[t]he honor of the civil servant is vested in his ability to 
execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed 
with his own conviction. This holds even if the order appears wrong to him and if, despite the 
civil servant’s remonstrances, the authority insists on the order” (Weber in: Gerth & Wright 
Mills 1946: 95). Thus, this particular context within which the single official is thrusted 
causes him to lose her “moral compass” and eventually allows for prudential considerations to 
suppress moral ones. Eventually, the official’s mindset submits to and blends with the 
organization’s policies. In such a context, the commands of the immediately superior officers 
become the primary, if not the only relevant source of the official’s actions. The constitution, 
statutes and other formally superior legal acts become of secondary relevance – the internal, 
oftentimes secret instructions, circulars, and other directions from the superior officials 
become the real basis of decision-making in the public administration. This phenomenon 
could be described as “an inversion in the sources of law” and is particularly relevant for 
explaining the Erasure. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Nobody”. According to Arendt, the “rule by Nobody” is the most tyrannical form of government “since there is 
no one left who could even be asked to answer for what is being done”. 
308
 As the famous Milgram experiments show, lack of information of the overall undertaking greatly facilitates 
misconduct by the officials. “The less individuals appreciate the consequences of their acts, the need to decide, 
and the available alternatives, the easier it will be for them to engage in destructive obedience. Milgram’s 
experiments suggest that the fragmentation of knowledge promotes organizational wrongdoing by blunting the 
edge of moral conflict” (Luban, Strudler & Wasserman 1992: 2362f). 
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CHAPTER 8. 
ERASURE AS AN AFFRONT  TO THE RULE OF LAW  
 
8.1.  Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter offered a detailed analysis of eight criteria of formal legality, 
understood as necessary qualities of law. Here, I apply these criteria to the case of Erasure, 
that is to the acts and activities of the Slovenian public authorities analysed in Part II. 
This chapter is divided in two sections: in the next one (8.2.), I analyse the first seven criteria, 
whereas in the final one (8.3.), I focus the criterion of congruence. 
 
 
8.2.  Erasure & the Rule of Law requirements  
8.2.1. Generality 
 
In its transitional provisions, the Aliens Act distinguished between two types of foreigners 
with permanent residence: (i) those who already had alien status under Yugoslav law (the so-
called “old foreigners” and (ii) those citizens of SFRY republics who did not obtain Slovenian 
citizenship. With regard to the former group, the law (Art. 82/3) provided that their residency 
permits remain valid ex lege in Slovenia, that is, even after the enforcement of this law 
(principle of continuity). On the other hand, with regard to the latter group, the same Act (Art. 
81/2) determined only that two months after the expiry of the deadline for applying for 
citizenship, the provisions of the Aliens Act will become applicable for this group of 
individuals. It said nothing as to the continued validity (or not) of their residence permits. 
The differentiated treatment of these “new” foreigners in relation to the “old” ones raises 
doubts as to its justification. Was such treatment in accordance with the above-presented 
principle of generality of addressees? Of course, we already know what the final 
consequences of this differentiation were: this latter group of individuals was ultimately 
erased. 
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I take as the basis of my answer the regulation regarding the legal position of “old foreigners” 
upon the enforcement of the Aliens Act. As said, the Act determined that permanent residency 
permits issued under the corresponding Yugoslav legislation continue to be valid after the 
adoption of the Aliens Act. The legislator’s decision to provide for the continued validity of 
these foreigners’ residency permits seems reasonable. I can find no compelling reason for a 
change in the legal status of these individuals in light of Slovenia’s independence. Things 
being so, and following our model of legal statuses, I argue that the access criteria determined 
for the acquisition (maintaining) of the permanent residency status according to this norm 
were: (i) being a foreigner (F) and (ii) having, at the time of the enactment of the Aliens Act, 
permanent residence in Slovenia (G). 
Assuming that the premises of my argument are correct, it would then be reasonable to expect 
that the same consequences would analogically apply also to this new group of foreigners, 
given that they also possessed both relevant characteristics, F and G, respectively.
309
 This, 
however, was not the case. The same legal consequences regarding the validity of their 
existing residency permits did not apply for the “new foreigners”. The differentiated treatment 
of this latter group with respect to the former can be put in the following terms: citizens of 
former SFRY republics with permanent residency in Slovenia at the time of its secession did 
possess the two relevant characteristics, F and G, but they were also marked by another, in the 
eyes of the legislator, crucial characteristic that warranted exceptional treatment. Namely, 
these individuals did not obtain the new Slovenian citizenship when given the opportunity. In 
more technical terms let us call this latter characteristic H. Hence, whereas the relevant norm 
regarding the legal situation of the “old foreigners” was something like “If F & G, then q” – 
where q stands for the ex lege prolongation of residency permits, then in the case of the 
Erased the norm  applicable to them was actually “If F & G & H, then z” – where z stands for 
the altogether unclear normative consequence of “applicability of the Aliens Act”.310 
On my view, this further characteristic H did not represent a justifiable ground for introducing 
an exception to the former norm. The differentiated treatment of the two groups of foreigners 
based on this additional feature had no rational basis and thus violated the principle of 
(formal) equal. Consequently, the generality of addressees principle was likewise violated. 
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 On the argument of analogy, in general, see Guastini 2011: 276ff and the bibliography cited there.  
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 See more on the problems of incomprehensiveness of this consequence below in 8.2.4. 
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In its first systemic decisions on the Erasure (U-I-284/94; see above, 5.3.), the Slovenian 
Constitutional Court considered the same question. It premised its decision on the 
constitutional principle of equality which is, according to the Court, “complied with only if in 
a statute identical actual states or identical legal positions are also regulated equally” (Par. 17 
of the decision). That means that whenever different regulation of identical (similar?) legal 
positions is provided for, the legislator needs to provide “real and sound reasons” for it – i.e. it 
must not act arbitrarily (Par. 17).  
The Court compared the legal position of individuals that were foreigners already prior to 
independence and of the citizens of other Yugoslav republics who did not opt for Slovenian 
citizenship (or whose applications were rejected). The Court noted how “all foreigners who 
had a permanent residence permit were allowed without any additional conditions to continue 
to reside in our country” (Par. 18), while the same statute did not regulate the legal position of 
the “new” foreigners, causing in this way “their legal position to be less favourable than that 
of foreigners who had that status already before gaining of independence of the Republic of 
Slovenia” (Par. 18).  
The Court established that “[a]s for the described differentiation no real and justified reason 
can be found which would justify that transitional legal position of citizens of other republics 
who had registered their permanent residence in the Republic of Slovenia and who legally 
resided in its territory should be essentially different from the legal position of those persons 
who had the status of foreigner with permanent residence already before the gaining of 
independence by Slovenia, the omission to regulate the position of the said persons also 
constitutes a violation of the principle of equality” (Par 18).311  
 
8.2.2. Publicity  
 
Violations of the publicity principle in the case of the Erasure can be loosely divided into two 
groups: (i) violations regarding the requirement of cognizability of legal directives; (ii) 
violations regarding the manner in which such directives ought to be published. Let us look at 
both in turn. 
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 See also the ECtHR’s decision with regard above in Part II, 5.3. 
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The first (i) group of violations is quite heterogeneous and regards different phases of the 
Erasure in the wider sense. We should begin by noting that even prior to the break-up of the 
SFRY, Yugoslav citizens in general were not well informed about the meaning (content, 
importance) of the various legal statuses, such as the republic citizenship, the personal ID 
number etc., nor did they know what their exact legal situation was in respect (see above, 
4.1.). Given the relatively quick pace of changes in the relevant legislation and its high 
complexity,
312
 it is safe to argue that the government failed in its duty to educate the people 
about these questions of fundamental importance for their legal position.
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After gaining independence, the Slovenian authorities did notify the public-at-large and its 
non-Slovenian residents about the conditions for obtaining the new Slovenian citizenship. 
Besides publishing the relevant legislation (the Citizenship Act) in the State Official Gazette, 
the information was also disseminated via public media (newspapers, TV programmes etc.). 
Kogovšek Šalamon notes that this information “reached quite a large number of people, given 
that the majority of those who were entitled to apply for citizenship under Article 40 
submitted applications” (Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 117).  
While it may be argued that the State did fulfil its duty to inform the relevant group of the 
possibilities of obtaining the new Slovenian citizenship, we should not forget that these 
individuals were under no obligation to acquire it – or at least this obligation was nowhere 
stated. This is especially important, since at no point in time were these individuals informed 
of the possible consequences their legal positions may suffer should they forego this 
possibility. If we take seriously the idea that the State’s obligation to inform the affected 
individuals of the impending changes for their legal position should be proportional to their 
impact, then it can be said that the State in this particular instance failed in its task. Given the 
gravity of the changes that followed, the State should actually have gone out of its way to 
inform the soon-to-be Erased of the consequences they will incur should they choose not to 
apply for citizenship.  
In its defence, the State argued that it actually had informed individuals of the necessity to 
“fix their status” by sending them personal invitations to appear before the local 
administrative office to sort the problems out. These letters, however, were sent only after 26 
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 See above, Chapter 4.1. 
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 Cfr Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 42-44. Kogovšek Šalamon notes that this lack of information had particularly 
dire consequences on the situation of lower working class immigrants from other republics of the former 
Yugoslavia. 
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February 1992, that is after the Erasure (in the narrow sense) had already taken place. As 
Kogovšek Šalamon shows, these invitations “were a decoy, a deceitful tactic used by 
administrative employees to attract people to the local office, ostensibly to ‘resolve their 
status’” (2016: 118). Those who actually responded, suffered the exact opposite consequences 
of what they could have expected: when they presented their (valid) personal documents to 
the public officials they took them and had them destroyed. Others, who either did not receive 
an invitation or refused to answer it, found out that they were erased often by chance or when 
for some other reason they to face the same public administrative officials.
314
  
All things considered, the manner in which the Erasure was executed, particularly the lack of 
communication by the authorities, clearly strikes at the core of the publicity requirement. In 
particular, the manner in which the authorities acted influenced certain aspects of the common 
knowledge requirement. The issue is best described by Zorn (Zorn 2003: 98): 
First and foremost, the erasure affected people individually. It tossed them into an unbearable 
and vulnerable situation: they were not informed that they were erased from the RPR [Registry 
of Permanent Residence]; in other words, they did not receive any official notification of this 
radical move. They learned about it by accident of when suddenly faced with the repercussions 
of this measure ... Thanks to such a method of ‘informing,’ every particular case became an 
individual matter. They were thrust into isolation and the responsibility for what happened 
was placed on them.” 
The opaque manner in which the authorities acted and “processed” cases, created in the 
affected individuals a feeling that somehow their cases were particular, accidental. The lack of 
understanding (common knowledge) that the matter was actually a systemic and massive 
occurrence, deprived the affected individuals from acting as a group, rather than as scattered, 
powerless individuals, and consequently made collective action impossible. In this, their 
capacity to act as autonomous agents on the basis of sufficient information for making 
fundamental life decisions (i.e. their dignity) was profoundly violated. As Zorn notes, it was 
only after some of them were able to obtain some kind of residency permit and were able to 
set up an informal social network that the affected individuals could “appear in the public as a 
group (The Erased) and as such begin to fight for their rights” (Zorn 2003: 99). 
The second (ii) group of violations refers particularly to the manner in which the relevant 
norms were published. Here, what interests us is not the Citizenship Act as before but rather 
the Aliens Act – the statute, as you will remember, that was the basis for the Erasure. In this 
regard, the publicity principle was twice violated. 
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219 
 
First, in a somewhat broader sense, the principle was violated by the language of the Aliens 
Act insofar as the critical provision (Art. 81, Par. 2) was so indeterminate that it can be argued 
– albeit, I will admit, somewhat stretched –  that this indeterminacy constituted a type of 
secrecy of the law. A total inability of knowing the consequences attached to a particular legal 
situation indeed closely approaches secrecy. 
However, the key problem from the point of view of the publicity principle was the fact that 
the Ministry’s “in-house” instructions on how to enforce the Aliens Act and other newly 
adopted legislation were not published in any official publication – that, in other words, they 
were secret. Their existence and content was made known only to the public officials who 
were charged with implementing them.
315
 We needn’t waste too much time arguing how 
official actions against citizens that are not based on publicly accessible acts is a clear 
violation of the principle of legality. This violation was only exacerbated in the case of the 
Erasure by the magnitude and the intensity of the violation. Indeed, as Rangelov notes (2014: 
106), “the fact that the measure was implemented by executive decision and shrouded in 
secrecy ... exacerbated the vulnerability of the ‘erased,’ exposing them to arbitrariness and 
abuse of power by agents of the state”. Preventing the Erased from exercising any autonomy 
of action with respect to the activities of the State in their confront, the State, it can be argued, 
also violated their dignity qua capacity to make important life decisions of their own free will. 
 
8.2.3. Prospectivity 
 
The Erasure in the wider sense manifests two types of problems regarding retroactivity. One 
(i) is seen in the use of retroactivity for the redress of past wrongs, while the other (ii) in the 
use of “quasi” retroactivity applied in the prescription of citizenship-acquisition criteria. Let 
us begin with the latter (ii) aspect, which is arguably the more problematic of the two. 
The original text of the Citizenship Act set up a six-month deadline for acquiring citizenship 
on the basis of Art. 40 (for citizens of other SFRY republics residing in Slovenia, that is). Just 
days prior to the expiration of this deadline, the same Article was amended with the addition 
of two new paragraphs: both provided for exceptions regarding the citizenship acquisition 
conditions by determining that an individual who otherwise fulfilled the prescribed conditions 
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 In Kutz's terminology they represented a meta-secret. See Kutz 2009: 206. 
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but was, after 26 June 1991 convicted of particular criminal acts relative to public order, 
security or defence of the country, could not obtain the Slovenian citizenship. 
The underlying reasons for the adoption of these amendments needn’t concern us too much.316 
Suffice it to say that these amendments provided the basis for rejecting several hundred 
applications – which meant that these individuals would consequently be erased.317 What is, 
however, of interest here, is the retroactive effect of these amendments.  
The problematic situations can be represented in the following manner: 
Assume that T0 is the time at which the relevant Act came into force. Thus, at T0 the 
acquisition criteria were, let’s say, Z1. Assume that Tx is the time at which the six-month 
application period came to an end. Assume, moreover, that T1 marks the moment the 
amendments of the Act were enforced – thus, the valid law from then on was no longer Z1 but 
Z2. The problem we are concerned with here regards all those applications that were filed 
between T0 and T1 – that is, at the time when Z1 was valid law – but were not resolved before 
T1, that is, not before Z2 became valid law.
318
 In these cases, individuals that filed their 
applications under one set of rules found their applications being evaluated by another – under 
conditions they had no way of predicting at the time they filed their application.  
At this time, we should introduce a distinction between what could be called “true 
retroactivity” and “quasi-retroactivity”. The former can be defined in terms provided for in 
the previous chapter (see 7.2.3): a law is retroactive with respect to an act if and only if the 
law was created at a given time, the act was done before that time, and the law altered the 
legal status of that act. Quasi retroactivity, on the other hand, “occurs when a new rule of law 
is applied to an act or transaction in the process of completion” (Hartley 2014: 162-3).  
Only the latter type of retroactivity is relevant for the case at hand. The underlying problem in 
this matter is that citizenship is not (yet) recognized as an enforceable right, neither in 
domestic nor in international law (cfr. Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 71). Hence, in Slovenia, 
citizenship-rights are only bestowed upon an individual on the day the citizenship certificate 
                                                          
316
 Jelka Zorn has argued that the introduction of these two paragraphs allowed “the executive authority to 
arbitrarily rule on cases, thus deepening the ethnic and moralistic dimension of Slovene citizenship”. In this way, 
she goes on, “[t]hey created formal inequality between ‘Slovenes’ and ‘non-Slovenes’ on the basis of moral 
reference” (Zorn 2007: 62).  Cfr. Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 67–77. 
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 It is said that 449 individuals’ applications for citizenship were denied on this basis. Cfr. Kogovšek Šalamon 
2016: 77. 
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 The problem, of course, did not regard every applicant that fell within the relevant timeframe. Rather, it 
regarded only those who meet the additional criteria set in the amendments. 
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is issued to her – and not already on the date when she filed her application. “Theoretically”, 
says Kogovšek Šalamon (2016: 72), “the requirements for obtaining citizenship rights could 
therefore change countless times during the period between the application date and the date 
of issuing a citizenship certificate”. On the other hand, it is undeniable that an individual who 
had filed an application for citizenship at the time (T1) when one set of criteria was prescribed 
(Z1) had reasonable (justified) expectations that her application will be evaluated on the basis 
of precisely those criteria. Should she be able to predict that some other set of criteria will be 
applied later on, she might have decided otherwise. Thus, we may conclude that the quasi-
retroactive provisions of the Citizenship Act violated the (prohibition of) retroactivity 
criterion in that they encroached upon the individuals’ capacity to decide for themselves a 
course of action based on their knowledge of the applicable law. In doing so, the authorities 
also infringed these individuals’ respective dignity. 
The second (ii) point regarding the retroactivity in the case is a more positive one. Having 
declared the Erasure unconstitutional for the second time, the Constitutional Court in 2003 
(see above, 5.3.), on its own established that the permanent residence status of the erased 
individuals is ex tunc restored to them. On this basis it further ordered the Ministry of the 
Interior to issue, by official duty, these individuals with supplementary decisions on the 
establishment of their permanent residence in the Republic of Slovenia from 26 February 
1992 onwards – in other words, ex tunc or retroactively. 
 
8.2.4. Intell igibility 
 
In relation to the Erasure, three instances in which poor intelligibility of legal prescriptions 
played an important role can be identified. 
(i) First of all, the relevant rules regarding citizenship, residency and other personal conditions 
in the old SFRY were not at all clear and known to affected individuals. They were thus often 
unaware of their legal statuses in relation to particular republics and did not know whether 
and where such information might even be available. Public records of different republics 
containing information on (republic) citizenship, permanent or temporary residence, personal 
ID numbers etc. were not synchronized amongst each other, nor were the information they 
contained always correct (cfr. Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 40–46). Given the great relevance of 
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such information for each individual in general, and especially in times of transition 
(dissolution of one State and creation of new ones in its stead), I conclude that the States (both 
the SFRY and later Slovenia) did not do enough for making these information known to their 
citizens; equally so, the available information were often false, unintelligible, contradictory 
etc. Hence, the requirement of intelligibility can be said to have been violated. 
(ii) The second problem regards the Citizenship Act and more precisely, the conditions for the 
acquisition of citizenship for citizens of former SFRY republics. Art. 40 of the Citizenship 
Act determined that citizens of other SFRY republics who on the day of the plebiscite had 
their permanent residence in Slovenia and actually lived there, could obtain Slovenian 
citizenship should they submit their application within the determined period of time. In order 
to prove their citizenship status, applicants were required to provide as proof their birth 
certificates. This requirement, however, was nowhere indicated in Art. 40 – it was prescribed 
subsequently (and we could argue arbitrarily) by the administrative authorities.
319
 By laying 
down this requirement, the officials imposed undue burden upon the applicants, for the 
relevant information should have been available to the authorities from public records. If for 
some reason the applicant was unable to provide her birth certificate – and thus provide proof 
of citizenship –, her application was denied and she was later erased (Kogovšek Šalamon 
2016: 58). 
(iii) Finally, the gravest violation of the clarity condition can be witnessed on the example of 
the Aliens Act. Here, what has already been said on the matter in reference to the publicity 
condition (8.2.2.) likewise holds. Namely, the norm-consequent of Art. 81/2 was such that it 
made it impossible for the affected individuals to understand its content. It was, therefore, as 
such in violation of the clarity condition. However, I have also argued that whenever a norm 
has a particularly strong effect upon its addressees, that is, whenever it profoundly affects 
their existing legal position (especially by depriving them of obtained rights), the law-maker 
should do whatever is in its powers to make the norm intelligible to its specific addressees. 
The specific addressees of these norms were, you will remember, grosso modo poorly 
educated individuals, with poor command of the Slovenian language (cfr. Kogovšek Šalamon 
2016: 82). The legislator, well aware of these facts, ought to have done more to spell out the 
relevant norms in terms understandable to these particular individuals. Its failure to do so 
constituted a violation of the condition of clarity. 
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8.2.5. Consistency 
 
Little can be said regarding the questions of logical and moral inconsistencies in the case of 
the Erased. There is no evidence that the relevant norms of the case would be either 
conflicting or contradictory.  
Something, however, can be said on pragmatic inconsistencies. Indeed, a stark contrast can be 
identified between the “spirit” of the pre-Independence acts, such as the Statement on Good 
Intentions, and the various activities (political and legal in nature) of the Slovenian authorities 
in the same period. With the Statement on Good Intentions, the Slovenian authorities in statu 
nascendi proclaimed that they would guarantee to all permanent residents the right to obtain 
Slovenian citizenship, should they so desire. The authorities later made good on the promise 
by establishing a six-month period in which these individuals were able to obtain the 
citizenship under relatively undemanding conditions. All this would suggest that the 
authorities favoured the inclusion of non-Slovene residents into the newly-established 
Slovenian body politic.
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On the other hand, however, there is ample evidence to suggest that all along the authorities 
held hostile feelings towards the group of people in question; I have even claimed that there 
was an intention to disenfranchise the entire population that ethnically originated from the 
other SFRY republics (see above, 5.1). You will remember that I have described the 
Slovenian state as an ethno-democracy. As Kogovšek Šalamon argues: “formal and legal 
preparations to establish the nation-state rested on the nationalist ideology which pervaded the 
entire political apparatus of the time. It was the main driving force behind the ethnic 
homogenisation, foundation, and later the existence of a new state” (Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 
138). Rangelov describes the resulting tension well. He says: 
The contradictory character of Slovenia’s citizenship policy in the wake of independence is as 
apparent as it is puzzling. On the one hand, the vast majority of permanent residents who were ethnic 
non-Slovenes were able to acquire Slovenian citizenship on the basis of the publicly adopted 
legislation and the procedures put in place for its implementation. On the other hand, the same body of 
law opened up the possibility for serious abuses and discriminatory policies adopted by executive 
decision and pursued covertly by the agents of the state. These contradictions can be 
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 The incorporation of a large part of the ethnic non-Slovenes into the Slovenian body politic was in large part a 
consequence of several different pressures, both from within the state and from the international community. See 
more above in 5.1. 
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comprehended as expressing a foundational tension between the rule of law and ethnic 
citizenship, each associated with powerful pressures that were set in motion at the time of gaining 
independence, and continued to pull in opposite directions throughout the period of transition 
(2014: 112). 
 
Pragmatic inconsistencies were therefore embedded into the Slovenian legal system. Its laws, 
on the one hand, promoted integration of the ethnic non-Slovenes into its body politic while, 
on the other hand, they were design to allow for wide-scale exclusion of these same 
individuals. 
 
8.2.6. Practicability 
 
Those applying for Slovenian citizenship often found it impossible to fulfil the requirements 
set out in the Citizenship Act. Some of its specific requirements, for instance, the need to 
present a birth certificate in order to prove one’s citizenship of another SFRY republic, often 
proved practically impossible to respect, either because of the drastically changed conditions 
in those republics caused by the war (cfr. Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 112) or the inadequately 
maintained official records in those republics. 
In its first systemic decision on the Erasure (decision U-I-284/94), the Constitutional Court 
decided that the Aliens Act was unconstitutional “for failing to determine the conditions for 
the acquisition of permanent residence permit[s] by persons referred to in paragraph 2 of 
article 81 upon the expiry of the time period during which they had the possibility to apply for 
citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia, if they did not do so, or after the date of finality of the 
decision on refusal to grant citizenship”. The legislator was ordered to eliminate this 
unconstitutionality within six months of the publication of that decision.  
The decision was implemented by the adoption of the Legal Status Act that same year (see 
above, 5.3). One of the requirements for the “legalization” of the status of the erased 
individuals (for obtaining a retroactively valid permanent residence permit) was that of actual 
or continuous residence in Slovenia from the date of the referendum until present time. 
Besides the question of the reasonableness and legitimacy of introducing this requirement 
(again, see above, 5.3), what is relevant for us in this respect, is not so much the fact that this 
condition was, in a way, enforced only retroactively (the Erased had to prove that they 
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actually lived in Slovenia over a long period of time without being able beforehand to foresee 
that such a requirement will be made at a later date); rather it is that the requirement itself 
was, for many of the Erased, practically impossible to fulfil since the Erasure caused many of 
them to leave the country (either voluntarily or not). Thus, for many of the affected, fulfilling 
this particular requirement proved impossible to achieve and, indeed, the failure to fulfil it 
was one of the most common reasons for the rejection of applications (see Kogovšek Šalamon 
2016: 230).  
Moreover, the same statute provided for a three-month period for submitting the application. 
Given the circumstances in which the erased individuals found themselves in, we may 
reasonably argue that the provided timeframe was too short. Indeed, the Constitutional Court 
(decision U-I-246/02, from 3 April 2003) was of the same opinion when it held that  
the legislature should also have considered personal and other circumstances that could 
impede the timely filing of an application by entitled persons ... It should have considered that 
due to the fact that their legal position was unregulated for a long period of time, citizens of 
other Republics could not have expected that such a short time limit would be prescribed for 
the regulation of their status. In particular, they could not have envisaged that not applying 
within such a short period would result in a loss of the right to acquire a permit for permanent 
residence (Par. 34). 
 
8.2.7. Constancy 
 
Given the relatively short amount of time that the authorities had in order to establish a 
functioning legal system, the Constitutional Act (Art. 4/1) established that until the adoption 
of new Slovenian legislation, federal SFRY laws that had been valid in Slovenia until 
independence continue to be valid, insofar as they do not contradict the new Slovenian legal 
order. Hence, continuity was the primary principle in this respect.  
Nevertheless, numerous new fundamental laws were adopted in a short period of time. While 
one might consider this to be in contradiction of the constancy requirement, I would not be 
willing to support such a claim. Given the radical systemic changes, large legislative changes 
were to be expected well in advance. Hence, I do not believe that the principle of constancy 
was violated in this case. 
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8.3. Congruence 
 
The Erasure got its name from the physical act of the cancellation of more than 25,000 
individuals from the registries of permanent residents, committed by the local administrative 
officials working for the Slovenian government. The Erasure, then, is at its core a 
phenomenon that regards the workings of the State’s bureaucratic machinery. 
The theoretical discussion in the previous chapter provided us with the foundations for 
understanding how it was possible that the Erasure in the narrow sense occurred – how, in 
other words, it was possible for the numerous State public officials to act the way they did in 
this concrete case. 
Above, I had argued that congruence between the laws adopted by the legislator and the law 
that is eventually enforced by the public officials is of moral value only if we are dealing with 
a legal system that is on the whole a just one.  
Here, two different situations should immediately be distinguished. It is one thing if we are 
dealing with a “wicked legal system” – a regime in which the law is on the whole morally 
corrupt
321
 and in the service of deplorable political (ideological) aims. In such a context, full 
compliance of legal officials with the government authorities and faithful implementation of 
the law will, in all probability, have disastrous results. The experience of the Nazi legal 
system which relied heavily on the judiciary and administrative apparatus for the 
implementation of its anti-Semitic policies is sufficiently telling (cfr. Arendt 2006; Dyzenhaus 
1991; Fraenkl 2010; Rüthers 2016). In such cases, protection of “true” legality and 
fundamental human rights seem to require the exact opposite course of action from the 
officials: namely, one of defiance and violation of the principle of congruence. Indeed, 
Kramer argues in this regard that “promptings that divert officials from the strict enforcement 
of those laws – even if they are ignoble promptings – may be morally better than a posture of 
steadfast dedication to such enforcement” (Kramer 2007: 174; cfr. also Murphy 2005: 251). 
Kramer’s argument is basically that in an unjust legal system, the officials’ lack of 
subordination and unwillingness to implement the corrupt law is actually the morally correct 
way to proceed, since in this way the morally wicked intentions present in the law may, at 
least to some extent, be deflected in practice. 
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and intuitive idea of justice. 
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It is quite another thing, however, if we faced with a legal system whose overall wickedness 
(moral corruption) we are not so easily ready to admit. I am thinking about a legal system 
which arguably to a certain extent violates one or more conditions of formal legality but 
whose legitimacy as a system of law as such cannot, for this reason alone, be rejected.  
This, I submit, was the situation we encountered in Slovenia in 1992. Let us quickly recall 
some key facts about the Erasure that will allow us to develop our discussion. The reason for 
an accentuated role of the administration in the Erasure story can be found in the nature of 
Article 81/2 of the Aliens Act – the legal provision that made the Erasure possible. A 
purposefully created legal gap that made it impossible for the administrative organs to base 
their actions directly on the Aliens Act effectively enabled the transfer of the power to mend 
this gap, i.e. to provide substance to the aforementioned provision, to the executive branch of 
government. 
On this basis, the Ministry of the Interior prepared a series of “in-house” or internal 
Instructions, directed at all local administrative units around the country, on how to interpret 
and implement the said provision – as well as instructions regarding the implementation of 
other relevant legislation (see above, 5.2.). In these Instructions, the administrative officials 
were given explicit orders on what they are to do with the (residency) records in reference to 
the individuals covered by Art. 81/2. 
My wish here is to understand how it was possible that the administrative officials so 
rigorously followed and executed the Ministry’s directives; how did they not raise any doubts 
as to the appropriateness or, for that matter, legality of the interpretation offered by the 
Ministry? In the following, I will base my reflections on the theoretical basis introduced in the 
previous chapter. The gist of those arguments can be found in Zygmund Bauman’s analysis of 
the conditions that allowed for the Holocaust to be perpetrated. Seeing how other analyses of 
the Erasure have in the past been based on Bauman’s discussion, I will here follow suit (e.g. 
Zorn 2003 & 2005; Kogovšek Šalamon 2016).  
Bauman, speaking more generally about the perpetrators of mass killings in the Second World 
War, argued that these atrocities committed by the Nazi regime were only possible on three 
conditions:
322
 (i) that the violence had to be authorized by superior officials; (ii) that the work 
(bureaucratic and other activities) had to be routinized by rule-based practices that also 
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 Actually, in presenting these conditions, Bauman follows the work of Herbert C. Kelman, Violence without 
Moral Restraint, in. Journal of Social Issues 29 (1973): 29–61. 
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specify the role of each individual in the process; finally, (iii) that the victims of violence had 
to be dehumanized (Bauman 1989: 21). Even a rapid overview suffices to see that all three 
conditions were indeed met in the Erasure. 
As to the first (i) condition, we have seen that the Erasure was authorized by the Ministry of 
the Interior, with a tacit agreement of the Government and the legislator. It was ordered, 
moreover, via internal (i.e. secret) Instructions. You will remember that in highly hierarchical 
bureaucratic organizations such internal, sub-statutory acts often assume the role of supreme 
normative authority: in exceptional circumstances superior law (statuses, the constitution 
etc.), especially when so vague as in this case, is disregarded and executive decrees take their 
place.
323
 Such decrees are also more fitted for the administrative actions: they are much more 
clear and precise as general and abstract laws and thus allow for a more efficient 
implementation.  
Several points should be made as far as the second (ii) condition is concerned. Routinization, 
as Bauman reminds us, is achieved through a precise division of labour and attribution to each 
individual involved in the process of as precise competences as possible. Apart from the pre-
established internal division of labour within the administrative units and clearly specified 
orders that we already discussed, it should be stressed that the Erasure in the wider sense was 
effectuated by an efficient (though not always and not necessarily directly coordinated) 
division of labour. Kogovšek Šalamon describes this process in the case of the Erasure. She 
succinctly says: “employees dealing directly with foreigners invalidated their personal 
documents, the courts issued rulings on expulsions, the employees working for the Ministry 
of Defence confiscated Yugoslav People’s Army-owned apartments, and the police stopped 
people on the streets and transported them to the detention centre or the state border” (2016: 
147).  
In our prior theoretical discussion of the bureaucratic organization it was established that a 
strict division of labour, both internal and external, has the effect of distancing the individuals 
involved in the process from the end result of the activity they participate in. Being a mere 
“cog” in the complex machinery of the State government apparatus makes one unable to see 
“the whole picture” (cfr. Bauman 1989: 98ff). This loss includes the deprivation of 
information on the full set of means employed in the operation, its extent and overall aims, as 
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unforeseen exceptional situation the “normal” legal order is suspended and the emergency management which 
rules by decrees is instituted. See, for instance, Agamben 2005. 
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well as of the final consequences of the whole enterprise.  Being unaware of all these aspects 
makes it easy for the individual to perceive herself, and her actions, as largely insignificant in 
the grand scheme of things. As a result, the individual loses the sense of responsibility for her 
actions. In such circumstances, it is not uncommon that individual officials come to argue that 
they were only doing their job or that they couldn’t have done anything about the situation – 
they had only obeyed the law.
324
  
The same was the case with the Erasure. Moral considerations regarding the legality of one’s 
undertaking or the sense of responsibility for the effects one’s actions might have on other 
individuals are in this way easily substituted for purely technical considerations. As a public 
official, one’s duty is to be as efficient as possible in the task at hand. Hence one tends to 
focus on the technicalities of the work, regardless of its legality or reasonableness. In this 
sense, the example presented by Zorn (2003: 113) is illustrative. When the Erased individuals 
tried to (re)obtain a residence permit in Slovenia, they had to provide an address of their 
residence abroad – otherwise they could not have been considered foreigners and, 
consequently, could not be eligible to apply for residency. But many, if not most, of the 
Erased did not have any kind residence outside of Slovenia. Thus, they often had to make up 
false addresses abroad in order to apply. As Zorn notes, the administrative officials were not 
at all concerned whether the furnished addresses were real or false. Their main goal was to 
satisfy the prescribed rule. 
(iii) A feeling of de-humanization – of being treated as “just another case” – is very common 
among individuals who come into contact with any bureaucratic body and especially the 
State’s large network of administrative organs. If such organs are to effectively exercise their 
function of implementing the law on a large scale, they must ignore the countless facts that 
the individuals believe might matter in their specific case and rather focus on the facts 
relevant for the present task as determined by the legal regulations they are supposed to 
follow. This inevitably means abstracting the individual person and transforming her into “a 
case”. Besides this process of de-humanization, which is common to all bureaucratic 
institutions, in the case of the Erasure a further (or rather, a prior) type of de-humanization 
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exaggerated. See Merton 1940: 566. Cfr. Kogovšek Šalamon (2016: 172) who talks about how individuals were 
often confronted with unhelpful and misleading officials. 
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also took place. While this process was not originally legal in nature, it did fundamentally 
contribute to the (legal) Erasure and thus I find it important to at least shortly mention it. 
The process I have in mind began prior to the Erasure and is inherently connected to the 
independence efforts (see above, 5.1.) and the “necessity” to distinguish, at first symbolically, 
the ethnic Slovenes from ethnic non-Slovenes. This social process of distinguishing the two 
groups and of the consequent exclusion of the latter group (the so-called creation of the social 
Other) was a crucial element that facilitated the Erasure.
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 By publicly portraying the ethnic 
non-Slovenes as barbaric, profiteers, aggressors and traitors, the Slovene authorities were able 
to create an atmosphere of hostility towards these individuals, making the public much less 
sensitive for the treatment these individuals were receiving and, in the final instance, if not 
supportive of the Erasure, at least indifferent to it.  
In conclusion, I should note that the “perpetrators” of the Erasure, the administrative officials 
themselves, were not spared a similar process of de-humanization as their clients underwent. 
Indeed, as we have noted above, the double dehumanization of both the victims as well as of 
the culprits is a typical characteristic of bureaucratic systems. The described influence of the 
bureaucratic system will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the system in which the 
administrative officials perpetrating the Erasure were working imbued them with a kind of 
“thoughtlessness”, a kind of “inability and unwillingness ... to make a moral/value judgment 
regarding their own conduct” (Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 145).326 Interestingly, Kogovšek 
Šalamon notes that most of the administrative employees did not hold and nationalistic or 
other negative feelings towards their “victims” – rather, they were neutral in executing their 
duties. As we might suspect by now, their reason for acting the way they did was that they 
were only following the law and fulfilling their tasks. 
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 Vlasta Jalušič has dedicated an entire monograph to the study of the phenomenon of thoughtlessness. See 
Jalušič 2009. 
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CONCLUSION. 
THE PERSON IN LIMBO:  LEGAL EXCLUSIONISM ,  ERASURE &  THE 
RULE OF LAW  
 
The purpose of this dissertation, as stated in the introductory chapter (Chapter 1), was to 
explore the world of legal statuses – particular kinds of “legal clothes” that human beings (and 
certain non-human entities) are vested with throughout their lives. In this context, I 
endeavoured to understand what legal statuses are, to whom are they usually attributed and 
why, and what their effects are on those ascribed with them. As the title of the dissertation 
already indicates, I was particularly interested in legal personhood as the originary and 
arguably the most important legal status. However, law’s creative or status-giving power, 
though of fundamental importance, was not my principal focus; rather, the central subject of 
this investigation was law’s destructive or status-depriving power, particularly in relation to 
legal personhood. Put simply, my aim was to understand how legal personhood may be taken 
away from its holders and what the consequences of such deprivation may be. 
In Part I of the thesis, I analysed the notions of legal status (Chapter 2) and legal personhood 
(Chapter 3), respectively. I rejected the historically prevalent conception of status as a 
condition of the legally “ab-normal” individuals, such as married women, infants, prisoners 
etc., which imposed limitations on these persons’ capacities in law (e.g. the inability to 
manage their own property). Instead, I adopted the view that a legal status is, for one part, an 
intermediary legal term (a tû-tû) – a stand-in for a set of rights and duties ascribable to an 
individual in virtue of her meeting the status’s access conditions; for the other part, the 
existence and the content of a legal status, I claimed, are conditioned by its underlying 
purpose (a societal interest or a need). The so-informed content of the status, in turn, partially 
determines the status’s access conditions.  
I then applied this understanding of status to the notion of legal personhood. “The person” is a 
history-filled and substance-rich notion, which has been extensively discussed in virtually 
every field of humanities and social sciences. As far as a comprehensive treatment of 
personhood from these different perspectives goes, this thesis leaves much room for further 
investigation. I have left non-legal conceptualizations of personhood aside in order to focus 
exclusively on how personhood is debated and conceptualized in the legal domain.  
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Comparing law to games, as it is often done by legal philosophers, I came to argue that 
personhood is constitutive of the concept of law (the legal game) itself. Just as there are, for 
instance, fundamental, game-constituting rules of basketball that determine, among other 
things, who are the players of the game and which the objects of their game, so too we have in 
law (explicit or customary) rules that determine which entities are the subjects of law 
(persons) and which the objects of law (things). This subject-defining function makes legal 
personhood one of law’s fundamental concepts. Additional, more specialized legal statuses 
can only be determined on the precondition of one’s possessing the status of a person. An 
individual cannot be considered an infant or a university professor, if she is not first also a 
person in the eyes of the law. Hence, legal personhood precedes and is a precondition of any 
other legal status an individual may come to hold. In this sense it is the originary legal status 
and it is also why it is, in my view, the most important legal status.  
Just as all games have some particular purpose (usually to be won, but also to satisfy some 
more profound human desires), the legal game is no exception – although there is most likely 
not one, but many different underlying purposes of law. While these purposes might be quite 
complex, the manner in which law goes about satisfying them is less so: simply put, the law 
satisfies its subjects’ needs and interests by allowing them to enter into specific legal relations 
amongst each other, whereby they come to hold (voluntarily or not) different rights and duties 
with respect to one another. Becoming entitled to receive another man’s property after his 
death, making a contract in order to sell one’s house, being sued by another because of 
creating damage to her reputation, or being incarcerated because of taking another man’s life, 
are all legal relations and acts-in-the-law which require that whoever partakes in them (be it 
actively or passively) is legally capable of so doing. Legal personhood is the legal status that 
determines which fundamental capacities any given person in law possesses (which acts-in-
the-law and legal relations it may perform or be party of).  
This goes to show that legal personhood is not a static and an uniform status – not all who are 
persons in law have the same legal capacities; rather, depending on both empiric (e.g. 
cognitive capacities) and institutional reasons (e.g. the extent to which the law-maker values 
an entity’s interests), persons in law may possess a greater or a lesser degree of legal 
capacities. Accordingly, I distinguished between passive incidents of legal personhood (e.g. 
entitlement to fundamental rights, the capacity to own property, legal standing etc.) and active 
ones (e.g. legal competences and the capacity for being held responsible for one’s own 
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actions). Persons in law are not all the same: some are endowed with a “thicker” legal 
personhood, while others are “thinner” persons. 
Conformant with our proposed model of legal statuses, these capacities are partly determining 
of personhood’s access conditions. Having extensively analysed different theories of legal 
personhood, which can simply be distinguished into formal and substantive ones, I came to 
the conclusion that while passive personhood can be ascribed to almost any entity, as long as 
the law-maker conceives it of sufficient value to merit some legal protection for its own sake, 
the exercise of active incidents of legal personhood requires possession of certain physical 
(cognitive) capacities – in particular, the entity in question should be sufficiently intellectually 
evolved to be able to formulate and express its own will freely and be able to comprehend the 
consequences of its actions. This being the case, it is virtually universally agreed that the 
paradigmatic example of a full or thick person is the adult human being of sound mind. 
The basis of my further investigation was a widely (universally) accepted presupposition that 
live-born human beings are automatically and unconditionally ascribed legal personhood at 
the moment of their birth and maintain this status until their deaths. It is probably for this 
reason (and the lack of further scrutiny) that legal personhood has become widely perceived 
as a (quasi)natural quality of human beings and, in consequence, being a human is equated 
with being a person in law. My position opposes these presumptions. On my view, legal 
personhood is an artificial legal construct (just as every other legal status), which is granted to 
different entities on the basis of specific access conditions. From this follows the fact that we 
should clearly distinguish between human beings and persons in law, as these are entities 
altogether different, belonging to two different ontologies; while it is true that personhood is 
mostly ascribed to human beings, there are in any legal system also numerous non-human 
persons (e.g. corporations). I am also of the opinion that legal personhood is not an 
inalienable legal status, which leads me to conclude that human non-persons, i.e. individuals 
who are not considered persons in law, are at least a conceptual possibility.  
Another important element of the model of legal statuses that I have worked with in this thesis 
is the fundamental distinction between persons and things in law. This ancient dualism, dating 
back to Roman law, is an exhaustive one: every entity in law is either a person or a thing. 
Today, however, due to significant scientific and technological developments an increasing 
number of already existing and newly-created entities are seeking their “more just place” in 
the law as they seem to escape the traditional persons-things dualism. The problem is usually 
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tackled either with proposals for ascribing these entities, or at least some of them, personhood 
status (as in the case of activists and scholars arguing for personhood status of the Great 
Apes) or by developing new, intermediary legal categories (e.g. Pietrzykowski’s non-personal 
subjects of law). Although I touch upon this topic in the thesis, I leave it largely unexamined 
as it does not directly pertain to the pursued objectives. Nevertheless, I hold that this line of 
research is a highly important one and worth exploring further, since it shows us that legal 
personhood (and other related categories) is not something static but, quite the opposite, a 
concept that can and must adapt to changing conditions – be it scientific discoveries and/or 
developing social conceptions of individual worth. The extension of legal personhood in any 
particular point in time and space reflects the underlying knowledge and values of that 
particular society on who it is that matters and ought, for that reason, be appropriately legally 
recognized. Luckily, research dealing with the extension of legal personhood to new, non-
human entities (reasons pro and contra, development of a justificatory basis, construction of 
new conceptual categories etc.) is today the most prosperous area of scholarly work related to 
the wider area of legal personhood-related research. Unfortunately, much less attention is 
being given to the problem of the deprivation (limitation) of legal personhood from human 
beings. The focus of my thesis is precisely on this latter issue and I hope to at least partially 
fill the knowledge gap in this area. 
Not only a conceptual possibility, human non-person are also a historical fact: the institution 
of slavery is arguably the most well-known, though not the only example of human beings 
being legally considered as objects (things), as pieces of property that can be bought and sold. 
This example demonstrates that the supposition of legal personhood being a natural and 
inalienable status of every human being is historically false. Another example is discussed by 
Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism, where individuals, who after WWI had lost 
their citizenship status, are shown to have been left rightless (i.e. having their legal 
personhood nullified). What is most interesting in Arendt’s account (and, at least for me, most 
surprising) is that the condition of rightlessness is shown to have been brought about precisely 
by the loss of citizenship. This could be called the paradox of legal personhood: if we imagine 
legal statuses composed in a pyramidal structure, legal personhood would be positioned on 
the bottom as it is a precondition of every other legal status; citizenship could then be placed 
on the level immediately above it, as it is, on the one hand, dependent on personhood status 
and, on the other hand, itself a highly important status and a precondition for the acquisition 
of many other statuses (rights); finally, all other statuses would be positioned on the 
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subsequent levels of the pyramid. On this view, it can be expected that the loss of a lower-
lying, more fundamental status, would cause the above-lying, dependent, statuses to be lost as 
well. Loss of citizenship, for example, will cause the loss of access to public sector jobs, 
reserved for citizens only. What Arendt’s example shows, however, is that the opposite 
appears also to be possible: namely, that the loss of a dependent status, such as citizenship, 
may also cause the loss of the conditioning status – in this case legal personhood. This is 
perplexing and defies our intuitions. 
The answer Arendt puts forward in order to explain how the “statelessness as rightlessness” 
phenomenon emerges is that with the first declarations of the Rights of Man (particularly with 
the 1789 French Declaration), promulgated in the context of emerging nation-States, erected 
on the ideal of national sovereignty, the basis of rights recognition and protection was not – as 
it was presumed – personhood, but rather citizenship – the status manifesting one’s belonging 
to a particular nation and its State. Following the horrors of World War II, the new, 
purportedly universal human rights declarations and national Bills of Rights explicitly 
affirmed both the right of every individual to be recognized as a person before the law (Art. 6 
of the UDHR), as well as the fact that rights belonged by nature to each human being, 
regardless of her nationality and even to those who have no nation (the stateless). While these 
affirmations may lead us to believe that in our time rightlessness-producing phenomena are no 
longer possible, history once again puts our suppositions to the test: whether it be the “enemy 
combatants” locked up in Guantanamo Bay without any formal charges and deprived of the 
most fundamental procedural rights or the countless document-less refugees from war-torn 
countries who instead of being offered asylum protection are put into “identification 
facilities” which function more like prisons than humanitarian facilities, the fact is that 
numerous individuals today find themselves in conditions that correspond to the rightlessness 
described by Arendt. 
Such examples, which both defy one’s sense of fundamental justice and excite theoretical 
perplexities, have provided the stimulus for and are the focal point of this dissertation. 
Understanding the phenomenon of rightless human beings – the creation of human non-
persons – and, in particular, the legal mechanisms involved in depriving people of their 
personhood status, have been at the centre of my interest throughout this work. In pursuing 
this goal, I could have examined any number of examples that prima facie manifest the 
above-described characteristics; rather, due to spatial and temporal constraints, I decided to 
focus and examine only one such case. While an analysis of the kind has its limits, this thesis 
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should rather be read as one part of (and the first step in) a larger project dealing with the 
phenomenon I proposed to call “legal exclusionism” – which should roughly be understood to 
indicate all those legal practices where legal instruments (e.g. laws, sub-statutory acts, judicial 
decisions etc.) are employed in order to, directly or indirectly, limit, disfigure, hollow out or 
take away the legal personhood of an individual. The examination of other cases, such as 
slavery, (the legal aspects of) the Nazi extermination of the Jews and the more recent 
examples of migrants and “enemy combatants”, are all potential study cases of any future 
investigations into this topic. I believe that a comparison of the legal mechanisms employed in 
the exclusionary practices of the past and present will reveal numerous similarities in the way 
law is used for exclusionary purposes and will enrich our understanding of the exclusionary 
phenomenon. This task remains to be completed. 
The chosen case-study has popularly been called the Erasure. The administrative cancellation 
of some 25,000 individuals – citizens of former SFRY republics with permanent residence in 
Slovenia at the time of its secession, who did not obtain the new Slovenian citizenship – from 
the registry of permanent residents on the territory of a newly independent Republic of 
Slovenia in 1992, left the affected individuals in a complex legal situation, a kind of legal 
limbo, very much resembling a state of rightlessness. Besides the in itself curious and 
research-appealing legal condition of the Erased, the case has also proven useful and 
informative for other reasons. The examination of the technical-legal aspects of the Erasure 
has demonstrated, among other things: how exclusion from such fundamental legal statuses as 
citizenship (remember Arendt!) and permanent residence can have disastrous effects for the 
affected individuals as these losses may cause the further loss of all kinds of life-determining 
rights (housing rights, access to health care and employment, social security benefits, 
educational opportunities etc.); how different types of legal acts that can be employed in 
exclusionary practices (statutes, executive decrees, judicial verdicts etc.); how effective such 
practices can be when different branches of Government cooperate; and how crucial for the 
end result are accompanying practices of social exclusion that facilitate the legal efforts. 
Especially with regard to the latter, this thesis proves wanting. History shows that practically 
all major legal exclusionist projects (slavery, the genocide, the Apartheid etc.) were 
accompanied and facilitated by social stigmatization and marginalization of the targeted 
groups. Further inquiries into the Erasure and other exclusionary practices ought to take into 
consideration this important aspect as well. 
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My analysis of the Erasure (see Part II) has confirmed that it is indeed possible – with the 
appropriate means and in the right social circumstances – that an individual’s exclusion from 
certain (important) legal statuses negatively impacts the same individual’s legal personhood. 
It should be stressed that these secondary effects of exclusionary practices upon legal 
personhood needn’t necessarily be desired or expected – they may very well be accidental. 
While it may be that outright deprivation of legal personhood is today no longer a viable 
possibility, this investigation demonstrates that limitations of the various incidents of legal 
personhood, both active and passive, are very much a reality. 
This has led me to conclude that legal personhood is in fact not a well-entrenched, natural and 
inalienable status as many believe it to be; indeed, legal personhood has been demonstrated as 
a fairly precarious status that is susceptible to different influences, including those aiming at 
its degradation or elimination. Legal personhood is not some independent basis for the 
acquisition of every other legal status; while it is a fundamental status that enables any kind of 
acting in law, it is not entirely independent of the statuses whose basis it represents. Thus, 
returning to our pyramidal representation of statuses, these new findings compel us to modify 
the way we represent how statuses function as a whole. I argue that while the pyramidal 
structure can be maintained in this new perspective, it should be turned upside down – our 
statutes should be seen as an inverted pyramid. In this manner, the general idea of the way 
statuses are compiled one atop another is maintained, whereas the new orientation of the 
pyramid shows how legal personhood – which can still be found at the basis of the structure – 
is actually fragile and dependent upon the other, derivative, legal statuses. While this 
representation is a more satisfactory one, the state of affairs it represents is not a very 
desirable one: given its overarching importance, legal personhood ought to be constructed in 
much more solid terms so that its alterations would be prevented as much as possible. A 
theorization of legal personhood along these lines is undoubtedly one of the major future tasks 
of legal theory in this field – and perhaps in general. It is, however, too complicated a matter 
to be dealt with adequately in this thesis. For this reason, I have limited myself to proposing 
only a rough sketch of a more desirable model for legal personhood. On this view, legal 
personhood ought to be theoretically constructed in a way that would be reflective of the way 
a spider’s web is structured. One particular advantage of such a model is in the fact that the 
centrality of legal personhood is not lost, all the while any limitation or loss of legal statuses 
derivative thereof does not, for that reason alone, signify any distress for the personhood 
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status as well. I believe that the spider’s web model should serve as a starting point for any 
further theoretical work on legal personhood. 
While the technical mechanisms with which the Erasure was carried out are vital for 
understanding how exclusionary legal practices may be implemented, the key question 
confronted in this context regarded the nature of these acts and actions. What was it about 
these exact acts and actions that enabled the type of results witnessed? The mere analysis of 
the formal measures employed in the Erasure could not have given us the desired answers. 
What was needed was a look into the “guts” of these actions: we needed to comprehend the 
specific quality of the statutes that provided the basis for Erasure and of the executive decrees 
that effectively ordered it.  
In Part III of the thesis, I endeavoured to understand what precisely it was about the acts and 
actions of the Government institutions that made the Erasure possible in the way it transpired 
and brought about the described consequences for personhood status. In order to do so, I 
wished to employ an instrument whose usefulness would not be limited to this specific case 
only or to this particular legal environment. I endeavoured to use an instrument that could be 
– or so I believe – applied to all the (supposed) cases of legal exclusionism that I mention 
throughout the thesis and in this conclusion. The concept of the formal Rule of Law appeared 
as a perfect fit. The main reason for this is that the criteria of evaluation promoted by this 
instrument regard only the formal characteristics of law – and not its content; according to the 
formal conception of the Rule of Law (principle of formal legality), any law (as a system and 
any individual act) ought to possess certain qualities if it is to be effective in guiding human 
behaviour through its commands (rules). The ideal of formal legality regards, above all, the 
manner in which laws are promulgated, the clarity in which law’s commands are expressed 
and their temporal quality. Several lists of such necessary qualities are in circulation in 
theoretical debates, though most of them are based on the one presented by the American 
scholar Lon Fuller – which is also the one I follow in this thesis. Beyond enabling efficient 
action guiding, respect for formal legality is also a condition (necessary, but not sufficient) for 
the respect of the dignity of legal addressees – understood as the person’s capacity to plan her 
own future. It is important to remember that these formal characteristics are not the all-or-
nothing kind, but rather of the more-or-less kind: their fulfilment, in other words, is a matter 
of degree. 
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One important premise, relevant for the understanding of the working of the formal legality 
criteria in this particular case, is the specific “quality” of the Slovenian constitutional system 
which, on my analysis, stems from the most important state-founding constitutional 
documents and which I have come to call (following established terminology) “ethno-
democracy”. An ethnic democracy is, simply put, a democratic system that contains the non-
democratic institutionalization of one ethnic group’s dominance over the other(s). The 
examination of the relevant Slovenian legal sources and scholarly literature has demonstrated 
that all levels of the constitutional system are permeated with principles and legal mechanisms 
that privilege the members of the Slovenian ethnicity over other residents, particularly those 
originating from other former SFRY republics (that applies to the constitutional provisions, 
the relevant citizenship legislation and all the way down to the executive decrees with which 
the Erasure was ordered). This circumstance is very important for our analysis of the way 
Rule of Law criteria had been respected, because nationalism and the Rule of Law, as two 
mechanisms of political legitimation, often find themselves in contradiction, creating 
institutional tensions. If nationalistic tendencies prevail and ethnic citizenship and other 
nationalist policies are institutionalized, law becomes an instrument promoting subjugation, 
inequality and exclusion. This, I argue, was at least partly the case in our example. 
How, then, do the mechanisms of the Erasure (the acts and actions of public authorities) fair 
when tested against the conditions of formal legality? While a detailed analysis is provided in 
Chapter 8, I will here look at just a select few criteria and try to demonstrate their individual 
and collective contribution to the end result. The principle of generality, for its part, requires 
that “the rights” subjects be addressed by a given norm (following the principle of formal 
equality which demands that like cases should be treated alike) and that the prescribed 
behaviour be determined with a degree of generality (specificity) that enables the norms to 
effectively guide the behaviour of their addressees. The Slovenian authorities established a 
differentiated treatment of the “new foreigners” (i.e. the permanent residents with citizenship 
of other SFRY republics who did not obtain Slovenian citizenship) with respect to the “old 
foreigners”: the latter’s residency permits were automatically prolonged, whereas with regard 
to the former’s the relevant legislation was silent on the matter – it neither determined that 
their residency permits cease to be valid, that their validity is automatically prolonger nor any 
other thing. This silence of the law regarding the consequences following these individuals’ 
not obtaining the Slovenian citizenship amounted to a legal gap. In this way, they were put in 
a highly precarious legal condition.  
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This legal gap can also be seen as a violation of the publicity principle. The latter requires that 
legal acts, in general, be made public and known to those individuals whose behaviour it 
purports to regulate. Banally, an act that does not determine the legal consequences following 
from a particular course of action can be seen as a violation of the publicity requirement. 
Moreover, the publicity requirement was also violated as affected individuals were not in any 
way notified – neither individually nor collectively, neither publicly nor privately – of the 
consequences that they will incur if they do not accept the Slovenian citizenship in the 
provided timeframe. In this way the precariousness of their legal condition was only 
exacerbated.  
Finally, the intelligibility criterion requires that law’s prescription be such that their 
addressees are able to understand them. Here, again, the problems related to the Aliens Act 
and its indeterminacy are crucial. What this criterion especially emphasizes is that the 
prescriptions ought to be as much as possible understandable to their specific addressees – not 
to some fictional standard individual. In our case, this means that the legislator, especially 
given the gravity of the consequences that were to follow, ought to have taken particular care 
to make sure the affected individuals – who were, you will remember, mostly uneducated 
foreigners with poor command of the language – would be aware of the consequences 
following from their choice not to take up citizenship. Clearly, the legislator failed in this 
task. 
Whether or not the prescribed law respects the criteria of rule-making, the impact of this law 
on its addressees ultimately depends on the way it is implemented by the legal officials of the 
system. Hence, I would argue that the congruence (of official action with prescribed law) is in 
a way the most relevant RoL criteria. It should be noted that congruence between official 
action and formal rules is of particular value only insofar as the entire system is, on the whole, 
a benign one – meaning that it respects the principles of RoL and individual rights. Nazism 
and the South African Apartheid, on the other hand, are good examples of what happens when 
public officials (blindly) follow corrupt law. This principle is also worth highlighting, because 
it puts due emphasis on the workings of the executive, law-applying organs, which too often 
are unjustly overlooked in scholarly literature, regardless of their massively important role in 
any legal community. I would even go so far as to argue that the mechanisms of law-
application by the State bureaucratic bodies is one of the most important under-examined 
topics in contemporary legal theory. As the Erasure was basically an act performed by the 
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State’s bureaucracy implementing the relevant legal acts, the importance of understanding 
what is involved in law-applying seems that more important in the given case.  
Our analysis of the Erasure has shown that the pertinent legal provisions were in many 
respects faulty, i.e. they violated, at least to some extent, several criteria of formal legality. 
Thus, the competent administrative officials that were trusted with implementing the new 
citizenship legislation were dealing with purposefully formally defective law. While I would 
not go as far as to claim that this particular set of laws and instructions was illegitimate – and 
so that the officials of the system were under some moral obligation to reject its application, 
we can nevertheless ask, how was it possible that these officials were so willing to implement 
the instructions of their superiors which at the very least should have raised some doubts as to 
their legality. In answering this question, I relied on the works of scholars who had dedicated 
themselves to the study of the inner mechanisms of the bureaucratic apparatus. Bauman, as 
one of the foremost students of Nazism and the reasons for the perpetration of the genocide, 
famously argued that three conditions have to be met in order for normal individuals to 
participate in the most atrocious crimes. While certainly I am not implying that the Erasure 
should be compared in brutality to the extermination of the Jews, his insights into how great 
and efficient bureaucratic machineries function is of universal value. Bauman thus argued that 
the acts (of the legal officials) ought to be authorized by superior officials; second, that the 
work (bureaucratic and other activities) must be made routine by rule-based practices that also 
specify the role of each individual in the process; and finally, that victims of violence be 
dehumanized. Our analysis has demonstrated that all these elements were present in the 
workings of the Slovenian administrative officials who actively participated in the Erasure.  
The discussion in this dissertation has, in my opinion, produced answers that provide us with 
a better understanding not only of particular legal concepts, such as legal status, legal 
personhood, legal exclusionism, Rule of Law etc., but especially of the way these concepts 
are connected with each other and what may be the consequences of their interaction if law is 
employed to malicious ends. We have seen that the person in law is a fundamental legal status 
that creates the players of the legal game and enables the game to be played at all; but we 
have also seen that despite this fundamental role, legal personhood can also be quite a 
precarious legal status, susceptible to various manipulations and limitations. These 
manipulations and limitations of personhood can be achieved by using the very same legal 
means participate in its creation. Some of the ways that the law can be employed in the 
deprivation of legal personhood have been examined on the case of the Erasure; they include 
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the use of vague and ambiguous laws; laws that establish unjustified distinctions between 
different, yet comparable groups of people; retroactive amendments introducing last-minute 
changes to status-acquisition conditions; secret executive decrees that may produce dire 
consequences for affected individuals yet are never made known to them, neither a priori nor 
ex post facto. The list of exclusionary mechanisms, however, is not conclusive and could 
continue. Benign legal instruments, when created in violation of formal legality requirements 
and then put into practice by a cooperative (loyal) administrative apparatus, can ultimately 
produce the results we have seen in the Erasure or worse: human beings can be put in 
seriously precarious legal conditions, without access to some of the most fundamental legal 
protections, into a kind of legal limbo, a condition of utter insecurity and precariousness. 
Legal exclusionism ought to be, in my mind, one of the central topics in contemporary 
theoretical study of law. As I hope to have shown, legal exclusionism touches upon issues that 
are of fundamental importance for the very concept of law, as well as for our everyday use of 
it. While the question of legal personhood has, in recent times, become somewhat more 
present in scholarly debates, these discussions have mainly revolved around its extension to 
non-human animals and other non-animal entities. Very little has been said about the very 
things we take most for granted – for instance, the legal personhood of human beings. Yet, as 
I hope to have shown, the dangers related to possible deprivations of the status are too great 
and too complex to be left unexamined. I also believe that besides legal scholars, legal 
practitioners should also be interested in the topics discussed here. This is particularly true for 
the law-makers, for it is primarily them who by adopting faulty laws most contribute to the 
possibilities of abuses of law for exclusionary purposes; but it is also the public administrative 
officials who should take to heart the stories of Erasure, of Guantanamo Bay prisoners, the 
innocent migrants locked in prison-like structures etc. and re-examine their self-perception as 
officials of the legal system; the way they operate on the daily basis in confront to their 
clients; and the way they comprehend the hierarchal system of which they are part of. I am 
certain that greater awareness of the inherent exclusionary capacities of law and the 
consequences that may be produced when unleashed by thoughtless public officials could 
greatly contribute to the reduction of their occurrence. Hopefully, this thesis has contributed 
somewhat in that direction. 
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ABSTRACTS  
 
Abstract 
 
Legal personhood is the legal status that endows human beings (and certain non-human 
entities) with the capacity to participate, actively or passively, in the generality of legal 
relations and to perform acts-in-the-law. It is a fundamental legal status, constitutive of the 
concept of law itself as well as a threshold status, distinguishing subjects of law from legal 
objects. Legal personhood is today understood as a quasi-natural status, attaching to every 
human being unconditionally and inalienably from birth until death. It is argued that full 
deprivation of legal personhood, as in the case of antebellum slavery, is today legally 
impossible. This thesis examines the notion of legal personhood (of human beings) and, 
opposite to the former claim, proposes that even today human beings can be spoiled of legal 
personhood. This phenomenon is called legal exclusionism and it is argued that legal 
personhood can be deprived from human individuals in different ways, to a different degree 
and, consequently, to a different effect. 
This thesis has three parts. In Part I, the notions of legal status and legal personhood are 
analysed, respectively. For the purposes of this thesis, legal status is understood as an 
intermediary legal term (a tû- tû) connecting a set of access criteria with a set of normative 
consequences (entitlements). It is further claimed that a given legal status (its content or the 
set of normative consequences stemming from the status) is partially determined by an 
underlying reason or interest for having that status. Legal personhood is then treated as such a 
legal status. It is proposed that the reason underlying its existence is the very need for having 
subjects of law, entities able to act in the legal sphere, to perform acts with legal 
consequences and enter into legal relations. Various theories of legal personhood are then 
examined and, finally, one proposal for expanding the rigid “persons-things” dualism (by 
introducing a third conceptual category of entities in law) is briefly presented. 
The central object of investigation, examined in Part II, is the so-called Erasure – an 
administrative cancellation of some 25,000 individuals from the registry of permanent 
residents, conducted by Slovenian authorities in 1992 following Slovenia’s separation from 
the SFRY. The Erasure, affecting those non-Slovenian residents who did not wish to (or were 
unable to) obtain Slovenian citizenship, left the affected individuals without political, social 
and economic rights in Slovenia, in a condition best described as rightlessness. A 
reconstruction of the relevant legal sources (official declarations, constitutional acts, 
legislation etc.) that underlay and determined the legal frame of the Erasure is provided and it 
is argued that the Slovenian constitutional order is permeated with a nationalistic component. 
This distinct quality of the legal order was a core element of the Erasure. Thereafter, the 
consequences of the Erasure for the legal condition of the affected in general and, in specific, 
for their status as persons in law is also looked at. 
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In Part III, the aforementioned legal sources are submitted to an analysis from the criteria of 
formal legality (formal Rule of Law), as first proposed by Lon Fuller. Particular attention is 
given to the condition of congruence and, more generally, to the organizational and 
operational principles underlying the work of the State administrative bodies. It is shown that 
the relevant legal acts in the analysed case were produced in violation of most of the formal 
Rule of Law demands, such as generality, publicity, prospectivity etc. On the other hand, the 
actions of the administrative bodies were perfectly in line with the requirements of the 
superior organs – the administrative officials followed the secret internal orders of their 
superiors to the letter, without expressing any doubt whatsoever as to their legality. It was this 
attitude of blind compliance that made the Erasure such an efficient operation. 
The conducted analysis does not allow us to conclude that legal personhood can be deprived 
in toto. Nevertheless, the examined case demonstrates that legal personhood can indeed be 
manipulated with, i.e. limited, diminished, hollowed out etc. Several different legal sources 
and methods have been exposed that enable depriving human beings (deliberately or not, 
directly or indirectly) from different incidents of legal personhood. Analyses of other 
examples may reveal other methods for depriving legal personhood and the creation of 
different types of legal semi-persons (legal chimeras). This thesis points to the possibility of 
employing the same analytical tools for the study of other historic and contemporary cases of 
legal exclusion. It is thought that a comparative analysis of several such cases would bring to 
the surface some common characteristics of all cases of legal exclusionism, past and present 
alike. 
This thesis demonstrates that the law’s status-granting, personhood-creating quality also has 
its flip side: law can just as well be used for status-depriving, personhood-manipulating 
purposes. While legal exclusionism is therefore in abstracto part of law’s nature, particular 
cases of legal exclusion can be avoided or, at least, mitigated if more attention is given to the 
quality of law-making and the manner of its application by law-applying bodies. 
 
Keywords 
Legal Exclusionism, Legal status, Legal personhood, Rule of Law, Erasure 
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Riassunto 
 
La personalità giuridica è uno status giuridico che conferisce agli esseri umani (e ad alcune 
entità non-umane) la capacità di partecipare – in modo attivo e passivo – alla generalità delle 
relazioni giuridiche e la capacità di eseguire atti giuridici. Si tratta di uno status giuridico 
fondamentale, costitutivo del concetto stesso di diritto. Inoltre, si tratta di uno status limite, 
ovvero di uno status che distingue i soggetti del diritto dagli oggetti del diritto. Oggi la 
personalità giuridica è intesa come uno status quasi-naturale, attribuito ad ogni essere umano 
in maniera incondizionata e inalienabile. Oggi, inoltre, la privazione totale della personalità 
giuridica, come nel caso della schiavitù, si dice impossibile. Questa tesi esamina il concetto di 
personalità giuridica (degli esseri umani) e propone – diversamente dalla asserzione 
precendente – che gli esseri umani ancora oggi possano essere spogliati della loro personalità 
giuridica. Questo fenomeno è chiamato esclusionismo giuridico. Si sostiene che gli esseri 
umani possano essere privati della personalità giuridica in modi diversi, in misura diversa e, 
di conseguenza, con effetti diversi. 
Questa tesi si compone di tre parti. Nella Prima parte si analizzano i concetti di status 
giuridico e di personalità giuridica. Ai fini di questa tesi, status giuridico è inteso come un 
termine intermedio (un tû- tû), che connette un insieme di condizioni di accesso ad un insieme 
di conseguenze normative. Si afferma, inoltre, che uno status giuridico qualsiasi (il suo 
contenuto ovvero l’insieme delle conseguenze normative derivanti dallo stesso) è 
parzialmente determinato dai motivi o dagli interessi a esso sottostanti. La personalità 
giuridica è intesa nella stessa maniera. Si sostieneche il motivo a fondamento della sua 
esistenza si trovi nella necessità stessa di avere soggetti di diritto, i.e. entità dotate della 
capacità di agire nella sfera giuridica, di effettuare atti dotati di conseguenze giuridiche e di 
entrare in  relazioni giuridiche. Si esaminano diverse teorie della personalità giuridica e si 
presenta, infine, brevemente una proposta per il superamento del rigido dualismo  “persone-
cose” (introducendo una terza categoria concettuale delle entità giuridiche)  
L’oggetto centrale dell’indagine nella Parte seconda è la cosiddetta Cancellazione – la 
cancellazione amministrative di circa 25,000 individui dal registro dei residenti permanenti, 
condotta dalle autorità slovene nel 1992 in seguito alla separazione della Slovenia dalla RSFJ 
(SFRY). La cancellazione, colpendo i residenti non-sloveni che non hanno voluto (o potuto) 
ottenere la cittadinanza slovena, ha lasciato questi stessi individui senza diritti politici, 
socialied economici in Slovenia, in una condizione di privazione totale dei diritti (Eng. 
rightlessness). Si fornisce una ricostruzione delle fonti giuridiche rilevanti (dichiarazioni 
ufficiali, atti costituzionali, legislazione ecc.) che fondano e  forniscono  la cornice giuridica 
della cancellazione. In seguito si sostiene che l’ordinamento giuridico sloveno sia permeato di 
una componente nazionalistica. Questa particolare qualità dell’ordinamento giuridico è stata 
un elemento centrale della cancellazione. Infine  si analizzano le conseguenze della 
cancellazione sulla condizione giuridica delle persone colpite, nello specifico, le conseguenze 
sul loro status di persona giuridica. 
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Nella Parte terza si sottopongono le suddette fonti giuridiche  ad una analisi a partire  dai 
criteri della legalità formale (Eng. formal Rule of Law). Particolare attenzione viene data alla 
condizione di congruenza e, più in generale, ai principi organizzativi e operativi che stanno 
alla base del  lavoro degli organi amministrativi statali. Si dimostrache gli atti giuridici 
rilevanti nel caso analizzato sono stati prodotti in violazione della maggior parte  dei criteri 
della legalità formale, come, per esempio, quelli di generalità, pubblicità, prospettività ecc. 
D’altra parte, si osserva che le azioni degli organi amministrativi sono stateperfettamente in 
linea con i requisiti degli organi superiori – i funzionari amministrativi seguivano gli ordini 
interni segreti dei loro superiori “alla lettera”, senza mai esprimere alcun dubbio in merito alla 
loro legittimità. È stato questo attegiamento di conformità cieca che ha reso la cancellazione 
una operazione così efficiente. 
L’analisi condotta in questa tesi non consente di concludere che la personalità giuridica può 
essere privata in toto. Tuttavia, il caso dei cancellati dimostra che la personalità giuridica può 
effetivamente essere manipolata, limitata, diminuita ecc. Diverse fonti e mezzi giuridici  
consentono di privare gli esseri umani (deliberatamente o meno, direttamente o 
indirettamente) di diversi elementi della loro personalità giuridica. L’analisi di altri casi può 
rivelare altri metodi di privazione della personalità giuridica e la creazione di diversi tipi di 
semi-persone (chimere giuridiche). Questa tesi indica la possibilità di impiegare gli stessi 
strumenti analitici per lo studio di altri casi storici e contemporanei di esclusionismo 
giuridico. Si ritiene che un’analisi comparata di distinti casi possa portare alla superficie 
alcune caratteristiche comuni a tutti i casi di esclusionismo giuridico, sia storici che 
contemporanei. 
Questa tesi dimostra che l’aspetto del diritto responsabile del conferimento degli status 
giuridici e della creazione delle persone giuridiche, ha un lato oscuro: la legge può anche 
essere utilizzata per la privazione degli status e la manipolazione della personalità giuridica. 
Mentre l’esclusionismo giuridico in abstracto fa parte della natura stessa del diritto, casi 
particolari di esclusione giuridica potrebbero  essere evitati o almeno attenuati, se si prestasse 
maggior attenzione alla qualità della creazione del diritto e al modo in cui questo viene 
applicato da parte degli organi statali. 
 
Parole chiave 
Esclusionismo giuridico, status giuridico, personalità giuridica, Rule of Law, Cancellazione  
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Resumen 
 
La personalidad jurídica es el estatus jurídico que otorga a los seres humanos (y también a 
ciertas entidades no humanas) la capacidad de participar – de forma activa o pasiva – en la 
generalidad de las relaciones jurídicas y de realizar actos jurídicos. Esta es un estatus jurídico 
fundamental, constitutivo del concepto mismo de derecho, así como es también un umbral que 
distingue los sujetos del derecho de los objetos del derecho. Hoy en día, la personalidad 
jurídica se entiende como un estatus cuasi-natural, perteneciente a todos los seres humanos de 
forma incondicional e inalienablemente desde el nacimiento hasta la muerte. Se argumenta 
que la privación total de la personalidad jurídica, como en el caso de la esclavitud, es hoy 
jurídicamente imposible. Esta tesis examina la noción de personalidad jurídica (de los seres 
humanos) y, en contraposición a la pretensión anterior, propone que incluso hoy los seres 
humanos pueden ser privados de la personalidad jurídica. Este fenómeno se denomina 
exclusionismo jurídico. Este propone que la personalidad jurídica puede ser privada a los 
individuos humanos de diferentes formas, grados y, en consecuencia, con efectos distintos. 
La tesis está compuesta por tres partes. En la primera, analizo las nociones de estatus jurídico 
y de personalidad jurídica, respectivamente. A los fines de esta tesis, se entiende por estatus 
jurídico un término jurídico intermedio (un tû-tû) que conecta un conjunto de criterios de 
acceso con un conjunto de consecuencias normativas (derechos). Además, se afirma que un 
determinado estatus jurídico (su contenido o el conjunto de consecuencias normativas 
derivadas del estatus) está parcialmente determinado por una razón o interés subyacente. La 
personalidad jurídica es tratada en este sentido. Se propone que la razón subyacente a su 
existencia es la necesidad de tener sujetos de derecho, entidades capaces de actuar en el 
ámbito jurídico, de realizar actos con consecuencias jurídicas y de entablar relaciones 
jurídicas. A continuación, se examinan diversas teorías de la personalidad jurídica y, por 
último, se presenta brevemente una propuesta para ampliar el rígido dualismo “personas-
cosas” (introduciendo una tercera categoría conceptual de entidades jurídicas). 
El objeto central de esta investigación, examinado en la segunda parte, es la cancelación (Eng. 
Erasure). Esta figura fue puesta en práctica en 1992 por Eslovenia, tras su separación de la 
RFSY, al cancelar administrativamente a aproximadamente unas 25.000 personas del registro 
de residentes permanentes. La cancelación, que afectó a los residentes no eslovenos que no 
deseaban (o no podían) obtener la ciudadanía eslovena, dejó a los afectados sin derechos 
políticos, sociales y económicos en Eslovenia, en una condición mejor descrita como la 
ausencia total de derechos (Eng. rightlessness). Se proporciona una reconstrucción de las 
fuentes jurídicas pertinentes (declaraciones oficiales, actos constitucionales, legislación etc.) 
que fundamentaron y proporcionaron el marco jurídico de la cancelación y se argumenta que 
el orden constitucional esloveno está permeado por un componente nacionalista. Esta cualidad 
distintiva del orden jurídico constituyó un elemento central de la cancelación. A partir de ello, 
se examinan las consecuencias de la cancelación para la condición jurídica de los afectados en 
general y para su condición de personas jurídicas en concreto. 
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En la tercera parte, someto las fuentes jurídicas mencionadas a un análisis bajo los criterios de 
la legalidad formal (Eng. formal Rule of Law), tal como fue propuesto por primera vez por 
Lon Fuller. Se presta especial atención a la condición de congruencia y, más generalmente, a 
los principios organizativos y operativos subyacentes al trabajo de los órganos administrativos 
de Estado. Se demuestra que los actos jurídicos pertinentes en el caso analizado se produjeron 
violando la mayoría de las exigencias de la legalidad formal, como la generalidad, la 
publicidad, la prospectividad, entre otros. Por otro lado, las acciones de los órganos 
administrativos estaban perfectamente alineadas con los requerimientos de los órganos 
superiores – los funcionarios administrativos siguieron al pie de la letra las órdenes secretas 
internas de sus superiores, sin expresar ninguna duda en cuanto a su legalidad. Fue esta ciega 
actitud lo que hizo a la cancelación una operación tan eficiente. 
El análisis realizado no nos permite concluir que la personalidad jurídica puede ser privada in 
toto. Sin embargo, el caso examinado demuestra que la personalidad jurídica puede ser 
manipulada, v. gr. limitada, disminuida, vaciada, etc. En esta tesis se han expuesto fuentes y 
métodos jurídicos diferentes que permiten privar a los seres humanos (deliberadamente o no, 
directamente o indirectamente) de los varios elementos de la personalidad jurídica. Los 
análisis de otros ejemplos pueden revelar otros métodos para privar la personalidad jurídica y 
crear diferentes tipos de semi-personas jurídicas (quimeras legales). Esta tesis apunta a la 
posibilidad de emplear las mismas herramientas analíticas para el estudio de otros casos 
históricos y contemporáneos de exclusión jurídica. Se cree que un análisis comparativo de 
varios casos traería a la superficie algunas características comunes de todas las exclusiones 
jurídica, pasadas y presentes. 
Esta tesis muestra que el aspecto del derecho responsable en conferir estatus jurídicos y crear 
personas jurídicas, tiene un lado oscuro: el derecho también puede ser utilizado para la 
privación de estatus y para la manipulación de la personalidad jurídica. Si bien la exclusión 
jurídica es parte de la naturaleza del derecho, se pueden evitar casos particulares de ella o, al 
menos, mitigarse si se presta más atención a la calidad del proceso legislativo y a la forma de 
aplicación por los órganos competentes. 
 
Palabras claves  
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